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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 Many patients seek genetic testing to see if 
they have mutations in their genes that are 
associated with a significantly increased risk of 
breast or ovarian cancer.  Respondent Myriad 
Genetics obtained patents on two human genes that 
correlate to this risk, including any naturally 
occurring mutations of those genes, on the theory 
WKDWVLPSO\E\UHPRYLQJ´LVRODWLQJµWKHJHQHV from 
the body, they have invented something patentable.  
Petitioners are primarily medical professionals who 
routinely use standard genetic testing methods to 
examine genes, but are prohibited from examining 
the human genes that Myriad claims to own.  This 
case therefore presents the following questions: 
 1.  Are human genes patentable? 
2. Did the court of appeals err in adopting a 
new and inflexible rule, contrary to normal standing 
UXOHVDQGWKLV&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQLQMedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), that petitioners 
ZKR KDYH EHHQ LQGLVSXWDEO\ GHWHUUHG E\ 0\ULDG·V
´DFWLYHHQIRUFHPHQWµRI LWVSDWHQWULJKWVQRQHWKHOHVV
lack standing to challenge those patents absent 
evidence that they have been personally and directly 
threatened with an infringement action? 
  
ii 
 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
 The petitioners are the Association for 
Molecular Pathology, American College of Medical 
Genetics, American Society for Clinical Pathology, 
College of American Pathologists, Haig Kazazian, 
MD, Arupa Ganguly, PhD, Wendy Chung, MD, PhD, 
Harry Ostrer, MD, David Ledbetter, PhD, Stephen 
Warren, PhD, Ellen Matloff, M.S., Elsa Reich M.S., 
%UHDVW&DQFHU$FWLRQ%RVWRQ:RPHQ·V+HDOWK%RRN
Collective, Lisbeth Ceriani, Runi Limary, Genae 
Girard, Patrice Fortune, Vicky Thomason, and 
Kathleen Raker.  The respondents are Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., and in their official capacity as 
directors of the University of Utah Research 
Foundation, Lorris Betz, Roger Boyer, Jack Brittain, 
Arnold B. Combe, Raymond Gesteland, James U. 
Jensen, John Kendall Morris, Thomas Parks, David 
W. Pershing, and Michael K. Young.  The United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was 
dismissed as a defendant by the district court and 
that ruling was not appealed.  Accordingly, the PTO 
is not a respondent in this Court. 
RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
STATEMENT 
Petitioners do not have any parent 
corporations, and no publicly held company owns 10 
percent or more of the stock of any petitioner. 
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OPINIONS BELOW 
 The opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, App. at 1-­112a, is 
reported at 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The 
district court opinion granting summary judgment to 
plaintiffs/petitioners and denying summary 
judgment to defendants/respondents, App. at 113-­
238a, is reported at 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).  An earlier opinion of the district court, App. 
at 239-­306a, denying the motion to dismiss based, in 
part, on standing is reported at 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 The Court of Appeals decision in this case was 
issued on July 29, 2011.  Both parties filed petitions 
for panel rehearing.  The court denied the petition by 
plaintiffs Association for Molecular Pathology et al. 
on September 13, 2011, and the petition of 
defendants Myriad et al. on September 16, 2011.  
This petition is thus timely.  Jurisdiction is conferred 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
 35 U.S.C. § 101 SURYLGHV´:KRHYHULQYHQWVRU
discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
RIWKLVWLWOHµ 
 The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that: 
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´&ongress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof;; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press;; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress RIJULHYDQFHVµ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1.   This case challenges the patenting of 
human genes.  More specifically, it challenges 
patents awarded to Myriad Genetics1 on two genes, 
known as BRCA1 and BRCA2 because mutations of 
those genes correlate with an increased risk of 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.  App. at 19a.  
Myriad claims exclusive control over the genes once 
WKH\KDYHEHHQ´LVRODWHGµ² that is, removed from the 
body and other cellular material.  Myriad and other 
gene patent holders have gained the right to exclude 
the rest of the scientific community from examining 
thousands of naturally-­occurring human genes and 
WR SUHYHQW SDWLHQWV· DFFHVV WR WKHLU Rwn genetic 
information.  The practical consequence of these 
patents is that Myriad has the authority to stop 
standard clinical testing of and research on its genes.  
For those at risk of hereditary cancer, the effect is to 
prevent second opinions and to block access to 
alternative and potentially more comprehensive tests 
and lower cost options. 
The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes exist in the 
body of every single person.  See App. at 119a.  For 
                                                 
1 Myriad obtained the patents at issue with others, including 
the University of Utah Research Foundation, which is an owner 
or co-­owner of each of the challenged patents.  App. at 129a.  
They have acted jointly throughout this litigation.  
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many patients, knowing whether their genes contain 
the harmful mutations is essential to making 
informed medical decisions.  App. at 159-­60a.  
Myriad did not develop the methods by which 
JHQHWLFLVWV ORRN DW RU ´LVRODWHµ WKH %5&$ DQG
BRCA2 genes.  App. at 151-­53a.  Those methods, 
which were well-­known and are used by geneticists 
to sequence thousands of other human genes on a 
daily basis, id., are not the subject of this lawsuit.  
0\ULDG·V SDWHQWV RQ WKH JHQHV KRZHYHU SUHYHQW
clinicians from using those methods to examine 
DQ\RQH·V%5&$DQG%5&$JHQHV 
Myriad defends its patents on the grounds 
that those patents cover only ´LVRODWHGµ JHQHV and 
WKDW ´LVRODWHGµJHQHVDUHGLVWLQJXLVKDEOH IURPJHQHV
in the body.  Three of the four judges who have 
issued opinions in this case (the District Court judge 
and three Court of Appeals judges each writing 
VHSDUDWH RSLQLRQV IRXQG WKDW ´LVRODWHGµ JHQHV ZHUH
functionally identical to genes in the body (the fourth 
judge did not express an opinion, asserting that this 
fact was irrelevant).  Three of the four judges also 
IRXQG WKDW ´LVRODWHGµ Jenes were virtually identical 
structurally to genes in the body (the fourth asserted 
that an insignificant chemical change was 
transformative).  Notwithstanding these findings, 
DQG QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKLV &RXUW·V UHSHDWHG KROGLQJV
that products and laws of nature are not patentable, 
D VSOLW )HGHUDO &LUFXLW UXOHG WKDW 0\ULDG·V JHQH
patents were valid, reversing the district court. 
 2.  Every human body contains DNA.  Genes 
are segments or fragments of DNA that determine, in 
part, the structure and functions of the body.  App. at 
138-­44a.  They are created naturally.  App. at 139-­
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42a.  Through naturally-­occurring processes in the 
body, genes produce proteins (or polypeptides) and 
those proteins do the work of the body.  Id.  Genes 
vary from one individual to another.  Genetic 
alterations or variations can be inherited or can 
occur after birth, but in both instances they come 
about naturally.  App. at 141-­42a.  Variants can 
appear to be unimportant, correlate with an 
LQFUHDVHGULVNRIGLVHDVHRUGLVRUGHU´PXWDWLRQVµRU
KDYH XQNQRZQ VLJQLILFDQFH ´YDULDQW RI XQNQRZQ
VLJQLILFDQFHµ Id.  The significance of the variant is 
purely a function of nature.  App. at 151a. 
In the context of BRCA1 and BRCA2, certain 
genetic mutations have been correlated with a much 
KLJKHU ULVN RI FDQFHU  ´:RPHQ ZLWK %5&$ DQG
BRCA2 mutations face up to an 85% cumulative risk 
of breast cancer as well as an up to 50% cumulative 
risk of ovariaQFDQFHU«7KHH[LVWHQFHRI%5&$DQG
BRCA2 mutations is therefore an important 
consideration in the provision of clinical care for 
EUHDVWDQGRURYDULDQFDQFHUµ$SSDWD 
 In order to provide effective treatment to 
patients and to research a wide range of diseases and 
conditions, including cancer, pathologists, clinical 
laboratory scientists, and other medical professionals 
conduct genetic testing for clinically significant 
alterations.  App. at 151-­53a.  There are a variety of 
methods by which medical professionals can examine 
genes.  Id.  Basic methods involve extracting or 
´LVRODWLQJµ WKH '1$ ZKLFK UHPRYHV WKH '1$ IURP
the cell and associated proteins and randomly 
fragments it.  Second Corrected App. Vol. VI at 
A7036-­39, $VV·Q IRU 0ROHFXODU 3DWKRORJy v. U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
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Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-­1406).  The standard process of 
isolation does not result in DNA fragments that do 
not exist naturally in the body.  Id.  It simply makes 
D SHUVRQ·V JHQHWLF LQIRUPDWLRQ PRUH DFFHVVLEOH IRU
sequencing by medical professionals.  Id.  Thousands 
of medical professionals, including many of the 
plaintiffs, isolate and sequence genes daily, and the 
processes by which isolation and sequencing are done 
are not at issue here.  App. at 151-­53a. 
 At the end of the process, the medical 
professional has a long string of four letters (A, C, T, 
and G) that correspond to the four nucleotides that 
make up DNA and genes.  App. at 138a, 141-­42a.  
The structure, function, and sequence of the 
nucleotides are created entirely by nature.  Id.  The 
medical professional looks to see if there are 
variants, e.g., whether natural processes have caused 
there to be a C where a T would normally be.  App. at 
141-­42a. 
This is what Myriad does when it examines 
SDWLHQWV· %5&$ DQG %5&$ JHQHV ORRNLQJ IRU
variants.  Its process is not unique.  What is unique 
LV LWV H[FOXVLYH FRQWURO RYHU SHRSOH·V JHQHWLF
information as a result of the patents it has been 
granted for BRCA1 and BRCA2, preventing other 
clinicians from accessing these genes for testing.  
 After completing its genetic tests, Myriad 
issues a report that essentially says:  We have 
H[DPLQHG WKH JHQHV REWDLQHG RU ´LVRODWHGµ IURP
your blood sample.  Because they are identical to the 
genes in your body, we can say with assurance that 
you do (or do not) have a variant.  App. at 151-­53a, 
160a.  The report then informs the patient:  Based on 
the medical literature, this variant does (or does not) 
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mean you have an increased risk of breast or ovarian 
cancer (or we do not know what the significance of 
the variant is).  Id.   ,IWKH´LVRODWHGµJHQHVSDWHQWHG
by Myriad were not identical to the genes in the 
ERG\ 0\ULDG FRXOG QRW XVH WKH ´LVRODWHGµ JHQHV to 
provide genetic information to patients. 
 3.  This lawsuit began in 2009 with the filing 
of a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York against the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 
as well as the patent holders, Myriad Genetics and 
the directors of the University of Utah Research 
Foundation.  Plaintiffs include four national 
organizations of physicians, geneticists, researchers, 
clinicians, and other health professionals with a 
combined total of over 150,000 members, as well as 
six of the naWLRQ·V OHDGLQJ JHQHWLFLVWV WZR JHQHWLF
FRXQVHORUV WZR ZRPHQ·V KHDOWK DQG EUHDVW FDQFHU
organizations, and six patients who have been 
diagnosed with or are at risk of hereditary breast or 
ovarian cancer.  App. at 121-­29a. 
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the 
patents are invalid under Section 101 of the Patent 
Act because they cover products and laws of nature 
and abstract ideas.  They also alleged that the effects 
of the challenged patents is to preempt scientific 
inquiU\DQGPHGLFDOFDUHWRWKHGHWULPHQWRISDWLHQWV·
health and to scientific advancement, in violation of 
both Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
 The complaint challenged fifteen claims from 
seven different patents.  App. at 178-­84a.  The claims 
relevant to this Petition cover the BRCA1 and 
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BRCA2 genes.2  Each of those claims defines the gene 
according to how it functions in the body.  App. at 
179-­81a.  For example, claims in the patent 
¶LQFOXGH 
1.  An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide, said polypeptide having 
the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO:2. 
2.  The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein 
said DNA has the nucleotide 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. 
5.  An isolated DNA having at least 15 
nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1. 
App. at 179-­80a.  The patent specifications define 
´LVRODWHGµ'1$DVKDYLQJEHHQUHPRYHGIURPWKHFHOO
and separated from other genetic material.  App. at 
189-­90a.  The referenced sequences (e.g., SEQ ID 
NO.___) identify the lengthy nucleotide sequences 
IRXQG LQ D ´ZLOG-­W\SHµ QRQ-­mutated or normal) 
BRCA1 gene and the amino acid sequence found in a 
protein created by a wild-­type BRCA1 gene.  App. at 
179a.  Other claims3 cover all variations and 
mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, both 
known and unknown.  App. at 178-­81a.   
                                                 
2 The complaint also challenged methods of comparing the 
´ZLOG-­W\SHµ RU QRQ-­mutated genetic sequence to the genetic 
sequence of a sample obtained from a patient.  App. at 181-­84a.  
All but one of the method claims were declared invalid by both 
the district court and the Court of Appeals.  App. at 54-­61a, 
224-­36a.  None of the method claims is the subject of this 
petition. 
3 The other claims at issue in this petition are contained in the 
Appendix.  App. at 307-­08a. 
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According to the patent specifications, each of 
the claims covers virtually every short fragment of 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as well as the full-­
length genes.  E.g., ¶SDWHQWDW-­30, 25:36-­37.  
Thus, the patents claim any fragments as short as 15 
nucleotides (comprised of the A, C, G, and T 
component bases) of the gene, which consists of many 
thousands of nucleotides. Id.;; App. at 179-­80a.  
Additionally, the patents cover cDNA, a form of DNA 
that can also be found in the body, albeit less 
frequently, in which some of the inessential (non-­
coding) nucleotides known as introns have been 
removed.  App. at 148-­50a, 218-­20a.  Myriad has 
never argued that any of its claims is limited to any 
one form of DNA, including cDNA.  Through its 
combined patents, Myriad claims ownership of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes of every American.  
 4.  In the district court, the defendants moved 
to dismiss largely on the grounds that the plaintiffs 
did not have standing.  App. at 273a et seq.  The 
court denied that motion.  App. at 293a.  Both 
plaintiffs and Myriad subsequently moved for 
summary judgment, and the PTO moved for 
judgment on the pleadings.  App. at 118a. The 
GLVWULFW FRXUW JUDQWHG WKH SODLQWLIIV· PRWLRQ IRU
VXPPDU\MXGJPHQWDQGGHQLHG0\ULDG·VPRWLRQId.  
The court dismissed the constitutional claims against 
the PTO based on the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance.  Id.;; App. at 236-­37a. 
 7KH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V ILQGLQJ WKDW HDFK RI WKH
plaintiffs had standing was based on an application 
RI WKLV &RXUW·V RSLQLRQ LQ MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), which held that 
standing in patent cases should be analyzed in the 
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same manner as standing in non-­patent cases.  The 
district court found that Myriad had taken 
DIILUPDWLYH DFWV WR HQIRUFH LWV SDWHQWV ´through 
personal communications, cease-­and-­desist letters, 
OLFHQVLQJ RIIHUV DQG OLWLJDWLRQµ $SS DW D 7KH
court also found that each plaintiff had the capacity, 
ability, and desire to engage in infringing activity (or 
activity to contribute to or induce infringement) but 
was prevented from doing so by the patents.  App. at 
288-­93a.  More specifically, each of the physician 
plaintiffs and at least one physician member of each 
of the medical association plaintiffs submitted 
declarations indicating they sequenced genes on a 
regular basis, would immediately utilize their 
standard sequencing methods to sequence the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes if possible, and were 
prevented from doing so solely as a result of fear of 
suit by Myriad.4  App. at 290-­91a.  The district court 
found that the remaining plaintiffs (genetic 
counselors and breast cancer advocacy groups who 
referred women for testing, and patients who sought 
to be tested) had standing based on their stated 
desire to contribute to infringement by referring 
patients (or themselves) to physicians for testing, a 
GHVLUH IUXVWUDWHG VROHO\ E\ 0\ULDG·V DFWLYH
enforcement of its patents.  App. at 291-­93a. 
 7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWJUDQWHGSODLQWLIIV·PRWLRQIRU
summary judgment in a 153-­page, comprehensive 
opinion that relied heavily on facts presented by both 
                                                 
4 Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly had been sequencing BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes until they were forced to stop as a result of letters 
and lawsuits by Myriad.  App. at 20-­23a.  Their declaration 
indicated they would consider resuming that activity if the 
patents were invalidated.  App. at 34a. 
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parties and carefully analyzed the decisions of this 
Court holding that patents cannot be issued on laws 
of nature, products of nature, or abstract ideas.  App. 
at 113-­238a.  The district court began by discussing 
the standard set by this Court for determining if a 
patented composition of matter ² like the DNA at 
issue here ² has been sufficiently changed such that 
it is no longer a product of nature.  App. at 201-­04a 
(citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980);; 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127 (1948);; and American Fruit Growers Inc. v. 
Brodgex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931)).   
7KH GLVWULFW FRXUW FRQVLGHUHG 0\ULDG·V
arguments regarding both structural and functional 
GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ ´LVRODWHGµ '1$ DQG WKH '1$
inside the human body, ultimately concluding that 
QRQH FDXVHG ´LVRODWHGµ JHQHV WR EH ´PDUNHGO\
GLIIHUHQWµChakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310, from genes 
in the body.  App. at 214-­24a.  In holding that 
isolated DNA remains a product of nature, the 
district court emphasized the unique properties of 
genes as 
>,@QIRUPDWLRQ « >WKDW@ UHIOHFWV LWV
primary biological function;; directing 
the synthesis of other molecules in the 
body ² namely, prRWHLQV ´ELRORJLFDO
PROHFXOHV RI HQRUPRXV LPSRUWDQFHµ
ZKLFK ´FDWDO\]H ELRFKHPLFDO UHDFWLRQVµ
DQG FRQVWLWXWH WKH ´PDMRU VWUXFWXUDO
PDWHULDOVRIWKHDQLPDOERG\µ 
App. at 216a (emphasis in original;; citations 
omitted).  The district court found that in isolating 
WKH JHQHV 0\ULDG GLG QRW ´DOWHU LWV HVVHQWLDO
characteristic ² its nucleotide sequence that is 
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defined by nature and central to both its biological 
function within the cell and is utility as a research 
WRRO LQ WKH ODEµ  $SS DW D  7KH FRXUW DOVR 
invalidated the patents on cDNA for largely the same 
reason.  App. at 218-­20a.   
 5.  Myriad appealed to the Federal Circuit.  
Plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the PTO, 
which is therefore no longer a party to the case, 
although plaintiffs continued to raise their First 
Amendment claims against the University of Utah 
defendants.  The United States did, however, 
participate in the appellate proceedings as amicus 
curiae.  It was personally represented by the Solicitor 
General and, as more fully described below, largely 
VXSSRUWHGSODLQWLIIV·SRVLWLRQ 
 A divided panel of the court of appeals 
reversed.  The court was unanimous, however, in 
UHMHFWLQJ 0\ULDG·V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW QRQH RI WKH
plaintiffs had standing.  Specifically, all three judges 
agreed that plaintiff Dr. Harry Ostrer had standing 
to sue because he had received a letter from Myriad 
proposing a BRCA licensing agreement for which a 
royalty would need to be paid.  The court found:  
0\ULDG·V DFWLYH HQIRUFHPHQW RI LWV
patent rights forced [plaintiff] Dr. 
Ostrer, as well as every other similarly 
situated researcher and institution, to 
cease performing the challenged BRCA 
testing services, leaving Myriad as the 
sole provider of BRCA clinical testing in 
WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV « 0\ULDG·V
enforcement efforts eliminated all 
FRPSHWLWLRQ«µ 
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App. at 35a (emphasis added).  The court further 
QRWHGWKDW'U2VWUHUKDG´QRWRQO\WKHUHVRXUFHVDQG
expertise to immediately undertake clinical BRCA 
testing, but also states unequivocally that he will 
immediately begin suFKWHVWLQJµ$SSDW4a.  While 
accurate, that statement did not distinguish Dr. 
Ostrer from the most of the other physician plaintiffs 
and members of the medical association plaintiffs 
who submitted similar or identical evidence of their 
resources, expertise, capability, and desire to begin 
testing.  App. at 288-­92a.  The court denied the 
standing of other plaintiffs because, unlike Dr. 
Ostrer, they had not been individually contacted by 
Myriad.  App. at 39-­40a.  The court found that 
DOWKRXJK0\ULDG·V´Dctive HQIRUFHPHQWµRILWVSDWHQWV
KDG ´IRUFHG«HYHU\ RWKHU«UHVHDUFKHU and 
LQVWLWXWLRQµ WR FHDVH WHVWLQJ 'U 2VWUHU DORQH KDG
VWDQGLQJ EHFDXVH WKHUH KDG QRW EHHQ ´DIILUPDWLYH
DFWV E\ WKH SDWHQWHH GLUHFWHG DW VSHFLILF 3ODLQWLIIVµ
App. at 35-­39a.  The court of appeals discarded the 
plaintiffs whose standing was based on contributory 
or inducing infringement essentially without 
comment.  
 On the merits, each member of the panel wrote 
a separate opinion discussing the patentability of 
human genes, and each opinion analyzed the issue 
differently.  Judge Lourie purported to apply the 
standard in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
310 (1980), that a court must analyze whether an 
´LVRODWHGµ JHQH is ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQWµ IURPZKDW LV
found in nature.5  He held that in performing this 
                                                 
5 0\ULDG KDG DUJXHG WKDW WKH ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQWµ VWDQGDUG
had not been established by the Court and should not be 
applied.  
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analysis, the functionality of the gene was irrelevant.  
App. at 49a.  7KXV HYHQ LI ´LVRODWHGµ JHQHV ZHUH
functionally identical to genes in the body, they 
would still be patentable.  Id.  +HKHOGWKDW´LVRODWHGµ
DNA was structurally different from DNA on the sole 
basis that in the process of being removed from the 
body and its surrounding chemicals and tissues, a 
covalent (electron) bond has been broken.              
App. at 46-­49a.  Covalent bonds are naturally-­
occurring bonds that hold together DNA.  Plaintiffs-­
$SSHOOHHV·3HWLWLRQIRU3DQHO5HKHDULQJDW$VV·QIRU
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-­01406).  
They are constantly formed and broken in the body.  
Id.;; see Second Corrected App. Vol. VI at A7036-­38, 
$VV·Q IRU 0ROHFXODU 3DWKRORJ\ Y 86 3DWHQW DQG
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 2010-­1406). 
Judge Moore, by contrast, found that both 
structure and function were relevant in determining 
LIDFRPSRVLWLRQLV´PDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWµIURPZKDWLV
found in nature.  App. at 77-­79a.  She found that a 
full-­OHQJWK ´LVRODWHGµ gene ´GRes not clearly have a 
new utility and appear to simply serve the same ends 
GHYLVHGE\QDWXUHµ  App. at 79a.  She said:  ´If I were 
deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might 
conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that 
includes most or all of a gene is not patentable 
VXEMHFW PDWWHUµ  Id.  She nevertheless found full-­
length genes to be patentable because of the 
´KLVWRULFDOEDFNJURXQGµRIWKH372·VSDVWSUDFWLFHRI
granting gene patents.  Id.  She also held that small 
fragments of genes were patentable subject matter 
because removal caused the fragments to have 
different chemical elements at each end.  App. at 75-­
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77a.  Moreover, she noted that small fragments can 
be used as probes and primers ² segments of DNA 
that are used by laboratories in the process of genetic 
testing.  Id. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bryson held 
the genes were not patentable.   
Myriad is claiming the genes 
themselves, which appear in nature on 
the chromosomes of living human 
beings.  The only material change made 
to those genes from their natural state 
is the change that is necessarily 
incidental to the extraction of the genes. 
App. at 98a.  Judge Bryson noted that Federal 
Circuit Judge Dyk had expressed the same view in a 
VHSDUDWHFDVHUHDVRQLQJWKDW´SUHPDWXUHO\SOXFNLQJ
the leaf [off a tree] would not turn it into a human-­
made invention.  That would remain true if there 
were minor differences between the plucked leaf and 
WKHIDOOHQDXWXPQOHDI«µ Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 
617 F.3d 1282, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in part).  Judge Bryson concluded: 
The structural differences between the 
FODLPHG ´LVRODWHGµ JHQHV DQG WKH
corresponding portion of the native 
genes are irrelevant to the claim 
limitations, to the functioning of the 
genes, and to their utility in their 
isolated form.  The use to which the 
genetic material can be put, i.e., 
determining its sequence in a clinical 
setting is not a new use;; it is only a 
consequence of possession. In order to 
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sequence an isolated gene, each gene 
must function in the same manner in 
the laboratory as it does in the human 
body. 
App. at 105-­06a.  He further concluded that the 
372·V SDVW SUDFWLFH ZDV QRW HQWLWOHG WR VLJQLILFDQW
weight because the courts, not the PTO, have 
ultimate authority to determine what is patentable 
under the laws enacted by Congress.  App. at 110-­
12a.  All three members of the court held that cDNA 
was patentable subject matter.  E.g., App. at 42-­43a, 
73-­74a, 94a.  The court LJQRUHG WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V
construction of the claims, App. at 189-­90a, and 
found that cDNA did not appear in the body and is 
simpl\ ´LQVSLUHG E\ QDWXUHµ   $SS DW D  The 
majority of the court did not identify which claims in 
the patents were limited to cDNA.  See App. at 43a.  
The court also did not address the constitutional 
claims raised by plaintiffs. 
 Plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing by the 
panel, arguing that certain facts relied on in the 
opinions of Judge Lourie and Judge Moore were not 
in the record and were flawed.  Specifically, plaintiffs 
DUJXHGWKDW-XGJH/RXULH·Vreliance on the breaking 
of FRYDOHQWERQGVWKDWRFFXUVZKHQ'1$LV´LVRODWHGµ
in concluding that isolated DNA is markedly 
different from DNA was erroneous.  Covalent bonds 
DUHLQGHHGEURNHQLQWKHSURFHVVRI´LVRODWLRQµDVWKH
DNA is fragmented.  But covalent bonds are also 
broken inside the body as part of natural processes.  
Fragments of genes identical to the fragments found 
DIWHU ´LVRODWLRQµ ZLWK EURNHQ FRYDOHQW ERQGV DQG
different ends, exist naturally in the body.  Plaintiffs-­
$SSHOOHHV·3HWLWLRQIRU3DQHO5HKHDULQJDW$VV·Qfor 
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Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-­01406);; 
Fed. Cir. App. at A7036-­40.  Broken covalent bonds 
VLPSO\ GR QRW GLVWLQJXLVK DQ ´LVRODWHGµ JHQH IURP D
product of nature.  Id.  Defendants also petitioned for 
rehearing on the holding that Dr. Ostrer had 
standing to challenge the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
patents.  Both rehearing motions were denied 
without opinion. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I.     THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HUMAN 
GENES AND THE INFORMATION THEY 
CONVEY ARE PATENTABLE IS OF 
PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO THE 
FUTURE OF PATENT LAW, THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF MEDICAL SCIENCE, 
AND 3$7,(176· HEALTH. 
 In recent years, this Court has granted 
certiorari on several cases concerning the 
patentability of methods.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2010);; Prometheus v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services, granting, vacating and remanding 130 S. 
Ct. 3543 (2010), and cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 
(June 20, 2011).  See also Metabolite v. Laboratory 
Corp., cert. dism. 548 U.S. 124 (2006).  For over 
thirty years, the Court has not addressed the 
patentability of compositions of matter under Section 
101.  There can be little doubt that it is crucial for 
the Court to address this subject. 
 The legal community needs guidance from this 
Court regarding the scope of Section 101 as it applies 
to compositions of matter and DNA.  Four federal 
judges in this case have written opinions on the 
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patentability of human genes.  Each has adopted a 
different method of analyzing the issues.  The district 
court judge held that neither DNA nor cDNA is 
patentable subject matter because the genes that 
make up DNA function the same whether they are 
inside or outside the body.  App. at 214-­24a.  He thus 
rejected the notion that isolated DNA is markedly 
different than the DNA that exists in nature.  
Federal Circuit Judge Lourie, by contrast, held that 
the function of genes inside and outside the body is 
always irrelevant.  App. at 49-­50a.  In his view, 
isolated DNA is patentable because removing a gene 
from the body necessarily alters its chemical 
structure.  App. at 46-­47a.  Judge Moore thought 
that the court must examine both function and 
structure.  App. at 75-­77a.  Although she found that 
full-­length genes were functionally and to a 
significant degree structurally identical whether 
isolated or not, she nevertheless found them 
SDWHQWDEOH E\ GHIHUULQJ WR WKH 372·V SDVW SUDFWLFH
App. at 79a.  With respect to small fragments of 
genes, she found that they could be used outside the 
body as probes or primers, unlike small identical 
fragments found inside the body, and were therefore 
patentable.  App. at 75-­78a.  Finally, Judge Bryson 
found genes unpatentable because any structural 
changes were incidental to the isolation process and 
DQ\ IXQFWLRQDO XVH ZDV ´RQO\ D FRQVHTXHQFH RI
SRVVHVVLRQµ6  App. at 105-­06a.  All three court of 
DSSHDOV MXGJHV LJQRUHG WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V IDFWXDO
                                                 
6 -XGJH%U\VRQ·VDQDO\VLVZDVIRUHVKDGRZHGE\)HGHUDO&LUFXLW
-XGJH'\N·V RSLQLRQ LQDQHDUOLHU FDVH See Intervet v. Merial 
Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J. concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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finding that cDNA appears in the body and found it 
patentable because it is more often created in a lab.  
That cDNA and DNA are functionally identical was, 
they apparently thought, irrelevant.  None identified 
which of the claims, if any, is limited to cDNA. 
 All of the judges purported to apply this 
&RXUW·V VWDQGDUG LQ Chakrabarty that a patentable 
FRPSRVLWLRQ PXVW EH ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQWµ IURP D
product of nature, but each differed in how to apply 
that standard to full-­length genes, gene fragments, 
and cDNA.  Each had divergent views on the 
relevance of the existence of genes or gene fragments 
that are identical inside and outside of the body.  
Each also disagreed on the degree to which minor 
structural alterations incident to removal render a 
composition patentable and the relevance of function 
in assessing patentability.  The district court and 
-XGJH%U\VRQIRXQGLWKLJKO\UHOHYDQWWKDW0\ULDG·V
HQWLUH EXVLQHVV LV EDVHG RQ WKH IDFW WKDW ´LVRODWHGµ
genes have the identical nucleotide sequence as 
genes in the body ² because otherwise any diagnostic 
FRQFOXVLRQVGUDZQIURPWKH´LVRODWHGµJHQHZRXOGEH
impossible.  Judges Lourie and Moore found that fact 
irrelevant. 
 The executive branch, too, has expressed 
different opinions in this litigation.  The PTO 
granted the patents at issue in this case and has 
published guidelines authorizing the patenting of 
isolated DNA.  See Utility Examination Guidelines, 
66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).7  However, when 
this case reached the Federal Circuit, the United 
                                                 
7 These Guidelines are not entitled to any deference.          
$UQROG3·VKLSY'XGDV, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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States adopted a different position.  After consulting 
ZLWK WKH ´3DWHQW DQG 7UDdemark Office (PTO), the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, and the National 
Economic Council, among others,µWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
concluded that DNA and human genes are not 
patentable, but that cDNA is.  Br. for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Neither Party at 
1, $VV·Q IRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\ Y863DWHQW DQG
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 2010-­1406).  Contrary to the usual practice, the 
PTO did not sign the brief that was submitted by the 
United States.  Arguing personally on behalf of the 
United States, the Solicitor General proposed a new 
method of analyzing the degree to which a part of the 
KXPDQERG\ LV SDWHQWDEOH  WKH ´PDJLFPLFURVFRSHµ
Because the same DNA molecule could be seen if a 
magic microscope were to be invented allowing one to 
zoom in and view the DNA inside a human body, 
isolated DNA is a product of nature.8  App. at 83a. 
                                                 
8 The Department of Health and Human Services has also 
weighed in on the question of gene patents.  Last year, its 
6HFUHWDU\·V $GYLVRU\ &RPPLWWHH RQ *HQHWLFV +HDOWK DQG
Society issued a report concluding that gene patents were 
unnecessary to incentivize research or the development of 
clinical testing and impeded patient access to genetic testing 
DQG TXDOLW\ DVVXUDQFH LQ WHVWLQJ  'HS·W RI +HDOWK 	 +XPDQ
6HUY 6HF·\·V $GYLVRU\ &RPP RQ*HQHWLFV+HDOWK DQG 6RF·\
Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on 
Patient Access to Genetic Tests (April 2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_repo
rt_2010.pdf. 
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 This case is an ideal vehicle to analyze the 
Section 101 TXHVWLRQ3ODLQWLIIV·VROHFODLPXQGHUWKH
Patent Act was brought pursuant to Section 101.  
Unlike other Federal Circuit cases dealing with 
isolated DNA patents, see, e.g., Intervet Inc. v. Merial 
Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), this is the 
first to present and thoroughly litigate the issue of 
whether isolated DNA falls within the Section 101 
exceptions.  At the district court, all parties agreed 
on the fundamental characteristics of isolated DNA 
and disputed only the application of the law to the 
facts.  App. at 135-­60a. 
 This case is not, however, solely about the 
pressing need to clarify the legal doctrine governing 
the patentability of compositions of matter and the 
scope of the product of nature exception.  At its core, 
it presents a critical question of great concern to this 
country, especially patients affected by hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer and the medical and 
scientific communities:  are patents on genes valid, 
thus preventing advances in science and medicine 
that could result in better diagnosis and treatment?  
There were thirty amicus briefs filed in the court of 
appeals signed by sixty-­seven organizations, 
corporations, associations, or individuals.  Among 
those who signed briefs supporting plaintiffs were (1) 
major medical associations (beyond the four 
associations who are plaintiffs themselves), including 
the American Medical Association (AMA), the 
American Society of Human Genetics, the American 
College of Embryology, and the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and (2) 
organizations committed to advocacy on behalf of 
patients, including the March of Dimes, AARP, the 
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Canavan Foundation, the Claire Altman Heine 
Foundation, the National Organization for Rare 
Disorders, National Tay-­Sachs and Allied Diseases 
Association, Ovarian Cancer National Alliance, and 
Facing Our Risk of Cancer Empowered, which 
advocates on behalf of patients and families affected 
by hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.9  All of 
these amici weighed in because of the significant 
impact of gene patents on patient care.  App. at 3-­7a, 
129-­32a.  As the Department of Justice said in its 
brief:  ´7KH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK EDVLF GLVFRYHULHV LQ
genetics may be patented is a question of great 
importance to the national economy, to medical 
VFLHQFHDQGWRWKHSXEOLFKHDOWKµBr. for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Neither Party at 
1, $VV·Q for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 2010-­1406).  See also Br. for Amicus Curiae 
IntellHFWXDO 3URS /DZ $VV·Q LQ 6XSS Rf Reversal, 
but in Supp. of Neither Party at 2, $VV·Q IRU
Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 2010-­1406) ´$Q\WKLQJEXWVLPSOHKRZHYHUDUH
the legal issues raised by those questions and the 
ramifications of the District Court's decision.  At 
stake are significant medical and economic interests 
RILQGLYLGXDOVDQGLQGXVWULHVDOLNHµ. 
 The patents give Myriad the authority to 
prevent all research and clinical testing of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  Myriad has vigorously 
enforced its patents to stop clinical testing by any 
                                                 
9 Other amici in support of plaintiffs included the Southern 
Baptist CRQYHQWLRQ  0\ULDG·V DPLFL LQFOXGHG DVVRFLDWLRQV RI
biotechnology corporations.  They too recognized that this issue 
is critical. 
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other lab.  App. at 163-­66a, 262-­65a.  Myriad did so 
even during a period of several years when it failed 
to look for all known mutations and was thus 
providing false negative results to some women.  
App. at 160a.  Other labs, which were willing to do 
more comprehensive and therefore more accurate 
testing, were barred by Myriad from doing so.  App. 
at 166-­67a.  Currently, Myriad collects a huge 
amount of data on the nature and significance of 
variants in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but 
refuses to share that data with the scientific 
community and has no obligation to fully develop 
scientific knowledge about the genes.  App. at 174a.  
Many women, upon obtaining results from Myriad, 
wish to get a second opinion before they submit to 
life-­altering, prophylactic surgery.  Myriad refuses to 
allow any lab to confirm the results through 
sequencing the genes.  App. at 169-­70a.  The patents 
preclude others from providing testing, even where 
they could do so for a lower price or for free.  Myriad 
has contracts with only half of the state Medicaid 
insurance SURJUDPV 2QO\PLOOLRQ RI$PHULFD·V
308 million people can receive insurance coverage for 
their testing.  Second Corrected App. Vol. VI at 
A4703, $VV·Q IRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\Y863DWHQW
and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (No. 2010-­1406). 
 The usual rationale for granting a patent ² the 
need to create economic incentives to advance science 
² did not apply in this case and does not apply to 
products of nature.  RHVHDUFKHUV EHVLGHV 0\ULDG·V
were also looking for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
and had indicated that they would share their results 
with the scientific community.  The widespread 
clinical testing of other, unpatented genes and the 
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extraordinary importance of breast and ovarian 
cancers make it clear that diagnostic tests resulting 
from the discoveries of BRCA1 and BRCA2 would 
have been made available to the public even without 
the patent incentive.  See App. at 175-­76a. 
Indeed, as this Court has suggested, patenting 
basic elements of nature has the opposite effect, 
stifling research and scientific advancement.  Where 
WKH FODLPHG FRPSRVLWLRQ·V ´TXDOLWLHV DUH WKHZRUN RI
QDWXUHµ WKRVH TXDOLWLHV DUH QRW SDWHQWDEOH IRU
´>W@Key are manifestations of laws of nature, free to 
DOO PHQ DQG UHVHUYHG H[FOXVLYHO\ WR QRQHµ          
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.  To otherwise hold 
ZRXOG EH ´DOORZLQJ D SDWHQW WR issue on one of the 
DQFLHQWVHFUHWVRIQDWXUHQRZGLVFORVHGµ Id. at 132.  
$FFRUGLQJO\´>S@DWHQWODZVHHNVWRDYRLGWKHGDQJHUV
of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid 
the diminished incentive to invent that 
XQGHUSURWHFWLRQ FDQ WKUHDWHQµ Ey bringing certain 
types of invention and discovery within the scope of 
patentability while excluding others.  Lab. Corp. of 
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 127 
(U.S. 2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting);; Cf. Great Atl. & 
Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 
147, 155 (U.S. 1950) 'RXJODV-FRQFXUULQJ´(YHU\
patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls 
from the public.  The Framers plainly did not want 
those monopolies freely granted.  The invention, to 
justify a patent, had to serve the ends of science-­to 
push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the 
OLNHµ 
 )LQDOO\LWLVRIFULWLFDOLPSRUWDQFHWRZRPHQ·V
health that knowledge about breast and ovarian 
cancer increase in order to advance diagnosis and 
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treatment.  This case does not question the 
patentability of new methods of diagnosis or methods 
of treatment.  It does not deal with new drugs or new 
instruments.  Instead, it concerns perhaps the most 
basic elements of biology, human genes:   
Genes are basic units of heredity found 
in all living organisms and are 
responsible for the inheritance of a 
discrete trait . . . . Together, the 
approximately 25,000 genes in the 
human body make up the human 
genome.  The genome, and the genes 
within it, are contained within almost 
every cell in the human body and define 
physical trains such as skin tone, eye 
color, and sex, in addition to influencing 
the development of conditions such as 
REHVLW\ GLDEHWHV $O]KHLPHU·V GLVHDVH
and bipolar disorder. 
App. at 139-­40D  $V WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW IRXQG ´7KH
widespread use of gene sequence information as the 
foundation for biomedical research means that 
resolution of these issues will have far-­reaching 
implications, not only for gene-­based health care and 
the health of millions of women facing the specter of 
breast cancer, but also for the future course of 
ELRPHGLFDOUHVHDUFKµ$SS at 243a. 
 The extraordinary importance of the issues 
presented by this case combined with the lack of 
clarity concerning the legal issues it presents merit 
review by this Court. 
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II.  PATENTS ON ´ISOLATEDµ DNA ARE 
INVALID UNDER THIS C2857·6
SECTION 101 JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
The patenting of isolated DNA violates long-­
established Supreme Court precedent that prohibits 
the patenting of laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
products of nature, and abstract ideas.  Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty  86     ´¶>7@KH
relevant GLVWLQFWLRQ· IRU SXUSRVHV RI   LV   
¶between products of nature, whether living or not, 
and human-­PDGH LQYHQWLRQV·µ  J.E.M. Ag Supply, 
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-­%UHG,QW·O,QF, 534 U.S. 124, 130, 
134 (2001) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313).  
See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 
F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928);; In re Marden (Marden 
II), 47 F.2d 958, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1931);; In re Marden 
(Marden I), 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931).  In Bilski, 
the Court affirmed that subject matter eligibility 
remains a threshold question, separate and distinct 
from considerations of utility or novelty.  130 S. Ct. 
at 3225;; see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 
(1978);; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189-­90 
(1981).   
In deciding that the patents at issue survive 
Section 101, the Federal Circuit departed 
dramatically from Chakrabarty, Funk Brothers, and 
American Fruit Growers WKLV&RXUW·V VHPLQDO FDVHV
on the product of nature doctrine.  Those cases held 
that a claimed composition does not become 
patentable simply because there has been a change 
in its structure, as the opinion of Judge Lourie 
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concluded below.  Instead, the Section 101 inquiry 
involves more:  whether the claimed composition has 
´D GLVWLQFWLYH QDPH FKDUDFWHU >DQG@ XVHµ DQG
´PDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVIURPDQ\IRXQGLQ
QDWXUHµ Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-­10 (citation 
omitted)DQGGRHVQRWFRYHU´QDWXUH·VKDQGLZRUNµRU
´TXDOLWLHV WKDW DUH WKH ZRUN RI QDWXUHµ  Id.;; Funk 
Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.  Unless what is claimed meets 
WKHVH FULWHULD WKH SDWHQW ZLOO HQFXPEHU ´WKH
storehousHRINQRZOHGJHRIDOOPHQµFunk Bros., 333 
U.S. at 130. 
Thus, the Court has examined the key 
characteristics, including function, of a claimed 
composition and determined whether they are the 
work of nature.  Comparing the unpatentable 
combination of bacteria in Funk Brothers with the 
genetically-­engineered and patentable Chakrabarty 
bacterium, the Court in Chakrabarty concluded that 
WKH ODWWHU KDV ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV
IURP DQ\ IRXQG LQ QDWXUHµ ZKLOH WKH IRUPHU·V
GLVFRYHU\LV´QDWXUH·VKDQGLZRUNµ 
¶The combination of species [in Funk 
Brothers] produces no new bacteria, no 
change in the six species of bacteria, 
and no enlargement of the range of their 
utility.  Each species has the same effect 
it always had.  The bacteria perform in 
their natural way.  Their use in 
combination does not improve in any 
way their natural functioning.  They 
serve the ends nature originally 
provided and act quite independently of 
any effort of the patentee.· 
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Here, by contrast, the patentee has 
produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from 
any found in nature and one having the 
potential for significant utility.  His 
GLVFRYHU\LVQRWQDWXUH·VKDQGLZRUNEXW
his own;; accordingly it is patentable 
subject matter under § 101. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (quoting Funk Bros., 
333 U.S. at 131).  Because the patent holder of the 
´LVRODWHGµFunk Brothers EDFWHULDGLG ´QRW FUHDWe [a] 
state of inhibition or of non-­inhibition in the 
EDFWHULDµ KH FRXOG QRW SDWHQW WKH SURGXFW HYHQ
though the bacteria did not exist together naturally, 
and even though their aggregate nitrogen-­fixing 
capability had been newly identified and had 
commercial utility.  333 U.S. at 130-­31.  Similarly, in 
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., the Court 
rejected the patenting of a fruit that had been 
treated with mold-­resistant borax, although the 
´FRPSOHWHDUWLFOHLVQRWIRXQGLQQDWXUHµDQGGHVSLWH
LWV´WUHDWPHQWODERUDQGPDQLSXODWLRQµ86, 
11-­12 (1931).  The Court held that it did not become 
DQ ´DUWLFOH RI PDQXIDFWXUHµ XQOHVV LW ´SRVVHVVHV D
new or distinctive form, qualit\RUSURSHUW\µGLVWLQFW
from nature.  Id.  
Just as the fruit and the aggregation of 
bacteria strains were products of nature, so too are 
the isolated DNA at issue here.  The patent claims 
WKHPVHOYHV GHILQH ´LVRODWHG '1$µ DFFRUGLQJ WR D
naturally-­occurring functional characteristic ² 
QDPHO\ ´FRGLQJ IRUµ D QDWXUDOO\-­occurring 
polypeptide.  Thus, the claims explicitly recognize 
that DNA stores and conveys specific information ² 
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as dictated by the natural order of nucleotides ² that 
serves as the blueprint for proteins, and ultimately 
the cells and organs, that make up the human body.  
Because this blueprint is the essential characteristic 
of DNA and remains the same before and after 
isolation, ´isolatedµ DNA has neither a distinctive 
name, character, or use from naturally-­occurring 
DNA, nor markedly different characteristics.  Both 
are DNA, their structures are not markedly different, 
the protein coded for by each is the same, and their 
use in storing and transmitting information about a 
SHUVRQ·VKHUHGLWy is identical.    
The Federal Circuit failed to properly analyze 
'1$·V FKDUDFWHULVWLFV LQ OLJKW RI WKLV &RXUW·V
precedents.  The opinion of the court by Judge Lourie 
focused only on the chemical structure of DNA, 
disregarding its biological characteristics.  App. at 
D ´:H UHFRJQL]H WKDW ELRORJLVWV PD\ WKLQN RI
molecules in terms of their uses, but genes are in fact 
materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are 
best described in patents by their structures rather 
WKDQ WKHLU IXQFWLRQVµ  7KDW PRGe of analysis 
contradicts both the patent claim language ² 
claiming isolated DNA as coding for a specified 
protein ² DQGWKLV&RXUW·V UHSHDWHGDGPRQLWLRQ WKDW
patents should be evaluated according to the actual 
claim language, Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996);; White v. Dunbar, 119 
U.S. 47, 52 (1886)  ,W DOVR LJQRUHV WKH &RXUW·V
decisions establishing that function is a critical factor 
for determining whether something is patentable 
under Section 101.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
Otherwise, the fruit of American Fruit Growers 
would surely have been patentable, for its structure 
was quite different from the naturally occurring 
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fruit, even though its use for human consumption 
remained the same.  See 283 U.S. at 11-­12.  
Furthermore, Judge Lourie elevated the importance 
of chemical bonds such that any cleavage of a 
covalent bond would render the resulting molecule 
patentable.  App. at 49a.  Such a rule has never been 
endorsed by this Court, or to the best of our 
knowledge, by any court, and runs counter to the 
pragmatic approach this Court has taken in applying 
Section 101.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226-­27 (rejecting a 
ULJLG ´PDFKLQH-­or-­WUDQVIRUPDWLRQµ WHVW IRU PHWKRG
claims).  As in Bilski, the court of appeals again 
imposed an inflexible test not rooted in precedent. 
Though the concurring opinion by Judge 
Moore discussed the structure and function of 
isolated DNA, it failed to take into account whether 
its qualities are the work of nature.  Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 309-­10;; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.  In 
her view, an isolated DNA sequence that includes 
most or all of a gene might not be patentable because 
it would not have a clearly new utility or function 
compared to a naturally-­occurring gene;; however, a 
15 nucleotide segment, as claimed in patent `282 cl. 
5, would be patentable, because it could potentially 
be used as a primer or probe.  App. at 75-­79a.  This 
holding flatly contradicts the Section 101 case law 
barring patents on a phenomenon of nature.        
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.  Because small 
sequences of DNA are repeated throughout the 
human genome, a claim on small segments of DNA, 
like claims 5 or 6 of `282, covers portions of the DNA 
of nearly all human genes, not just BRCA1.  App. at 
107-­08a.  None of the claims at issue here are limited 
to new uses of DNA fragments as primers or probes.  
Accordingly, claims like 5 and 6 of patent `282 
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preempt researchers from working with that segment 
of DNA, wherever it may appear in the genome, and 
poses a serious threat to scientific freedom and 
advancement.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230-­31;; 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-­72 (1972);; 
Funk Bros.86DW ´7KHTXDOLWLHV of these 
bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the 
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men . . . . He who discovers a 
hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no 
claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognL]HVµ  
See also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-­27 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
GLVVHQWLQJ´>6@RPHWLPHVtoo much patent protection 
can iPSHGH UDWKHU WKDQ ¶SURPRWH WKH 3URJUHVV RI
6FLHQFHDQGXVHIXO$UWV·µ    
Patents on isolated DNA, whether small 
segments or whole genes, also violate the First 
Amendment because they block scientific inquiry into 
the patented DNA.  These patents prevent access to 
HDFK SHUVRQ·V LQGLYLGXDO JHQHWLF LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG
deprive others from examining the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes and engaging in fundamental scientific 
ZRUN  ,W LV QRW SRVVLEOH WR ´LQYHQW DURXQGµ KXPDQ
genes, as it is with a true invention, like a 
carburetor.  Because the patents grant control over a 
body of knowledge and over pure information, they 
violate the First Amendment.  Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) ´)LUVW
Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the 
government seeks to control thought or to justify its 
laws for that impermissible end.  The right to think 
LVWKHEHJLQQLQJRIIUHHGRPµ 
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III. BY HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS 
LACKED STANDING UNLESS THEY 
WERE PERSONALLY THREATENED BY 
MYRIAD, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
IMPOSED A RIGID STANDING 
REQUIREMENT CONTRARY TO THIS 
&2857·6$3352$&+,1MEDIMMUNE. 
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., this 
Court declared that the correct standing analysis in 
SDWHQW FDVHV DV LQ DOO RWKHU $UWLFOH ,,, FDVHV ´LV
whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
ZDUUDQW WKH LVVXDQFH RI D GHFODUDWRU\ MXGJPHQWµ
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (citation omitted);; see also 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 
2705, 2717 (2010) (citing MedImmune in a non-­
patent case for the proposition that plaintiffs need 
not await actual enforcement before bringing a 
lawsuit or to have a credible fear of enforcement).  
MedImmune instructs that bright line rules and 
steadfast requirements are inappropriate when 
DQDO\]LQJ D SODLQWLII·V VWDQGLQJ LQ D GHFODUDWRU\
judgment action.  549 U.S. at 127.  Yet, the Federal 
Circuit imposed just such a rule in concluding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing unless they were 
personally threatened by Myriad.  
The court of appeals found: 
0\ULDG·V DFWLYH HQIRUFHPHQW RI LWV
patent rights forced Dr. Ostrer, as well 
as every other similarly situated 
researcher and institution, to cease 
performing the challenged BRCA 
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testing services . .   0\ULDG·V
enforcement efforts eliminated all 
competition . . . . [N]othing in the record 
suggests that any researcher or 
institution has successfully attempted 
to compete with Myriad, or that Myriad 
has in any way changed its position 
with regard to its patent rights. 
App. at 34-­35a (emphasis added).  The court then 
inexplicably held that these facts did not amount to 
DQ ´LQMXU\ WUDFHDEOH WR 0\ULDGµ DQG DPRXQWHG WR
´VXIIHULQJDQDWWHQXDWHGQRn-­proximate, effect from 
WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D SDWHQWµ IRU DOO RI WKH SODLQWLIIV
other than Dr. Ostrer.  App. at 34-­39a. 
It is difficult to reconcile a holding that all of 
WKHSODLQWLIIVKDYHEHHQ´IRUFHGWRFHDVHµWKHLUDFWLRQV
DVDUHVXOWRI0\ULDG·VDFWLRns and that the effect of 
0\ULDG·V DFWLRQV ZDV WR ´HOLPLQDWH DOO FRPSHWLWLRQµ
ZLWKDKROGLQJWKDWWKHHIIHFWRI0\ULDG·VDFWLRQVZDV
´DWWHQXDWHG QRQ-­SUR[LPDWHµ DQG LQVXIILFLHQW WR
create standing.  Furthermore, the idea that a 
plaintiff cannot have standing unless a patent holder 
´GLUHFWHG DQ\ OHWWHUV RU RWKHU FRPPXQLFDWLRQV
UHJDUGLQJ LWV SDWHQWV DW WKHPµ $SS DW 3a, is 
contrary to numerous decisions of this Court that 
parties may bring challenges even if they have not 
been personally threatened by those who enforce the 
requirement they seek to challenge. 
In MedImmune, this Court held that the 
)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·V SULRU VWDQGLQJ UXOHVZHUH FRQWUDU\
to precedent including Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937) ´ZKHUH
jurisdiction obtained even though the very reason the 
insurer sought declaratory relief was that the 
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insured had given no indication that he would file 
VXLWµ   86 DW  Q  7KLV KROGLQJ ZDV
consistent with many other decisions from this 
Court.  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) 
ILQGLQJ WKDW SK\VLFLDQV KDYH VWDQGLQJ ´GHVSLWH WKH
fact that the record does not disclose that any one of 
them has been prosecuted, or threatened with 
prosecution, for violation of the State's abortion 
VWDWXWHVµ9LUJLQLDY$P%RRNVHOOHUV$VV·Q,QF484 
U.S. 383, 393 (1988) ´:H DUH QRW WURXEOHG E\ WKH 
pre-­enforcement nature of this suit. The State has 
not suggested that the newly enacted law will not be 
enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise. 
We conclude that plaintiffs have alleged an actual 
and well-­founded fear that the law will be enforced 
DJDLQVW WKHPµ  ,QGHHG DV American Booksellers 
suggests, the burden is on the enforcers to say that 
they will not enforce, a burden Myriad in this case 
has studiously refused to meet.  App. at 286-­87a.  See 
also Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 
376, 382 (2d Cir. 2000) (civil cases);; Biotech. Indus. 
Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
The FHGHUDO&LUFXLW·VQHZO\PLQWHGUXOHWKDWD
party does not have declaratory judgment standing 
unless he or she has been personally threatened by a 
patent holder is even more restrictive than that 
FRXUW·VSULRU´UHDVRQDEOHDSSUHKHQVLRQµWHVWUHMHFWHG
by this Court in MedImmune.  If the proper test is 
applied, based on the findings that all of the 
SODLQWLIIV KDYH EHHQ ´IRUFHG WR FHDVHµ DFWLYLWLHV DV D
UHVXOW RI 0\ULDG·V DFWLRQV WKDW ´HOLPLQDWHG all 
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FRPSHWLWLRQµDQGWKDW´QRWKLQJKDVFKDQJHGµHDFKRI
the plaintiffs has standing.10 
For the reasons stated above, the Federal 
&LUFXLW·V QHZ UXOH is erroneous.  The medical 
organizational plaintiffs and most of the physician 
plaintiffs would be identical for standing purposes to 
Dr. Ostrer, because they have the equipment, 
expertise and desire to engage in testing but have 
UHIUDLQHGVROHO\DVDUHVXOWRI0\ULDG·VUHSHDWHGVXLWV
and threats.  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH )HGHUDO &LUFXLW·V
inflexible standing requirement led it to wrongly 
dismiss the plaintiffs whose standing is based on 
contributory or inducing infringement.  Metabolite 
Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 
1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (disseminating medical 
information and a directory of medical service 
                                                 
10 7KLVZDVQRWWKHFLUFXLW·VRQO\FOHDUHUURU$OWKRXJKWKHSDQHO
found that plaintiff Dr. Ostrer had standing, the court did not 
address the standing of the organizational plaintiff American 
College of Medical Genetics (ACMG), of which Dr. Ostrer is a 
member.  App. at 249a.  The undisputed record reflects that 
JHQH SDWHQWLQJ LV JHUPDQH WR $&0*·V SXUSRVH  $SS DW -­
45a.  Pursuant to well-­established law in this Court, ACMG 
therefore has organizational standing.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 511 (1975).  The panel also asserted WKDW´>Q@RQHRIWKH
plaintiffs besides Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer, allege 
that Myriad directed any letters or other communications 
UHJDUGLQJ LWV SDWHQWV DW WKHPµ  $SS DW D  7KDW LV VLPSO\
incorrect and contrary to the factual findings of the district 
FRXUW3ODLQWLII(OOHQ0DWORII·VGHFODUDWLRQPDNHVFOHDUWKDWVKH
personally had conversations with Myriad in which she was told 
by Myriad that she and geneticists at Yale would violate 
0\ULDG·V SDWHQWV LI WKH\ SHUIRUPHG WHVWV WKDW ZHUH QRW EHLQJ 
offered by Myriad, and which she wanted to perform.  App. at 
264a.  The court of appeals held that a plaintiff had standing if 
0\ULDGGLUHFWHG ´DQ\«FRPPXQLFDWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ LWVSDWHQWV
DWWKHPµ(YHQXQGHUWKDWVWDQGDUG0V0DWORIIKDVVWDQGLQJ 
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providers was sufficient to trigger liability for 
inducing infringement).   
  
 36 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, the petition for 
certiorari should be granted. 
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OPINION 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge.  
Myriad Genetics, Inc. and the Directors of the 
University of Utah Research Foundation 
FROOHFWLYHO\ ´0\ULDGµ DSSHDO IURP WKH GHFLVLRQ RI
the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York holding that an assortment of 
medical organizations, researchers, genetic 
FRXQVHORUV DQG SDWLHQWV FROOHFWLYHO\ ´3ODLQWLIIVµ
have standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
WR FKDOOHQJH 0\ULDG·V SDWHQWV Assoc. for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. 
6XSSG6'1<´DJ Op.µ0\ULDGDOVR
DSSHDOV IURP WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ JUDQWLQJ
summary judgment that all of the challenged claims 
are drawn to non-­patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101. Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
6'1<  ´SJ Op.µ :H DIILUP LQ SDUW DQG
reverse in part.  
On the threshold issue of jurisdiction, we 
DIILUP WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V GHFLVion to exercise 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction because we 
conclude that at least one plaintiff, Dr. Harry Ostrer, 
KDV VWDQGLQJ WR FKDOOHQJH WKH YDOLGLW\ RI 0\ULDG·V
SDWHQWV2QWKHPHULWVZHUHYHUVHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·V
GHFLVLRQ WKDW 0\ULDG·V FRPSRVLWLon claims to 
´LVRODWHGµ '1$ PROHFXOHV FRYHU SDWHQW-­ineligible 
products of nature under § 101 since the molecules as 
claimed do not exist in nature. We also reverse the 
GLVWULFW FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ WKDW0\ULDG·VPHWKRG FODLP
to screening potential cancer therapeutics via 
changes in cell growth rates is directed to a patent-­
ineligible scientific principle. We, however, affirm the 
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FRXUW·VGHFLVLRQWKDW0\ULDG·VPHWKRGFODLPVGLUHFWHG
WR ´FRPSDULQJµ RU ´DQDO\]LQJµ '1$ VHTXHQFHV DUH
patent ineligible;; such claims include no 
transformative steps and cover only patent-­ineligible 
abstract, mental steps.  
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs brought suit against Myriad, 
challenging the patentability of certain composition 
and method claims relating to human genetics. See 
DJ Op., at 369-­76. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that fifteen claims from seven patents 
assigned to Myriad are drawn to patent-­ineligible 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101: claims 1, 2, 5, 
  DQG  RI 86 3DWHQW  ´WKH ·
SDWHQWµFOaims 1, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent 5,837,492 
´WKH ·SDWHQWµ FODLPRI863DWHQW
´WKH ·SDWHQWµ FODLPRI863DWHQW
´WKH ·SDWHQWµ FODLPRI863DWHQW
´WKH ·SDWHQWµ FODLPRI863DWHQW1 
´WKH·SDWHQWµDQGFODLPVDQGRI863DWHQW
´WKH·SDWHQWµ 
The challenged composition claims cover two 
´LVRODWHGµ KXPDQ JHQHV BRCA1 and BRCA2 
FROOHFWLYHO\ ´BRCA1/2µ RU ´BRCAµ DQG FHUWDLQ
alterations, or mutations, in these genes associated 
with a predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers. 
Representative composition claims include claims 1, 
DQGRIWKH·SDWHQW 
1. An isolated DNA coding for a 
BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide 
having the amino acid sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID NO:2.  
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2. The isolated DNA of claim 1, 
wherein said DNA has the 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ 
ID NO:1.  
5. An isolated DNA having at least 
15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1.  
SEQ ID NO:2 depicts the amino acid sequence 
of the BRCA1 protein, and SEQ ID NO: 1 depicts the 
nucleotide sequence of the BRCA1 DNA coding 
UHJLRQ·SDWHQWFROOO-­50.  
All but one of the challenged method claims 
FRYHU PHWKRGV RI ´DQDO\]LQJµ RU ´FRPSDULQJµ D
SDWLHQW·VBRCA sequence with the normal, or wild-­
type, sequence to identify the presence of cancer-­
predisposing mutations. Representative method 
FODLPVLQFOXGHFODLPRIWKH·DQG·SDWHQWV 
1. A method for detecting a germline 
alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said 
alteration selected from the group 
consisting of the alterations set forth 
in Tables 12A, 14, 18 or 19 in a 
human which comprises analyzing a 
sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 
RNA from a human sample or 
analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 
cDNA made from mRNA from said 
human sample with the proviso that 
said germline alteration is not a 
deletion of 4 nucleotides 
corresponding to base numbers 4184-­
4187 of SEQ ID NO:1.  
·SDWHQWFODLPHPSKDVHVDGGHG 
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1. A method for screening a tumor 
sample from a human subject for a 
somatic alteration in a BRCA1 gene 
in said tumor which comprises [] 
comparing a first sequence selected 
from the group consisting of a 
BRCA1 gene from said tumor 
sample, BRCA1 RNA from said 
tumor sample and BRCA1 cDNA 
made from mRNA from said tumor 
sample with a second sequence 
selected from the group consisting of 
BRCA1 gene from a nontumor 
sample of said subject, BRCA1 RNA 
from said nontumor sample and 
BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA 
from said nontumor sample, wherein 
a difference in the sequence of the 
BRCA1 gene, BRCA1 RNA or 
BRCA1 cDNA from said tumor 
sample from the sequence of the 
BRCA1 gene, BRCA1 RNA or 
BRCA1 cDNA from said nontumor 
sample indicates a somatic 
alteration in the BRCA1 gene in said 
tumor sample.  
·SDWHQWFODLPHPSKDVLVDGGHG 
The final method claim challenged by 
Plaintiffs is directed to a method of screening 
potential cancer therapeutics. Specifically, claim 20 
RIWKH·SDWHQWUHDGVDVIROORZV 
20. A method for screening potential 
cancer therapeutics which 
comprises: growing a transformed 
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eukaryotic host cell containing an 
altered BRCA1 gene causing cancer 
in the presence of a compound 
suspected of being a cancer 
therapeutic, growing said 
transformed eukaryotic host cell in 
the absence of said compound, 
determining the rate of growth of 
said host cell in the presence of said 
compound and the rate of growth of 
said host cell in the absence of said 
compound and comparing the growth 
rate of said host cells, wherein a 
slower rate of growth of said host cell 
in the presence of said compound is 
indicative of a cancer therapeutic.  
The challenged claims thus relate to isolated 
gene sequences and diagnostic methods of identifying 
mutations in these sequences. To place this suit in 
context, we take a step back to provide background 
on the science involved, including the identification 
of the BRCA JHQHVDQGWKH3ODLQWLIIV·FRQQHFWLRQVWR
the invention and to Myriad.  
I. 
Human genetics is the study of heredity in 
human beings.1 The human genome, the entirety of 
human genetic information, contains approximately 
25,000 genes, which form the basis of human 
inheritance. The majority of genes act by specifying 
polypeptide chains that form proteins. Proteins in 
                                                                                                                    
1 7KH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V RSLQLRQ SJ Op., at 192-­203, contains a 
detailed and comprehensive discussion of the science involved 
in this case. We repeat only the basics here.  
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turn make up living matter and catalyze all cellular 
processes.  
Chemically, the human genome is composed of 
GHR[\ULERQXFOHLF DFLG ´'1$µ (DFK '1$ PROHFXOH
is made up of repeating units of four nucleotide 
bases³DGHQLQH ´$µ WK\PLQH ´7µ F\WRVLQH ´&µ
DQG JXDQLQH ´*µ³which are covalently linked, or 
bonded,2 together via a sugar-­phosphate, or 
phosphodiester, backbone. DNA generally exists as 
two DNA strands intertwined as a double helix in 
which each base on a strand pairs, or hybridizes, 
with a complementary base on the other strand: A 
pairs with T, and C with G. Figure 1 below depicts 
the structure of a DNA double helix and the 
complementary pairing of the four nucleotide bases, 
represented by A, T, C, and G.  
 
Figure 1 
The linear order of nucleotide bases in a DNA 
PROHFXOH LV UHIHUUHG WR DV LWV ´VHTXHQFHµ 7KH
sequence of a gene is thus denoted by a linear 
VHTXHQFHRI$V7V*VDQG&V´'1$VHTXHQFLQJµRU
´JHQHVHTXHQFLQJµUHIHUVWRWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFKWKH
                                                                                                                    
2 Covalent bonds are chemical bonds characterized by the 
sharing of electrons between atoms in a molecule.  
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precise linear order of nucleotides in a DNA segment 
RUJHQH LVGHWHUPLQHG$JHQH·VQXFOHRWLGH VHTXHQFH
in turn encodes for a linear sequence of amino acids 
that comprise the protein encoded by the gene, e.g., 
the BRCA1 gene encodes for the BRCA1 protein. 
0RVWJHQHVKDYHERWK´H[RQµDQG´LQWURQµVHTXHQFHV
Exons are DNA segments that are necessary for the 
creation of a protein, i.e., that code for a protein. 
Introns are segments of DNA interspersed between 
the exons that, unlike exons, do not code for a 
protein.  
The creation of a protein from a gene 
comprises two steps: transcription and translation. 
)LUVW WKH JHQH VHTXHQFH LV ´WUDQVFULEHGµ LQWR D
GLIIHUHQWQXFOHLFDFLGFDOOHGULERQXFOHLFDFLG´51$µ
RNA has a chemically different sugar-­phosphate 
backbone than DNA, and it utilizes the nucleotide 
EDVH XUDFLO ´8µ LQ SODFH RI WK\PLQH ´7µ )RU
transcription, the DNA double helix is unwound and 
each nucleotide on the non-­coding, or template, DNA 
strand is used to make a complementary RNA 
molecule of the coding DNA strand, i.e., adenine on 
the template DNA strand results in uracil in the 
RNA molecule, thymine results in adenine, guanine 
in cytosine, and cytosine in guanine. The resulting 
´SUH-­51$µ OLNH WKH '1$ IURP ZKLFK LW ZDV
generated, contains both exon and intron sequences. 
Next, the introns are physically excised from the   
pre-­51$PROHFXOH LQ D SURFHVV FDOOHG ´VSOLFLQJµ WR
produce a messengeU51$´P51$µ)LJXUHEHORZ
shows the steps of transcribing a gene that contains 
three exons (exon 1-­3) and two introns (intron 1 and 
2) into a pre-­RNA, followed by RNA splicing of the 
introns to produce an mRNA containing just the exon 
sequences. 
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Figure 2 
Following transcription, the resulting mRNA 
LV ´WUDQVODWHGµ LQWR WKH HQFRGHGSURWHLQ*HQHV DQG
their corresponding mRNAs, encode proteins via 
three-­nucleotide combinations called codons. Each 
codon corresponds to one of the twenty amino acids 
WKDW PDNH XS DOO SURWHLQV RU D ´VWRSµ VLJQDO WKDW
terminates protein translation. For example, the 
codon adenine-­thymine-­guanine (ATG, or UTG in the 
corresponding mRNA), encodes the amino acid 
methionine. The relationship between the sixty-­four 
possible codon sequences and their corresponding 
amino acids is known as the genetic code. Figure 3 
below represents an mRNA molecule that translates 
into a protein of six amino acids (Codon 1, AUG, 
methionine;; Codon 2, ACG, threonine;; Codon 3, GAG, 
glutamic acid;; Codon 4, CUU, leucine;; Codon 5, CGG, 
arginine;; Codon 6, AGC, serine), and ends with one of 
the three stop codons, UAG.  
16a 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Changes, or mutations, in the sequence of a 
human gene can alter the structure as well as the 
function of the resulting protein. Small-­scale changes 
include point mutations in which a change to a single 
nucleotide alters a single amino acid in the encoded 
protein. For example, a base change in the codon 
GCU to CGU changes an alanine in the encoded 
protein to an arginine. Larger scale variations 
include the deletion, rearrangement, or duplication of 
larger DNA segments, ranging from several 
hundreds to over a million nucleotides, and result in 
the elimination, misplacement, or duplication of an 
entire gene or genes. While some mutations have 
OLWWOH RU QR HIIHFW RQ WKH ERG\·V SURFHVVHV RWKHUV
result in disease, or an increased risk of developing a 
particular disease. DNA sequencing is used in 
clinical diagnostic testing to determine whether a 
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gene contains mutations associated with a particular 
disease or risk of a particular disease.  
Nearly every cell in the human body contains 
DQLQGLYLGXDO·VHQWLUHJHQRPH'1$LQWKHFHOOFDOOHG
´QDWLYHµRU´JHQRPLFµ'1$LVSDFNDJHGLQWRWZHQW\-­
three pairs of chromosomes. Chromosomes are 
complex structures of a single DNA molecule 
wrapped around proteins called histones, as shown in 
Figure 4 below.  
Figure 4 
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Humans have twenty-­two pairs of autosomal 
chromosomes, numbered one to twenty-­two according 
to size from largest to smallest, and one pair of sex 
chromosomes, two X chromosomes in females and 
one X and one Y chromosome in males.  
Genomic DNA can be extracted from its 
cellular environment using a number of well-­
established laboratory techniques. A particular 
segment of DNA, such as a gene, can then be excised 
or amplified from the DNA to obtain the isolated 
DNA segment of interest. DNA molecules can also be 
synthesized in the laboratory. One type of synthetic 
'1$ PROHFXOH LV FRPSOHPHQWDU\ '1$ ´F'1$µ
cDNA is synthesized from mRNA using 
complementary base pairing in a manner analogous 
to RNA transcription. The process results in a 
double-­stranded DNA molecule with a sequence 
corresponding to the sequence of an mRNA produced 
by the body. Because it is synthesized from mRNA, 
cDNA contains only the exon sequences, and thus 
none of the intron sequences, from a native gene 
sequence.  
II. 
Mutations in the BRCA genes correlate with 
an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancer. The 
average woman in the United States has around a 
twelve to thirteen percent risk of developing breast 
cancer in her lifetime. Women with BRCA mutations, 
in contrast, face a cumulative risk of between fifty to 
eighty percent of developing breast cancer and a 
cumulative risk of ovarian cancer of between twenty 
to fifty percent. Diagnostic genetic testing for the 
existence of BRCA mutations is therefore an 
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important consideration in the provision of clinical 
care for breast or ovarian cancer. This testing 
provides a patient with information on her risk for 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancers, and thus aids 
in the difficult decision regarding whether to 
undertake preventive options, including prophylactic 
surgery. Diagnostic results can also be an important 
factor in structuring an appropriate course of cancer 
treatment, since certain forms of chemotherapy are 
more effective in treating cancers related to BRCA 
mutations.  
The inventors of the patents in suit identified 
the genetic basis of BRCA1 and BRCA2-­related 
cancers using an analysis called positional cloning. 
Relying on a large set of DNA samples from families 
with inherited breast and ovarian cancers, the 
inventors correlated the occurrence of cancer in 
individual family members with the inheritance of 
certain marker DNA sequences. This allowed the 
inventors to LGHQWLI\RU´PDSµ WKHSK\VLFDO ORFDWLRQ
of the BRCA genes within the human genome and to 
isolate the BRCA genes and determine their exact 
nucleotide sequences. This in turn allowed Myriad to 
provide BRCA diagnostic testing services to women.  
Myriad filed the first patent application 
leading to the patents in suit covering isolated 
BRCA1 DNA and associated diagnostic methods in 
$XJXVW7KHILUVWSDWHQWWKH·SDWHQWLVVXHG
on December 2, 1997. Myriad filed the first 
application leading to the patents in suit covering 
isolated BRCA2 DNA and associated diagnostic 
methods in December 1995, and the first patent, the 
·SDWHQWLVVXHGRQ1RYHPEHU 
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III. 
Myriad, however, was not the only entity to 
implement clinical BRCA testing services. Starting 
LQ  WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 3HQQV\OYDQLD·V *HQHWLF
'LDJQRVWLF /DERUDWRU\ ´*'/µ FR-­directed by 
plaintiffs Haig H. Kazazian, Jr., M.D. and Arupa 
Ganguly, Ph.D., provided BRCA1/2 diagnostic 
services to women. By 1999, however, accusations by 
Myriad tKDW*'/·VBRCA testing services infringed 
its patents forced the lab to stop providing such 
services.  
The first sign of a dispute came in early 1998. 
At that time, Dr. Kazazian recalls a dinner with Dr. 
Mark Skolnick, inventor and Chief Science Office at 
Myriad. At the dinner, Skolnick informed Kazazian 
that Myriad was planning to stop GDL from 
providing clinical BRCA WHVWLQJ LQ OLJKW RI0\ULDG·V
patents. A month or two later, in May 1998, 
Kazazian received a letter from William A. Hockett, 
Director of Corporate Communications at Myriad. 
The letter stated that Myriad knew that Kazazian 
was currently providing BRCA1 diagnostic testing 
services, and that Myriad, as patent holder of five 
patents covering the isolated BRCA1 gene and 
diagnostic testing, was making available to select 
institutions a collaborative license. Attached to the 
OHWWHU ZDV D FRS\ RI 0\ULDG·V FROODERUDWLYH
DJUHHPHQW ZKLFK SURSRVHG VHYHUHO\ OLPLWLQJ *'/·V
testing services to certain tests for patients of 
Ashkenazi Jewish descent. Plaintiff Harry Ostrer, 
0' D UHVHDUFKHU DW1HZ<RUN8QLYHUVLW\ ´1<8µ
School of Medicine, received the same letter and 
collaborative agreement in May 1998, although his 
laboratory did not, at the time, provide such testing 
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services. Rather, Ostrer sent patient samples to GDL 
for BRCA genetic testing.  
Months later, in August 1998, Dr. Kazazian 
received a second letter, this time from George A. 
5LOH\ RI WKH ODZ ILUP2·0HOYHQ\	0\HUV//37KH
letter identified by number five Myriad patents 
´FRYHULQJ DPRQJ RWKHU Whings, the BRCA1 gene 
sequence . . . and methods for detecting alternations 
LQ WKH %5&$ VHTXHQFHµ -$  7KH OHWWHU DOVR
LQGLFDWHGWKDWLW´KDVFRPHWR0\ULDG·VDWWHQWLRQWKDW
you are engaged in commercial testing activities that 
LQIULQJH 0\ULDG·V SDWHQWVµ DQG WKDW ´>X@QOHVV DQG
until a licensing arrangement is completed . . . you 
VKRXOG FHDVH DOO LQIULQJLQJ WHVWLQJ DFWLYLW\µ Id. The 
letter noted, however, that the cease-­and-­desist 
QRWLILFDWLRQGLGQRWDSSO\WRUHVHDUFKWHVWLQJ´IRUWKH
purpose of furthering non-­commercial research 
programs, the results of which are not provided to 
the patient and for which no money is received from 
WKHSDWLHQWRUWKHSDWLHQW·VLQVXUDQFHµId.  
In June 1999, Robert Terrell, the General 
Counsel for University of Pennsylvania, received a 
similar cease-­and-­desist letter from Christopher 
:LJKW0\ULDG·V*HQHUDO&RXQVHO7KH OHWWHU VWDWHG
´,W KDV FRPH WR RXU DWWHQWLRQ WKDW 'U +DLJ +
Kazazian, Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania is 
continuing to willfully engage in commercial BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genetic testing activities, in violation of 
WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI3HQQV\OYDQLD·VSUHYLRXVDVVXUDQFHV
that such commercial testing activities would be 
GLVFRQWLQXHGµ-$7HUUHOOUHVSRQGHGWR:LJKW
by letter on September 10, 1999, VWDWLQJ WKDW ´WKH
University agrees that it will not accept samples for 
%5&$ UHVHDUFK WHVWLQJ IURP WKLUG SDUWLHVµ -$
22a 
  
2891. Kazazian thus informed Dr. Ostrer that GDL 
would no longer be accepting patient samples for 
BRCA testing from him or anyone else as a result of 
the patent infringement assertions made by Myriad. 
As a result, Ostrer started sending patient samples 
for BRCA genetic testing to Myriad, who became 
(and remains today) the only provider of such 
services in the United States.  
During this period, Myriad also initiated 
several patent infringement suits against entities 
providing clinical BRCA testing. Myriad filed suit 
against Oncormed Inc. in 1997 and again in 1998, 
Myriad Genetics v. Oncormed, Nos. 2:97-­cv-­922, 2:98-­
cv-­35 (D. Utah), and the University of Pennsylvania 
in 1998, Myriad Genetics v. Univ. of Pa., No. 2:98-­cv-­
829 (D. Utah). Both lawsuits were later dismissed 
without prejudice after each defendant agreed to 
discontinue all allegedly infringing activity.  
None of the plaintiffs besides Drs. Kazazian, 
Ganguly, and Ostrer, allege that Myriad directed any 
letters or other communications regarding its patents 
at them. Rather, the other researchers and medical 
organization members state simply that knowledge 
RI0\ULDG·VYLJRURXVHQIRUFHPHnt of its patent rights 
against others stopped them from engaging in 
clinical BRCA genetic testing, although they have 
the personnel, expertise, and facilities as well as the 
desire to provide such testing. The patient plaintiffs 
state that they have been unable to obtain any BRCA 
genetic testing or their desired BRCA testing, either 
through their insurance or at a price that they can 
DIIRUGEHFDXVHRI0\ULDG·VSDWHQWSURWHFWLRQ 
Like the other researchers, Dr. Kazazian 
VWDWHVWKDWLI0\ULDG·VSDWHQWVZHUe held invalid, he 
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and Dr. Ganguly would be able to resume BRCA 
testing within a matter of a few weeks. He notes, 
KRZHYHUWKDWWKLVLVRQO\LIWKH\´GHFLGHGWRUHVXPH
%5&$ WHVWLQJµ -$  *DQJXO\ FRQFXUV VWDWLQJ
that if the patents were invalidated, ´, ZRXOG
immediately consider resuming BRCA testing in my 
ODERUDWRU\µ-$2VWUHUDOVRLQGLFDWHVWKDWKLV
lab has all the personnel, facilities, and expertise 
necessary to undertake clinical BRCA testing and 
HPSKDWLFDOO\VWDWHVWKDWKLVODE´ZRXOG immediately 
begin to perform BRCA1/2-­related genetic testing 
XSRQLQYDOLGDWLRQRIWKH0\ULDGSDWHQWVµ-$-­
38.  
IV. 
After Plaintiffs filed suit, Myriad moved to 
have the case dismissed, alleging that the Plaintiffs 
lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment suit 
challenging the validity of its patents. The district 
court disagreed, however, holding that the Plaintiffs 
KDG HVWDEOLVKHG $UWLFOH ,,, VWDQGLQJ XQGHU WKH ´DOO
WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHVµ WHVW DUWLFXODWHG E\ WKH 6XSUHPH
Court in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118, 127 (2007). DJ Op., at 385-­92. The court 
first found that Myriad had engaged in sufficient 
´DIILUPDWLYH DFWVµ EDVHG RQ WKH FRPSDQ\·V DVVHUWLRQ
RI LWV ´ULJKW WR SUHFOXGH RWKHUV IURP HQJDJLQJ LQ
BRCA1/2 genetic testing through personal 
communications, cease-­and-­desist letters, licensing 
RIIHUV DQG OLWLJDWLRQµ WKH UHVXOW RI ZKLFK ZDV ´WKH
widespread understanding that one may engage in 
BRCA1/2 testing at the risk of being sued for 
LQIULQJHPHQW OLDELOLW\ E\ 0\ULDGµ Id. at 390. 
0\ULDG·V DFWLRQV WKH FRXUW FRQFOXGHG KDG SODFHG
´WKH 3ODLQWLIIV LQ SUHFLVHO\ WKH VLWXDWLRQ WKDW WKH
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Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to address: 
the Plaintiffs have the ability and desire to engage in 
BRCA1/2 testing as well as the belief that such 
testing is within their rights, but cannot do so 
ZLWKRXWULVNLQJLQIULQJHPHQWOLDELOLW\µId.  
,Q VR KROGLQJ WKH FRXUW UHMHFWHG 0\ULDG·V
argument that there must be some act directed 
toward the Plaintiffs, noting that Myriad had, in fact, 
taken affirmative acts toward plaintiffs Dr. Kazazian 
and Dr. Ganguly. Id. at 387-­88. The court also 
UHMHFWHG 0\ULDG·V DUJXPHQWV WKDW WKH FHDVH-­and-­
desist letter sent to plaintiff Kazazian was too old to 
support declaratory judgment jurisdiction and that 
the legal actions brought against third parties could 
not be considered in the jurisdictional analysis. Id. at 
388-­89. The court concluded that rigid adherence to 
either of these requirements would be inconsistent 
with MedImmune·V PDQGDWH WKDW WKH FRXUW DVVHVV
the facts alleged under all the circumstances. Id.  
The district court also found that the Plaintiffs 
had alleged sufficient meaningful preparations for 
infringement to establish declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction. Id. at 390-­92. With respect to the 
researchers, the court held it was sufficient that they 
ZHUHDOO´UHDG\ZLOOLQJDQGDEOHµWREHJLQBRCA1/2 
WHVWLQJZLWKLQWKHQRUPDOFRXUVHRIWKHLUODERUDWRULHV·
UHVHDUFK UHMHFWLQJ 0\ULDG·V DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH\
needed to allege specific preparatory activities. Id. at 
390-­ 7KH FRXUW DOVR UHMHFWHG 0\ULDG·V DUJXPHQW
that plaintiffs Kazazian and Ganguly testified only 
WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG ´FRQVLGHUµ HQJDJLQJ LQ DOOHJHGO\
infringing activities, concluding that the proper focus 
of the inquiry is whether they are meaningfully 
prepared, not whether they have made a final, 
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conclusive decision to engage in such activities. Id. at 
391 n.18.  
The parties then moved for summary 
MXGJPHQWRQWKHPHULWVRI3ODLQWLIIV·FKDOOHQJH
WR0\ULDG·VSDWHQWFODLPV7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWKHOGIRU
Plaintiffs, concluding that the fifteen challenged 
claims were drawn to non-­patentable subject matter 
and thus invalid under § 101. SJ Op., at 220-­37. 
Regarding the composition claims, the court held 
that isolated DNA molecules fall within the judicially 
creaWHG ´SURGXFWV RI QDWXUHµ H[FHSWLRQ WR  
EHFDXVH VXFK LVRODWHG '1$V DUH QRW ´PDUNHGO\
GLIIHUHQWµIURPQDWLYH'1$VId. at 222, 232 (quoting 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)). The 
court relied on the fact that, unlike other biological 
moleculeV '1$V DUH WKH ´SK\VLFDO HPERGLPHQW RI
LQIRUPDWLRQµ DQG WKDW WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ LV QRW RQO\
preserved in the claimed isolated DNA molecules, 
but also essential to their utility as molecular tools. 
Id. at 228-­32.  
Turning to the method claims, the court held 
WKHP SDWHQW LQHOLJLEOH XQGHU WKLV FRXUW·V WKHQ
definitive machine-­or-­transformation test. Id. at 233 
(citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
affirmed on other grounds by Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010)). The court held that the claims 
FRYHUHG ´DQDO\]LQJµ RU ´FRPSDULQJµ '1$ VHTXHQFHV
by any method, and thus covered mental processes 
independent of any physical transformations. Id. at 
233-­35. In so holding, the court distinguished 
0\ULDG·V FODLPV IURP WKRVH DW LVVXH LQ Prometheus 
EDVHG RQ WKH ´GHWHUPLQLQJµ VWHS LQ WKH ODWWHU EHLQJ
construed to include the extraction and measurement 
of metabolite levels from a patient sample. SJ Op., at 
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234-­35 (citing Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), cert. granted 2011 WL 973139 (June 20, 
2011)). Alternatively, the court continued, even if the 
claims could be read to include the transformations 
associated with isolating and sequencing human 
DNA, these transformations would constitute no 
more than preparatory data-­gathering steps. Id. at 
236 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 
1989)). Finally, the court held that the one method 
FODLPWR´FRPSDULQJµWKHJURZWKUDWHRIFHOOVFODLPHG
a basic scientific principle and that the 
transformative steps amounted to only preparatory 
data gathering. Id. at 237.  
Myriad appealed. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).  
DISCUSSION 
I. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction 
A. 
The first question we must address is whether 
the district court correctly exercised declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction over this suit. The Declaratory 
-XGJPHQW $FW SURYLGHV WKDW ´,Q D FDVH RI DFWXDO
controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of 
the United States . . . may declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking 
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or 
FRXOGEHVRXJKWµ86&D7KHSKUDVH´D
FDVH RI DFWXDO FRQWURYHUV\µ LQ WKH $FW UHIHUV WR WKH
W\SHV RI ´FDVHVµ DQG ´FRQWURYHUVLHVµ WKDW DUH
justiciable under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 
Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-­40 
(1937).  
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Although no bright-­line rule exists for 
determining whether a declaratory judgment action 
VDWLVILHV $UWLFOH ,,,·V FDVH-­or-­controversy 
requirement, the Supreme Court has held that the 
GLVSXWHPXVWEH´GHILQLWHDQGFRQFUHWHWRXFKLQJWKH
legal relations of parties having adverse legal 
LQWHUHVWVµ ´UHDO DQG VXEVWDQWLDOµ DQG ´DGPL>W@ RI
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive 
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of 
IDFWVµMedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Aetna 
Life, 300 U.S. at 240-­ ´%DVLFDOO\ WKHTXHVWLRQ LQ
each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
ZDUUDQWWKHLVVXDQFHRIDGHFODUDWRU\MXGJPHQWµId. 
(quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. P. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 
270, 273 (1941)).  
In applying MedImmune·V DOO-­the-­
circumstances test to a declaratory judgment action, 
ZH DUH JXLGHG E\ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW·V WKUHH-­part 
framework for determining whether an action 
presents a justiciable Article III controversy: 
standing, ripeness, and mootness. See Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). In this case, the parties have framed 
the jurisdictional issue as one of standing. See 
MedImmune86DWQ´7KHMXVWLFLDELOLW\
problem that arises, when the party seeking 
declaratory relief is himself preventing the 
complainedof injury from occurring, can be described 
LQ WHUPV RI VWDQGLQJ    RU    ULSHQHVVµ LQWHUQDO
citations omitted)).  
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´>7@KH LUUHGXFLEOH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO PLQLPXP RI
standinJ FRQWDLQV WKUHH HOHPHQWVµ Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
´)LUVW WKHSODLQWLIIPXVWKDYH VXIIHUHGDQ LQMXU\ LQ
fact³an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminenWQRWFRQMHFWXUDORUK\SRWKHWLFDOµ
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
´6HFRQG WKHUHPXVWEHDFDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ
the injury and the conduct complained of²the injury 
KDV WR EH ¶IDLUO\    WUDFH>DEOH@ WR WKH FKDOOHQJHG
action of the GHIHQGDQW    ·µ Id. (quoting                   
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-­
  ´7KLUG LWPXVW EH ¶OLNHO\· DV RSSRVHG WR
PHUHO\¶VSHFXODWLYH·WKDWWKHLQMXU\ZLOOEH¶UHGUHVVHG
E\D IDYRUDEOHGHFLVLRQ·µ Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 
426 U.S. at 38, 43).  
´:KHWKHUDQDFWXDO FDVHRU FRQWURYHUV\H[LVWV
so that a district court may entertain an action for a 
declaratory judgment of non-­infringement and/or 
LQYDOLGLW\ LV JRYHUQHG E\ )HGHUDO &LUFXLW ODZµ
MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds, 
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130-­31. Following 
MedImmune, this court has held that, to establish an 
injury in fact traceable to the patentee, a declaratory 
judgment plaintiff must allege both (1) an 
affirmative act by the patentee related to the 
enforcement of his patent rights, SanDisk Corp. v. 
STMicroelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380-­81 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct 
potentially infringing activity, Cat Tech LLC v. 
TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
We review the exercise of declaratory judgment 
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jurisdiction upon a particular set of facts de novo. 
SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1377.  
B. 
0\ULDG FKDOOHQJHV WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V
jurisdictional decision on the grounds that Myriad 
and the Plaintiffs do not have adverse legal interests 
and that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a controversy 
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment. Specifically, 
Myriad argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege 
DQ\´DIILUPDWLYHDFWVµE\0\ULDGZLWKLQWKHSDVWWHQ
years relating to the patents in suit or directed at 
any Plaintiff. According to Myriad, the district court 
HUUHG E\ UHO\LQJ RQ ´VWDOH FRPPXQLFDWLRQVµ GLUHFWHG 
at Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer over a decade 
ago, as well as ten-­year-­old licensing and litigation 
activities directed at third parties, and thus 
H[HUFLVHG MXULVGLFWLRQ EDVHG VROHO\ RQ 3ODLQWLIIV·
subjective fear of suit, arising from rumor and 
innuendo in the research community.  
Plaintiffs respond that they have standing 
under MedImmune·V DOO-­the-­circumstances test 
because, not only are they undisputedly prepared to 
immediately undertake potentially infringing 
activities, but also Myriad took sufficient affirmative 
acts with respect to the patents in suit. Regarding 
the latter, Plaintiffs assert that Myriad sued, 
threatened to sue, or demanded license agreements 
from every known institution offering BRCA clinical 
testing, including university labs directed by 
plaintiffs Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer, forcing 
each to cease such testing. And, according to 
3ODLQWLIIV WKH DZDUHQHVV RI 0\ULDG·V YLJRURXV
assertion of its patent rights still continues to 
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suppress their ability to perform clinical BRCA 
testing, placing Plaintiffs in the very dilemma the 
Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to address: 
they must either proceed with BRCA-­related 
activities and risk liability for patent infringement, 
or refrain from such activities despite believing 
0\ULDG·Vpatents are invalid.  
Under the facts alleged in this case, we 
conclude that one Plaintiff, Dr. Ostrer, has 
established standing to maintain this declaratory 
judgment suit. All Plaintiffs claim standing under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act based on the same 
alleged injury: that they cannot undertake the 
BRCA-­related activities that they desire because of 
0\ULDG·V HQIRUFHPHQW RI LWV SDWHQW ULJKWV FRYHULQJ
BRCA1/2.3 Only three plaintiffs, however, allege an 
injury traceable to Myriad;; only Drs. Kazazian, 
Ganguly, and Ostrer allege affirmative patent 
enforcement actions directed at them by Myriad. Of 
these three, Dr. Ostrer clearly alleges a sufficiently 
real and imminent injury because he alleges an 
intention to actually and immediately engage in 
allegedly infringing BRCA-­related activities. We 
address each in turn.  
Although MedImmune UHOD[HG WKLV FRXUW·V
PRUH UHVWULFWLYH ´UHDVRQDEOH DSSUHKHQVLRQ RI VXLWµ
                                                                                                                    
3 Certain patients also allege an injury based on their inability 
to gain access to affordable BRCA genetic testing because of 
0\ULDG·V SDWHQW GRPLQDQFH RI VXFK VHUYLFHV :KLOH GHQLDO RI
health services can, in certain circumstances, state a judicially 
cognizable injury, see Simon, 426 U.S. at 40-­41, Plaintiffs have 
not pressed this as an independent ground for standing. 
Moreover, we fail to see how the inability to afford a patented 
invention could establish an invasion of a legally protected 
interest for purposes of standing.  
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test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction, SanDisk, 
)G DW  LW GLG QRW DOWHU ´WKH EHGURFN UXOH
that a case or controversy must be based on a real 
and immediate injury or threat of future injury that 
is caused by the defendantsµPrasco, LLC v. Medicis 
Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
Accordingly, following MedImmune, this court has 
continued to hold that declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction will not arise merely on the basis that a 
party learns of the existence of an adversely held 
patent, or even perceives that such a patent poses a 
risk of infringement, in the absence of some 
affirmative act by the patentee. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 
1380-­81. Thus, without defining the outer boundaries 
of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, we have held 
WKDW´ZKHUHDSDWHQWHHDVVHUWVULJKWVXQGHUDSDWHQW
based on certain identified ongoing or planned 
activity of another party, and where that party 
contends that it has the right to engage in the 
accused activity without license, an Article III case or 
FRQWURYHUV\ ZLOO DULVH    µ Id. at 1381;; see also 
Prasco)GDW´$SDWHQWHHFDQFDXVH  
an injury [sufficient to create an actual controversy] 
in a variety of ways, for example, by creating a 
reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit, [or] 
GHPDQGLQJ WKHULJKWWR UR\DOW\SD\PHQWVµ LQWHUQDO
citations omitted)).  
In this case, Myriad demanded a royalty under 
its patents from Dr. Ostrer based on his clinical 
BRCA-­UHODWHG DFWLYLWLHV ,Q 0D\  0\ULDG·V
Director of Corporate Communications sent Ostrer a 
letter proposing a collaborative license. The letter 
stated that Myriad was aware that Ostrer was either 
currently providing, or was interested in initiating, 
BRCA1 diagnostic testing services and that Myriad, 
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as holder of U.S. patents covering the BRCA1 gene 
and diagnostic testing of BRCA1, was making 
available to his institution, NYU Medical Center, a 
limited collaborative license. The collaborative 
license required NYU to make a payment to Myriad 
for each non-­research BRCA test performed.  
At the same time, as Ostrer was aware, 
Myriad was asserting its patent rights against other 
similarly situated parties, a fact to be considered in 
assessing the existence of an actual controversy 
under the totality of circumstances. See Micron 
Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 901 
)HG&LU6RRQDIWHU2VWUHUUHFHLYHG0\ULDG·V
letter, Dr. Kazazian informed him that, because of 
0\ULDG·V DVVHUWLRQ RI LWV SDWHQW ULJKWV DJDLQVW KLP
GDL would no longer be accepting patient samples 
for BRCA JHQHWLF WHVWLQJ 0\ULDG·V DVVHUWLRQ RI LWV
patent rights against Kazazian escalated into a 
patent infringement suit by Myriad against the 
University of Pennsylvania, which was later 
dismissed without prejudice after the University 
agreed to cease all accused BRCA testing services. 
Myriad also sued Oncormed for patent infringement 
based on its BRCA genetic testing services. As a 
UHVXOW RI 0\ULDG·V SDWHQW HQIRUFHPHQW DFWLRQV 'U
Ostrer was forced to send all patient samples to 
Myriad, now the sole provider of BRCA diagnostic 
testing services.  
Dr. Ostrer, on the other hand, maintains that 
he could have proceeded with his BRCA-­related 
clinical activities without taking a license from 
Myriad. This assertion is based on his belief that the 
patents Myriad claims cover such activities are 
invalid because genes are patent-­ineligible products 
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of nature. Acting on his belief, Ostrer seeks in this 
lawsuit a declaration of his right to undertake 
BRCA-­related clinical activities without a license. 
Accordingly, Myriad and Dr. Ostrer have taken 
adverse legal positions regarding whether or not 
Ostrer can engage in BRCA genetic testing without 
LQIULQJLQJDQ\YDOLGFODLPWR´LVRODWHGµBRCA DNAs 
RU PHWKRGV RI ´DQDO\]LQJµ RU ´FRPSDULQJµ BRCA 
VHTXHQFHVDVUHFLWHG LQ0\ULDG·VSDWHQWVSee Aetna 
Life, 300 U.S. at 242 (holding declaratory judgment 
MXULVGLFWLRQ H[LVWHG ZKHQ ´WKH parties had taken 
adverse positions with respect to their existing 
REOLJDWLRQVµRQDQLQVXUDQFHFRQWUDFW 
Dr. Ostrer has also alleged a controversy of 
sufficient reality and immediacy, MedImmune, 549 
U.S. at 127;; he has alleged a concrete and actual 
injuU\ WUDFHDEOH WR 0\ULDG·V DVVHUWLRQ RI LWV SDWHQW
rights, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. First, Ostrer seeks 
to undertake specific BRCA-­related activities³
BRCA diagnostic testing³for which Myriad has 
demanded a license under specific patents³those 
that cover the isolated BRCA genes and BRCA 
GLDJQRVWLFWHVWLQJ7KXV2VWUHUGRHVQRWUHTXHVW´DQ
opinion advising what the law would be upon a 
K\SRWKHWLFDO VWDWH RI IDFWVµAetna Life, 300 U.S. at 
241, but rather whether his proposed BRCA testing 
services are covered by valid patent claims to 
´LVRODWHGµBRCA JHQHV DQGPHWKRGV RI ´FRPSDULQJµ
WKHJHQHV·VHTXHQFHV6HFRQG2VWUHUQRWRQO\KDVWKH
resources and expertise to immediately undertake 
clinical BRCA testing, but also states unequivocally 
that he will immediately begin such testing. In 
contrast to Ostrer, who alleges an actual and 
imminent injury for purposes of standing, Drs. 
Kazazian and Ganguly allege only that they will 
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´FRQVLGHUµUHVXPLQJBRCA WHVWLQJ7KHVH´¶VRPHGD\·
LQWHQWLRQVµ DUH LQVXIILFLHQW WR VXSSRUW DQ ´DFWXDO RU
LPPLQHQWµ LQMXU\ IRU VWDQGLQJ ´ZLWKRXW    DQ\
specification of when the some GD\ ZLOO EHµ Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 564. As a result, Drs. Kazazian and 
Ganguly do not have standing.  
Myriad seeks to escape this result based on 
the timing of its enforcement actions. Specifically, 
Myriad argues that time has extinguished the 
immediacy and reality of any controversy, relying on 
language that hearkens back to our pre-­MedImmune 
reasonable apprehension of suit test. See, e.g., 
$SSHOODQW %U  ´>$@ SDWHQWHH·V WHQ-­year silence 
presumptively extinguishes any reasonable objective 
IHDU RI VXLWµ :H GLVDJUHH ,Q PDQ\ FDVHV D
FRQWURYHUV\ PDGH PDQLIHVW E\ D SDWHQWHH·V
affirmative assertion of its patent rights will 
dissipate as market players and products change. In 
this case, however, the relevant circumstances 
VXUURXQGLQJ 0\ULDG·V DVVHUWLRQ RI LWV SDWHQW ULJKWV
have not changed despite the passage of time.4  
0\ULDG·V DFWLYH HQIRUFHPHQW RI LWV SDWHQW
rights forced Dr. Ostrer, as well as every other 
similarly situated researcher and institution, to 
cease performing the challenged BRCA testing 
services, leaving Myriad as the sole provider of 
BRCA clinical testing to patients in the United 
                                                                                                                    
4  0\ULDG·V DQDORJ\ WR ODFKHV LV DOVRXQFRQYLQFLQJ/DFKHV EDUV
the recovery of pre-­filing damages;; it does not preclude a patent 
action for prospective relief, the type of relief sought here. See 
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc ´>/@DFKHV EDUV UHOLHI RQ D
SDWHQWHH·VFODLPRQO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRGDPDJHVDFFUXHGSULRUWR
VXLWµ  
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States. Since that time, neither the accused activities 
nor the parties· SRVLWLRQV KDYH FKDQJHG )LUVW
Myriad does not allege that genetic testing 
technology has changed in any way that renders its 
past assertions of its patent rights irrelevant to 
2VWUHU·V FXUUHQWO\ SURSRVHG BRCA testing. Rather, 
the patents cover, as Myriad asserted in the late 
1990s, the basic components of any such test: the 
isolated BRCA genes and the diagnostic step of 
FRPSDULQJWKHJHQHV·VHTXHQFHV 
6HFRQG HYHU VLQFH 0\ULDG·V HQIRUFHPHQW
efforts eliminated all competition, Myriad and Ostrer 
have not altered their respective positions. Ostrer, 
VWLOO ODERULQJXQGHU0\ULDG·V WKUHDW RI LQIULQJHPHQW
liability, has not attempted to provide BRCA testing;; 
yet, as a researcher, he remains in the same position 
with respect to his ability and his desire to provide 
BRCA testing as in the late 1990s. Furthermore, 
nothing in the record suggests that any researcher or 
institution has successfully attempted to compete 
with Myriad, or that Myriad has in any way changed 
its position with regard to its patent rights. Just as 
DFWLYH HQIRUFHPHQW RI RQH·V SDWHQW ULJKWV DJDLQVW
others can maintain a real and immediate 
controversy despite the passage of time, see Micron, 
518 F.3d at 901, so too can the successful assertion of 
such rights when the relevant circumstances remain 
unchanged. Thus, consistent with the purpose of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Ostrer need not risk 
liability and treble damages for patent infringement 
before seeking a declaration of his contested legal 
rights. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 134.  
Myriad also argues that the record refutes 
2VWUHU·V FODLP WKDW KH KDV EHHQ UHVWUDLQHG IURP
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engaging in BRCA-­related gene sequencing. 
Specifically, Myriad argues that since Myriad 
published its discoveries of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes in October 1994 and March 1996, respectively, 
over 18,000 scientists have conducted research on the 
BRCA genes and over 8,600 research papers have 
been published. Furthermore, according to Myriad, 
plaintiff Wendy Chung concedes that her lab 
currently conducts sequencing of BRCA genes. Yet, 
both Drs. Chung and Ostrer state that, although 
they conduct gene sequencing, they are forbidden 
from informing their research subjects of the results 
of their BRCA tests without first sending the 
samples to Myriad. Accordingly, Ostrer is restrained 
from the BRCA-­related activity that he desires to 
undertake: clinical diagnostic testing.  
0\ULDG·V FRPPXQLFDWLRQV ZLWK 'U 2VWUHU
confirm this understanding. The licensing letter 
Myriad sent to Ostrer proposed a collaborative 
agreement giving NYU the right to perform 
´5HVHDUFK 7HVWVµ ZLWKRXW SD\PHQW WR 0\ULDG -$
 ´5HVHDUFK 7HVWVµ DUH GHILQHG DV WHVWV WKDW
IXUWKHU ´QRQ-­commercial research programs, the 
results of which are not provided to the patient and 
IRUZKLFKQRPRQH\LVUHFHLYHGµ-$HPSKDsis 
added). In contrast, the agreement requires payment 
WR0\ULDGIRUHDFK´7HVWLQJ6HUYLFHµSHUIRUPHGZLWK
´7HVWLQJ 6HUYLFHVµ GHILQHG DV ´PHGLFDO ODERUDWRU\
testing . . . for the presence or absence of BRCA1 
mutations for the purpose of determining or 
predicting predisposition to, or assessing the risk of 
EUHDVW RU RYDULDQ FDQFHU LQ KXPDQVµ -$ -­67. 
7KXV 0\ULDG·V SDWHQW HQIRUFHPHQW DFWLRQV QHYHU
targeted the non-­clinical BRCA research now cited by 
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0\ULDGDQG2VWUHU·VDELOLW\WRSHUIRUPVXFKUHVHDUch 
does not address the injury asserted here.  
Finally, Myriad argued in its reply brief and at 
RUDODUJXPHQWWKDW3ODLQWLIIV·GHFODUDWRU\DFWLRQZLOO
not afford them the relief they want, a requirement 
for standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-­61;; see also 
MedImmune 86 DW Q ´>$@ OLWLJDQWPD\
not use a declaratory-­judgment action to obtain 
piecemeal adjudication of defenses that would not 
finally and conclusively resolve the underlying 
FRQWURYHUV\µ 6SHFLILFDOO\ 0\ULDG DVVHUWV WKDW
because Plaintiffs have challenged just fifteen 
composition and method claims, while admitting that 
other unchallenged claims to BRCA probes and 
primers will still prevent them from engaging in 
BRCA sequencing, a favorable decision will not 
UHGUHVV WKH 3ODLQWLIIV· DOOHged injury. Again, we 
disagree.  
The Supreme Court has required only that it is 
´OLNHO\µ UDWKHU WKDQ ´PHUHO\ ¶VSHFXODWLYH·µ WKDW WKH
DOOHJHG LQMXU\ ZLOO EH ´UHGUHVVHG E\ D IDYRUDEOH
GHFLVLRQµLujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The Court has not 
required certainty. For example, in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., the Court held that the plaintiffs 
KDG VWDQGLQJ WR FKDOOHQJH D VXEXUE·V H[FOXVLRQDU\
]RQLQJ RUGLQDQFH DV WKH RUGLQDQFH VWRRG DV ´DQ
DEVROXWH EDUULHUµ WR WKH KRXVLQJ Gevelopment 
0HWURSROLWDQ+RXVLQJ'HYHORSPHQW&RUS´0+'&µ
had contracted to provide in the village. 429 U.S. 
252, 261 (1977). The Court noted that injunctive 
UHOLHIZKLOHUHPRYLQJWKH´EDUULHUµRIWKHRUGLQDQFH
ZRXOG QRW ´JXDUDQWHHµ WKDW WKH KRXVLQJ ZRXld be 
built since MHDC still had to secure financing, 
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qualify for federal subsidies, and carry through with 
construction. Id. The Court nevertheless recognized 
WKDW ´DOO KRXVLQJ GHYHORSPHQWV DUH VXEMHFW WR VRPH
H[WHQW WR VLPLODU XQFHUWDLQWLHVµ DQG FRQFOXGed that 
LW ZDV VXIILFLHQW WKDW WKHUH ZDV D ´VXEVWDQWLDO
SUREDELOLW\µ WKDW WKHKRXVLQJGHYHORSPHQWZRXOGEH
built. Id. at 261, 264.  
,Q WKLV FDVH0\ULDG·V FKDOOHQJHG FRPSRVLWLRQ
DQG PHWKRG FODLPV XQGLVSXWHGO\ SURYLGH ´DQ
DEVROXWHEDUULHUµWR'U2VWUHU·VDbility to undertake 
BRCA diagnostic testing activities, and a declaration 
RIWKRVHFODLPV·LQYDOLGLW\ZRXOGUHPRYHWKDWEDUULHU
See id. at 261. Moreover, while there may be other 
patent claims directed to BRCA probes and primers 
that prevent Ostrer from performing BRCA 
diagnostic testing free of infringement liability, 
Myriad has failed to direct us to any specific 
unchallenged claim that will have that effect. And 
3ODLQWLIIV· FRXQVHO VWDWHG DW RUDO DUJXPHQW WKDW KLV
clients can sequence the BRCA genes without using 
BRCA probes and primers. Oral Arg. at                   
34:07-­25, 34:53-­35:29 available at http://www.cafc.  
uscourts.gov/oral-­argument-­recordings/2010-­1406/all. 
Accordingly, we decline to construe claims and hold 
RQ WKLV UHFRUG WKDW 'U 2VWUHU·s proposed BRCA-­
related activities would infringe unchallenged claims 
to primers and probes. We thus conclude that it is 
OLNHO\ QRW PHUHO\ VSHFXODWLYH WKDW 'U 2VWUHU·V
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.  
Accordingly, although we affirm the district 
FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ WR H[HUFLVH GHFODUDWRU\ MXGJPHQW
jurisdiction, we affirm on much narrower grounds. 
The district court failed to limit its jurisdictional 
holding to affirmative acts by the patentee directed 
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at specific Plaintiffs, see San-­Disk, 480 F.3d at 1380-­
81, erroneously holding all the Plaintiffs had 
VWDQGLQJ EDVHG RQ ´WKH ZLGHVSUHDG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
that one may engage in BRCA1/2 testing at the risk 
RI EHLQJ VXHG IRU LQIULQJHPHQW OLDELOLW\ E\0\ULDGµ
DJ Op., at 390. We disagree, and thus we reverse the 
GLVWULFW FRXUW·V KROGLQJ WKDW WKH YDULRXV SODLQWLIIV
other than Dr. Ostrer have standing to maintain this 
declaratory judgment action. Simply disagreeing 
with the existence of a patent or even suffering an 
attenuated, non-­proximate, effect from the existence 
RI D SDWHQW GRHV QRW PHHW WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW·V
requirement for an adverse legal controversy of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment. See MedImmune, 
549 U.S. at 127.  
Having found one plaintiff with standing to 
maintain this declaratory judgment action, see Horne 
v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592-­93 (2009), we may 
WXUQ QRZ WR WKH PHULWV RI 0\ULDG·V DSSHDO RI WKH
GLVWULFW FRXUW·V VXPPDU\ MXGJPHQW GHFLVLRQ ZKLFK
held all fifteen challenged composition and method 
claims invalid under § 101.  
II. Patentable Subject Matter 
8QGHU WKH 3DWHQW $FW ´:KRHYHU LQYHQWV RU
discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
RIWKLVWLWOHµ86&7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDV
consistently construed § 101 broadly, explaining that 
´>L@QFKRRVLQJVXFKH[SDQVLYHWHUPV   PRGLILHGE\
WKH FRPSUHKHQVLYH ¶DQ\· &RQJUHVV plainly 
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contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
ZLGHVFRSHµBilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 
(2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308).  
The Supreme Court, however, has also 
consistently held that § 101, although broad, is not 
unlimited. Id. 7KH&RXUW·V SUHFHGHQWV SURYLGH WKUHH
MXGLFLDOO\FUHDWHGH[FHSWLRQVWR·VEURDGSDWHQW-­
HOLJLELOLW\ SULQFLSOHV ´ODZV RI QDWXUH SK\VLFDO
SKHQRPHQD DQG DEVWUDFW LGHDVµ Id. (quoting 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). The Court has also 
referred to these exceptions as precluding the 
patenting of phenomena of nature, mental processes, 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), and 
products of nature, Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313 
´>7@KHUHOHYDQWGLVWLQFWLRQIRUSXUSRVHVRILV
. between products of nature . . . and human-­made 
LQYHQWLRQVµ7KH&RXUWKDVH[SODLQHGWKDWDOWKRXJK
QRW UHTXLUHG E\ WKH VWDWXWRU\ WH[W ´>W@KH FRQFHSWV
FRYHUHG E\ WKHVH H[FHSWLRQV DUH ¶SDUW RI WKH
storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men 
and reservHGH[FOXVLYHO\WRQRQH·µBilski, 130 S. Ct. 
at 3225 (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948))  
3ODLQWLIIV FKDOOHQJH XQGHU   0\ULDG·V
FRPSRVLWLRQ FODLPV GLUHFWHG WR ´LVRODWHGµ '1$
molecules and method claims direcWHGWR´DQDO\]LQJµ
RU ´FRPSDULQJµ'1$VHTXHQFHV:HDGGUHVVHDFK LQ
turn.  
A. Composition Claims: Isolated DNA Molecules 
i. 
Myriad argues that its challenged composition 
FODLPV WR ´LVRODWHGµ '1$V FRYHU SDWHQW-­eligible 
compositions of matter within the meaning of § 101. 
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According to Myriad, the district court came to a 
contrary conclusion by (1) misreading Supreme Court 
precedent as excluding from patent eligibility all 
´SURGXFWVRIQDWXUHµXQOHVV´PDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWµIURP
naturally occurring ones;; and (2) incorrectly focusing 
not on the differences between isolated and native 
DNAs, but on one similarity: their informational 
content. Rather, Myriad argues, an isolated DNA 
molecule is patent eligible because it is, as claimed, 
´D QRQQDWXUDOO\ RFFXUULQJ FRPSRVLWLRQ RI PDWWHUµ
ZLWK ´D GLVWLQFWLYH QDPH FKDUDFWHU DQG XVHµ
Appellant Br. 41-­42 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
at 309-­10). According to Myriad, isolated DNA does 
not exist in nature, and isolated DNAs, unlike native 
DNAs, can be used as primers and probes for 
diagnosing cancer. Moreover, Myriad asserts that a 
FDWHJRULFDO ´SURGXFWV RI QDWXUHµ H[FHSWLRQ QRW RQO\
would be unworkable, as every composition of matter 
is, at some level, composed of natural materials, but 
DOVRZRXOGEHFRQWUDU\WRWKLVFRXUW·VSrecedents, the 
372·V  Utility Examination Guidelines, and 
&RQJUHVV·VUROHLQHQDFWLQJWKHSDWHQWODZV 
Plaintiffs respond that claims to isolated DNA 
molecules fail to satisfy § 101 because such claims 
cover natural phenomena and products of nature. 
According to Plaintiffs, Supreme Court precedent 
establishes that a product of nature is not patent 
eligible even if, as claimed, it has undergone some 
highly useful change from its natural form. Rather, 
Plaintiffs assert, to be patent eligible a composition 
of matter must also have a distinctive name, 
FKDUDFWHU DQG XVH PDNLQJ LW ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQWµ
from the natural product. In this case, Plaintiffs 
conclude that because isolated DNAs retain the same 
nucleotide sequence as native DNAs, they do not 
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have an\ ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQWµ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV
Furthermore, according to Plaintiffs, the isolated 
DNA claims also have a preemptive effect, excluding 
anyone from working with the BRCA genes.  
The government as amicus curiae does not 
GHIHQGWKH372·VORQJVWDQGLQJposition that isolated 
DNA molecules are patent eligible, arguing instead 
for a middle ground. Specifically, the government 
argues that DNA molecules engineered by man, 
including cDNAs,5 are patent-­eligible compositions of 
matter because, with rare exceptions, they do not 
occur in nature, either in isolation or as contiguous 
sequences within a chromosome. In contrast, the 
government asserts, isolated and unmodified 
genomic DNAs are not patent eligible, but rather 
patent-­ineligible products of nature, since their 
nucleotide sequences exist because of evolution, not 
man.  
At oral argument, the government illustrated 
LWV DUJXPHQW E\ ZD\ RI D ´PDJLF PLFURVFRSHµ WHVW
Oral Arg. at 46:50-­47:50. According to the 
JRYHUQPHQW·V WHVW LI DQ LPDJLQDU\PLFURVFRSH FRXOG
focus in on the claimed DNA molecule as it exists in 
the human body, the claim covers unpatentable 
subject matter. The government thus argues that 
because such a microscope could focus in on the 
claimed isolated BRCA1 or BRCA2 sequences as they 
exist in the human body, the claims covering those 
sequences are not patent eligible. In contrast, the 
government contends, because an imaginary 
microscope could not focus in vivo on a cDNA 
                                                                                                                    
5  According to the government, several of the composition claims 
DW LVVXH LQ WKLV VXLW LQFOXGLQJ FODLP  RI WKH · SDWHQW DUH
limited to cDNA and thus patent eligible.  
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sequence, which is engineered by man to splice 
together non-­contiguous coding sequences (i.e., 
exons), claims covering cDNAs are patent eligible.  
In sum, although the parties and the 
government appear to agree that isolated DNAs are 
compositions of matter, they disagree on whether 
and to what degree such molecules fall within the 
exception for products of nature. As set forth below, 
we conclude that the challenged claims to isolated 
DNAs, whether limited to cDNAs or not, are directed 
to patent-­eligible subject matter under § 101.  
ii. 
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQVLQChakrabarty 
and Funk Brothers set out the framework for 
deciding the patent eligibility of isolated DNA 
molecules.6 
                                                                                                                    
6  Other Supreme Court decisions cited by the parties and amici 
were decided based on lack of novelty, not patentable subject 
matter. In American Wood-­Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating 
Co. WKH &RXUW KHOG WKH FKDOOHQJHG SDWHQW ´YRLG IRU ZDQW RI
QRYHOW\LQWKHPDQXIDFWXUHSDWHQWHGµEHFDXVHWKH´>S@DSHU-­pulp 
obtained from various vegetable substances was in common use 
before the original patent was granted . . . , and whatever may 
be said of their process for obtaining it, the product was in no 
VHQVHQHZµ86   6LPLODUO\ LQCochrane v. 
Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, the Court held that a claim to 
artificial alizarine covered an old and well-­known substance, 
the alizarine of madder, which could not be patented although 
made artificially for the first time. 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884);; see 
also id. at 308-­´,WLVYHU\SODLQWKDWWKHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIWKH
original patent, No. 95,465, states the invention to be a process 
for preparing alizarine, not as a new substance prepared for the 
first time, but as the substance already known as alizarine, to 
be prepared, however, by the new process, which process is to be 
the subject of the patent, and is the process of preparing the 
known product DOL]DULQHIURPDQWKUDFLQHµHPSKDVHVDGGHG 
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In Chakrabarty, the Court addressed the 
question whether a man-­made, living microorganism 
is a patentable manufacture or composition of matter 
within the meaning of § 101. 447 U.S. at 305, 307. 
The microorganisms were bacteria genetically 
engineered with four naturally occurring DNA 
plasmids, each of which enabled the breakdown of a 
different component of crude oil. Id. at 305, 305 n.1. 
The bacteria, as a result, could break down multiple 
components of crude oil, a trait possessed by no 
single naturally occurring bacterium and of 
significant use in more efficiently treating oil spills. 
Id. at 305, 305 n.2. The Court held that the bacteria 
qualified as patentable subject matter because the 
´FODLP LV QRW WR D KLWKHUWR XQNQRZQ QDWXUDO
phenomenon, but to a non-­naturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter³a product of 
KXPDQ LQJHQXLW\ ¶KDYLQJ D GLVWLQFWLYH QDPH
FKDUDFWHU >DQG@ XVH·µ Id. at 309-­10 (quoting 
Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).  
To underscore the point, the Court compared 
&KDNUDEDUW\·V HQJLQHHUHG EDFWHULD ZLWK EDFWHULD
inoculants found unpatentable in Funk Brothers, 
again casting this case decided on obviousness in 
terms of § 101. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 
(1978);; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. In Funk Brothers, the 
patentee discovered that certain strains of nitrogen-­
fixing bacteria associated with leguminous plants do 
not mutually inhibit each other. 333 U.S. at 129-­30. 
Based on this discovery, the patentee produced (and 
claimed) mixed cultures of nitrogen-­fixing species 
capable of inoculating a broader range of leguminous 
plants than single-­species cultures. Id. The Court 
KHOG WKDW WKH EDFWHULD·V TXDOLWLHV RI QRQ-­inhibition 
ZHUH ´OLNH WKH KHDW RI WKH VXQ HOHFWULFLW\ RU WKH
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TXDOLWLHV RIPHWDOVµ WKH ´ZRUN RI QDWXUHµ DQG WKXV
not patentable. Id. at 130. The Court also held that 
application of the newly discovered bacterial trait of 
non-­inhibition to create a mixed bacterial culture 
was not a patentable advance because no species 
acquired a different property or use. Id. at 131. The 
Chakrabarty Court thus concluded that what 
GLVWLQJXLVKHG &KDNUDEDUW\·V EDFWHULD IURP WKRVH
claimed in Funk Brothers, and made the former 
patHQWHOLJLEOHZDVWKDW&KDNUDEDUW\·VEDFWHULDKDG
´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV IURP DQ\
>EDFWHULXP@ IRXQG LQQDWXUHµEDVHGRQ WKHHIIRUWV RI
the patentee. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
The distinction, therefore, between a product 
of nature and a human-­made invention for purposes 
of § 101 turns on a change in the claimed 
FRPSRVLWLRQ·V LGHQWLW\ FRPSDUHGZLWKZKDWH[LVWV LQ
nature. Specifically, the Supreme Court has drawn a 
line between compositions that, even if combined or 
altered in a manner not found in nature, have 
similar characteristics as in nature, and compositions 
WKDW KXPDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQ KDV JLYHQ ´PDUNHGO\
GLIIHUHQWµ RU ´GLVWLQFWLYHµ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV Id. 
Hartranft, 121 U.S. at 615;; see also Am. Fruit 
Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931). 
Applying this test to the isolated DNAs in this case, 
we conclude that the challenged claims are drawn to 
patentable subject matter because the claims cover 
molecules that are markedly different³have a 
distinctive chemical identity and nature³from 
molecules that exist in nature.  
,WLVXQGLVSXWHGWKDW0\ULDG·VFODLPHGLVRODWHG
DNAs exist in a distinctive chemical form³as 
distinctive chemical molecules³from DNAs in the 
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human body, i.e., native DNA. Native DNA exists in 
the body as one of forty-­six large, contiguous DNA 
molecules. Each DNA molecule is itself an integral 
part of a larger structural complex, a chromosome. In 
each chromosome, the DNA molecule is packaged 
around histone proteins into a structure called 
chromatin, which in turn is packaged into the 
chromosomal structure. See supra, Figure 3.  
Isolated DNA, in contrast, is a free-­standing 
portion of a native DNA molecule, frequently a single 
gene. Isolated DNA has been cleaved (i.e., had 
covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) or 
synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally 
occurring DNA molecule. For example, the BRCA1 
gene in its native state resides on chromosome 17, a 
DNA molecule of around eighty million nucleotides. 
Similarly, BRCA2 in its native state is located on 
chromosome 13, a DNA of approximately 114 million 
nucleotides. In contrast, isolated BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, with introns, each consists of just 80,000 or 
so nucleotides. And without introns, BRCA2 shrinks 
to just 10,200 or so nucleotides and BRCA1 to just 
around 5,500 nucleotides. Furthermore, claims 5 and 
 RI WKH · SDWHQW FRYHU LVRODWHG'1$V KDYLQJ DV
few as fifteen nucleotides of a BRCA sequence. 
Accordingly, BRCA1 and BRCA2 in their isolated 
state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists 
in the body;; human intervention in cleaving or 
synthesizing a portion of a native chromosomal DNA 
imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical 
identity from that possessed by native DNA.  
As the above description indicates, isolated 
DNA is not purified DNA. Purification makes pure 
what was the same material, but was previously 
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impure. Although isolated DNA must be removed 
from its native cellular and chromosomal 
environment, it has also been manipulated 
chemically so as to produce a molecule that is 
markedly different from that which exists in the 
body. It has not been purified by being isolated. 
Accordingly, this is not a situation, as in Parke-­Davis 
& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., in which purification of 
adrenaline resulted in the identical molecule being 
´IRU Hvery practical purpose a new thing 
FRPPHUFLDOO\ DQG WKHUDSHXWLFDOO\µ  )  
(C.C.N.Y. 1911). Although, we note, Judge Learned 
+DQG KHOG WKH FODLPHG SXULILHG ´$GUHQDOLQµ WR EH
patentable subject matter. Id. The In re Marden 
cases are similarly inapposite,7 directed as they are 
to the patent ineligibility of purified natural 
                                                                                                                    
7  We note that Bergy is no longer binding law. Bergy was the 
companion case to Charkarbarty, and was vacated by the 
Supreme Court and remanded for dismissal as moot. Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). Other CCPA cases cited 
by the parties and amici were not decided based on patent 
eligibility. In In re Bergstrom, the court held that pure 
prostaglandin compounds, PGE(2) and PGE(3), were improperly 
rejected as lacking novelty. 427 F.2d 1394, 1394 (CCPA 1970);; 
see Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961 (recognizing Bergstrom as a case 
decided under § 102). Similarly in In re Kratz, the court held 
non-­obviousness claims to synthetically produced, substantially 
pure 2-­methyl-­2-­SHQWHQRLF DFLG ´03$µ D FKHPLFDO WKDW
gives strawberries their flavor. 592 F.2d 1169, 1170 (CCPA 
1979);; see also In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 619 (CCPA 1939) 
(holding claims to vitamin C invalid for lack of novelty, as 
´>D@Spellants were not the first to discover or produce [vitamin 
&@LQLWVSXUHIRUPµIn re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (CCPA 1938) 
(holding claims to artificial ultramarine that contains non-­
IORDWDEOH LPSXULWLHV LQYDOLG DV QRW ´LQYHQWLYHµ DQG WKXV DV
obvious).  
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elements³ductile uranium, 47 F.2d 957 (CCPA 
1931), and vanadium, 47 F.2d 958 (CCPA 1931)³
that are inherently ductile in purified form.       
Parke-­Davis and Marden address a situation in 
which claimed compound A is purified from a 
physical mixture that contains compound A. In this 
case, the claimed isolated DNA molecules do not 
exist as in nature within a physical mixture to be 
purified. They have to be chemically cleaved from 
their chemical combination with other genetic 
materials. In other words, in nature, isolated DNAs 
are covalently bonded to such other materials. Thus, 
when cleaved, an isolated DNA molecule is not a 
purified form of a natural material, but a distinct 
chemical entity. In fact, some forms of isolated DNA 
require no purification at all, because DNAs can be 
chemically synthesized directly as isolated molecules.  
The dissent disparages the significance of a 
´FKHPLFDO ERQGµ SUHVXPDEO\ PHDQLQJ D FRYDOHQW
bond, in distinguishing structurally between one 
molecular species and another. But a covalent bond 
is the defining boundary between one molecule and 
DQRWKHU 7KH GLVVHQW·V FLWDWLRQ RI /LQXV 3DXOLQJ·V
FRPPHQWWKDWFRYDOHQWERQGV´PDNHLWFRQYHQLHQWIRU
the chemist to consider [the aggregate] as an 
LQGHSHQGHQWPROHFXODUVSHFLHVµXQGHUOLQHVWKHSRLQW
The covalent bonds in this case separate one 
chemical species from another.  
Plaintiffs argue that because the claimed 
isolated DNAs retain the same nucleotide sequence 
as QDWLYH '1$V WKH\ GR QRW KDYH DQ\ ´PDUNHGO\
GLIIHUHQWµ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV 7KLV DSSURDFK KRZHYHU
looks not at whether isolated DNAs are markedly 
different³have a distinctive characteristic³from 
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naturally occurring DNAs, as the Supreme Court has 
directed, but at one similarity: the information 
FRQWHQW FRQWDLQHG LQ LVRODWHG DQG QDWLYH '1$V·
nucleotide sequence. Adopting this approach, the 
district court disparaged the patent eligibility of 
isolated DNA molecules because their genetic 
function is to transmit information. We disagree, as 
it is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as 
isolated compositions of matter that determines their 
patent eligibility rather than their physiological use 
or benefit. Uses of chemical substances may be 
relevant to the non-­obviousness of these substances 
or to method claims embodying those uses, but the 
patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated 
because it has similar informational properties to a 
different, more complex natural material that 
embodies it. The claimed isolated DNA molecules are 
distinct from their natural existence as portions of 
larger entities, and their informational content is 
irrelevant to that fact. We recognize that biologists 
may think of molecules in terms of their uses, but 
genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature 
and, as such, are best described in patents by their 
structures rather than their functions.  
The district court in effect created a 
categorical rule excluding isolated genes from patent 
eligibility. See SJ Op., at 228-­29. But the Supreme 
&RXUW KDV ´PRUH WKDQ RQFH FDXWLRQHG WKDW FRXUWV
¶VKRXOGQRWUHDGLQWRWKHSDWHQWODZVOLPLWDWLRQVDQG
FRQGLWLRQVZKLFKWKH OHJLVODWXUHKDVQRWH[SUHVVHG·µ
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)), and has repeatedly 
UHMHFWHG QHZ FDWHJRULFDO H[FOXVLRQV IURP  ·V
scope, see id. at 3227-­28 (rejecting the argument that 
business method patents should be categorically 
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excluded from § 101);; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314-­
17 (same for living organisms). We therefore reject 
WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VXQZDUUDQWHGFDWHJRULFDOH[FOXVLRQ
of isolated DNA molecules.  
Because isolated DNAs, not just cDNAs, have 
a markedly different chemical structure compared to 
QDWLYH '1$V ZH UHMHFW WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V SURSRVHG
´PDJLF PLFURVFRSHµ WHVW DV LW PLVXQGHUVWDQGV WKH
difference between science and invention and fails to 
take into account the existence of molecules as 
separate chemical entities. The ability to visualize a 
DNA molecule through a microscope, or by any other 
means, when it is bonded to other genetic material, is 
worlds apart from possessing an isolated DNA 
molecule that is in hand and usable. It is the 
difference between knowledge of nature and reducing 
a portion of nature to concrete form, the latter 
activity being what the patent laws seek to 
HQFRXUDJHDQGSURWHFW7KHJRYHUQPHQW·VPLFURVFRSH
could focus in on a claimed portion of any complex 
molecule, rendering that claimed portion patent 
ineligible, even though that portion never exists as a 
separate molecule in the body or anywhere else in 
nature, and may have an entirely different utility. 
That would discourage innovation. One cannot 
visualize a portion of a complex molecule, including a 
DNA containing a particular gene, and will it into 
isolation as a unique entity. Visualization does not 
cleave and isolate the particular DNA;; that is the act 
of human invention.  
The parties and amici have provided many 
thought-­provoking hypotheticals, each of which 
raises a complicated issue of patent eligibility not 
before the court. Accordingly, we address them only 
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briefly;; courts decide cases, they do not draft legal 
treatises. It is suggested that holding isolated DNAs 
patent eligible opens the door to claims covering 
isolated chemical elements, like lithium;; minerals 
found in the earth, like diamonds;; atomic particles, 
like electrons;; and even organs, like a kidney, and a 
leaf from a tree. None of these examples, however, as 
far as we can discern, presents the case of a claim to 
a composition having a distinctive chemical identity 
from that of the native element, molecule, or 
structure. Elemental lithium is the same element 
whether it is in the earth or isolated;; the diamond is 
the same lattice of carbon molecules, just with the 
earth removed;; the kidney is the same kidney, the 
leaf the same leaf. Some may have a changed form, 
quality, or use when prepared in isolated or purified 
form, but we cannot tell on this record whether the 
changes are sufficiently distinctive to make the 
composition markedly different from the one that 
exists in nature. In contrast, a portion of a native 
DNA molecule³an isolated DNA³has a markedly 
different chemical nature from the native DNA. It is, 
therefore, patentable subject matter.  
7KH GLVVHQW LQGLFDWHV WKDW ZH ´DFNQRZOHGJH>@
that elemental lithium (like other elements) would 
QRW EH SDWHQWDEOH VXEMHFW PDWWHU EHFDXVH LW ¶LV WKH
VDPH HOHPHQW ZKHWKHU LW LV LQ HDUWK RU LVRODWHG·µ
Again, these facts are not before us, so we do not 
attempt to evaluate the patentability of one form of 
lithium over another. Suffice it to say, however, that 
if lithium is found in the earth as other than 
HOHPHQWDO OLWKLXP VXFK DV ´LQ PROHFXODU IRUPµ
´EHFDXVH LW UHDFWVZLWK DLU DQGZDWHUµ LW LV QRW WKH
same material as elemental lithium.  
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It is also important to dispute the dLVVHQW·V
analogy to snapping a leaf from a tree. With respect, 
no one could contemplate that snapping a leaf from a 
tree would be worthy of a patent, whereas isolating 
genes to provide useful diagnostic tools and 
medicines is surely what the patent laws are 
intended to encourage and protect. Snapping a leaf 
from a tree is a physical separation, not one creating 
a new chemical entity.  
The dissent also mentions several times in its 
opinion the breadth of certain claims as grounds for 
objecting to their patentability. However, we do not 
have here any rejection or invalidation on the various 
grounds relating to breadth, such as in 35 U.S.C. § 
112. The issue before us is patent eligibility, not the 
DGHTXDF\ RI WKH SDWHQWV· GLVFORVXUH WR VXSSRUW
particular claims.  
Finally, our decision that isolated DNA 
molecules are patent eligible comports with the 
longstanding practice of the PTO. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stated that changes to 
longstanding practice should come from Congress, 
not the courts. In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Hi-­Bred International, Inc., the Court rejected the 
argument that plants did not fall within the scope of 
UHO\LQJ LQSDUWRQWKH IDFWWKDW´WKH372KDV
assigned utility patents for plants for at least 16 
years and there has been no indication from either 
Congress or agencies with expertise that such 
FRYHUDJHLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK>IHGHUDOODZ@µ86
124, 144-­45 (2001);; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 
 ´>&@RXUWV PXVW be cautious before adopting 
changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the 
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LQYHQWLQJFRPPXQLW\µ FLWLQJWarner-­Jenkinson Co. 
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)));; 
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding a written 
description requirement separate from enablement 
based in part on stare decisis).  
In this case, the PTO has issued patents 
directed to DNA molecules for almost thirty years. In 
the early 1980s, the Office granted the first human 
gene patents. See Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent 
Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
6RF·\   ,W LV HVWLPDWHG WKDW WKH 372 KDV
LVVXHG  SDWHQWV FODLPLQJ ´LVRODWHG '1$µ RYHU
the past twenty-­nine years, J.A. 3710, and that by 
2005, had granted 40,000 DNA-­related patents 
covering, in non-­native form, twenty percent of the 
genes in the human genome, Rogers, supra at 40. In 
2001, the PTO issued Utility Examination 
Guidelines ZKLFK UHDIILUPHG WKH DJHQF\·V SRVLWLRQ
that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible, 66 
Fed. Reg. 1092-­94 (Jan. 5, 2001), and Congress has 
QRW LQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH372·VSRVLWLRQ LVLQFRQVLVWHQW
with § 101. If the law is to be changed, and DNA 
inventions excluded from the broad scope of § 101 
contrary to the settled expectation of the inventing 
community, the decision must come not from the 
courts, but from Congress.  
 
II. Method Claims 
:H WXUQ QH[W WR 0\ULDG·V FKDOOHQJHG PHWKRG
FODLPV 7KH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ SUHGDWHG WKH
6XSUHPH &RXUW·V GHFLVLRQ LQ Bilski, which rejected 
WKLV FRXUW·V PDFKLQH-­or-­transformation test as the 
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exclusive test for determining whether an invention 
is a patent-­eligible process under § 101, although the 
WHVWUHPDLQV´DXVHIXODQGLPSRUWDQWFOXHµ6&W
at 3227. Both parties, however, had the opportunity 
WRDGGUHVVWKH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQLQEULHILQJDQGDWRUDO
arguments. Accordingly, we proceed to the merits, 
DQGZHFRQFOXGHWKDWDOOEXWRQHRI0\ULDG·VPHWKRG
claims are directed to patent-­ineligible, abstract 
mental processes, and fail the machine-­or-­
transformation test.  
$0HWKRGVRI´&RPSDULQJµRU´$QDO\]LQJµ
Sequences 
Myriad argues that its claims to methods of 
´FRPSDULQJµ RU ´DQDO\]LQJµBRCA sequences satisfy 
the machine-­or-­transformation test as applied by this 
court in Prometheus because each requires a 
transformation³extracting and sequencing DNA 
molecules from a human sample³before the 
sequences can be compared or analyzed. According to 
Myriad, the district court failed to recognize the 
transformative nature of the claims by (1) 
PLVFRQVWUXLQJ WKH FODLP WHUP ´VHTXHQFHµ DV MXVW
information, rather than a physical molecule;; and (2) 
erroneously concluding, in the alternative, that 
0\ULDG·V SURSRVHG WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVZHUHPHUH GDWD-­
gathering steps, rather than central to the purpose of 
the claims.  
Plaintiffs respond that these method claims 
are drawn to the abstract idea of comparing one 
sequence to a reference sequence and preempt a 
phenomenon of nature³the correlation of genetic 
mutations with a predisposition to cancer. And, 
accordinJ WR WKH 3ODLQWLIIV OLPLWLQJ WKH FODLPV·
application to a specific technological field, i.e., BRCA 
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gene sequences, is insufficient to render the claims 
patent eligible. Plaintiffs also assert that the claims 
do not meet the machine-­or-­transformation test 
EHFDXVH WKHFODLPV·SODLQ ODQJXDJH LQFOXGHV MXVW WKH
RQH VWHS RI ´FRPSDULQJµ RU ´DQDO\]LQJµ WZR JHQH
sequences.  
:H FRQFOXGH WKDW 0\ULDG·V FODLPV WR
´FRPSDULQJµ RU ´DQDO\]LQJµ WZR JHQH VHTXHQFHV IDOO
outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only 
abstract mental processes. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 
´3KHQRPHQDRIQDWXUHPHQWDOSURFHVVHVDQG
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as 
they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
ZRUNµ7KHFODLPVUHFLWHIRUH[DPSOHD´Pethod for 
VFUHHQLQJ D WXPRU VDPSOHµ E\ ´FRPSDULQJµ D ILUVW
BRCA1 sequence from a tumor sample and a second 
BRCA1 sequence from a non-­tumor sample, wherein 
a difference in sequence indicates an alteration in the 
WXPRU VDPSOH · SDWHQW FODLP 7KLV FODLm thus 
recites nothing more than the abstract mental steps 
necessary to compare two different nucleotide 
sequences: look at the first position in a first 
sequence;; determine the nucleotide sequence at that 
first position;; look at the first position in a second 
sequence;; determine the nucleotide sequence at that 
first position;; determine if the nucleotide at the first 
position in the first sequence and the first position in 
the second sequence are the same or different, 
wherein the latter indicates an alternation;; and 
repeat for the next position.  
Limiting the comparison to just the BRCA 
JHQHVRUDVLQWKHFDVHRIFODLPRIWKH·SDWHQW
to just the identification of particular alterations, 
fails to render the claimed process patent eligible. As 
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the SupUHPH&RXUWKDVKHOG´WKHSURKLELWLRQDJDLQVW
SDWHQWLQJDEVWUDFW LGHDV ¶FDQQRWEHFLUFXPYHQWHGE\
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a 
SDUWLFXODUWHFKQRORJLFDOHQYLURQPHQW·µBilski, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-­92);; see 
also id. DW ´Flook established that limiting an 
abstract idea to one field of use . . . did not make the 
FRQFHSW SDWHQWDEOHµ $OWKRXJK WKH application of a 
formula or abstract idea in a process may describe 
patentable subject matter, id. at 3230, MyrLDG·V
claims do not apply the step of comparing two 
nucleotide sequences in a process. Rather, the step of 
comparing two DNA sequences is the entire process 
claimed.  
To escape this result, Myriad attempts to read 
into its method claims additional, transformative 
steps. As described above, Myriad reads into its 
claims the steps of (1) extracting DNA from a human 
sample, and (2) sequencing the BRCA DNA molecule, 
arguing that both steps necessarily precede the step 
of comparing nucleotide sequences. The claims 
themselves, however, do not include either of these 
steps. The claims do not specify any action prior to 
WKHVWHSRI´FRPSDULQJµRU´DQDO\]LQJµWZRVHTXHQFHV
WKHFODLPVUHFLWH MXVWWKHRQHVWHSRI ´FRPSDULQJµRU
´DQDO\]LQJµ 0RUHRYHU WKRVH WHUPV· SODLQ meaning 
GRHV QRW LQFOXGH 0\ULDG·V SURSRVHG VDPSOH-­
processing steps;; neither comparing nor analyzing 
PHDQV RU LPSOLHV ´H[WUDFWLQJµ RU ´VHTXHQFLQJµ '1$
RURWKHUZLVH´SURFHVVLQJµDKXPDQVDPSOH 
0\ULDG FODLPV WKDW ´FRPSDULQJµ DQG
´DQDO\]LQJµWDNHRQWKLVPHaning when read in light 
of the patent specifications. Specifically, Myriad 
argues that the specifications show that the claim 
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WHUP´VHTXHQFHµUHIHUVQRWWRLQIRUPDWLRQEXWUDWKHU
to a physical DNA molecule, whose sequence must be 
determined before it can be compared. We disagree. 
7KHSDWHQWVSHFLILFDWLRQVPDNHFOHDUWKDW´VHTXHQFHµ
does not exclusively specify a DNA molecule, but 
refers more broadly to the linear sequence of 
nucleotide bases of a DNA molecule. For example, 
Figure 10A-­10H is described as showing the 
´JHQRPLFVHTXHQFHRI%5&$µ ·SDWHQWFROO
Figure 10 does not show a physical DNA molecule;; 
the figure lists a series of letters (Gs, As, Ts, and Cs) 
corresponding to the nucleotides guanine, adenine, 
thymine, and cytosine of a DNA molecule. Similarly, 
WKHSDWHQW VSHFLILFDWLRQV VWDWH WKDW ´>W@KHQXFOHRWLGH
sequence for BRCA1 exon 4 is shown in SEQ ID NO: 
µId. col.53 ll.50-­53. SEQ ID NO: 11 again lists a 
series of Gs, As, Ts, and Cs corresponding to the 
nucleotide sequence of BRCA1 exon 4.  
$FFRUGLQJO\ 0\ULDG·V FKDOOHQJHG PHWKRG
claims are distinguishable from the claims upheld 
under § 101 in Prometheus. In Prometheus, the 
patents claimed methods for optimizing the dosage of 
thiopurine drugs administered to patients with 
gastrointestinal disorders. 628 F.3d at 1350. As 
written, the claimed methods included the steps of 
D ´DGPLQLVWHULQJµ D WKLRSXULQH GUXJ WR D VXEMHFW
DQGRUE´GHWHUPLQLQJµWKHGUXJ·VPHWDEROLWHVOHYHOV
in the subject, wherein the measured metabolite 
levels are compared with predetermined levels to 
optimize drug dosage. Id. In holding that the claims 
satisfied § 101, this court concluded that, in addition 
WRWKH´DGPLQLVWHULQJµVWHSEHLQJWUDQVIRUPDWLYHWKH
´GHWHUPLQLQJµ VWHS ZDV ERWK WUDQVIRUPDWLYH DQG
central to the purpose of the claims. Id. at 1357. 
Specifically, the court held that because the 
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metabolite levels could not be determined by mere 
inspection, the determining step necessarily required 
DWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ´6RPHIRUPRIPDQLSXODWLRQLV
necessary to extract the metabolites from a bodily 
VDPSOH DQG GHWHUPLQH WKHLU FRQFHQWUDWLRQµ Id. 
Moreover, we concluded that this transformation was 
not just insignificant extra-­solution activity or 
necessary data-­gathering steps, but was central to 
the claims, because determining the metabolite 
levels was what enabled the optimization of drug 
dosage. Id.  
0\ULDG·VFODLPVLQFRQWUDVWGRQRWLQFOXGHWKH
VWHS RI ´GHWHUPLQLQJµ WKH VHTXHQFH RI BRCA genes 
by, e.g., isolating the genes from a blood sample and 
sequencing them, or any other necessarily 
transformative step. Rather, the comparison between 
the two sequences can be accomplished by mere 
LQVSHFWLRQ DORQH $FFRUGLQJO\ 0\ULDG·V FODLPHG
methods of comparing or analyzing nucleotide 
sequences fail to satisfy the machine-­or-­
transformation test, and are instead directed to the 
abstract mental process of comparing two nucleotide 
sequences. The claims thus fail to claim a patent-­
eligible process under § 101.  
 
 
B. Method of Screening Potential Cancer 
Therapeutics 
Lastly, ZH WXUQ WR 0\ULDG·V PHWKRG FODLP
directed to a method for screening potential cancer 
WKHUDSHXWLFV YLD FKDQJHV LQ FHOO JURZWK UDWHV ·
patent claim 20. Plaintiffs challenge this claim as 
directed to the abstract idea of comparing the growth 
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rates of two cell populations and as preempting a 
basic scientific principle³that a slower growth rate 
in the presence of a potential therapeutic compound 
suggests that the compound is a cancer therapeutic. 
We disagree.  
Starting with the machine-­or-­transformation 
test, we conclude that the claim includes 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYH VWHSV DQ ´LPSRUWDQW FOXHµ WKDW LW LV
drawn to a patent-­eligible process. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 
at 3227. Specifically, the claim recites a method that 
FRPSULVHV WKH VWHSV RI  ´JURZLQJµ KRVW FHOOV
transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the 
presence or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, 
 ´GHWHUPLQLQJµ WKH JURZWK UDWH RI WKH KRVW FHOOV
with or without the potential therapeutic, and (3) 
´FRPSDULQJµ WKH JURZWK UDWH RI WKH KRVW FHOOV 7KH
claim thus includes more than the abstract mental 
VWHSRIORRNLQJDWWZRQXPEHUVDQG´FRPSDULQJµWZR
KRVWFHOOV·JURZWKUDWHV7KHFODLPLQFOXGHVWKHVWHSV
RI ´JURZLQJµ WUDQVIRUPHG FHOOV LQ WKH SUHVHQFH RU
absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, an 
inherently transformative step involving the 
manipulation of the cells and their growth medium. 
7KHFODLPDOVRLQFOXGHVWKHVWHSRI´GHWHUPLQLQJµWKH
FHOOV· JURZWK UDWHV D VWHS WKDW DOVR QHFHVVDULO\
involves physical manipulation of the cells. 
Furthermore, these steps are central to the purpose 
of the claimed process. See Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 
1356-­57, 1358 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962). 
7KH JRDO RI WKH FODLP LV WR DVVHVV D FRPSRXQG·V
potential as a cancer therapeutic, and growing the 
cells and determining their growth rate is what 
achieves that goal.  
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)XUWKHUPRUH WKH FODLP LV QRW VR ´PDQLIHVWO\
DEVWUDFWµ DV WR FODLP RQO\ D VFLHQWLILF SULQFLSOH DQG
not a patent-­eligible process. See Research Corp. 
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). The claim does not cover all cells, all 
compounds, or all methods of determining the 
therapeutic effect of a compound. Rather, it is tied to 
specific host cells transformed with specific genes 
and grown in the presence or absence of a specific 
type of therapeutic. Moreover, the claim is tied to 
measuring a therapeutic effect on the cells solely by 
FKDQJHV LQ WKH FHOOV· JURZWK UDWH 7KH FODLP WKXV
SUHVHQWV ´IXQFWLRQDO DQG SDOSDEOH DSSOLFDWLRQVµ LQ
the field of biotechnology. Id. at 868;; see also 
Prometheus )G DW  ´>7@KH FODLPV GR QRW
preempt all uses of the natural correlations;; they 
XWLOL]H WKHP LQ D VHULHV RI VSHFLILF VWHSVµ
$FFRUGLQJO\ZHKROGWKDWFODLPRIWKH·SDWHQW
claims patentable subject matter under § 101.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
GLVWULFW FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ WR H[HUFLVH GHFODUDWRU\
judgment jurisdiction over this case, we reverse the 
GLVWULFW FRXUW·V JUDQW RI VXPPDU\ MXGJPHQW ZLWK
UHJDUG WR 0\ULDG·V FRPSRVLWLRQ FODLPV WR LVRODWHG
DNAs, we aIILUP WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW·V JUDQW RI
VXPPDU\ MXGJPHQWZLWK UHJDUG WR0\ULDG·VPHWKRG
claims to comparing or analyzing gene sequences, 
DQGZHUHYHUVHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VJUDQWRIVXPPDU\
MXGJPHQW ZLWK UHJDUG WR 0\ULDG·V PHWKRG FODLP WR
screening potential cancer therapeutics via changes 
in cell growth rates.  
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART 
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No costs  
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MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurring-­in-­part.  
I join the majority opinion with respect to 
standing and the patentability of the method claims 
at issue. I believe, however, that claims directed to 
isolated DNA sequences present a different set of 
issues. I join the majority with respect to claims to 
isolated cDNA sequences, and concur in the 
judgment with respect to the remaining sequences. I 
write separately to explain my reasoning.  
I. 
The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101, allows 
´>Z@KRHYHU LQYHQWV RU GLVFRYHUV DQ\ QHZ DQG XVHIXO
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
PDWWHURUDQ\QHZDQGXVHIXOLPSURYHPHQWWKHUHRIµ
to obtain a patent. The plain language of this statute 
RQO\UHTXLUHVWKDWDQLQYHQWLRQEH´QHZDQGXVHIXOµ
DQG IDOO LQWR RQH RI IRXU FDWHJRULHV D ´SURFHVV
PDFKLQH PDQXIDFWXUH RU FRPSRVLWLRQ RI PDWWHUµ
Congress did not impose any additional constraints 
on the scope of patentable subject matter. In fact, 
´&RQJUHVV LQWHQGHG VWDWXWRU\ VXEMHFW PDWWHU WR
¶LQFOXGH DQ\WKLQJ XQGHU WKH VXQ WKDW LV PDGH E\
PDQ·µDiamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980) (quoting the statutory history).  
While the plain language used by Congress did 
not limit the scope of patentable subject matter in 
WKH VWDWXWH WKH ´&RXUW
V SUHFHGHQWV SURYLGH WKUHH
specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-­eligibility 
SULQFLSOHV ¶ODZVRIQDWXUHSK\VLFDOSKHQRPHQDDQG
DEVWUDFW LGHDV·µ Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
7KHVH H[FHSWLRQV ´UHVW>@ QRW RQ WKH QRWLRQ WKDW
natural phenomena are not processes [or other 
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articulated statutory categories], but rather on the 
more fundamental understanding that they are not 
thHNLQGRI¶GLVFRYHULHV·WKDWWKHVWDWXWHZDVHQDFWHG
WRSURWHFWµParker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).  
Applying the judicially created exception to 
the otherwise broad demarcation of statutory subject 
matter in section 101 can be difficult. See Funk Bros. 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134-­45 
)UDQNIXUWHU-FRQFXUULQJ´>7@HUPVDV ¶WKH
ZRUNRIQDWXUH·DQGWKH¶ODZVRIQDWXUH·DUHYDJXH
and malleable terms . . . . Arguments drawn from 
such terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly 
EHHPSOR\HGWRFKDOOHQJHDOPRVWHYHU\SDWHQWµ7KH
analysis is relatively simple if the invention 
previously existed in nature exactly as claimed. For 
example, naturally existing minerals, a plant found 
in the wild, and physical laws such as gravity or 
E=mc2 are not patentable subject matter, even if 
WKH\ ZHUH ´GLVFRYHUHGµ E\ DQ HQWHUSULVLQJ LQYHQWRU
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.  
Even though an invention did not previously 
exist in nature in exactly the claimed state, however, 
does not automatically mean it is patentable subject 
matter. For example, in Funk Brothers, the Supreme 
Court held a patent to a combination of multiple 
naturally occurring bacterial strains was not 
SDWHQWDEOH$OWKRXJKWKHUHZDV´DQDGYDQWDJHLQWKH
combinationµ ZKLFK ZDV DSSDUHQWO\ ´QHZ DQG
XVHIXOµ QRQH RI WKH EDFWHULDO VWUDLQV ´DFTXLUH>HG@ D
GLIIHUHQW XVHµ LQ FRPELQDWLRQ Id. at 131-­32. The 
aggregation of the bacterial strains into a single 
SURGXFWSURGXFHG´QRQHZEDFWHULDQRFKDQJHLQWKH
six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the 
range of their utility. Each species has the same 
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effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their 
natural way. . . . They serve the ends nature 
originally provided and act quite independently of 
any effort of the pateQWHHµId.  
In contrast, the Supreme Court held bacteria 
that included extra genetic material introduced by 
WKH LQYHQWRU ZHUH ´D QRQQDWXUDOO\ RFFXUULQJ
manufacture or composition of matter³a product of 
KXPDQ LQJHQXLW\ ¶KDYLQJ D GLVWLQFWLYH QDPH
character >DQG@ XVH·µ DQG WKHUHIRUH SDWHQWDEOH
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-­310 (quoting Hartranft 
v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). Chakrabarty 
explained that there is no distinction between 
inventions based on living and inanimate objects for 
the purpose of the patent statute;; instead, the 
´UHOHYDQWGLVWLQFWLRQµ IRU WKH VHFWLRQDQDO\VLV LV
´EHWZHHQ SURGXFWV RI QDWXUH    DQG KXPDQ-­made 
LQYHQWLRQVµId. at 312-­13. Even if the invention was 
based on nature, and resulted in a living organism, it 
may fall within the scope of section 101. For example, 
´WKHZRUNRIWKHSODQWEUHHGHU ¶LQDLGRIQDWXUH·ZDV
SDWHQWDEOH LQYHQWLRQµ EHFDXVH ´¶D SODQW GLVFRYHU\
resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is 
not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by 
QDWXUH XQDLGHG E\ PDQ·µ Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 
315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 6-­8 (1930)). In 
Chakrabarty, the intervention of man resulted in 
EDFWHULD ZLWK ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFVµ
IURPQDWXUHDQG´WKHSRWHQWLDOIRUVLJQLILFDQWXWLOLW\µ
resulting in patentable subject matter. Id. at 310.  
Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty do not stake 
out the exact bounds of patentable subject matter. 
Instead, each applies a flexible test to the specific 
question presented in order to determine whether the 
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claimed invention falls within one of the judicial 
exceptions to patentability. Funk Brothers indicates 
WKDW DQ LQYHQWLRQ ZKLFK ´VHUYH>V@ WKH HQGV QDWXUH
RULJLQDOO\ SURYLGHGµ LV OLNHO\ XQSDWHQWDEOH VXEMHFW
PDWWHUEXWDQ LQYHQWLRQ WKDW LVDQ ´HQODUJHPHQWRI
the rDQJHRI   XWLOLW\µDVFRPSDUHGWRQDWXUHPD\
be patentable. 333 U.S. at 131. Likewise, 
Chakrabarty illustrates that an invention with a 
distinctive name, character, and use, e.g., markedly 
different characteristics with the potential for 
significant utility, is patentable subject matter. 447 
U.S. at 309-­310. Although the two cases result in 
different outcomes, the inquiry itself is similar.  
Courts applied an analogous patentability 
inquiry long before Funk Brothers or Chakrabarty. In 
one notable case, Judge Learned Hand held that 
purified adrenaline, a natural product, was 
patentable subject matter. Judge Hand explained 
that even if the claimed purified adrenaline were 
´PHUHO\ DQ H[WUDFWHG SURGXFWZLWKRXW FKDQJH WKHUH
is no rule that such products are QRW SDWHQWDEOHµ
Parke-­Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 
 6'1<  7KLV LV EHFDXVH ´ZKLOH LW LV RI
course possible logically to call this a purification of 
WKH SULQFLSOHµ WKH UHVXOWLQJ SXULILHG DGUHQDOLQHZDV
´IRU HYHU\ SUDFWLFDO SXUSRse a new thing 
FRPPHUFLDOO\DQGWKHUDSHXWLFDOO\µId. Similarly, in a 
case applying the Patent Act of 1952,1 purified 
vitamin B-­12, another natural product, was also held 
patentable subject matter within the meaning of 
                                                                                                                    
1  The Patent Act of 1952 was the first time patentable subject 
matter (the current section 101) was separated out from novelty 
(the current section 102). Previously, these two concepts were 
combined into a single section.  
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section 101. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. 
Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958). The Fourth 
Circuit explained that purified vitamin B-­ZDV´IDU
from the premise of the [naturally occurring] 
principle. . . . The new product, not just the method, 
had such advantageous characteristics as to replace 
the [naturally occurring] liver products. What was 
SURGXFHG ZDV LQ QR VHQVH DQ ROG SURGXFWµ Id. at 
162-­63. These purified pharmaceutical cases are both 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent: the 
SXULILHG VXEVWDQFH ZDV ´D QHZ WKLQJ   
theUDSHXWLFDOO\µParke-­Davis, 189 F. at 103, and had 
VXFK ´DGYDQWDJHRXV FKDUDFWHULVWLFVµ WKDW ZKDW ZDV
SURGXFHG E\ SXULILFDWLRQ ´ZDV LQ QR VHQVH DQ ROG
SURGXFWµMerck, 253 F.2d at 162-­63. In other words, 
the purified natural products were held to have 
´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFVµ DV FRPSDUHG WR
WKHLPSXUHSURGXFWVZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQ´WKHSRWHQWLDO
IRUVLJQLILFDQWXWLOLW\µChakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
In contrast, mere purification of a naturally 
occurring element is typically insufficient to make it 
patentable subject matter. For example, our 
predecessor court held that claims to purified 
vanadium and purified uranium were not patentable 
subject matter since these were naturally occurring 
elements with inherent physical properties 
unchanged upon purification. See In re Marden, 47 
)G&&3$´>3@XUHYDQDGLXPLVQRW
new in the inventive sense, and, it being a product of 
nature, no one is entitled to a monopoly of the 
VDPHµ In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957 (CCPA 1931) 
´GXFWLOH XUDQLXPµ not patentable because uranium 
is inherently ductile). Likewise, claims to purified 
ductile tungsten were not patentable subject matter 
since pure tungsten existed in nature and was 
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inherently ductile. Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio 
Co., 28 F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928). In each of these 
cases, purification did not result in an element with 
new properties. Instead, the court held the naturally 
occurring element inherently had the same 
characteristics and utility (e.g. ductility) as the 
claimed invention. Consistent with Funk Brothers 
and Chakrabarty, the claims all fell within the laws 
of nature exception.  
As illustrated by these examples, courts have 
long applied the principles articulated in Funk 
Brothers and Chakrabarty to different factual 
scenarios in order to determine whether an 
invention, as claimed, falls into the laws of nature 
exception. I see no reason to deviate from this 
longstanding flexible approach in this case. Keeping 
these principles in mind, I analyze the isolated DNA 
claims below, to determine whether they have 
markedly different characteristics with the potential 
IRU VLJQLILFDQW XWLOLW\ HJ DQ ´HQODUJHPHQW RI WKH
UDQJH RI    XWLOLW\µ DV FRPSDUHG WR QDWXUH
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-­310;; Funk Bros., 333 
U.S. at 131.  
II. 
The majority conducts a thoughtful analysis of 
the scientific principles associated with the claims at 
issue in this case. I write separately here to 
emphasize certain chemical considerations which I 
believe are particularly important in this case.  
DNA is a chemical polymer. In principle, a 
polymeric DNA sequence is no different than any 
other well known polymer, for example, nylon. Like 
any polymer, DNA is made up of repeating monomer 
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units, connected by chemical bonds to form one 
larger molecule. In a DNA sequence, the letters A, C, 
T, and G each represent a different monomer unit;; 
each monomer has a distinct structure, with distinct 
properties. When they are assembled into a DNA 
sequence, these monomers are chemically bonded to 
each other. The process of polymerization of the 
monomer units³whether carried out by chemical or 
biological means³results in a new molecule. For 
example, the sequence A-­T-­C-­G-­T represents a single 
molecule created by polymerizing five monomer 
units: A, T, C, G, and T again. As illustrated by the 
figure below, polymerization changes the monomers 
and results in a molecule with a different ionic 
charge, different chemical bonds, and a different 
chemical composition, as compared to the monomers 
in aggregate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-­T-­C-­G-­T polymer (left) versus the A, T, C, G, 
T aggregated monomers (right)  
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Deconstructing an existing DNA sequence 
leads to similar results: a fragment of a DNA 
sequence has different properties than the parent 
molecule from which it is derived. For example, as 
shown below, a two nucleotide sequence (T-­C), has a 
different chemical structure, and different chemical 
connections than the same subunit found within the 
larger A-­T-­C-­G-­T structure. Despite many 
similarities, it is impossible to find the isolated T-­C 
structure in the A-­T-­C-­G-­T molecule. This is because, 
instead of being connected to a phosphate, the C 
subunit terminates in a different functional group, a 
hydroxyl. Likewise, instead of being connected to 
another sugar via a phosphodiester bond, the T 
subunit instead terminates in a phosphate. The 
isolated T-­C sequence is a different molecule than 
WKH´7-­&µVHTXHQFHDSSHDULQJDVSDUWRIWKHODUJHU$-­
T-­C-­G-­T polymer. These changes are indicated with 
arrows below. 
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A-­T-­C-­G-­T polymer (left, with T-­C highlighted) 
YHUVXV´LVRODWHGµ7-­C molecule (right) 
The isolated DNA sequences at issue in this 
case have the same type of chemical changes, but on 
a much bigger scale. Instead of a string of five 
nucleotides, the chromosome is millions of base pairs;; 
instead of a two-­monomer molecule, the isolated 
molecules claimed in this case range from 15 
nucleotides to thousands (or tens of thousands) of 
nucleotides. Nevertheless, like the simple sequences 
discussed above, just because the same series of 
letters appears in both the chromosome and an 
isolated DNA sequence does not mean they are the 
same molecule. While the isolated DNA molecules 
claimed in this case are undoubtedly inspired by the 
corresponding naturally occurring sequence present 
on the chromosome, man must create these isolated 
DNA molecules. This can be accomplished by 
building them de novo using chemical or biological 
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means, or by chemically altering the larger polymer 
to cleave off adjacent portions.  
Isolation of a DNA sequence is more than 
separating out impurities: the isolated DNA is a 
distinct molecule with different physical 
characteristics than the naturally occurring polymer 
containing the corresponding sequence in nature. 
These differences, of course, are directly related to 
the change in chemical bonds in the isolated DNA. 
Instead of being connected to many thousands of 
DGGLWLRQDO QXFOHRWLGHV DW WKH · DQG · HQGV RI WKH
sequence in question, as is the case in the 
chromosome, the isolated DNA molecules terminate 
in, for example, a hydroxyl and a phosphate group, 
respectively.  
There are other differences between an 
isolated DNA sequence and that same DNA sequence 
as part of the chromosome. The DNA sequence of a 
gene, as it occurs in nature, is part of a much larger 
structure, the chromosome. The claims in suit 
include DNA sequences as short as fifteen 
nucleotides, and the isolated BRCA1 cDNA sequence 
has approximately six thousand nucleotides (see, 
HJ·FRO-­80 (SEQ ID NO:1)). Both of these are 
much smaller than the isolated full length BRCA1 
gene sequence, which, as discussed below, includes 
both exon and intron sequences. Even the isolated 
BRCA1 gene, however, is substantially smaller than 
chromosome 17, which includes the unisolated 
BRCA1 gene as well as many other genes. J.A. 4321. 
Isolation of a DNA sequence thus results in a 
substantially smaller molecule compared to the 
naturally occurring sequence as part of the 
chromosome.  
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cDNA, unlike isolated or unisolated DNA, has 
a unique sequence of DNA bases (A, C, G, T) which is 
not actually present in nature. While cDNA is 
derived from RNA, it has a distinctly different 
sequence of nucleotides, substituting in the 
complementary nucleotide (swapping G and C, and A 
and T/U) to form a DNA sequence that is completely 
different than the corresponding RNA. There is no 
contiguous sequence on the chromosome that 
duplicates the cDNA sequence. Moreover, the 
naturally occurring gene sequence includes both 
introns (which are removed) and exons (which are 
included in the mature RNA). The cDNA sequences, 
which are complementary to the mature RNA, do not 
include the introns.  
Schematic illustrating RNA splicing (J.A. 
4331) 
Creating isolated DNA allows a scientist, 
among other things, to remove potentially 
confounding sequences that are naturally present in 
the larger chromosomal polymer, and instead focus 
on just the sequence of interest. This aspect of 
isolated DNA has important practical consequences 
and leads to additional utility, particularly for the 
smaller isolated fragments. For example, a small 
fragment of isolated DNA can be used as a primer in 
order to selectively detect the presence of the BRCA1 
gene or BRCA1 gene mutation in a patient. Armed 
with this scientific background, we can now apply the 
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principles of Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty to the 
isolated DNA claims at issue.  
III. 
The isolated DNA claims of the patents in suit 
fall into two categories. The first category of claims is 
directed to isolated sequences that are identical to 
naturally occurring gene sequences. These include 
claims encompassing both the isolated full length 
JHQHVHTXHQFHHJFODLPRI·SDWHQWZKLFKDUH
thousands of nucleotides, and claims to shorter 
isolated DNA strands, with as few as fifteen 
nucleotides, whose nucleotide sequence is found on 
the chromosome (e.g. claim  RI · SDWHQW 7KH
second category of claims is directed to isolated DNA 
sequences that are different from the naturally 
occurring gene sequences. These include claims to 
LVRODWHG F'1$ PROHFXOHV HJ FODLP  RI WKH ·
patent), which differ from the natural gene sequence 
in that the introns are removed, and are the opposite 
(complementary) sequence of the naturally occurring 
RNA.  
The cDNA claims present the easiest analysis. 
Although the plaintiffs (now plaintiff) in the suit 
argue, and the district court held, that cDNA falls 
ZLWKLQ WKH ´ODZVRIQDWXUHµ H[FHSWLRQ WR VHFWLRQ
patentability, I cannot reconcile this argument with 
the fact that the claimed cDNA sequences do not 
exist in nature. Moreover, since cDNA has all of the 
introns removed, and only contains the coding 
nucleotides, it can be used to express a protein in a 
cell which does not normally produce it. Of course, 
the claimed isolated cDNA is inspired by nature³
after all, naturally occurring RNA is the template 
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upon which cDNA is constructed. Because it is used 
as a template, however, cDNA has a complementary 
sequence of nucleotides, and therefore has a 
completely different nucleotide sequence than the 
RNA. Moreover, DNA has a different chemical 
structure than RNA, including a different base (T 
instead of U, respectively) and sugar units 
(deoxyribose instead of ribose, respectively). This 
results in, among other things, greater stability for 
the DNA sequence as compared to the RNA 
sequence.  
cDNA sequences thus have a distinctive name, 
character, and use, with markedly different chemical 
characteristics from either the naturally occurring 
RNA or any continuous DNA sequence found on the 
chromosome. The claimed isolated cDNA sequences 
are the creation of man, made using biological tools 
and the naturally occurring mRNA as a template. 
F'1$LVWKHUHIRUHQRWRQHRIWKH´¶PDQLIHVWDWLRQVRI
. . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
QRQH·µ WKDW IDOOV RXWVLGH RI WKH SDWHQW V\VWHP
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros., 
333 U.S. at 130). I decline to extend the laws of 
nature exception to reach entirely manmade 
sequences of isolated DNA, even if those sequences 
are inspired by a natural template. I therefore join 
the majority opinion with respect to the claims to 
cDNA sequences.2 
DNA sequences that have the same pattern of 
DNA bases as a natural gene, in whole or in part, 
                                                                                                                    
2  To the extent the claims to shorter portions of cDNA include 
only naturally occurring sequences found in the chromosome, 
IRUH[DPSOHFODLPRIWKH·SDWHQWP\UHDVRQLQJLVWKHVDPH
as for the isolated sequences of claim 5, discussed below.  
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present a more difficult issue. Unlike the isolated 
cDNA molecules, whose sequence is not present in 
nature, these kinds of isolated DNA claims include 
nucleotide sequences which are found in the human 
body, albeit as part of a much larger molecule, the 
chromosome. The majority analysis focuses on the 
´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKHPLFDO VWUXFWXUHµ RI LVRODWHG
DNAs, as compared to the corresponding native 
DNA. Majority at 45. Although the different chemical 
structure does suggest that claimed DNA is not a 
product of nature, I do not think this difference alone 
QHFHVVDULO\ PDNHV LVRODWHG '1$ VR ´PDUNHGO\
GLIIHUHQWµ Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310, from 
chromosomal DNA so as to be per se patentable 
subject matter. Cf. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130-­31 
&UHDWLRQ RI ´D QHZ DQG GLIIHUHQW FRPSRVLWLRQµ RI
bacterial strains was nevertheless not patentable 
subject matter).  
Given the chemical differences highlighted by 
-XGJH/RXULH·s opinion and discussed supra, the mere 
fact that the larger chromosomal polymer includes 
the same sequence of nucleotides as the smaller 
isolated DNA is not enough to make it per se a law of 
nature and remove it from the scope of patentable 
subject matter. The actual molecules claimed in this 
case are therefore not squarely analogous to 
unpatentable minerals, created by nature without 
the assistance of man. Instead, the claimed isolated 
DNA molecules, which are truncations (with 
different ends) of the naturally occurring DNA found 
as part of the chromosome in nature, are not 
naturally produced without the intervention of man. 
Cf. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 312-­13.  
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Given the differences, we should, as precedent 
instructs, consider whether these differences impart 
a new utility which makes the molecules markedly 
different from nature. I begin with the short isolated 
sequences such as those covered by claim 5 which is 
GLUHFWHG WR ´DQ LVRODWHG '1$ KDYLQJ DW OHDVW 
QXFOHRWLGHVRIWKH'1$RIFODLPµ7KLVFODLPcovers 
a sequence as short as 15 nucleotides and arguably 
as long as the entire gene. For this claim to be patent 
eligible, all of the sequences ranging from the 15 
nucleotide sequence to the full gene must be 
patentable subject matter. The shorter isolated DNA 
sequences have a variety of applications and uses in 
isolation that are new and distinct as compared to 
the sequence as it occurs in nature. For example, 
these sequences can be used as primers in a 
diagnostic screening process to detect gene 
mutations. These smaller isolated DNA sequences³
including isolated radiolabeled sequences mirroring 
those on the chromosome³can also be used as the 
basis for probes. Naturally occurring DNA cannot be 
used to accomplish these same goals. Unlike the 
isolated DNA, naturally occurring DNA simply does 
not have the requisite chemical and physical 
properties needed to perform these functions.  
The ability to use isolated DNA molecules as 
the basis for diagnostic genetic testing is clearly an 
´HQODUJHPHQWRIWKHUDQJHRI XWLOLW\µDVFRPSDUHG
to nature. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. Indeed, many 
of the plaintiffs in this case submitted declarations 
indicating that they wanted to either offer such 
testing or receive such testing. These new 
applications, of course, rely on physical properties 
devised by nature, namely the ability of a strand of 
DNA to specifically interact with a complementary 
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strand. Diagnostic testing, however, is not a natural 
utility³the body does not naturally engage in this 
type of testing, and certainly does not do so with the 
shorter (non-­naturally occurring) isolated DNA used 
E\PDQ$V VXFK WKH FODLPHG'1$GRHV QRW ´VHUYH
WKHHQGVQDWXUHRULJLQDOO\SURYLGHGµId. Instead, the 
isolated DNA sequences have markedly different 
properties which are directly responsible for their 
new and significant utility. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 
309-­10. The same sequence, as it appears in nature 
as part of the chromosome, simply cannot be used in 
the same way. Because the different chemical 
structure of the isolated DNA, which is a product of 
the intervention of man, leads to a different and 
beneficial utility, I believe small, isolated DNA 
fragments are patentable subject matter.  
,Q IDFW PXFK RI WKH GLVVHQW·V DQDO\VLV ZLWK
regard to the full gene would seem to support my 
conclusion that small isolated DNA molecules are 
directed to patent-­eligible subject matter. The 
dissent explains why the baseball bat is directed to 
SDWHQWHOLJLEOHVXEMHFWPDWWHU ´PDQKDVGHILQHGWKH
parts that are to be retained and the parts that are to 
be discarded. The result of the process of selection is 
a product with a function that is entirely different 
from that of the raw material from which it was 
REWDLQHGµ 'LVVHQW DW  7KH H[DFW VDPH WKLQJ LV
true with regard to primer and probe claims. Man 
has whittled the chromosomal DNA molecule down 
to a 15 nucleotide sequence³defining the parts to be 
retained and discarded. And the result is a product 
with a function (primer or probe) that is entirely 
different from the full gene from which it was 
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obtained.3 I conclude that the small, isolated DNA 
molecules, are an alteration of the natural product 
´ZLWK PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV IURP DQ\
found in nature and one having the potential for 
VLJQLILFDQWXWLOLW\µChakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
Longer strands of isolated DNA, in particular 
isolated strands which include most or all of the 
entire gene, are a much closer case. Some of the 
FODLPVDWLVVXHIRUH[DPSOH ·SDWHQWFODLPDUH
genus claims, drafted broadly enough to include both 
short fragments as well as the entire isolated gene 
sequence. As discussed above, I believe many species 
within this genus³the shorter isolated DNA 
fragments³are clearly patentable subject matter 
based on their new structure and corresponding 
enlarged range of utility. Yet that still leaves species 
that include most or all of the isolated gene sequence. 
While I ultimately conclude that these longer 
isolated sequences, including the isolated gene 
sequence as a whole, are also patentable subject 
matter, I do so for a reason different than for the 
shorter sequences.  
All of the same structural arguments apply to 
any length of isolated DNA so, like the shorter 
strands, an isolated DNA coding for a gene does have 
a literal chemical difference from the gene as it 
appears on the chromosome. Different ends in a 15 
nucleotide sequence have greater significance than 
different ends in a 6000 nucleotide sequence. Unlike 
                                                                                                                    
3  The dissent analogizes the full BRCA gene to a slab of marble 
found in the earth as distinct from the sculpture carved into it, 
which the dissent indicates would be worthy of intellectual 
property protection. If the multi-­thousand nucleotide BRCA 
JHQHLVWKHVODELVQ·WWKHQXFOHRWLGHSULPHUthe sculpture?  
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the shorter strands of isolated DNA, the chemical 
and structural differences in the isolated gene do not 
FOHDUO\ OHDG WR DQ ´HQODUJHPHQW RI WKH UDQJH RI   
XWLOLW\µDVFRPSDUHGWRQDWXUHFunk Bros., 333 U.S. 
at 131. For example, the full length gene is too large 
to be used as a probe. See J.A. 4322 (a probe is a 
DNA molecule usually 100-­1,000 bases long). 
Likewise, an entire isolated gene appears unsuitable 
for use as a primer in genetic screening for mutations 
in that same gene. See -$  3ULPHUV ´DUH
complementary to an exact location of a much larger 
target '1$ PROHFXOHµ HPSKDVLV DGGHG $V VXch, 
the chemical and structural differences in an isolated 
DNA sequence which includes most or all of a gene 
do not clearly lead to significant new utility as 
compared to nature. Whether an isolated gene is 
patentable subject matter depends on how much 
weight is allocated to the different structure as 
compared to the similarity of the function to nature.  
If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, 
I might conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that 
includes most or all of a gene is not patentable 
subject matter. Despite the literal chemical 
difference, the isolated full length gene does not 
clearly have a new utility and appears to simply 
serve the same ends devised by nature, namely to act 
as a gene encoding a protein sequence. This case, 
however, comes to us with a substantial historical 
background.  
Congress has, for centuries, authorized an 
expansive scope of patentable subject matter. 
Likewise, the United States Patent Office has 
allowed patents on isolated DNA sequences for 
decades, and, more generally, has allowed patents on 
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purified natural products for centuries. There are 
now thousands of patents with claims to isolated 
DNA, and some unknown (but certainly large) 
number of patents to purified natural products or 
fragments thereof.4 As I explain below, I believe we 
must be particularly wary of expanding the judicial 
exception to patentable subject matter where both 
settled expectations and extensive property rights 
are involved. Combined with my belief that we 
should defer to Congress, these settled expectations 
tip the scale in favor of patentability.5  
IV. 
)RU PRUH WKDQ D GHFDGH WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V
SROLF\KDVEHHQWKDW´>D@QLVRODWHGDQGSXULILHG'1$
molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally 
occurring gene is eligible for a patent because . . . 
                                                                                                                    
4   See, e.g., U.S. Patent 3,067,099 (claiming vancomycin, an 
antibiotic produced by bacteria found in soil) and U.S. Patent 
4,552,701 (claiming a vancomycin fragment produced by 
removing a sugar unit). A natural product fragment, for 
example a naturally occurring antibiotic with a sugar moiety 
removed, is highly analogous to isolated DNA. In each case, the 
claimed molecule is a smaller fragment of a naturally occurring 
molecule, with some naturally occurring functionality removed. 
See U.S. Patent 4,552,701, col.3-­4 (compare entry 2 with entries 
10 and 13).  
5  My analysis of the claims at issue assumes that they do not 
include an isolated, full length chromosome. I do not believe 
that a claim to an entire chromosome, for example chromosome 
17, is patentable subject matter. First, there is no indication 
that the chromosome in isolation has markedly different 
characteristics compared to the chromosome in nature. Second, 
unlike claims to isolated genes, there is no indication of either 
settled expectations or extensive property rights for claims to 
isolated chromosomes. This is undoubtedly due to the small 
number of chromosomes as compared to the number of genes.  
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that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated 
IRUPLQQDWXUHµ)HG5HJ-DQ
 7KH H[SOLFLW VWDWHPHQW RI WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V
position on isolated DNA, however, is simply a 
continuation of a longstanding and consistent policy 
of allowing patents for isolated natural products. See 
id. QRWLQJ 86 3DWHQW  FODLPLQJ ´>\@HDVW
IUHH IURPRUJDQLF JHUPV RI GLVHDVHµ LVVXHG WR/RXLV
Pasteur in 1873);; cf. In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 
(CCPA 1970) (isolated prostaglandins patentable). 
According to the Patent Office, isolated DNA is no 
different from the isolated natural products of Parke-­
Davis. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093 (quoting Parke-­
Davis).  
Even before the current guidelines formalized 
WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V SRVLWLRQ however, it granted 
patents to human genes in the early 1980s, and 
subsequently issued thousands of patents on 
´LVRODWHG '1$µ 0DMRULW\ DW  ,Q IDFW FODLPV
similar to the ones at issue in this case have been the 
focal point of important litigation. For example, 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 
 )HG &LU  LQYROYHG D FODLP WR ´¶>D@
purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting 
essentially of a DNA sequence encoding human 
HU\WKURSRLHWLQ·µ Id. at 1203-­04 (quoting U.S. Patent 
No. 4,703,008, claim 2). We affirmed that this claim 
was valid and infringed. Id. at 1219. Erythropoietin, 
also known as EPO, went on to become the biggest-­
selling biotechnology drug developed to that point, 
resulted in billions of dollars in sales, and accounted 
IRU RYHU  RI $PJHQ·V UHYHQXH LQ  Amgen, 
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 
69, 77 (D. Mass. 2001). Isolated DNA claims, at least 
82a 
  
in the case of Amgen, represent crucial and 
exceedingly valuable property rights.  
The settled expectations of the biotechnology 
industry³not to mention the thousands of issued 
patents³cannot be taken lightly and deserve 
deference. This outpouring of scientific creativity, 
spurred by the patent system, reflects a substantial 
investment of time and money by the biotechnology 
industry to obtain property rights related to DNA 
sequences. The type of fundamental alteration in the 
scope of patentable subject matter argued in this 
FDVH´ULVN>V@GHVWUR\LQJWKHOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVRI
inventors in their pURSHUW\µFesto Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 
(2002). I believe leaving intact the settled 
expectations of property owners is particularly 
important in light of the large number of property 
rights involved, both to isolated DNA and to purified 
natural products generally.  
7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV ZDUQHG WKDW ´FRXUWV
must be cautious before adopting changes that 
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing 
FRPPXQLW\µ Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. The settled 
expectations of the inventing community with 
respect to isolated DNA claims are built upon the 
broad language of the statute, judicial precedent, 
such as Parke-­Davis and Merck, and the Patent 
2IILFH·V ORQJ-­standing policy and practice. Neither 
Funk Brothers nor Chakrabarty purported to 
RYHUUXOHHLWKHUWKHHDUO\FDVHVRUWKH3DWHQW2IILFH·V
practice;; indeed, as discussed supra, these cases 
weigh the same considerations as Parke-­Davis and 
Merck ´¶7R FKDQJH VR VXEVWDQWLDOO\ WKH UXOHV RI WKH
JDPH QRZ·µ DIWHU PRUH WKDQ D FHQWXUy of practice, 
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´¶FRXOG YHU\ ZHOO VXEYHUW WKH YDULRXV EDODQFHV WKH
PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous 
patents which have not yet expired and which would 
EH DIIHFWHG E\ RXU GHFLVLRQ·µFesto, 535 U.S. at 739 
(quoting Warner-­Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997)).  
Although the Patent Office has consistently 
followed the same policy for a decade (and arguably a 
century or more), the United States, as an amicus 
represented at argument by the Solicitor General, 
now argueV WKDW WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V SXEOLVKHG
guidelines are incorrect and a misstatement of the 
law. In place of these guidelines, the Solicitor 
*HQHUDO VXJJHVWHG WKDW ZH VKRXOG XVH D ´PDJLF
PLFURVFRSHµDVSDUWRIRXUVHFWLRQDQDO\VLV,IZH
could observe the claimed substance in nature using 
this microscope, the Solicitor General argues, it is not 
patentable. The magic microscope test applies 
equally to portions of a larger, naturally occurring 
molecule. For example, the optical field of view could 
be zoomed to see just a sequence of fifteen 
nucleotides within the chromosome. As long as you 
FRXOG´VHHµWKHFODLPHGPROHFXOHLQQDWXUHXVLQJWKH
PDJLF PLFURVFRSH LW ZRXOG IDOO LQWR WKH ´ODZV RI
QDWXUHµ H[FHSWLRQ DQG EH XQSDWHQWDEOH VXEMHFW
matter.  
Certainly the magic microscope has curb 
appeal³its child-­like simplicity an apparent virtue. 
The magic microscope, however, would not see the 
claimed DNA molecules at issue in this case. An 
isolated DNA molecule has different chemical bonds 
DV FRPSDUHG WR WKH ´XQLVRODWHGµ VHTXHQFH LQ WKH
chromosome (the ends are different). In short, the 
claimed molecules cannot be seen in nature through 
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the magic microscope. While you may be able to see 
the order of DNA nucleotides in the chromosome, the 
isolated fragment of DNA is a different molecule. It 
may be that the microscope can also break and form 
chemical bonds to yield the claimed isolated DNA. 
Even so, the microscope must make some decisions: 
should the isolated DNA begin and end in a 
phosphate? a hydrogen? a hydroxyl? a methyl group? 
an acyl group? These decisions might be obvious to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art, but they are not 
inherent to the unisolated sequence as part of the 
chromosome. Creating the claimed isolated DNA 
sequences therefore results in a distinctly unnatural 
molecule.6 Even the dissent agrees that the isolated 
DNA molecules at issue require cleaving chemical 
bonds, though it disputes the importance of the 
UHVXOWLQJ GLVWLQFW ´¶PROHFXODU VSHFLHV·µ 'LVVHQW DW 
(quoting Linus Pauling, The Nature of the Chemical 
Bond 6 (3d ed. 1960)). The magic microscope test 
simply does not work the way the government 
claims.  
                                                                                                                    
6   7KLV DOVR LOOXVWUDWHV ZK\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V DQDORJLHV WR
situations dealing with elements, for example lithium, are 
LQDSSRVLWH (YHQ DVVXPLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW
lithium does not exist in isolated form in nature, it is 
nevertheless clear that elemental lithium, a basic building block 
provided by nature, at some point must have reacted with, e.g., 
water to form the naturally occurring lithium salts. In contrast, 
an isolated DNA sequence did not necessarily exist before 
reacting further to produce the corresponding naturally 
occurring chromosomal DNA. Unlike a lithium salt, the 
chromosome does not imply that an isolated DNA molecule of 
15 nucleotides³or even a gene³necessarily previously existed 
as an isolated molecule in nature.  
  
85a 
  
While the magic microscope creates a bright 
line rule, it presents a poorly defined question: can 
ZH ´VHHµ WKH FODLPHG PROHFXOH RU VRPHWKLQJ Iairly 
similar, in nature? Even if the scientific imprecision 
of the test were excusable, the government also asks 
us to do away with &KDNUDEDUW\·Vflexible inquiry as 
WRZKHWKHUWKHLQYHQWLRQDVFODLPHGKDV´PDUNHGO\
different characteristics from any foXQG LQ QDWXUHµ
ZKLFKUHVXOW LQ´WKHSRWHQWLDO IRUVLJQLILFDQWXWLOLW\µ
Id. at 310. Indeed, the bright line magic microscope 
test actually appears to be contrary to Funk 
Brothers, since the combination of bacteria in that 
case ZDV D ´QHZ DQG GLIIHUHQW FRPSosition of non-­
LQKLELWLYHVWUDLQVµ86DW-­31, and therefore 
not actually present in nature. There may be 
DGGLWLRQDO QXDQFH LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V DUJXPHQW
that accounts for this inconsistency, but under my 
understanding of the magic microscope test, the 
combination in Funk Brothers would be patentable 
subject matter.  
Indeed, the government does not apply its own 
understanding of section 101 consistently. In its 
EULHI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV H[SODLQV WKDW ´>D@ FKHPLFDO
alteration of a bioactive molecule to improve 
absorption by the body . . . would likely satisfy 
VHFWLRQ µ 8QLWHG 6WDWHV $PLFXV %U  Q $V
discussed supra, the isolated DNA molecules at issue 
LQWKLVFDVHDUHWKHUHVXOWRID´FKHPLFDODOWHUDWLRQRI
D ELRDFWLYH PROHFXOHµ WKDW OHDGV WR different 
properties, including a dramatic reduction in size. 
-XVW DV WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V WKHRUHWLFDO ´FKHPLFDO
DOWHUDWLRQµ OHDGV WR D PROHFXOH ZLWK LPSURYHG
absorption properties, the isolation of discrete DNA 
sequences changes the properties of the sequence as 
compared to the chromosomal DNA. This is not 
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´>P@HUHO\ VRUWLQJ WKH SURYHUELDO ZKHDW IURP WKH
FKDIIµ id., but the creation of new DNA molecules 
with distinct properties and additional utility, 
including the ability to be used as a primer in genetic 
testing.7  
Also troubling is the apparent lack of 
awareness about the impact of the proposed test. The 
JRYHUQPHQW DVVHUWV WKDW WKHPDJLFPLFURVFRSH ´LV D
YHU\OLPLWHGSRVLWLRQµWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVZURQJ7KLV
test cannot be limited to DNA by either legal or 
scLHQWLILF SULQFLSOHV )RU H[DPSOH /RXLV 3DVWHXU·V
 FODLP WR ´<HDVW IUHH IURP RUJDQLF JHUPV RI
GLVHDVH DV DQ DUWLFOH RIPDQXIDFWXUHµ UXQV DIRXO RI
the magic microscope since the microscope could 
zoom in to see that yeast free from contaminants. 
Similarly, isolated naturally occurring molecules long 
considered patentable subject matter, including 
adrenaline, vitamin B-­12, and prostaglandins, would 
also fall outside the scope of section 101. Although 
the powers of the magic microscope are not entirely 
clear, it appears that patents to smaller fragments of 
                                                                                                                    
7  7KHJRYHUQPHQW·VSRVLWLRQPD\EHWKDWDGGLQJIXQFWLRQDOLW\WR
a naturally occurring molecule, for example adding a lipid 
chain, is a creation of man while removing functionality, for 
example truncating a natural DNA sequence or protein to yield 
smaller molecules with new properties, is not. Scientifically, 
this distinction makes little sense: in either case, it is the 
intervention of man that created a new molecule. After all, the 
hand of man is just as apparent in the David, created by 
removing stone from a block of marble, as the ceiling of the 
Sistine Chapel, created by adding layers of paint to an existing 
structure.  
 
  
87a 
  
naturally occurring molecules, for example claims to 
truncated proteins (see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 
 HQWLWOHG ´7UXQFDWHG 3URWHLQ RI
Interleukin-­µZRXOGDOVREHXQSDWHQWDEOH 
7KH JRYHUQPHQW·s new test fundamentally 
changes more than a century of precedent and Patent 
Office practice in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology arena. The proposed test is a purely 
mechanical inquiry that fails to account for the 
possibility that chemical changes to the isolated DNA 
sequences at issue, as compared to their natural 
state, could result in markedly different uses. As 
VXFKWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VSRVLWLRQLQWKLVFDVHFDOOVLQWR
question the validity of an unknown number of 
patents and claims and upsets the settled 
expectations of some of our most innovative 
LQGXVWULHV7KLVLVQRWD´YHU\OLPLWHGSRVLWLRQµ 
7KH GLVVHQW FODLPV WKDW WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V
SDVW YLHZV DUH ´VXEVWDQWLDOO\ XQGHUPLQHG E\ WKH
SRVLWLRQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW KDV WDNHQ LQ WKLV FDVHµ
Dissent at 18. 7KH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V SULRU SUDFWLFH
however, is particularly important since it resulted 
in a large number of property rights over the past 
decades. If the Executive decided to change course in 
the Patent Office, and decline to issue new patents to 
isolated genes, it would not impact these existing 
property rights. This, however, is not what the 
Executive argues in this case. Instead the Solicitor 
General argues for an entirely different 
interpretation of the law that would destroy existing 
property rights. Although the dissent points out that 
Chakrabarty RYHUWXUQHG WKH3DWHQW2IILFH·V SUDFWLFH
of denying patents to microorganisms, there is a 
clear difference between allowing additional patent 
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protection where none previously existed, and 
denying patent protection decades (or centuries) after 
the fact, thereby eliminating a large number of 
property rights. Moreover, Chakrabarty, consistent 
with the broad language of the statute, allowed 
additional patents where none previously existed. 
Here, the Solicitor General proposes to destroy 
existing property rights based on a judge made 
exception to that same broad language. This is a 
dramatic step that I believe is best left to the 
legislature.  
Nevertheless, the Solicitor General claims that 
´WKLV LV D SXUH TXHVWLRQ RI ODZµ DQG WKDW ZH FDQ
therefore feel free to ignore the years of Patent Office 
practice and the accompanying expectations that 
practice created within the industry. The Solicitor 
General argues that we should not defer to the broad 
language (all but unchanged since 1793) provided by 
Congress in the patent statute, or allow Congress to 
decide whether it is necessary to correct the Patent 
2IILFH·VSUDFWLFHWKURXJKOHJLVODWLRQ,WLVWHPSWLQJWR
use our judicial power in this fashion, especially 
when the patents in question raise substantial moral 
and ethical issues related to awarding a property 
right to isolated portions of human DNA³the very 
thing that makes us humans, and not chimpanzees.  
7KH6ROLFLWRU*HQHUDO·V LQYLWDWLRQ LV WHPSWLQJ
but I must decline the opportunity to act where 
&RQJUHVVUHPDLQVVLOHQW ´>2@XUREOLJDWLRQ LVWR WDNH
VWDWXWHVDVZHILQGWKHPµChakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
DW  :LWK UHVSHFW WR VHFWLRQ  ´>W@KH VXEMHFW-­
matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in 
broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory 
JRDO RI SURPRWLQJ ¶WKH 3URJUHVV RI 6FLHQFH DQG WKH
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XVHIXO $UWV·    µ Id. Any judicial exception to the 
VWDWXWH·V EURDG ODQJXDJHPXVW EH DSSOLHGZLWK FDUH
OHVW WKH FRXUWV XVXUS &RQJUHVV·V FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
mandated authority to promote science and useful 
arts. Judicial restraint is particularly important here 
because an entire industry developed in the decades 
since the Patent Office first granted patents to 
isolated DNA. Disturbing the biotechnology 
industr\·V VHWWOHG H[SHFWDWLRQV QRZ ULVNV LPSHGLQJ
not promoting, innovation.  
Regardless, the judiciary is illsuited to 
determine whether the claims at issue promote or 
inhibit science and useful arts in all but the clearest 
cases, for example a new mineral discovered in the 
earth, or a new plant found in the wild, or E=mc2, or 
the law of gravity. Instead, I leave it to Congress, 
ZKR ´KDV WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DXWKRULW\ DQG WKH
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied 
permutations of competing interests that are 
LQHYLWDEO\LPSOLFDWHGE\VXFKQHZWHFKQRORJ\µSony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 431 (1984), to decide whether it is 
necessary to change the scope of section 101 to 
exclude the kind of isolated DNA claims at issue 
KHUH´>8@QWLO&RQJUHVVWDNHVVXFKDFWLRQWKLV>F@RXUW
PXVW FRQVWUXH WKH ODQJXDJH RI   DV LW LVµ
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318. Section 101 is, on its 
face, broad enough to include the claims to isolated 
DNA at issue here.  
The dissent suggests thDW ´WKLV PD\ ZHOO EH
RQH RI WKRVH LQVWDQFHV LQ ZKLFK ¶WRR PXFK SDWHQW
SURWHFWLRQ FDQ LPSHGH UDWKHU WKDQ ¶SURPRWH WKH
3URJUHVV RI 6FLHQFH DQGXVHIXO$UWV·µ'LVVHQW DW 
(quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
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Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from dismissal of writ as improvidently 
granted)). Yet the biotechnology industry is among 
our most innovative, and isolated gene patents, 
including the patents in suit, have existed for 
decades with no evidence of ill effects on innovation. 
See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, 
Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the 
Biotech Patent Debate, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1677, 1681 
´7KHH[LVWLQJHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVILQGIHZFOHDU
signs that the patenting of biotechnology inventions 
LVDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWLQJELRPHGLFDOLQQRYDWLRQµ id. at 
 FRQFOXGLQJ ´WKDW RYHUDOO ELRWHFKQRORJ\
innovation is not being impaired by the growth in 
SDWHQWVLVVXHGµ&KDQJLQJFRXUVH\HDUVDIWHUWKHIDFW
will only serve to punish those companies who made 
the reasonable decision to invest large amounts of 
time and money into the identification, isolation, and 
characterization of genes. Unsettling the 
expectations of the biotechnology industry now, 
based on nothing more than unsupported 
supposition, strikes me as far more likely to impede 
the progress of science and useful arts than advance 
it. Given the complicated technology and conflicting 
incentives at issue here, any change must come from 
Congress. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-­
73 $VHFWLRQDQDO\VLVUDLVHV´FRQVLGHUDEOH
problems . . . which only committees of Congress can 
manage, for broad powers of investigation are 
needed, including hearings which canvass the wide 
variety of views which those operating in this field 
entertain. The technological problems tendered [by 
the parties] . . . indicate to us that considered action 
E\WKH&RQJUHVVLVQHHGHGµ 
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In fact, Congress has at least implicitly 
DSSURYHG RI WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V SROLF\ RI DZDUGLQJ
patents on genes and DNA sequences. For example, 
&RQJUHVV LQFOXGHG DV SDUW RI WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V
appropriations, language affirming the Patent 
2IILFH·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI VHFWLRQ  WR SURKLELW
patents on human organisms. Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-­199, § 634, 
6WDW$OWKRXJK&RQJUHVVZDVDZDUH´WKDW
there are many institutions . . . that have extensive 
SDWHQWV RQ KXPDQ JHQHVµ  &RQJ 5HF +
H7274, it explicitly declined to implement legislation 
WR ´DIIHFW DQ\ RI WKRVH FXUUHQW H[LVWLQJSDWHQWVµ Id. 
(statement of Mr. Weldon introducing amendment). 
To the contrary, it made clear that the language 
UHODWHG WR ´KXPDQ RUJDQLVPVµ ZDV QRW LQWHQGHG WR
FKDQJH WKH 3DWHQW 2IILFH·V SROLF\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR
claims to genes, stem cells, or other similar 
inventions. Id.8 Far from oblivious to the patenting of 
genes, members of Congress previously introduced 
bills which would put a moratorium on gene 
patents,9 authorize funding for the study of whether 
                                                                                                                    
8  See also 149 Cong. Rec. E2417-­´:KDW,ZDQWWRSRLQWRXWLV
that the U.S. Patent Office has already issued patents on genes, 
stem cells, animals with human genes, and a host of non-­
biologic products used by humans, but it has not issued patents 
on claims directed to human organisms, including human 
embryos and fetuses. My amendment would not affect the 
formerEXWZRXOGVLPSO\DIILUPWKH ODWWHUµ HPSKDVLVDGGHG
(statement of Mr. Weldon after amendment approved);; see also 
157 Cong. Rec. E1177-­04 (resubmitting this testimony in the 
context of the current patent reform legislation).   
9   At least one bill was introduced in Congress to put a 
moratorium on patents to human genes or gene sequences. See, 
e.g., The Animal and Gene Patent Moratorium Bill (S.387 
1993).  
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genes ought to be patentable,10 and exempt from 
patent infringement anyone who uses patented genes 
for non-­commercial research purposes or medical 
practitioners who use genetic diagnostic tests.11 None 
of these became law. Congress is obviously aware of 
WKHLVVXHVSUHVHQWHGLQWKLVFDVHDQG,EHOLHYH´>D@Q\
recalibration of the standard of [patentability] 
UHPDLQVLQLWVKDQGVµMicrosoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 
S.Ct. 2238, 2252 (2011).  
This case typifies an observation by the late 
Chief Judge Markey, our first Chief Judge, that 
´>R@QO\*RGZRUNVIURPQRWKLQJ Men must work with 
ROGHOHPHQWVµFromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 
755 F.2d 1549, 1556 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quotation, 
citations omitted). Human DNA is, for better or 
worse, one of the old elements bequeathed to men to 
use in their work. The patents in this case revealed a 
QHZPROHFXODU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DERXW RXUVHOYHV ´WKH
inventions most benefiting mankind are those that 
¶SXVK EDFN WKH IURQWLHUV RI FKHPLVWU\ SK\VLFV DQG
WKH OLNH·µ Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316 (quoting 
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 
147, 154 (1950)). We cannot, after decades of patents 
and judicial precedent, now call human DNA fruit 
from the poisonous tree, and punish those inquisitive 
HQRXJK WR LQYHVWLJDWH LVRODWH DQG SDWHQW LW ´2XU
                                                                                                                    
10  The Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002 
(H.R. 3966).  
11   The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 
 +5  $V WKH ELOO·V VSRQVRU H[SODLQHG ´,W LV
important to note that this section would not overturn the 
commercial rights of patent holders. If a research [organization] 
utilizing the exemption makes a commercially viable finding, he 
or she would still have to negotiate any rights to market the 
QHZGLVFRYHU\ZLWKWKHSDWHQWKROGHUµ Cong. Rec. E353-­03.  
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task . . . is the narrow one of determining what 
Congress meant by the words it used in the statute;; 
RQFH WKDW LV GRQH RXU SRZHUV DUH H[KDXVWHGµ Id. at 
318. This inquiry does not have moral, ethical, or 
theological components. Cf. id. at 316-­ ´>:@H DUH
without competence to HQWHUWDLQµ DUJXPHQWV DERXW
´WKHJUDYHULVNVµJHQHUDWHGE\JHQHWLFUHVHDUFK7KH
patents in this case might well deserve to be 
excluded from the patent system, but that is a debate 
for Congress to resolve. I therefore decline to extend 
WKH ´ODZV RI QDWXUHµ H[FHSWLRQ WR LQFOXGH LVRODWHG
DNA sequences.  
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BRYSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:  
, FRQFXU ZLWK WKH SRUWLRQV RI WKLV FRXUW·V
judgment that are directed to standing, the 
patentability of the cDNA claims, and the 
patentability of the method claims. I respectfully 
GLVVHQW KRZHYHU IURP WKH FRXUW·V KROGLQJ WKDW
0\ULDG·V %5&$ JHQH FODLPV DQG LWV FODLPV WR JHQH
fragments are patent-­eligible. In my view, those 
claims are not directed to patentable subject matter, 
and if sustaiQHGWKHFRXUW·VGHFLVLRQZLOO OLNHO\KDYH
broad consequences, such as preempting methods for 
whole-­JHQRPH VHTXHQFLQJ HYHQ WKRXJK 0\ULDG·V
contribution to the field is not remotely consonant 
with such effects.  
In its simplest form, the question in this case 
is whether an individual can obtain patent rights to a 
human gene. From a common-­sense point of view, 
PRVW REVHUYHUV ZRXOG DQVZHU ´2I FRXUVH QRW
Patents are for inventions. A human gene is not an 
LQYHQWLRQµ7KHHVVHQFHRI0\ULDG·VDUJXPHQWLQWKLV
case is to say that it has not patented a human gene, 
but something quite different³an isolated human 
gene, which differs from a native gene because the 
process of extracting it results in changes in its 
molecular structure (although not in its genetic 
code). We are therefore required to decide whether 
the process of isolating genetic material from a 
human DNA molecule makes the isolated genetic 
material a patentable invention. The court concludes 
that it does;; I conclude that it does not.  
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At the outset, it is important to identify the 
LQYHQWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ XQGHUO\LQJ 0\ULDG·V SDWHQWV
Myriad was not the first to map a BRCA gene to its 
chromosomal location. That discovery was made by a 
team of researchers led by Dr. Mary-­Claire King. See 
Jeff M. Hall et al., Linkage of Early-­Onset Familial 
Breast Cancer to Chromosome 17q21, 250 Science 
1684 (1990). And Myriad did not invent a new 
method of nucleotide sequencing. Instead, it applied 
known sequencing techniques to identify the 
nucleotide order of the BRCA genes.1 0\ULDG·V
discovery of those sequences entailed difficult work, 
and the identified sequences have had important 
applications in the fight against breast cancer. But 
the discovery of the sequences is an unprotectable 
IDFW MXVW OLNH 'U .LQJ·V GLVFRYHU\ Rf the 
chromosomal location of the BRCA1 gene.  
Of course, Myriad is free to patent applications 
of its discovery. As the first party with knowledge of 
the sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to 
claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its 
unchallenged claims are limited to such applications. 
See, e.g.·SDWHQWFODLP·SDWHQWFODLP
·SDWHQWFODLP<HWVRPHRI0\ULDG·VFKDOOHQJHG
composition claims effectively preempt any attempt 
to sequence the BRCA genes, including whole-­
genome sequencing. In my view, those claims 
encompass unpatentable subject matter, and a 
                                                                                                                    
1   There is some dispute over whether other inventors helped 
Myriad discover the BRCA sequences or discovered the BRCA2 
sequence before Myriad. Because those disputes are irrelevant 
to the question of patentable subject matter, I refer to the 
GLVFRYHU\RIWKH%5&$VHTXHQFHVDV0\ULDG·VZRUN  
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contrary ruling is likely to have substantial adverse 
effects on research and treatment in this important 
field.  
I. 
As the majority and concurring opinions 
explain, the claims at issue in this case fall into three 
categories: claims that cover the isolated BRCA 
JHQHVFODLPRIWKH·SDWHQWFODLPRIWKH·
SDWHQWDQGFODLPVDQGRIWKH·SDWHQWFODLPV
that cover only the BRCA cDNA (claims 2 and 7 of 
WKH ·SDWHQWDQGFODLPRI WKH ·SDWHQWDQG
claims that cover portions of the BRCA genes and 
cDNA as small as 15 nucleotides long (claims 5 and 6 
RI WKH ·SDWHQW , ILUVWDGGUHVV WKH FODLPV WR WKH
BRCA genes.  
A. 
In the seminal case of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Supreme 
Court held that an artificial life form could be 
patented. In the course of its opinion, and critically 
for purposes of its reasoning, the Court stated that 
not all living things or other items found in nature 
were subject to patenting. The Court explained that 
although the language of section 101 of the Patent 
$FWLVEURDGLWLVQRWWKHFDVHWKDWLW´KDVQROLPLWVRU
WKDW LW HPEUDFHV HYHU\ GLVFRYHU\µ Id. at 309. The 
Court then set forth the general proposition that 
´ODZV RI QDWXUH SK\VLFDO SKHQRPHQD DQG DEVWUDFW
LGHDV KDYH EHHQ KHOG QRW SDWHQWDEOHµ Id. As 
H[DPSOHV WKH &RXUW QRWHG WKDW ´D QHZ PLQHUDO
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the 
ZLOG LV QRW SDWHQWDEOH VXEMHFW PDWWHUµ 7KXV HYHQ 
WKRXJK D PLQHUDO RU D SODQW LV D ´FRPSRVLWLRQ RI
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PDWWHUµ DQG FRXOG EH YLHZHG DV IDOOLQJ ZLWKLQ D
broad construction of section 101, the Court 
H[SODLQHG WKDW WKRVH ´PDQLIHVWDWLRQV RI    QDWXUHµ
DUHQRWSDWHQWDEOHVXEMHFWPDWWHUEXWDUH´IUHHWRDOO
meQ DQG UHVHUYHG H[FOXVLYHO\ WR QRQHµ Id., quoting 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127, 130 (1948);; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3225 (2010).  
The Court in Chakrabarty held the artificial 
life form at issue in that case to be patentable 
EHFDXVH WKH FODLP ZDV ´QRW WR D KLWKHUWR XQNQRZQ
natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter³a product of 
KXPDQ LQJHQXLW\ ¶KDYLQJ D GLVWLQFWLYH QDPH
FKDUDFWHU >DQG@ XVH·µ Id. at 309-­10, quoting 
Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887). In 
distinguishing between naturally occurring 
substances and nonnaturally occurring 
manufactures, the Court relied heavily on its earlier 
decision in Funk Brothers, in which the inventor 
discovered that certain useful bacterial strains did 
not exert an inhibitive effect on each other. Based on 
that discovery, the inventor obtained a patent on a 
mixed culture of those non-­inhibitive strains. The 
Supreme Court held the product unpatentable, 
however, because the bacteria remained structurally 
and functionally the same as in their natural state. 
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. By contrast, because 
&KDNUDEDUW\ KDG SURGXFHG ´D QHZ EDFWHULXP ZLWK
markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant 
XWLOLW\µWKH&RXUWKHOG&KDNUDEDUW\·VLQYHQWLRQWREH
patentable. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
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B. 
0\ULDG·V FODLPV WR WKH LVRODWHG %5&$ JHQHV
VHHPWRPHWRIDOOFOHDUO\RQWKH´XQSDWHQWDEOHµVLGH
of the line the Court drew in Chakrabarty. Myriad is 
claiming the genes themselves, which appear in 
nature on the chromosomes of living human beings. 
The only material change made to those genes from 
their natural state is the change that is necessarily 
incidental to the extraction of the genes from the 
environment in which they are found in nature. 
While the process of extraction is no doubt difficult, 
and may itself be patentable, the isolated genes are 
not materially different from the native genes. In 
this respect, the genes are DQDORJRXV WR WKH ´QHZ
PLQHUDO GLVFRYHUHG LQ WKH HDUWKµ RU WKH ´QHZ SODQW
IRXQG LQ WKHZLOGµ WKDW WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW UHIHUUHG
to in Chakrabarty. It may be very difficult to extract 
the newly found mineral or to find, extract, and 
propagate the newly discovered plant. But that does 
not make those naturally occurring items the 
products of invention.  
The same is true for human genes. Like some 
minerals, they are hard to extract from their natural 
setting. Also like minerals, they can be used for 
purposes that would be infeasible if they remained in 
their natural setting. And the process of extracting 
minerals, or taking cuttings from wild plants, like 
the process of isolating genetic material, can result in 
some physical or chemical changes to the natural 
substance. But such changes do not make extracted 
minerals or plant cuttings patentable, and they 
should not have that effect for isolated genes. In each 
case, merely isolating the products of nature by 
extracting them from their natural location and 
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making those alterations attendant to their 
extraction does not give the extractor the right to 
patent the products themselves.  
The majority characterizes the isolated genes 
DV ´QHZ PROHFXOHVµ DQG FRQVLGHUV WKHP GLIIHUHQW
substances from the corresponding native DNA.2 
Because the native BRCA genes are chemically 
bonded to other genes and histone proteins, the 
majority concludes that cleaving those bonds to 
isolate the BRCA genes turns the isolated genes into 
´GLIIHUHQW PDWHULDOVµ <HW WKHUH LV QR PDJLF WR D
chemical bond that requires us to recognize a new 
product when a chemical bond is created or broken, 
but not when other atomic or molecular forces are 
altered.3 A chemical bond is merely a force between 
WZR DWRPV RU JURXSV RI DWRPV VWURQJ HQRXJK ´WR
make it convenient for the chemist to consider [the 
DJJUHJDWH@ DV DQ LQGHSHQGHQW PROHFXODU VSHFLHVµ
                                                                                                                    
2   Although I recognize that Judge Lourie and Judge Moore, 
while reaching the same ultimate conclusions, have taken 
analytical paths that differ in some respects, for convenience I 
will refer to JudJH/RXULH·VRSLQLRQDVWKHPDMRULW\RSLQLRQDQG
-XGJH0RRUH·VRSLQLRQDVWKHFRQFXUULQJRSLQLRQ  
3  The majority characterizes the question in this case as turning 
on the breaking of covalent bonds linking the BRCA genes to 
the rest of the DNA in chromosomes 13 and 17, but its analysis 
appears to place patentable weight on the breaking of other 
chemical bonds, such as the hydrogen bonds that are broken 
when separating DNA from histones or³in an example 
unrelated to this case³the ionic bonds that are broken when 
lithium is derived from a salt. It is difficult to see why 
differences between types of chemical bonds should matter for 
patentability purposes, and I see little support for such a 
distinction in the governing precedents.  
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Linus Pauling, The Nature of the Chemical Bond 6 
(3d ed. 1960). Weaker interatomic forces will be 
broken when, for example, a dirty diamond is cleaned 
with water or another solvent, but that does not 
make the clean diamond a human-­made invention. 
See Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 
1, 12 (1931) (cleaning a shell by acid and then 
grinding off a layer with an emery wheel did not 
convert it into a different product). Nor should it 
make a difference for purposes of patentability if the 
portion of a wild plant that is collected for purposes 
of later regeneration is separated from the original 
plant by chemical means or by scissors.  
Although the majority insists that the changes 
in the DNA molecule that occur as part of the process 
of isolation render the gene claims patentable, the 
majority does not appear to take a similar position 
with respect to chemical elements. The government 
as amicus curiae argues that patenting the BRCA 
genes would be like patenting the element lithium. 
Isolated lithium does not occur naturally because it 
reacts with air and water and thus is found in nature 
only as part of a chemical compound, ionically bound 
to other elements. Robert E. Krebs, The History and 
8VH RI 2XU (DUWK·V &KHPLFDO (OHPHQWV 48 (2d ed. 
2006). Once isolated, lithium has many industrial 
applications, and in order to isolate lithium, it is 
necessary to break ionic bonds in the lithium 
compounds that are found in nature. But the 
majority acknowledges that elemental lithium (like 
other elements) would not be patentable subject 
PDWWHUEHFDXVHLW´LVWKHVDPHHOHPHQWZKHWKHULWLV
LQWKHHDUWKRULVRODWHGµ 
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The principles underlying that analysis apply 
to genetic material as well. In order to isolate the 
BRCA gene, it is necessary to break chemical bonds 
that hold the gene in its place in the body, but the 
genetic coding sequence that is the subject of each of 
the BRCA gene claims remains the same whether the 
gene is in the body or isolated. The majority, 
however, does not agree that the cases are analogous, 
and indeed appears to have adopted the following 
rule: Isolated atoms are not patent eligible, but 
isolated molecules are.  
Apart from the arbitrariness of such a rule, if 
we are to apply the conventional nomenclature of any 
ILHOG WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU 0\ULDG·V LVRODWHG '1$
FODLPVDUH´QHZµLWZRXOGVHHPWRPDNHPRUHVHQVH
to look to genetics, which provides the language of 
the claims, than to chemistry. Aside from MyriDG·V
cDNA claims, its composition claims are not defined 
by any particular chemical formula. For example, 
FODLP  RI WKH · SDWHQW FRYHUV DOO LVRODWHG'1$V
coding for the BRCA1 protein, with the protein being 
defined by the amino acid sequence encoded by the 
naturally occurring BRCA1 gene. From a molecular 
perspective, that claim covers a truly immense range 
of substances from the cDNA that is 5,914 
nucleotides long to the isolated gene that contains 
more than 120,000 nucleotides. And the patent does 
not define the upper end of that range because the 
patent does not identify a unique nucleotide sequence 
for the 120,000-­nucleotide-­long isolated BRCA1 gene. 
Instead, the patent contains a sequence that is just 
24,000 nucleotides long with numerous gaps denoted 
´YYYYYYYYYYYYYµ · SDWHQW ILJ  $Q DOPRVW
incalculably large number of new molecules could be 
created by filling in those gaps with almost any 
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nucleotide sequence, and all of those molecules would 
fall within the scope of claim 1. Included in that set 
are many important molecular variations to the 
BRCA1 gene that Myriad had not yet discovered and 
could not have chemically described. Yet those 
molecules would share only one unifying 
characteristic: each codes for the same protein as the 
naturally occurring BRCA1 gene.  
From a genetic perspective, that claim covers 
RQH ´FRPSRVLWLRQ RIPDWWHUµ³the BRCA1 gene. The 
isolated BRCA genes are identical to the BRCA genes 
found on chromosomes 13 and 17. They have the 
same sequence, they code for the same proteins, and 
they represent the same units of heredity. During the 
transcription phase of protein synthesis, the BRCA 
genes are separated from chromosomal proteins. The 
transcription process then proceeds from a starting 
point called the promoter to a stopping point often 
called the terminator. James D. Watson et al., 
Molecular Biology of the Gene 382, 394-­96 (6th ed. 
2008). The only difference between the naturally 
occurring BRCA genes during transcription and the 
claimed isolated DNA is that the claimed genes have 
EHHQ LVRODWHG DFFRUGLQJ WR QDWXUH·V SUHGHILQHG
boundaries, i.e., at points that preserve the ability of 
the gene to express the protein for which it is coded.  
In that respect, extracting a gene is akin to 
snapping a leaf from a tree. Like a gene, a leaf has a 
natural starting and stopping point. It buds during 
spring from the same place that it breaks off and 
falls during autumn. Yet prematurely plucking the 
leaf would not turn it into a human-­made invention. 
See Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1295 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and 
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dissenting in part). That would remain true if there 
were minor differences between the plucked leaf and 
the fallen autumn leaf, unless those differences 
LPSDUWHG ´PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFVµ WR WKH
plucked leaf. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
Both the majority and the concurring opinions 
attach significant weight to the fact that the claimed 
coding portions of the native BRCA genes are part of 
a much larger molecule and that the isolated BRCA 
genes, being smaller molecules extracted from the 
larger one, are therefore man-­made inventions. But 
to argue that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable 
because in its native environment it is part of a much 
larger structure is no more persuasive than arguing 
that although an atom may not be patentable, a 
subatomic particle is patentable because it was 
previously part of a larger structure, or that while a 
tree is not patentable, a limb of the tree becomes a 
patentable invention when it is removed from the 
tree.  
Of course, it is an oversimplification to say 
that something that can be characterized as 
´LVRODWHGµ RU ´H[WUDFWHGµ IURP LWV QDWXUDO VHWWLQJ
always remains a natural product and is not 
patentable. One could say, for example, that a 
baseball baW LV ´H[WUDFWHGµ RU ´LVRODWHGµ IURPDQDVK
WUHHEXW LQ WKDW FDVH WKHSURFHVVRI ´H[WUDFWLQJµ WKH
baseball bat necessarily changes the nature, form, 
and use of the ash tree and thus results in a 
manmade manufacture, not a naturally occurring 
product. In that setting, man has defined the parts 
that are to be retained and the parts that are to be 
discarded. The result of the process of selection is a 
product with a function that is entirely different from 
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that of the raw material from which it was obtained. 
In the case of the BRCA genes, by contrast, nature 
has defined the genes as independent entities by 
virtue of their capacity for protein synthesis and, 
ultimately, trait inheritance. Biochemists extract the 
target genes along lines defined by nature so as to 
preserve the structure and function that the gene 
possessed in its natural environment. In such a case, 
the extraction of a product in a manner that retains 
the character and function of the product as found in 
nature does not result in the creation of a human 
invention.4 
That principle was captured by the Supreme 
&RXUW·VVWDWHPHQWLQChakrabarty that the invention 
LQWKDWFDVHZDVQRWWR´DKLWKHUWRXQNQRZQQDWXUDO
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
PDQXIDFWXUH RU FRPSRVLWLRQ RI PDWWHU ¶KDYLQJ D 
GLVWLQFWLYH QDPH FKDUDFWHU >DQG@ XVH·µ 86 DW
309-­10.  
&DVHVLQYROYLQJWKH´SXULILFDWLRQµRIDQDWXUDO
substance employ similar analysis. Our predecessor 
court recognized that merely purifying a naturally 
occurring substance does not render the substance 
patentable unless it results in a marked change in 
functionality. In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (CCPA 
1938) (holding that there was no right to a patent on 
                                                                                                                    
4  By analogy, extracting a slab of marble from the earth does not 
give rise to protectable intellectual property rights, but 
´H[WUDFWLQJµDSLHFHRIVFXOSWXUHIURPWKDWVODERIPDUEOHGRHV
In the case of the BRCA gene claims, what Myriad has claimed 
is more akin to the slab of marble found in the earth than to the 
sculpture carved from it after its extraction. 
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a purer version of ultramarine, but recognizing that 
LI D FODLPHG DUWLFOH LV ´RI VXFK SXULW\ What it differs 
QRWRQO\LQGHJUHHEXWLQNLQGLWPD\EHSDWHQWDEOHµ
see also In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 620 (CCPA 1939) 
(same, for purified vitamin C);; In re Marden, 47 F.2d 
958, 959 (CCPA 1931) (same, for purified vanadium);; 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. DeForest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 
643 (3d Cir. 1928) (same, for purified tungsten). On 
the other hand, the purified natural substance is 
SDWHQWDEOH LI WKH ´SXULILFDWLRQµ UHVXOWV LQ D SURGXFW
ZLWKVXFKGLVWLQFWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWLWEHFRPHV´IRU
every practical purpose a new thing commercially 
DQG WKHUDSHXWLFDOO\µ Parke-­Davis & Co. v. H.K. 
Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911);; see 
also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 
F.2d 156, 161-­64 (4th Cir. 1958) (holding that a 
purified composition of vitamin B-­12 was patentable 
because the purification process resulted in a product 
that was therapeutically effective, whereas the 
natural form was not).  
In sum, the test employed by the Supreme 
Court in Chakrabarty requires us to focus on two 
things: (1) the similarity in structure between what 
is claimed and what is found in nature and (2) the 
similarity in utility between what is claimed and 
what is found in nature. What is claimed in the 
BRCA genes is the genetic coding material, and that 
material is the same, structurally and functionally, 
in both the native gene and the isolated form of the 
gene.  
The structural differences between the claimed 
´LVRODWHGµJHQHVDQGWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJSRUWLRQRIWKH
native genes are irrelevant to the claim limitations, 
to the functioning of the genes, and to their utility in 
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their isolated form. The use to which the genetic 
material can be put, i.e., determining its sequence in 
a clinical setting, is not a new use;; it is only a 
consequence of possession. In order to sequence an 
isolated gene, each gene must function in the same 
manner in the laboratory as it does in the human 
body. Indeed, that identity of function in the isolated 
gene is the key to its value. Moreover, as Judge 
0RRUH·V FRQFXUULQJ RSLQLRQ H[SODLQV 0\ULDG KDs 
failed to credibly identify new uses for the isolated 
BRCA genes as probes or primers. The naturally 
occurring genetic material thus has not been altered 
in a way that would matter under the standard set 
forth in Chakrabarty. For that reason, the isolation 
of the naturally occurring genetic material does not 
make the claims to the isolated BRCA genes patent-­
eligible.  
II. 
As noted, in addition to the BRCA gene claims 
discussed above, the claims at issue in this appeal 
include four claims to BRCA cDNA and two claims to 
portions of the BRCA genes and cDNA as small as 15 
nucleotides long.  
I agree with the court that the claims to BRCA 
cDNA are eligible for patenting. The cDNA cannot be 
isolated from nature, but instead must be created in 
the laboratory.5 Although that process occurs with 
                                                                                                                    
5  The appellees argue that the BRCA1 cDNA can be isolated 
from nature, and they refer to a BRCA1 pseudogene called 
BRCA1P1 that is found in the human genome. However, the 
appellees have failed to demonstrate that the pseudogene 
consists of the same sequence as the BRCA1 cDNA.  
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natural machinery, the end product is a human-­
made invention with distinct structure because the 
introns that are found in the native gene are 
removed from the cDNA segment. Additionally, the 
cDNA has a utility not present in the naturally 
occurring BRCA DNA and mRNA because cDNA can 
be attached to a promoter and inserted into a non-­
human cell to drive protein expression.  
However, I disagree with the court as to the 
two claims to short segments of DNA having at least 
15 nucleRWLGHV&ODLPRIWKH·SDWHQWFRYHUVDQ\
sequence of the BRCA1 cDNA that is at least 15 
nucleotides long. That claim encompasses each 
BRCA1 exon, even though each exon is naturally 
defined by transcription. Moreover, because small 
sequences of DNA are repeated throughout the three 
billion nucleotides of the human genome, the claim 
covers portions of the cDNA of more than 4% of 
human genes. It also covers portions of the DNA of 
nearly all human genes. Accordingly, efforts to 
sequence almost any gene could infringe claim 6 even 
WKRXJK 0\ULDG·V VSHFLILFDWLRQ KDV FRQWULEXWHG
nothing to human understanding of other genes.  
Myriad could easily have claimed more 
narrowly to achieve the utility it attaches to 
segments of cDNA. It contends that those segments 
can be used as probes and primers. DNA probes must 
EHFKHPLFDOO\DOWHUHGRU ´WDJJHGµEHIRUH WKH\FDQEH
so used, and Myriad could have claimed the tagged 
segments to achieve probe functionality. A claim to 
tagged segments would not encompass the BRCA1 
exons. As to primer functionality, many of the cDNA 
segments will not work. Some will be too long. Some 
will be too short. Some will be palindromic and fold 
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in on themselves. Myriad could have identified a 
subset of the segments that work as primers, and 
such a claim could be patentable if it were limited to 
VSHFLHVZLWK´PDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVIURP
any found in nature and . . . having the potential for 
VLJQLILFDQW XWLOLW\µ Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
The problem with claim 6 is that it is so broad that it 
includes products of nature (the BRCA1 exons) and 
portions of other genes;; its validity is not salvaged 
because it includes some species that are not natural. 
Accordingly, I would hold claim 6 unpatentable.  
0\ULDG·VODVWFODLPFODLPRIWKH·2 patent, 
is breathtakingly broad. That claim covers any 
segment of the DNA defined by claim 1, provided 
that the segment is at least 15 nucleotides long. 
Claim 1, in turn, covers any isolated DNA that codes 
for the BRCA1 polypeptide. Thus, claim 5 would 
cover not only the isolated BRCA1 gene in each of its 
untold molecular variations, but also any sub-­
sequence of those molecules, including portions that 
fall in the undefined range of those molecules 
GHQRWHG´YYYYYYYYYYYYYµ&ODLPZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEH
unpatentable for the same reasons as claim 1 and 
claim 6.  
Of course, in light of its breadth, claim 5 of the 
·SDWHQW LV OLNHO\ WR EH LQYDOLG RQ RWKHU JURXQGV
and thus a ruling as to patent-­eligibility with respect 
to that claim may be superfluous. Nonetheless, it is 
important to consider the effects of such broad patent 
claims on the biotechnology industry. While Myriad 
KDVHPSKDVL]HGWKHELRWHFKQRORJ\LQGXVWU\·VQHHGRI
patent protection to encourage and reward research 
in this difficult and important field, there is another 
side to the coin. Broad claims to genetic material 
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present a significant obstacle to the next generation 
of innovation in genetic medicine³multiplex tests 
and whole-­genome sequencing. New technologies are 
being developed to sequence many genes or even an 
entire human genome rapidly, but firms developing 
those technologies are encountering a thicket of 
SDWHQWV 6HFUHWDU\·V $GYLVRU\ &RPP RQ *HQHWLFV
+HDOWK DQG 6RFLHW\ 'HS·W RI +HDOWK 	 +XPDQ
Servs., Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and 
Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests 49-­62 
(2010). In order to sequence an entire genome, a firm 
would have to license thousands of patents from 
many different licensors. See id. at 50-­51. Even if 
many of those patents include claims that are invalid 
for anticipation or obviousness, the costs involved in 
determining the scope of all of those patents could be 
prohibitive. See id. at 51-­52;; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? 
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 
45 Hou. L. Rev. 1059, 1076-­1080 (2008) (concluding 
WKDW H[LVWLQJ VWXGLHV ´KDYH IRFXVHG UHODWLYHO\ OLWWOH
DWWHQWLRQ RQ GRZQVWUHDPSURGXFW GHYHORSPHQWµ DQG
that interviews accompanying those studies suggest 
that, though smaller than initially feared, the costs 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWK WKHSDWHQW WKLFNHWDUH ´TXLWH UHDO LQ
the calculations of product-­GHYHORSLQJ ILUPVµ ,Q
light of these considerations, this may well be one of 
WKRVHLQVWDQFHVLQZKLFK´too much patent protection 
FDQ LPSHGH UDWKHU WKDQ ¶SURmote the Progress of 
6FLHQFHDQGXVHIXO$UWV·µLab. Corp. of Am. Holdings 
v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ as 
improvidently granted).  
My colleagues assign significant weight to the 
fact that since 2001 the PTO has had guidelines in 
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place that have allowed patents on entire human 
genes. They conclude that those guidelines, and the 
372·VHDUOLHUSUDFWLFHDUHHQWLWOHGWRGHIHUHQFHIURP
this court as to the question whether patents to 
isolated human genes constitute patent-­eligible 
VXEMHFW PDWWHU , WKLQN WKH 372·V SUDFWLFH DQG
guidelines are not entitled to significant weight, for 
several reasons.  
First, as we have recognized, the PTO lacks 
substantive rulemaking authority as to issues such 
as patentability. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 
932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In areas of patent 
scope, we owe deference only commensurate with the 
´WKH WKRURXJKQHVV RI LWV FRQVLGHUDWLRQ DQG WKH
YDOLGLW\RILWVUHDVRQLQJµMerck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 
F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The comments that 
the PTO issued at the time of its 2001 guidelines in 
response to suggestions that isolated human genes 
were not patentable are, frankly, perfunctory. See 
John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the 
Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as 
a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents, 85 J. Pat. & 
7UDGHPDUN 2II 6RF·\   %HFDXVH WKRVH
comments, at least on their face, do not reflect 
thorough consideration and study of the issue, I do 
not regard them as worthy of much weight in the 
analysis of this complex question.  
6HFRQGZKDWHYHUIRUFHWKH372·VYLHZVRQWKH
issue of patent eligibility may have had in the past 
has, at the very least, been substantially undermined 
by the position the government has taken in this 
case. The Department of Justice filed a brief on 
behalf of the United States in this court taking the 
SRVLWLRQ WKDW 0\ULDG·V JHQH FODLPV RWKHU WKDQ WKH
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cDNA claims) are not patent-­eligible. Although the 
372GLGQRW´VLJQµWKHEULHIand we are left to guess 
about the status of any possible continuing inter-­
agency disagreements about the issue, the 
Department of Justice speaks for the Executive 
Branch, and the PTO is part of the Executive 
Branch, so it is fair to assume that the Executive 
Branch has modified its position from the one taken 
by the PTO in its 2001 guidelines and, informally, 
before that.  
)LQDOO\SULRUWR WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQ
in Chakrabarty, the PTO had determined that 
microorganisms were not subject to patenting, but 
the Supreme Court gave no indication that it 
regarded that view as entitled to deference. 
Moreover, the Court gave short shrift to the 
&RPPLVVLRQHU·VFRQWHQWLRQZKLFKZDVPDGHWKHOHDG
argument in its brief) that the patentability of life-­
forms was an issue that should be left to Congress. 
Citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
 WKH &RXUW H[SODLQHG WKDW ´&RQJUHVV KDV
performed its constitutional role in defining 
patentable subject matter in § 101;; we perform ours 
in construing the laQJXDJH&RQJUHVVKDVHPSOR\HGµ
Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. at 315. We have the same 
responsibility and should not shy away from deciding 
the issues of law that the parties have brought to us. 
Although my colleagues believe our analysis of the 
legal question in this case should be influenced by 
purported expectations of the inventing community 
EDVHG RQ WKH372·V SDVW SUDFWLFH RI LVVXLQJ SDWHQWV
on human genes, that is in effect to give the PTO 
lawmaking authority that Congress has not accorded 
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it.6 There is no collective right of adverse possession 
to intellectual property, and we should not create 
such a right. Our role is to interpret the law that 
Congress has written in accordance with the 
governing precedents. I would do so and would affirm 
WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·V rulings as to the BRCA gene and 
BRCA gene segment claims. 
                                                                                                                    
6   Because the asserted reliance interest is based on PTO 
practice and not on prior judicial decisions, this case is not 
analogous to Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical 
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), or Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), where the 
expectations of the inventing community were based on 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent.  
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Sweet, D.J. 
Plaintiffs Association for Molecular Pathology, 
et al. (collectively "Plaintiffs") have moved for 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. 
P., to declare invalid fifteen claims (the "claims-­in-­
suit") contained in seven patents (the "patents-­in-­
suit") relating to the human BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes (Breast Cancer Susceptibility Genes 1 and 2) 
(collectively, "BRCA1/2") under each of (1) the 
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), (2) Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, 
and (3) the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution because the patent claims cover 
products of nature, laws of nature and/or natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic human 
knowledge or thought. The defendant United States 
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") issued the 
patents-­in-­suit which are held by defendants Myriad 
Genetics and the University of Utah Research 
Foundation ("UURF") (collectively "Myriad" or the 
"Myriad Defendants"). Myriad has cross-­moved 
under Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., for summary 
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint, and the 
USPTO has cross-­moved under Rule 12(c), Fed. R. 
Civ. P., for judgment on the pleadings. Based upon 
the findings and conclusions set forth below, the 
motion of Plaintiffs to declare the claims-­in-­suit 
invalid is granted, the cross-­motion of Myriad is 
denied, and the motion of the USPTO is granted. 
As discussed infra in greater detail, the 
challenged patent claims are directed to (1) isolated 
DNA containing all or portions of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 gene sequence and (2) methods for 
"comparing" or "analyzing" BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene 
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sequences to identify the presence of mutations 
correlating with a predisposition to breast or ovarian 
cancer. Plaintiffs' challenge to the validity of these 
Claims, and the arguments presented by the parties 
and amici, have presented a unique and challenging 
question: 
Are isolated human genes and the 
comparison of their sequences 
patentable? 
Two complicated areas of science and law are 
involved: molecular biology and patent law. The task 
is to seek the governing principles in each and to 
determine the essential elements of the claimed 
biological compositions and processes and their 
relationship to the laws of nature. The resolution of 
the issues presented to this Court deeply concerns 
breast cancer patients, medical professionals, 
researchers, caregivers, advocacy groups, existing 
gene patent holders and their investors, and those 
seeking to advance public health. 
The claims-­in-­suit directed to "isolated DNA" 
containing human BRCA1/2 gene sequences reflect 
the USPTO's practice of granting patents on DNA 
sequences so long as those sequences are claimed in 
the form of "isolated DNA." This practice is premised 
on the view that DNA should be treated no 
differently from any other chemical compound, and 
that its purification from the body, using well-­known 
techniques, renders it patentable by transforming it 
into something distinctly different in character. 
Many, however, including scientists in the fields of 
molecular biology and genomics, have considered this 
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practice a "lawyer's trick"1 that circumvents the 
prohibitions on the direct patenting of the DNA in 
our bodies but which, in practice, reaches the same 
result. The resolution of these motions is based upon 
long recognized principles of molecular biology and 
genetics: DNA represents the physical embodiment of 
biological information, distinct in its essential 
characteristics from any other chemical found in 
nature. It is concluded that DNA's existence in an 
"isolated" form alters neither this fundamental 
quality of DNA as it exists in the body nor the 
information it encodes. Therefore, the patents at 
issue directed to "isolated DNA" containing 
sequences found in nature are unsustainable as a 
matter of law and are deemed unpatentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Similarly, because the claimed comparisons of 
DNA sequences are abstract mental processes, they 
also constitute unpatentable subject matter under § 
101. 
The facts relating to molecular biology are 
fundamental to the patents at issue and to the 
conclusions reached. Consequently, in the findings 
which follow, the discussion of molecular biology 
precedes the facts concerning the development, 
application, and description of the patents. Following 
those facts are the conclusions which compel the 
partial grant of summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, 
                                                                                                                    
1  See, e.g., John M. Conley & Roberte Markowski, Back to the 
Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier 
to Biotechnology Patents, 65 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soe'y 
301, 3C5 (2003). 
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the denial of Myriad's cross-­motion, and the grant of 
the USPTO's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The complaint in this action was filed on May 
12, 2009, alleging violations of 35 U.S.C. § 101;; 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution;; and the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
which motion was denied by the opinion of November 
1, 2009. See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). Plaintiffs were found to have the 
necessary standing to assert their declaratory 
judgment claims against the Myriad Defendants and 
the USPTO, and specific personal jurisdiction was 
found to exist over the Directors of the UURF by 
virtue of acts performed in their official capacity that 
were directed to the state of New York. It was also 
determined that this Court possessed the necessary 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' 
constitutional claims against the USPTO and that 
the complaint satisfied the pleading requirements set 
forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and 
the cross-­motions for summary judgment and 
judgment on the pleadings were heard and marked 
fully submitted on February 4, 2010. 
II. THE PARTIES AND AMICI 
Plaintiff Association for Molecular Pathology 
("AMP") is a not-­for-­profit scientific society dedicated 
to the advancement, practice, and science of clinical 
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molecular laboratory medicine and translational 
research based on the applications of genomics and 
proteomics. AMP members participate in basic and 
translational research aimed at broadening the 
understanding of gene/protein structure and 
function, disease processes, and molecular 
diagnostics, and provide clinical medical services for 
patients, including diagnosis of breast cancer. Sobel 
Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-­5.2  
Plaintiff the American College of Medical 
Genetics ("ACMG") is a private, non-­profit voluntary 
organization of clinical and laboratory geneticists. 
The Fellows of the ACMG are doctoral level medical 
geneticists and other physicians involved in the 
practice of medical genetics. With more than 1300 
members, the ACMG's mission is to improve health 
through the practice of medical genetics. In order to 
fulfill this mission, the ACMG strives to define and 
promote excellence in medical genetics practice and 
the integration of translational research into 
practice;; promote and provide medical genetics 
education;; increase access to medical genetics 
services and integrate genetics into patient care;; and 
advocate for and represent providers of medical 
genetics services and their patients.                  
Watson Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-­5. 
Founded in 1922, plaintiff the American 
Society for Clinical Pathology ("ASCP") is the largest 
and oldest organization representing the medical 
specialty of pathology and laboratory medicine. 
                                                                                                                    
2   For purposes of this opinion, references to the parties' 
declarations will be in the format [Declarant name] Decl. ¶ 
[paragraph number]. 
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ASCP is a not-­for-­profit entity organized for scientific 
and educational purposes and dedicated to patient 
safety, public health, and the practice of pathology 
and laboratory medicine and has 130,000 members 
working as pathologists and laboratory professionals. 
ASCP members design and interpret the tests that 
detect disease, predict outcome, and determine the 
appropriate therapy for the patient. The ASCP is 
recognized for its excellence in continuing 
professional education, certification of laboratory 
professionals, and advocacy. Ball Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5.
 Plaintiff the College of American Pathologists 
("CAP") is a national medical society representing 
more than 17,000 pathologists who practice anatomic 
pathology and laboratory medicine in laboratories 
worldwide. The College's Commission on Laboratory 
Accreditation is responsible for accrediting more 
than 6,000 laboratories domestically and abroad, and 
approximately 23,000 laboratories are enrolled in 
CAP's proficiency testing programs. It is the world's 
largest association composed exclusively of board-­
certified pathologists and pathologists in training 
worldwide and is widely considered the leader in 
laboratory quality assurance. CAP is an advocate for 
high quality and cost-­effective medical care. Scott 
Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4-­5. 
Plaintiff Haig Kazazian, M. D. ("Dr. 
Kazazian"), is the Seymour Gray Professor of 
Molecular Medicine in Genetics in the Department of 
Genetics at the University of Pennsylvania School of 
Medicine. He is a human genetics researcher and the 
previous chair of the Department. Dr. Kazazian and 
plaintiff Arupa Ganguly, Ph.D. ("Dr. Ganguly"), 
designed tests to screen the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes in their lab and provided screening to 
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approximately 500 women per year starting in 1996. 
Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly ceased their BRCAl/2 
testing in response to cease-­and-­desist letters from 
Myriad relating to the patents-­in-­suit.                   
Kazazian Decl. ¶¶ 1-­5. 
Plaintiff Dr. Ganguly is an Associate Professor 
in the Department of Genetics at the Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Ganguly's work 
previously included BRCA1/2 screening for both 
research and clinical purposes. She ceased BRCA1/2 
screening following her receipt of cease-­and-­desist 
letters from Myriad accusing her lab of violating the 
patents-­in-­suit. Ganguly Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3-­5. 
Plaintiff Wendy Chung, M.D., Ph.D.            
("Dr. Chung"), is an Associate Professor of Pediatrics 
and the Herbert Irving Professor of Pediatrics and 
Medicine in the Division of Molecular Genetics at 
Columbia University. Dr. Chung is a human 
geneticist whose current research includes research 
on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Because of the 
patents-­in-­suit, Dr. Chung currently cannot tell 
research subjects in her studies the results of their 
BRCA1/2 tests and cannot offer clinical BRCA1/2 
testing services. Chung Decl. ¶¶ 1-­9, 13, 16. 
3ODLQWLII+DUU\2VWUHU0''U2VWUHUµLVD
Professor of Pediatrics, Pathology and Medicine and 
Director of the Human Genetics Program in the 
Department of Pediatrics at New York University 
School of Medicine. Dr. Ostrer's work has focused on 
understanding the genetic basis of development and 
disease, including disorders of sexual differentiation 
and genetic susceptibility to breast and prostate 
cancer and malignant melanoma. Dr. Ostrer is 
actively engaged in identifying genes that convey 
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risk of breast cancer and that may mitigate the 
effects of mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 
Dr. Ostrer is also the Director of the Molecular 
Genetics Laboratory of NYU Medical Center, one of 
the largest academic genetic testing laboratories in 
the United States. Because of the patents-­in-­suit, Dr. 
Ostrer currently cannot tell research subjects in his 
studies the results of their BRCA1/2 tests and 
cannot offer clinical BRCA1/2 testing services. 
Ostrer ¶¶ 1-­4. 
3ODLQWLII 'DYLG /HGEHWWHU 3K ' ´'U
/HGEHWWHUµ LV D 3URIHVVRU RI +XPDQ *HQHWLFV DQG
Director of the Division of Medical Genetics at the 
Emory University School of Medicine. Research in 
his laboratory focuses on the molecular 
characterization of human developmental disorders. 
Dr. Ledbetter directs the Emory Genetics Laboratory 
which provides testing services for individuals with 
or at risk for genetic diseases. Because of the 
patents-­in-­suit, Dr. Ledbetter cannot offer 
comprehensive BRCA1/2 genetic testing to patients. 
Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 1-­8, 16. 
Plaintiff Stephen T. Warren, Ph.D. ("Dr. 
Warren"), is the William Patterson Timmie Professor 
of Human Genetics, Chairman of the Department of 
Human Genetics, and Professor of Biochemistry and 
Professor of Pediatrics at Emory University. He is a 
past President of the American Society of Human 
Genetics. Dr. Warren supervises genetic research at 
Emory and is responsible for the laboratories at the 
Emory Genetics Laboratory. These laboratories 
would offer BRCA1/2 genetic testing but for the 
patents-­in-­suit. Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 1, 16. 
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Plaintiff Ellen Matloff, M.S. ("Ms. Matloff"), is 
Director of the Yale Cancer Genetic Counseling 
Program. Ms. Matloff advises women on the 
desirability of obtaining an analysis of their genes to 
determine if the women have the genetic mutations 
that correlate with an increased risk of breast and/or 
ovarian cancer. If she determines that such an 
analysis is warranted and the individual woman 
concurs, Ms. Matloff arranges for the analysis and 
then advises the woman of the significance of the 
results. Ms. Matloff would like to have the option to 
send patient samples to laboratories other than 
Myriad Genetics for BRCA1/2 sequencing.                 
Matloff Decl. ¶¶ 1-­4, 11. 
Plaintiff Elsa W. Reich, M.S. ("Ms. Reich"), is a 
Professor in the Department of Pediatrics at New 
York University. She is a genetic counselor. She 
helps women decide whether to be tested for 
mutations in the BRC1 and BRCA2 genes. If they 
need testing, she sends samples to Myriad and 
explains the results for the women. Ms. Reich would 
like to have the option to send patient samples to 
laboratories other than Myriad for BRCA1/2 
sequencing. Reich Decl. ¶¶ 1-­3, 8. 
Plaintiff Breast Cancer Action ("BCAµ is a 
national organization of approximately 30,000 
members based in San Francisco, California. BCA is 
dedicated to representing the voices of people 
affected by breast cancer in order to inspire and 
compel the changes necessary to end the breast 
cancer epidemic. Its members include breast cancer 
survivors, family members of people diagnosed with 
breast cancer and other people affected by or 
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concerned about breast cancer. BCA advocates for 
policy changes directed at achieving prevention, 
finding better treatments, and reducing the incidence 
of breast cancer, provides information about breast 
cancer to anyone who needs it via newsletters, web 
sites, e-­mail and a toll-­free number, and organizes 
people to get involved in advocacy to advance its 
policy goals. Brenner Decl. ¶¶ 1-­3. 
Plaintiff Boston Women's Health Book 
Collective, doing business as Our Bodies Ourselves 
("OBOS"), is a nonprofit, public interest women's 
health education, advocacy, and consulting 
organization. OBOS provides information about 
health, sexuality and reproduction from a feminist 
and consumer perspective. OBOS advocates for 
women's health and provides information to 
members of the public about genetic analysis. 
Norsigian Decl. ¶¶ 1-­4. 
Plaintiff Lisbeth Ceriani ("Ms. Ceriani") is a 
43-­year-­old single mother who was diagnosed with 
cancer in both breasts in May 2008. Ms. Ceriani is 
insured through MassHealth, a Medicaid insurance 
program for low-­income people. Her oncologist and 
genetic counselor recommended that she obtain 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing because she may 
need to consider further surgery in order to reduce 
her risk of ovarian cancer. However, Myriad will not 
accept the MassHealth coverage, and Ms. Ceriani is 
unable to pay the full cost out-­of-­pocket. Ceriani 
Decl. ¶¶ 1-­6. 
Plaintiff Runi Limary ("Ms. Limary") is a 32-­ 
year-­old Asian-­American woman who was diagnosed 
with aggressive breast cancer in 2005. Ms. Limary 
obtained BRCA1/2 testing through Myriad and 
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received the following result: "genetic variant of 
XQFHUWDLQVLJQLILFDQFHµ%HFDXVHRI0\ULDG
VSDWHQWV
she is unable to pursue alternative testing options. 
Limary Decl. ¶¶ 1-­5. 
Plaintiff Genae Girard ,"Ms. Girard") is a 39-­ 
year-­old woman who was diagnosed with breast 
cancer in 2006. Shortly after her diagnosis, she 
obtained BRCA1/2 genetic testing from Myriad and 
tested positive for a deleterious mutation on the 
BRCA2 gene. She sought a second opinion of that 
test result but learned that Myriad is the only 
laboratory in the country that can provide full 
BRCA1/2 sequencing. Girard Decl. ¶¶ 1-­6. 
Plaintiff Patrice Fortune ("Ms. Fortune") is a 
48-­year-­old woman who was diagnosed with breast 
cancer in February 2009. Ms. Fortune is insured 
through Medi-­Cal. Her oncologist and genetic 
counselor recommended that she obtain BRCA1/2 
genetic testing, including the supplemental testing 
that is offered by Myriad separate from its standard 
test, but told her that Myriad would not accept her 
insurance. Ms. Fortune is unable to pay the full cost 
out-­of-­pocket. Fortune Decl. ¶¶ 1-­5. 
Plaintiff Vicky Thomason ("Ms. Thomason") is 
a 52-­year-­old woman who was diagnosed with 
ovarian cancer in 2006. She obtained BRCA1/2 
genetic testing from Myriad in 2007 and was found to 
be negative for mutations covered by that test. Her 
genetic counselor advised her about additional 
BRCA1/2 genetic testing offered by Myriad that 
looks for other large genetic rearrangements that are 
not included in Myriad's standard full sequencing 
test, but informed her that her insurance would not 
cover the full cost of that test. Ms. Thomason is 
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unable to afford the extra cost. Thomason                     
Decl. ¶¶ 1-­8. 
Plaintiff Kathleen Raker ("Ms. Raker") is a 41-­ 
year-­old woman whose mother and maternal 
grandmother died from breast cancer. She obtained 
BRCA1/2 genetic testing from Myriad in 2007 and 
was found to be negative for mutations covered by 
that test. Her genetic counselor advised her about 
additional BRCA1/2 genetic testing offered by 
Myriad that looks for other large DNA 
rearrangements that are not included in Myriad's 
standard full sequencing test, but informed her that 
it was unclear whether her insurance would cover 
the full cost of that test. Ms. Raker is unable to afford 
the extra cost. Raker Decl. ¶¶ 1-­9. 
Defendant USPTO is an agency of the 
Commerce Department of the United States with its 
principal office in Alexandria, Virginia. USPTO 
Answer ¶ 27. 
Defendant Myriad is a for-­profit corporation 
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Myriad is the 
former co-­owner of several of the patents-­in-­suit and 
the current exclusive licensee of the patents-­in-­suit. 
Myriad is the sole provider of full sequencing of 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in the United States on a 
commercial basis. Myriad Answer ¶ 28. 
The University of Utah Research Foundation, 
whose directors are named as defendants in their 
official capacity, is an owner or part-­owner of each of 
the patents-­in-­suit. Myriad Answer ¶ 29. 
Amici curiae American Medical Association 
American Society of Human Genetics, American 
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College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American 
College of Embryology, and The Medical Society of 
the State of New York are non-­profit organizations 
representing physicians and medical students 
throughout the United States, including New York;; 
professionals in the field of human genetics, 
including researchers, clinicians, academicians, 
ethicists, genetic counselors and nurses whose work 
involve genetic testing;; women's health care 
professionals;; and embryologists. These amici 
contend that the patents-­in-­suit are directed to 
unpatentable natural phenomena in violation of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause B of the Constitution, and 
35 U.S.C. § 101, are unnecessary to promote 
innovation in genetic research, and violate medical 
and scientific ethics. 
Amici curiae March of Dimes Foundation, 
Canavan Foundation, Claire Altman Heine 
Foundation, Breast Cancer Coalition, Massachusetts 
Breast Cancer Coalition, National Organization for 
Rare Disorders, and National Tay-­Sachs & Allied 
Diseases Association are non-­profit organizations 
dedicated to advancing the treatment of a variety of 
genetic diseases, including breast cancer, Tay-­Sachs, 
Spinal Muscular Dystrophy, Canavan disease, and 
other rare genetic disorders. These amici contend 
that Myriad's patents represent patents on natural 
phenomena and laws of nature, thereby restricting 
future research and scientific progress. 
Amici curiae National Women's Health 
Network, Asian Communities for Reproductive 
Justice, Center for Genetics and Society, Generations 
Ahead, and Pro-­Choice Alliance for Responsible 
Research are non-­profit organizations seeking to 
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improve the health of women;; promote reproductive 
justice;; encourage responsible use and governance of 
genetic, reproductive and biomedical technologies;; 
promote policies on genetic technologies that protect 
human rights;; promote accountability, safety, and 
social justice in biomedical research from a women's 
rights perspective. These amici contend that isolated 
DNA constitutes an unpatentable product of nature 
whose patenting harms women by stifling innovation 
and interfering with patient access to medical testing 
and treatment. These amici also contend that human 
genes and the information contained therein 
constitute part of the common heritage of humanity, 
and patenting human gene sequences is contrary to 
both international law and treatises as well as the 
public trust doctrine. 
Amici curiae The International Center for 
Technology Assessment, Indigenous People Council 
on Biocolonialism, Greenpeace, Inc., and Council for 
Responsible Genetics are non-­profit organizations 
dedicated to assisting the public and policy makers in 
understanding how technology affects society, 
protecting the cultural heritage and genetic 
materials of indigenous peoples;; addressing global 
environmental problems;; and protecting the public 
interest and fostering public debate about the social, 
ethical, and environmental implications of genetic 
technologies. These amici contend that the patents-­
in-­suit claim unpatentable products of nature and 
that gene patents have significant negative 
consequences, including privatization of genetic 
heritage in violation of fundamental precepts of 
common heritage, public domain, and the public 
trust doctrine;; creation of private rights of unknown 
scope and significance;; facilitate the exploitation of 
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indigenous peoples;; and violation of patients' rights 
to informed consent. 
Amicus curiae Biotechnology Industry 
Organization ("BIO") is the country's largest 
biotechnology trade association, representing over 
1200 companies, academic institutions, and 
biotechnology centers in all 50 states. BIO members 
are involved in the research and development of 
biotechnological healthcare, agricultural, 
environmental, and industrial products. BIO member 
companies range from start-­up businesses and 
university spin-­offs to large Fortune 500 
corporations. BIO contends that patents directed to 
isolated DNA fall within the categories of patent-­
eligible subject matter because they differ "in kind" 
from naturally-­occurring DNA. The BIO also 
contends that patents such as the ones in dispute 
here provide incentives for investment in 
biotechnology that promotes the advancement of 
science. 
Amicus curiae Boston Patent Law Association 
("BPLA") is a non-­profit association of attorneys and 
other intellectual property professionals. BPLA's 
members serve a broad range of clients who rely on 
the patent system, including independent investors, 
corporations, investors, and non-­profit and academic 
institutions, such as universities and research 
hospitals. BPLA contends that patents, including 
patents on gene-­related inventions, promote 
innovation by protecting investments in the 
innovation process. It further contends that the 
patents-­in-­ suit satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 as well as the Constitution. 
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for-­profit, tax-­exempt health advocacy organization 
founded in 1986 (as the Alliance for Genetic Support 
Groups). It brings together diverse stakeholders that 
create novel partnerships in advocacy. By integrating 
individual, family, and community perspectives to 
improve health systems, Genetic Alliance seeks to 
revolutionize access to information to enable 
translation of research into services and 
individualized decision-­making. GA contends that 
the wholesale abolition of patents on isolated DNA 
molecules and isolated purified natural substances is 
legally untenable and undesirable as public policy, 
because it would diminish the promise of genetic 
research for patients and negatively affect other 
areas of medicine. 
Amicus curiae Rosetta Genomics, Inc. is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of amicus curiae Rosetta 
Genomics, Ltd., a molecular diagnostics company 
that provides diagnostic tests for cancer and which 
owns several patents claiming isolated nucleic acid 
sequences. Amicus curiae George Mason University 
("George Mason") is a public university located in 
Virginia. Research conducted at George Mason has 
been incorporated into patent applications covering 
cancer diagnostics. These amici contend that the 
question of patentability of human gene sequences is 
appropriately left to Congress;; that the patents-­in-­
suit promote, rather than hinder innovation;; and 
that the challenged patents are lawful under 3S 
U.S.C. § 101 and the Constitution. 
Amicus curiae BayBio is an independent, 
nonprofit 501(c) (6) trade association serving the life 
sciences industry in Northern California, and 
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represents more than 330 companies involved in the 
research and development of treatments, cures, and 
diagnostics. Amicus curiae Ce1era Corporation is a 
manufacturer of diagnostic products that include 
gene-­based products used in genetic testing. Amicus 
curiae The Coalition for 21st Century Medicine 
represents some of the world's most innovative 
diagnostic technology companies, clinical 
laboratories, researchers, physicians, venture 
capitalists, and patient advocacy groups that share a 
common mission to develop advanced diagnostics 
that improve the quality of healthcare for patients. 
Amicus curiae Genomic Health, Inc., is a life sciences 
company committed to improving the quality of 
cancer treatment decisions through genomics-­based 
clinical laboratory services and currently offers the 
Oncotype DX breast cancer assay, which predicts the 
likelihood of the recurrence of specific types of breast 
cancer and whether a patient will benefit from 
certain treatment strategies. Amicus curiae Qiagen, 
N.V. is a leading provider of innovative sample and 
assay technologies and products which are 
considered standard for use in molecular diagnostics, 
applied testing, and academic and pharmaceutical 
research and development. Amicus curiae Target 
Discovery, Inc. discovers, validates, and utilizes 
protein isoforms to improve clinical diagnosis and 
management of disease. Amicus curiae XDx, Inc., is a 
molecular diagnostics company focused on the 
discovery, development and commercialization of 
non-­invasive gene expression testing in the areas of 
transplant medicine and autoimmunity through the 
use of modern genomics and bioinformatics 
technology. These amici contend that patent 
exclusivity is required for the development of 
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personalized medicine and that the challenged 
patents satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
and the Constitution. In addition, the amici contend 
that the harm alleged by Plaintiffs can be redressed 
through traditional judicial remedies and do not 
require a finding that isolated DNA constitutes 
unpatentable subject matter. 
Amicus curiae Kenneth Chahine, Ph.D. 
("Professor Chahine"), is a Visiting Professor of Law 
at S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of 
Utah. Professor Chahine contends that the scope of 
the claims-­in-­suit are sufficiently limited to avoid 
claiming products of nature and that the claims 
directed to isolated DNA and diagnostic process 
satisfy the requirements of patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Amicus curiae Kevin E. Noonan, Ph.D. ("Dr. 
Noonan"), is a patent attorney with McDonnell 
Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP. Dr. Noonan 
contends that isolated human DNA constitutes 
patentable subject matter and that a ban on 
patenting isolated human DNA would negatively 
affect the development of human therapeutics, the 
development of personalized medicine, and the 
scientific research in general.  
III. THE FACTS 
The facts as set forth in this section are taken 
from the parties' respective statements and 
counterstatements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 
and the affidavits submitted by the parties and amici 
and are not in dispute except where noted. 
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A. The Development of Genetics as a Field 
of Knowledge 
The field of genetics -­ the science of heredity 
and variation in living organisms -­ and the concept of 
units of heredity that could be transmitted from one 
generation to another originated in the 19th century 
from experiments with pea plants conducted by 
Gregor Mendel. Mendel showed that certain traits 
are passed on from parent to offspring as discrete 
entities and do not appear blended in the offspring. 
He hypothesized that it was the plant's genotype, or 
assortment of hereditary factors, that determined the 
plant's phenotype, or appearance. Mason Decl. ¶ 8. 
In 1909, this unit of inheritance was termed a "gene." 
Yet the gene remained an abstract concept until 
1915, when it was shown that genes corresponded to 
physical spans of chromosomal material.                      
Mason Decl. ¶ 9. 
In 1944, scientists determined that the 
chemical compound known as deoxyribonucleic acid, 
or DNA,3 served as the carrier for genetic 
information by demonstrating that DNA extracted 
from one strain of bacteria and transferred to 
another strain could transfer certain characteristics 
found in the first strain. Oswald Theodore Avery, et 
al., Studies on the Chemical Nature of the Substance 
Inducing Transformation of Pneumococcal Types: 
Induction of Transformation by a Desoxyribonucleic 
                                                                                                                    
3   Scientists had learned to extract DNA from the body by 
removing it from the rest of the cellular material since as early 
as 1869. Ralf Dahm, Discovering DNA: Friedrich Miescher and 
the Early Years of Nucleic Acid Research, 122 Human Genetics 
565-­581, 567-­68 (2008).  
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Acid Fraction Isolated from Pneumococcus Type III, 
79 J. Exp. Med. 137-­ 158 (1944). 
On April 25, 1953, James Watson and Francis 
Crick published their determination of the famous 
double-­helix structure of DNA in the journal Nature. 
James D. Watson & Francis H.C. Crick, A Structure 
for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 Nature 737-­38 
(1953). Dr. Crick subsequently contributed to the 
decryption of the genetic code and proposed "the 
central dogma" of molecular biology: (1) information 
is encoded in a segment of DNA, i.e., a gene;; (2) 
transmitted through a molecule called RNA;; and 
then (3) utilized to direct the creation of a protein, 
the building block of the body. Mason Decl. ¶ 10. 
Our understanding of the DNA contained 
within our cells has since grown at an exponential 
rate and has included the landmark completion of 
the first full-­length sequence of a human genome, 
containing 25,000 genes, as a result of the work 
performed by the Human Genome Project from 1990 
to 2003. Sulston Decl. ¶¶ 11, 22. Access to the 
information encoded in our DNA has presented 
expansive new possibilities for future biomedical 
research and the development of novel diagnostic and 
therapeutic approaches. How this genomic 
information is best harnessed for the greater good 
presents difficult questions touching upon innovation 
policy, social policy, medical ethics, economic policy, 
and the ownership of what some view as our common 
heritage. 
 
 
 
138a 
  
B. Molecular Biology and Gene Sequencing 
An understanding of the basics of molecular 
biology is required to resolve the issues presented 
and to provide the requisite insight into the 
fundamentals of the genome, that is, the nature 
which is at the heard of the dispute between the 
parties. What follows represents the standard 
undisputed knowledge of those in the field of 
molecular biology as set forth in the parties' 56.1 
Statements and expert declarations. Citations are 
also made to two established texts in the field: Bruce 
Alberts, et al, Molecular Biology of the Cell (4th ed. 
2002) ("The Cell") and James Watson, et aL, 
Molecular Biology of the Gene (6th ed. 2008) ("The 
Gene"). 
1. DNA 
DNA is a chemical molecule composed of 
repeating chemical units known as "nucleotides" or 
"bases." DNA is composed of four standard 
nucleotides: adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine. 
As shorthand, scientists denote nucleotides by the 
first letter of the names of their bases: "A" for 
adenine;; "G" for guanine;; "T" for thymine;; and "c" for 
cytosine. These nucleotide units are composed of 
several chemical elements, namely carbon, hydrogen, 
oxygen, nitrogen, and phosphorus, and are linked 
together by chemical bonds to form a strand, or 
polymer, of the DNA molecule. Kay Decl. ¶¶ 14, 125;; 
Linck Decl. ¶ 70. 
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Although it can exist as a single strand of 
QXFOHRWLGHV'1$W\SLFDOO\H[LVWVDVDGRXEOHKHOL[µ4 
consisting of two intertwined strands of DNA that 
are chemically bound to each other. This structure is 
possible because of a property of DNA known as 
"base pair complementarity" or "base pairing," in 
which adenine on one strand of DNA always binds to 
thymine on the other strand of DNA, and guanine on 
one strand always bind to cytosine on the other 
strand. Kay Decl. ¶ 129. For example, if a portion of 
one strand of DNA has the nucleotide sequence 
ACTCGT, the corresponding section of DNA on the 
complementary strand will have the nucleotide 
sequence TGAGCA. 
Genes are basic units of heredity found in all 
living organisms and are responsible for the 
inheritance of a discrete trait. Sulston Decl. ¶ 11. In 
molecular terms, a gene is composed of several, 
typically contiguous, segments of DNA. Kay Decl. ¶ 
142. Each gene is typically thousands of nucleotides 
long and usually "encodes" one or more proteins, 
meaning it contains the information used by the body 
to produce those proteins. Some of the segments of 
DNA within a gene, known as "exons" or "coding 
sequences," contain sequences necessary for the 
creation of a protein, while other segments of DNA, 
known as "introns," are not necessary for the creation 
of a protein.5 See Mason Decl. ¶ 11;; Kay Decl. ¶ 151;; 
Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 14. DNA encodes proteins by 
                                                                                                                    
4  It was the description of this famous "double-­helix" structure 
that earned Watson and Crick the Nobel Prize.  
5  Introns can contain regulatory sequences that affect the body's 
rate of production of the protein encoded by a gene.                                
Kay Decl. ¶ 151.  
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way of three nucleotide combinations, termed 
"codons," that correspond to one of twenty amino 
acids that constitute the building blocks of proteins. 
Sulston Decl. ¶¶ 14-­15. For example, the codon 
adenine-­thymine-­guanine (ATG) encodes the amino 
acid methionine. Kay Decl. ¶ 158. However, because 
there are only twenty different amino acids but 64 
possible codons that can be derived from 
combinations of the four DNA nucleotides, most 
amino acids are encoded by more than one DNA 
codon. The Gene at 37 & Table 2-­3. 
Together, the approximately 25,000 genes in 
the human body make up the human genome.6 The 
genome, and the genes within it, are contained 
within almost every cell in the human body and 
define physical traits such as skin tone, eye color, 
and sex, in addition to influencing the development 
of conditions such as obesity, diabetes, Alzheimer's 
disease, and bipolar disorder. Mason Decl. ¶ 4-­5;; 
Sulston Decl. ¶¶ 10-­11. 
The linear order of DNA nucleotides that make 
up a polynucleotide, such as a gene, is referred to as 
the "nucleotide sequence," "DNA sequence," or "gene 
sequence."7 Kay Decl. ¶ 126;; Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 19;; 
Linck Decl. ¶ 45;; Sulston Decl. ¶ 16;; Mason Decl. ¶ 
13;; Chung Decl. ¶ 10. Gene sequences constitute 
biological information insofar as they describe the 
structural and chemical properties of a particular 
                                                                                                                    
6   Genome is defined as [t]he totality of genetic information 
belonging to a cell or an organism;; in particular, the DNA that 
carries this information." The Cell at G:15.  
7   By analogy, if a gene is the equivalent of a word, then the 
nucleotide sequence is the equivalent of the word's spelling. 
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DNA molecule and serve as the cellular "blueprint" 
for the production of proteins. Sulston Decl. ¶ 16;; 
Kay Decl. ¶ 126;; Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 19;;                    
Linck Decl. ¶¶ 45, 46. Genes and the information 
represented by human gene sequences are products 
of nature universally present in each individual, and 
the information content of a human gene sequence is 
fixed. While many inventive steps may be necessary 
to allow scientists to extract and read a gene 
sequence, it is undisputed that the ordering of the 
nucleotides is determined by nature. Sulston Decl. ¶ 
10, 17;; Ostrer Decl. ¶ 14;; Chung Decl. ¶ 25;; 
Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 27;; Leonard Decl. ¶ 15.  
Scientists often use the term "wild-­type" to 
refer to the "normal" human gene sequence, i.e. the 
sequence of a gene without any variations,8 against 
which individuals' gene sequences are compared. 
Mason Decl. ¶ 17;; Grody Decl. ¶ 46. Variations in the 
human genome are very common;; aside from 
identical twins, the genomes of any two individuals 
are estimated to have one to five nucleotide 
differences for every 1000 nucleotides. Mason Decl. ¶ 
14;; Sulston Decl. ¶ 12. 
Variations in the human genome, also known 
as "mutations," can occur at different scales. Small 
scale variations can be manifested as slight sequence 
differences between the same genes in different 
individuals. Thus, for example, if the wild-­type 
                                                                                                                    
8  At the same time there is an increasing recognition that the 
QRWLRQRID VLQJOH ´QRUPDOJHQH VHTXHQFHPD\QRWEHHQWirely 
accurate in light of the high frequency of variations in a genets 
sequence between individuals. Mason Decl. ¶ 17. For purposes 
of this opinion, however, genes are treated as having a single 
"normal" DNA sequence.  
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sequence of a portion of a gene is represented by 
GACTCG, a variation of that sequence might omit 
the first C (resulting in GATCG) or contain an extra 
C at that point (resulting in GACCTCG) or reverse 
the order of two of the letters (e.g., GCATCG). Mason 
Decl. ¶ 16. Alternatively, there can be large scale 
variations, such as the addition or deletion of 
substantial chromosomal regions. Thus, a particular 
gene may omit several hundred letters at one point 
or may add several hundred letters where they do 
not normally exist in the wild-­type gene sequence. 
Even larger variations, known as structural variants, 
also can occur, involving the deletion or duplication 
of up to millions of nucleotides. Extra copies or 
missing copies of the genome that are larger than 
1000 nucleotides are called "copy number variants" 
("CNVs"). Mason Decl. ¶ 15, 18. 
Some of these mutations have little or no effect 
on the body's processes, while other mutations, 
including those that appear to correlate with an 
increased risk of particular diseases, do interfere 
with the body's processes.9 There are also variants of 
uncertain significance ("VUS"): variants whose effect 
on the body's processes, if any, is currently unknown. 
Mason Decl. ¶ 19;; Sulston Decl. ¶ 18;; Kay Decl. ¶ 76. 
DNA as it is found in the human body -­ "native 
DNA" or "genomic DNA" -­ is packaged, along with 
                                                                                                                    
9   The correlation between a particular mutation and disease 
susceptibility is not self-­evident from the mutation itself;; 
rather, extensive statistical analysis is required to identify 
which alterations in the nucleotide sequence correlate with a 
particular medical condition, a process which may take many 
years. Kay Decl. ¶ 190. 
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proteins, into complex structures known as 
chromosomes, which contain the vast majority of the 
genes located in the cells of the human body.                  
Kay Decl. ¶ 131;; Schlessinger Dec1. ¶ 12. This 
mixture of DNA and proteins that makes up 
chromosomes is also referred to as chromatin. See 
The Gene at 135. Genes are organized on forty-­six 
chromosomes (twenty-­three of which are inherited 
from the mother, and twenty-­three of which are 
inherited from the father) which together constitute 
the vast majority of the human genome.10                    
Mason Decl. ¶ 5. The proteins within the 
chromosomes are bound11 to the DNA molecules and 
modulate the structure and function of the DNA 
molecules to which they are associated. Kay Decl. ¶ 
131;; Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 12;; The Cell at 198, 208, 
Fig. 4-­24. This interaction between chromosomal 
proteins and native DNA is one method by which the 
body establishes which genes are inactive, which 
genes are active, and the level of activity.                       
Kay Decl. ¶ 132. Some DNA in the body also 
undergoes chemical modifications, such as 
                                                                                                                    
10  A very small fraction of human genes are located in a cellular 
organelle known as the mitochondria. Kay Decl. ¶ 144;; Schles-­
singer Decl. ¶ 23. Neither party appears to believe that a 
discussion of mitochondrial DNA bears much relevance to the 
legal issues presented.  
11   The ionic chemical bonds that exists between proteins and 
DNA molecules differ from the covalent chemical bonds which 
hold DNA itself together. See The Cell at 198 (describing DNA 
in the cell as "associated with proteins that fold and pack the 
fine DNA thread into a more compact structure.");; id. at 208 
Fig. 4-­24 (demonstrating dissociation of histone proteins from 
DNA by high salt solution, indicating lack of covalent bond 
between DNA and histones).  
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methylation,12 which can affect the level of activity of 
a gene, but does not affect the nucleotide sequence of 
the gene. Kay Decl. ¶ 132;; Mason Supp. Decl. ¶ 22. 
2. Extracted and purified DNA 
Native DNA may be extracted from its cellular 
environment, including the associated chromosomal 
proteins, using any number of well-­established 
laboratory techniques. Grody Decl. ¶ 13;; Leonard 
Decl. ¶ 33. A particular segment of DNA, such as a 
gene, contained in the extracted DNA may then be 
excised from the genomic DNA in which it is 
embedded to obtain the purified DNA of interest. 
Kay Decl. ¶¶ 133, 137. DNA molecules may also be 
chemically synthesized in the laboratory.                         
Kay Decl. ¶¶ 17, 133, 137. 
Although the parties use the term "isolated 
DNA" to describe DNA that is separated from 
proteins and other DNA sequences, the term 
"isolated DNA" possesses a specific legal definition 
reflecting its use in the patents-­in-­suit. To avoid any 
confusion for purposes of this fact recitation, the 
term "extracted DNA" will be used to refer to DNA 
that has been removed from the cell and separated 
from other non-­DNA materials in the cell (e.g., 
proteins);; "purified DNA" will be used to refer to 
extracted DNA which has been further processed to 
separate the particular segment of DNA of interest 
from the other DNA in the genome;; and "synthesized 
                                                                                                                    
12  Methylation refers to the addition of a small chemical group 
composed of one carbon atom and three hydrogen atoms (CH3), 
known as a "methyl group," to the nucleotides of a segment of 
DNA. See The Cell at 430.  
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DNA" will be used to refer to DNA which has been 
synthesized in the laboratory. 
As noted above, native DNA, unlike purified or 
synthesized DNA, is not typically found floating 
freely in cells of the body, but is packaged into 
chromosomes. Kay Decl. ¶¶ 131, 148. However, when 
DNA is copied, or replicated, in preparation for cell 
division, short segments of DNA are dissociated from 
the chromosomal proteins, although they are still 
contained within the cell. Similarly, when a 
particular portion of DNA is transcribed into RNA, 
segments of DNA exist dissociated from the proteins 
normally bound to it. Mason Supp. Decl. ¶ 23. 
Purified or synthesized DNA may be used as 
tools for biotechnological applications for which 
native DNA cannot be used. Kay Decl. ¶¶ 134, 138;; 
Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 27. For example, unlike native 
DNA, purified or synthesized DNA may be used as a 
SUREHµ13 which is a diagnostic tool that a molecular 
biologist uses to target and bind to a particular 
segment of DNA, thus allowing the target DNA 
sequence to be detectable using standard laboratory 
machinery. Kay Decl. ¶ 135;; Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 29. 
Purified or synthesized DNA can also be used as a 
SULPHUµ14 to sequence a target DNA, a process used 
by molecular biologists to determine the order of 
nucleotides in a DNA molecule, or to perform 
polymerase chain reaction ("PCR") amplification, a 
                                                                                                                    
13  A probe is a DNA fragment that is usually between 100-­1000 
nucleotides long. Kay Decl. ¶ 135.  
14   A primer is a DNA fragment, usually between 15 and 30 
nucleotides long, that binds specifically to a target DNA 
sequence. Kay Decl. ¶ 183. 
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process which utilizes target-­DNA specific primers to 
duplicate the quantity of target DNA exponentially. 
Critchfield Decl. ¶ 40;; Kay Decl. ¶ 184. 
During this process, the DNA molecule being 
used as a probe or a primer binds, or "hybridizes," to 
a specific nucleotide sequence of a DNA target 
molecule, such as the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene. This 
sequence-­specific binding of two strands of DNA 
results from the same base-­pairing phenomenon 
which allows two complementary strands of DNA to 
form the double helix structure. As a result, a strand 
of isolated DNA being used as a primer with the 
sequence ATGTCG, for example, will bind 
specifically to the portion of the target DNA molecule 
containing the nucleotide sequence TACAGC. The 
hybridization of a primer or probe to a DNA target, 
such as BRCA1 or BRCA2, results in the formation of 
a "hybridization product" that either acts as a 
substrate for the enzymes used in the sequencing or 
amplification reaction or permits the detection of the 
target DNA. See Kay Decl. ¶¶ 138, 183;;                
Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 30;; The Gene at 105-­06;; 113-­15. 
The utility of purified BRCA1/2 DNA 
molecules as biotechnological tools therefore relies on 
their ability to selectively bind to native or isolated 
BRCA1/2 DNA molecules, which ability is a function 
of the isolated DNA's nucleotide sequence.                        
Kay Decl. ¶ 138. 
3. RNA 
Ribonucleic acid ("RNA") is another nucleic 
acid found in cells. Like DNA, an RNA molecule is 
composed of a combination of four different 
nucleotides, three of which are the same bases 
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incorporated into DNA: adenine, cytosine, and 
guanine. Unlike DNA, however, RNA utilizes uracil 
as the fourth nucleotide base, rather than thymine. 
In addition, the sugar-­phosphate backbone in RNA is 
chemically different from the sugar-­phosphate 
backbone of DNA. Kay Decl. ¶ 170. 
The creation of proteins, which do the work of 
the body, comprises two steps: transcription and 
translation. Transcription is the process by which a 
temporary copy of a particular DNA sequence, in the 
form of an RNA molecule, is generated.                        
Mason Decl. ¶¶ 11-­12;; Kay Decl. ¶¶ 149, 150. During 
transcription, a discrete segment of DNA unwinds 
itself inside the cell and the bases of the DNA 
molecule act as "clamps" that hold the bases of the 
newly forming RNA molecule in place while the 
chemical bonds of its sugar-­phosphate backbone are 
formed. Kay Decl. ¶ 150. Each nucleotide in the DNA 
strand corresponds to a nucleotide to be incorporated 
into the newly forming RNA molecule: adenine on 
the DNA molecule binds to and thereby acts as a 
clamp for RNA nucleotide uracil, thymine for 
adenine, guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for 
guanine. Kay Decl. ¶ 150. This newly generated RNA 
is termed "pre-­messenger RNA" or "pre-­mRNA" and, 
like the DNA from which it was generated, contains 
both introns and exons. In a process known as 
"splicing," the introns are physically cut out of the 
pre-­mRNA by the cell and the remaining RNA 
segments containing the exons are rejoined, or 
"ligated," together in consecutive order to form the 
final "messenger RNA," or "mRNA."                            
Mason Decl. ¶ 11;; Kay Decl. ¶ 151;;                       
Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 14. Pre-­mRNAs can also 
undergo a process known as "alternative splicing," in 
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which different combinations of exons from the same 
pre-­mRNA molecule are ligated together to yield 
different final mRNA products.15 Kay Decl. ¶ 152;; 
Schlessinger Decl. ¶ 14. 
During translation, an mRNA molecule serves 
as a template for the assembly of a protein. Kay Decl. 
¶ 157. In a process that parallels the transcription of 
DNA, the mRNA bases, along with other proteins in 
the cell, serve as clamps to hold the corresponding 
amino acids in place while the chemical bonds 
between the individual amino acids are formed. Kay 
Decl. ¶ 157. The three-­nucleotide codons originally 
found in DNA and copied into mRNA determine 
which amino acids are incorporated into the protein 
and the order in which they are incorporated. Kay 
Decl. ¶ 157. 
4. cDNA 
Complementary DNA, or "cDNA," is a type of 
DNA molecule generated from mRNA during a 
process known as "reverse transcription" which is 
catalyzed by a protein known as "reverse 
transcriptase." cDNA derives its name from the fact 
that it is "complementary" to the mRNA from which 
it is produced -­ that is, each base in the cDNA can 
                                                                                                                    
15   For example, a pre-­P51$ PROHFXOH FRQWDLQLQJ H[RQV ´(µ
numbered 1-­6, with introns ("I") between each axon whose 
structure is represented as follows: El+Il+E2+12+E3+13+ 
E4+14+ES+IS+E6. After splicing, the introns would be removed 
to form an mRNA composed only of exons: E1+E2+E3+ 
E4+E5+E6. On the other hand, the same pre-­mRNA molecule 
might undergo alternative splicing to form final mRNAs with a 
variety of different exon compositions: for example, E1+E2+E5;; 
El+E3+E6: and E1+E4+E6. 
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bind to the corresponding base in the mRNA from 
which it is generated. Kay Decl. ¶ 161. Because it is 
derived from mRNA, a cDNA molecule represents an 
exact copy of one of the protein coding sequences 
encoded by the original genomic DNA.                        
Leonard Decl. ¶ 75. In this respect, cDNA contains 
the identical protein coding informational content as 
the DNA in the body, even though differences exist in 
its physical form. Mason Decl. ¶ 32. 
During reverse transcription, each base of the 
mRNA serves as a clamp for its complementary 
nucleotide to be incorporated into the new cDNA 
molecule while the chemical bonds between the 
nucleotides of the cDNA strand are formed. Much 
like transcription, uracil on the mRNA binds to and 
thereby acts as a clamp for the nucleotide adenine, 
adenine for thymine, guanine for cytosine, and 
cytosine for guanine. Kay Decl. ¶ 165. The synthesis 
of cDNA from very long mRNA molecules, such as 
BRCA1 and BRCA2, often does not result in a cDNA 
strand that is as long as the mRNA chain.                       
Kay Decl. ¶ 166. 
cDNA is typically generated by scientists in a 
laboratory. Kay Decl. ¶ 164, Linck Decl. ¶ 48. 
However, naturally occurring cDNAs, known as 
"pseudogenes," exist in the human genome and are 
structurally, functionally, and chemically identical to 
cDNAs made in the laboratory. Mason Supp.  Decl. 
¶¶ 18-­21;; Nussbaum Decl. ¶¶ 41-­42. 
cDNA possesses certain structural and 
functional differences from native DNA. In contrast 
to most forms of native DNA, cDNA does not contain 
non-­coding intronic sequences because it is derived 
from mRNA in which the introns have been removed. 
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As a result, the production of proteins from cDNA 
does not require RNA splicing, in contrast to the 
production of proteins from native DNA as described 
above. Some cDNAs cannot be used to produce 
proteins without the addition of certain regulatory 
sequences, although other cDNAs possess some of the 
necessary regulatory sequences. cDNAs also usually 
contain nucleotides corresponding to the so-­called 
"poly A tail" sequence found in mRNA, which native 
DNA does not possess. In addition, as mentioned 
above, native DNA is often (although not always) 
chemically modified in the body, e.g., by methylation, 
while cDNA generated in the laboratory is not so 
modified. Kay Decl. ¶¶ 168, 169;; Mason Supp. Decl. 
¶¶ 18-­22;; Nussbaum Decl. ¶¶ 41-­42. cDNA also 
differs from mRNA in that it is a more stable 
compound and requires both transcription and 
translation to produce protein, rather than simply 
translation, as is the case with mRNA.                            
Kay Decl. ¶ 171. 
Much like purified DNA, cDNA can be used as 
a tool for biotechnological and diagnostic applications 
for which native DNA cannot be used. Kay Decl. ¶ 
162. In addition, a scientist seeking to learn more 
about a protein of interest may transfer a cDNA 
encoding the protein into a recipient cell that does 
not normally express that protein. If the cDNA is 
operatively linked to particular "promoter" sequences 
that initiate transcription from the cDNA, the 
recipient cell will then express the protein of interest. 
Kay Decl. ¶ 163. 
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5. DNA sequencing  
DNA sequencing is the process by which one 
"reads," or determines the ordering of the nucleotides 
within a DNA molecule. Sulston Decl. ¶ 20;;                    
Kay Decl. ¶ 138. In the context of a gene or a portion 
of the genome, sequencing is designed to illuminate 
the information that nature has dictated in that 
person's genome, and the sequencing process, by 
design, does not alter the information content of the 
native DNA sequence. Sulston Decl. ¶ 27;; Mason 
Decl. ¶ 32. In that respect, sequencing is analogous 
to examining something through a microscope 
insofar as it makes visible something that exists in 
nature but is too small to be seen otherwise. Mason 
Decl. ¶ 23. Gene sequencing is used in diagnostic 
testing, such as Myriad's tests, to determine whether 
a gene contains mutations that have been associated 
with a particular condition. Sulston Decl. ¶ 24;; 
Chung Decl. ¶ 10;; Swisher Dec1. ¶¶ 23-­26;; Mason 
Decl. ¶ 21. These mutations, along with any 
association with a propensity to develop a particular 
disease, are caused by nature. Chung Dec1. ¶ 10;; 
Mason Decl. ¶ 20;; Sulston Decl. ¶¶ 19, 27;;                   
Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 26. Therefore, the significance of 
any person's gene sequence, including its 
relationship to any disease, is dictated by nature. 
Mason Decl. ¶ 32. 
Sequencing is often used to identify single 
nucleotide substitutions or the insertion or deletion 
of a small number of nucleotides in a gene.                  
Swisher Decl. ¶ 23;; Kay Decl. ¶ 180. However, even 
full sequencing of an entire gene can miss large 
genomic rearrangements in which whole sections of 
the gene have been deleted or moved to a different 
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part of the genome. Other tests have been developed 
that better detect these large rearrangements.                              
Swisher Decl. ¶  24;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 16-­17.  
Sequencing native DNA first requires that 
cells of a tissue sample16 be broken open to permit 
extraction of the DNA contained within the cells. 
Sulston Decl. ¶ 25. The extracted DNA of the entire 
genome contains over three billion nucleotides, of 
which the gene of interest comprises a very small 
portion. Kay Decl. ¶ 178. BRCA1/2 sequencing by 
Myriad follows the typical process for sequencing 
extracted genomic DNA, which begins with obtaining 
a sufficient quantity of the BRCA1/2 genomic DNA 
to permit its sequencing. Critchfield Decl. ¶ 40. 
Under the current state of the art, the only 
practical way to obtain a sufficient amount of 
BRCA1/2 genomic DNA for mutation detection 
purposes is to PCR amplify the genomic DNA in 
segments. Critchfield Decl. ¶ 40. In order to design 
the necessary primers to PCR amplify the correct 
region of the genome, at least a portion of the 
sequence of the target DNA molecule must be known. 
Kay Decl. ¶ 184. Typically, each exon of the 
BRCA1/2 genes, including a small adjacent portion 
of the flanking introns, is separately amplified by 
PCR into one or more amplified DNA fragments, also 
called "amplicons." The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
have a total of 48 coding exons containing over 
15,700 nucleotide base pairs. More than 50 
amplicons are typically produced as part of Myriad's 
BRCA1/2 testing. Critchfield Decl. ¶ 40. 
                                                                                                                    
16   Various types of patient samples can be used, e.g., blood, 
tumor tissue, or non-­tumor tissue. Kay Decl. ¶ 186. 
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Following PCR amplification of the target 
DNA, a sequencing reaction is performed to 
determine the nucleotide sequence of the amplicon. 
Kay Decl. ¶ 183. As with PCR, at least some of the 
target sequence must be known in order to design a 
primer specific to the target DNA to be sequenced. 
Kay Decl. ¶¶ 177, 179, 183. For this reason, primers 
that bind only to specific DNA sequences in the 
BRCA1I and BRCA2 genes permit the analysis of a 
patient's native DNA sequence to determine if the 
nucleotide composition is the same or different from 
the nucleotide composition of the normal BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 gene. Kay Decl. ¶ 187. Gene sequencing also 
sometimes utilizes cDNA as the DNA template. 
Leonard Dec1. ¶ 75. 
The techniques required for gene sequencing 
are well-­known and understood by scientists skilled 
in molecular biology, and scientists and clinicians 
sequence and analyze genes literally every day. 
Chung Decl. ¶¶ 10-­11;; Mason Decl. ¶ 22;;                       
Hegde Decl. ¶¶ 6-­7. However, because sequencing 
requires knowledge of the sequence of a portion of 
the target sequence, some ingenuity and effort is 
required for the initial sequencing of a target DNA. 
See Kay Decl. ¶ 183;; Klein Decl. ¶ 32-­34. 
C. The Development of the Patents-­in-­Suit 
Breast cancer is the most frequently diagnosed 
cancer worldwide and is the leading cause of cancer 
death for women in Britain and the second leading 
cause of cancer death for women in the United 
States. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 8.17 Ovarian cancer is 
                                                                                                                    
17  Dr. Parthasarathy has researched the development of genetic 
testing for breast and ovarian cancer in the United States and 
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the eighth most common cancer in women and causes 
more deaths in the Western world than any other 
gynecologic cancer. Swisher Decl. ¶ 10. 
Throughout the 1980s, organizations dedicated 
to breast cancer awareness began efforts to increase 
public and governmental awareness of the breast 
cancer epidemic. In 1991, the U.S. Department of 
Defense created a research program devoted to 
breast cancer research. Over the years this funding 
has grown from less than $90 million during the 
fiscal year 1990 to more than $2.1 billion during the 
fiscal year 2008. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 10. 
Throughout the 1980s, scientists from the 
United States, England, France, Germany, Japan, 
and other countries sought to be the first to identify 
DNA nucleotide sequences associated with breast 
cancer. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 11. In 1989, various 
European and American research laboratories 
participated in the International Breast Cancer 
Linkage Consortium (the "Consortium"), and in 1990, 
a group of researchers led by Mary-­Claire King ("Dr. 
King") at the University of California, Berkeley, 
published a landmark paper demonstrating for the 
first time that a gene linked to breast cancer, whose 
sequence was unknown but which was later 
designated Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene 1 
(BRCA1), was located on a region of chromosome 17. 
See Jeff M. Hall, et al., Linkage of Early-­Onset 
Familial Breast Cancer to Chromosome 17q21, 250 
Science 1684-­89 (1990);; Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 11. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Britain and has interviewed over 100 individuals involved in 
the process, including research scientists, officials at research 
institutions, health care professionals, patent office officials, 
bioethicists, and journalists. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 6.  
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Soon afterwards, research intensified as teams 
around the world, including groups led by Dr. King, 
Dr. Mark Skolnick ("Dr. Skolnick") (co-­founder of 
Myriad), and Dr. Michael Stratton ("Dr. Stratton") 
(Institute for Cancer Research, London ("ICRµ
focused in on this region of the genome in an attempt 
to be the first to determine the DNA sequence of 
BRCA1. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 11. 
Dr. Skolnick, a 1968 economics graduate of the 
University of California, Berkeley, had become 
interested in the application of demography to the 
study of genetics while doing research for his Ph.D. 
in genetics, which he received from Stanford 
University in 1975. While reconstructing genealogies 
in Italy, he met three Mormons who were 
microfilming parish records and from whom he 
learned of the resources of the Utah Genealogical 
Society in Salt Lake City. Thereafter, in 1973, after 
an inquiry from the organizers of a cancer center at 
the University of Utah, Dr. Skolnick suggested 
linking the Utah Mormon Genealogy with the Utah 
Cancer Registry. To further this effort, a familial 
cancer screening clinic was established and a 
program for mapping genes was developed.                    
Skolnick Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11, 12. 
Following publication of the King group's 
study relating to BRCA1 in the fall of 1990, Dr. 
Skolnick and his collaborators concluded that 
additional resources would be required to compete 
with the team of Dr. Francis Collins, which had 
received a substantial grant from the National 
Institutes of Health ("NIH"), Skolnick Decl. ¶¶ 11 13, 
14, and in 1991 Myriad was founded by Dr. Skolnick 
and a local venture capital group interested in 
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genetics. Myriad received $5 million in funding in 
1992, $8 million in 1993, and $9 million in 1994. 
Skolnick Decl. ¶ 16. 
Locating the BRCA1 gene relied on the use of 
linkage analysis, in which correlations between the 
occurrence of cancer and the inheritance of certain 
DNA markers among family members were used to 
identify, or "map," the physical location of, the 
BRCA1 gene within the human genome. See '282 
patent, col. 7:39-­52. Once the physical location had 
been narrowed down to a sufficiently small region of 
the genome, Myriad was able to directly analyze the 
sequence of the DNA in this region and identify the 
nucleotides comprising the BRCA1 gene. See '282 
patent, col. 7:53-­8:7. Successful linkage analysis 
requires large and genetically informative families, 
or kindreds, and detailed family information, such as 
detailed genealogical records, are an important 
component to this analysis. Shattuck Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13;; 
'282 patent, col. 8:16-­29. 
In September 1994, the group at Myriad, along 
with researchers from the National Institute for 
Environmental Health Sciences ("NIEHS") (a 
subdivision of the NIH), the University of Utah, 
McGill University, and Eli Lilly and Company 
announced that they had sequenced the BRCA1 
gene. See Yoshio Miki, et al., A Strong Candidate for 
the Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene 
BRCA1, 266 Science 66-­71 (1994). In addition to 
funding the six NIEHS researchers who participated 
in the identification of BRCA1, the NIH had also 
provided approximately $2 million in funding to the 
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University of Utah.18 See id. at 71 n.52;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 18. According to one analysis, 
the NIH contributed one-­third of the funding for the 
identification of BRCA1. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 18. 
A dispute subsequently arose between Myriad 
and the NIH over the NIEHS scientists' exclusion as 
co-­inventors on the BRCA1 patents. Parthasarathy 
Decl. ¶ 19. The NIH maintained that its scientists 
had conducted some of the most important work 
leading up to the sequencing of the gene, including 
identifying the sequences of two of the BRCA1 gene 
fragments and assembling the complete BRCA1 
sequence. Id. Myriad agreed to include the names of 
the NIEHS researchers as inventors on its patent 
application and pay inventors' royalties, although no 
payments appear to have been made as of 2005. Id. 
Following the isolation of BRCA1, scientists 
continued to search for a second gene also believed to 
be linked with breast and ovarian cancer.19 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 12. Myriad collaborated with 
several research groups, including scientists at the 
University of Laval in Quebec, Canada, the Hospital 
for Sick Children in Toronto, Canada, and the 
University of Pennsylvania in their search for this 
second gene. It also collaborated with a team of 
researchers led by Dr. Stratton at the ICR which, in 
                                                                                                                    
18  According to the description of author associations, the first 
and second authors of the paper were associated with the 
University of Utah. 
  
19  The same positional cloning approach utilized to isolate the 
BRCA1 gene was relied on to isolate the BRCA2 gene.       
Tavtigian Decl. ¶ 4. 
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November 1995, identified a mutation in breast 
cancer patients that appeared to be located in the as-­
yet unpublished BRCA2 gene. Dr. Stratton ended the 
collaboration with Myriad upon learning of Myriad's 
plans to patent the BRCA2 gene sequence.                   
Sulston Decl. ¶ 30. 
On December 21, 1995, Myriad filed for 
patents on the BRCA2 gene in both the U.S. and 
Europe. Tavtigian Decl. ¶ 5. The next day, the 
Stratton group published its identification of the 
BRCA2 gene in the journal Nature, and Myriad 
submitted the sequence of BRCA2 to GenBank, an 
international depository of gene sequence 
information. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 12;;                    
Tavtigian Decl. ¶ 9;; Richard Wooster, et al., 
Identification of the Breast Cancer Susceptibility 
Gene BRCA2, 378 Nature 789-­92 (1995). Subsequent 
analysis of the BRCA2 sequence from the Stratton 
group indicated that while they had correctly 
sequenced the primary portion of the BRCA2 gene, 
their published sequence had errors in both ends of 
the BRCA2 gene. Tavtigian Decl. ¶¶ 7-­10. 
Nonetheless, the consensus among the scientific 
community is that the Stratton group, rather than 
Myriad, was the first to sequence the BRCA2 gene. 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 13. 
The isolation of the BRCA1/2 genes required 
considerable effort on the part of Myriad and its 
collaborators as well as ingenuity in overcoming 
technical obstacles associated with the isolation 
process. However, the process and techniques used 
were well understood, widely used, and fairly 
uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in the 
search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar 
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approach. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 19;;                         
Tavtigian Decl. ¶ 13. 
D. Application of the Patents-­in-­Suit 
Mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes correlate 
with an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancer. 
Women with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations face up 
to an 85% cumulative risk of breast cancer, as well as 
up to a 50% cumulative risk of ovarian cancer.                 
Love Decl. ¶ 10;; Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 9. In addition, 
among the 10-­15% of ovarian cancer cases that are 
inherited genetically, 80% of women diagnosed under 
the age of 50 carry mutations in their BRCAl genes 
and 20% carry mutations in their BRCA2 genes. The 
women with inherited BRCA1 mutations have a     
40-­52% cumulative risk of ovarian cancer by the time 
they reach 70 years old. For women with inherited 
BRCA2 mutations, the risk is approximately 15-­25%. 
Swisher Decl. ¶ 11. Male carriers of mutations are 
also at an increased risk for breast and prostate 
cancer. Love Decl. ¶ 10. 
The existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is 
therefore an important consideration in the provision 
of clinical care for breast and/or ovarian cancer. A 
patient will not only learn of her risk for hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer, but also can gain 
information that may be useful in determining 
prevention and treatment options. This information 
is useful for women who are facing difficult decisions 
regarding whether or not to undergo prophylactic 
surgery, hormonal therapy, chemotherapy, and other 
measures. Swisher Decl. ¶ 12;; Love Decl. ¶ 11. 
Testing results for the BRCA1/2 genes can be an 
important factor in structuring an appropriate course 
of cancer treatment, since certain forms of 
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chemotherapy can be more effective in treating 
cancers related to BRCA1/2 mutations.                                
Swisher Decl. ¶ 13;; Love Decl. ¶ 18. 
1. Myriad's BRCA1/2 testing 
Myriad offers multiple forms of BRCA1/2 
testing to the general public. Its standard test, called 
Comprehensive BRACAnalysis, originally only 
consisted of the full sequencing of the BRCA1/2 
genes. Swisher Decl. ¶ 29-­30;; Reich Decl. ¶ 10;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 26;; Critchfield Decl. ¶ 49.               
In 2002, Myriad supplemented its full                   
sequencing analysis with a large rearrangement 
panel ("LRP") for detecting five common large 
rearrangement mutations which is now included in 
the Comprehensive BRACAnalysis.                 
Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 49, 51. In 2006, Myriad began 
offering a supplemental test to Comprehensive 
BRACAnalysis called the BRACAnalysis 
Rearrangement Test ("BART"), which, according to 
Myriad, can detect virtually all large rearrangement 
mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.20 
Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 29-­30;; Reich Decl. ¶ 10;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 26;; Critchfield Decl. ¶ 51. 
2. Funding for Myriad' s BRCA1/2 tests 
The Myriad tests are available to clinicians 
and patients at a cost of over $3000 per test. In 2006, 
the total cost to Myriad of providing these tests was 
                                                                                                                    
20 Myriad also offers other more limited forms of BRCAI/2 
genetic testing. Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 29-­30;; Reich Decl. ¶ 10;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 26.  
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$32 million with resulting revenues of $222 million. 
See Myriad Genetics, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-­
K), at 27 (Aug. 28, 2008). In Ontario, where the 
regional public healthcare plan is ignoring Myriad's 
patent, the testing for breast cancer is performed for 
a third of Myriad's cost. See CBC News, Ontario to 
Offer New Genetic Test for Breast, Ovarian Cancer 
(Jan. 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/ 
2003/0l/06/test_genetic03010 6.html. 
Plaintiffs have noted several instances where 
women have been unable to obtain funding for all of 
Myriad's testing services. For example, Myriad 
refused to process Ms. Ceriani's sample because it 
did not accept coverage by Ms. Ceriani's insurance 
carrier. Unable to pay for Myriad's tests, and unable 
to find scholarship programs to fund her testing, Ms. 
Ceriani has not been tested. Ceriani Decl. ¶¶ 5-­7.    
Ms. Fortune's insurance carrier is not accepted by 
Myriad, and Ms. Fortune is also unable to pay the 
full out-­of-­pocket cost of Myriad's test.                       
Fortune Decl. ¶ 5. 
Myriad's BART test is not covered by a 
number of insurers, and unless a patient is one of a 
limited number of "high risk patients" who meet 
certain clinical criteria established by Myriad, a 
patient must pay an extra fee for BART testing. 
Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 29-­30;; Reich Decl. ¶ 10;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 26;; Critchfield Decl. ¶ 52. As a 
result of the cost of BART testing, the test is 
unavailable to women who would otherwise choose to 
utilize the test. Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 30-­31;;                         
Reich Decl. ¶ 10. For example, Ms. Raker is unable to 
afford the extra cost for BART testing and has not 
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been tested for large genomic rearrangements, 
despite the advice of her genetic counselor.                 
Raker Decl. ¶¶ 7-­11. Similarly, Ms. Thomason has 
been unable afford the BART testing recommended 
by her genetic counselor. Thomason Decl. ¶¶ 6-­9. 
Myriad has pursued Medicaid coverage for 
years, but has been unable to secure "participating 
provider" status in 25 states which would allow it to 
offer testing to that state's Medicaid patients. Myriad 
also has a financial assistance program which 
provides free testing to low-­income and uninsured 
patients who meet certain economic and clinical 
requirements. In addition, Myriad provides free 
testing to independent non-­profit institutions. In 
particular, Ms. Ceriani may be eligible to receive 
BRACAnalysis testing at no charge through the non-­
profit organization Cancer Resource Foundation, for 
which Myriad has provided free testing since 2009. 
Rusconi Decl. ¶¶ 4-­6;; Critchfield Decl. ¶ 33;;               
Ogaard Decl. ¶¶ 4-­6. Currently, 90% of the tests 
Myriad performs are covered by insurance at over 
90% of the test cost. Critchfield Decl. ¶ 1 32, 33, 52, 
53. 
A number of researchers, clinicians, and 
molecular pathologists have the personnel, 
equipment, and expertise to sequence and analyze 
genes, including the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, at a 
lower cost than Myriad's testing.                             
Kazazian Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11;; Matloff Decl. ¶ 12;;                  
Ostrer Decl. ¶¶ 8-­9;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 16-­18. For 
example, the BRCAI/2 testing previously conducted 
by the Yale DNA Diagnostics Laboratory and the 
University of Pennsylvania Genetic Diagnostic 
Laboratory ("GDL") cost less than what Myriad 
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charges, and testing by OncorMed, a one-­time 
competitor, was cheaper than Myriad's testing. 
Matloff Decl. ¶ 7;; Kazazian Decl. ¶ 8;;                 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 24. However, on a "cost per 
exon" basis, Myriad's BRACAnalysis test costs less 
than testing for other genes performed by the GDL at 
the University of Pennsylvania and Drs. Ledbetter 
and Warren at Emory University.                                      
See infra;; Critchfield Decl. ¶ 35. 
3. Myriad's enforcement of the Patents-­
in-­suit 
During the mid-­to-­late-­1990s, Drs. Kazazian and 
Ganguly offered, for a fee, screening services for 
BRCA1 mutations through the GDL at the 
University of Pennsylvania. Kazazian Decl. ¶ 4;; 
Ganguly Decl. ¶ 3. The screening methodology 
utilized by Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly differed from 
the testing method used by Myriad, but involved 
using isolated DNA encoding BRCA1 or BRCA2. 
Kazazian Decl. ¶ 9;; Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 23. At 
some point during this period, Dr. Skolnick advised 
Dr. Kazazian that Myriad planned to stop the 
BRCA1/2 testing being conducted at the GDL. 
Kazazian Dec1. ¶ 6. On May 29, 1998, Myriad offered 
Dr. Kazazian a collaborative license in connection 
with the '473, '999, '001, '282, and '441 patents. 
Ganguly Dec1. Ex. 2. However, the license covered 
only single mutation tests and multiple mutation 
panels of up to four mutations to allow for testing of 
patients of Ashkenazi Jewish descent.                       
Ganguly Decl. ¶ 5. Myriad subsequently sent cease 
and desist letters to Dr. Kazazian and the University 
of Pennsylvania. On August 26, 199B, O'Melveny & 
Myers LLP gave notice to Dr. Kazazian of 
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infringement in the absence of a license.                  
Ganguly Decl. Ex. 3. Myriad subsequently sued the 
University of Pennsylvania in November 199B for 
infringement of the patents-­in-­suit. See Myriad 
Genetics v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 2: 98-­cv-­00829 (D. 
Utah) (filed November 19, 1998). On June 10, 1999, 
Myriad's general counsel, Christopher Wright, sent a 
letter to the University of Pennsylvania seeking 
written assurances that Dr. Kazazian and the 
University of Pennsylvania had ceased BRCA1/2 
clinical testing. Ganguly Decl. Ex. 4. This demand 
was repeated in a September 22, 1999 letter from 
Myriad to the University of Pennsylvania.                 
Ganguly Decl. Ex. 6. 
As a result of Myriad's efforts to enforce its 
patents against the University of Pennsylvania, the 
GDL no longer conducts BRCA1/2 screening for 
research or as part of its clinical practice.               
Kazazian Decl. ¶ 5;; Ganguly Decl. ¶¶ 8-­9;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 28. However, sometime 
between 1999 and 2000, Dr. Critchfield, on behalf of 
Myriad, informed Dr. Kazazian that he is free to 
conduct academic research on the BRCA1/2 genes, 
including sequencing the genes and detecting 
mutations in the genes. Critchfield Decl. ¶ 22. 
In May 1998, Myriad offered Dr. Ostrer a 
license agreement to conduct diagnostic BRCA1/2 
genetic testing. The proposed license would permit 
Dr. Ostrer to conduct single mutation tests and 
multiple mutation panels (up to four mutations) for 
patients of Ashkenazi Jewish descent only.             
Dr. Ostrer declined the offer as too narrow to allow 
him to perform any meaningful BRCA1/2 testing.             
Ostrer Decl. ¶ 7. 
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On September 15, 1998, Myriad also notified 
Dr. Barbara Weber ("Dr. Weber"), a principal 
investigator on the Cancer Genetics Network Project 
("CGNP") sponsored by the National Cancer Institute 
("NCI"), that Myriad's patent position might impact 
research sponsored by NCI. As a result of that letter, 
the GDL at the University of Pennsylvania ceased 
conducting BRCA1/2 analysis for Dr. Weber. 
Ganguly Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 7. According to Myriad, the 
GDL's involvement in CGNP was to provide DNA 
testing on BRCA1/2 genes for a fee, similar to the 
activity of any commercial core lab.                      
Critchfield Decl. ¶ 21. In September 1999, Myriad 
also requested that Georgetown University, one of 
the other cancer centers participating in the CGNP, 
to cease sending genetic samples to the GDL for 
BRCA1/2 analysis. Ganguly Decl. ¶ 13. 
In December 2000, the director of the Yale 
DNA Diagnostics Lab received a cease and desist 
letter concerning BRCA1/2 genetic testing being 
conducted by the lab. As a result of the letter, the lab 
ceased BRCA1/2 genetic testing. Matloff Decl. ¶ 7. 
In 2005, Dr. Matloff sought permission from Myriad 
for the Yale DNA Diagnostics Lab to conduct 
screening for mutations caused by large 
rearrangements, which Myriad was not conducting 
at the time. Her request was denied.                              
Matloff Decl. ¶ 8. 
Myriad was also involved in a series of 
lawsuits in the late 1990s against Oncormed, another 
company undertaking BRCA-­related testing, 
regarding patents that covered various aspects of the 
BRCA1 gene sequence. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 27. 
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Myriad eventually purchased Oncormed's patents 
and testing services in 1998. Id. 
E. Disputed Issues 
1. The impact of 0\ULDG·V patents on 
BRCA1/2 testing 
According to Plaintiffs, Myriad's patents and 
its position as the sole provider of BRCAI/2 testing 
has hindered the ability of patients to receive the 
highest quality breast cancer genetic testing and has 
impeded the development of improvements to 
BRCA1/2 genetic testing. Plaintiffs first note 
deficiencies in the genetic testing services offered by 
Myriad, alleging that in the several years prior to the 
addition of the LRP, the testing done by Myriad did 
not reveal all known mutations in the BRCA1/2 
genes or utilize known methodologies that would 
have revealed these additional mutations.21       
Chung Decl. ¶ 19;; Matloff Decl. ¶ 8;; Swisher Decl. ¶ 
26;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 16;; Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 29. 
As a result, Myriad's test may have reported false 
negative results during this period. Plaintiffs also 
cite a study published in 2006 in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association that concluded that 
12% of those from high risk families with breast 
cancer and with negative test results from Myriad 
carried cancer-­predisposing genomic deletions or 
duplications in one of those genes. Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 
25-­26. Plaintiffs also note that the sensitivity and 
specificity of the BART test has not been validated by 
                                                                                                                    
21  For example, the Myriad test received by Ms. Thomason, Ms. 
Raker, and Ms. Limary did not look for all known large 
rearrangements in the BRCA genes. Thomason Decl. ¶ 6:   
Raker Decl. ¶¶ 7-­8;; Limary Decl. ¶ 7. 
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comparing the results of BART testing with 
Multiplex Ligation Dependent Probe Amplification 
("MLPA") testing commonly used by researchers. 
Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 32, 33.  
According to Plaintiffs, other labs are in a 
position to offer more comprehensive testing than 
Myriad's standard testing services and would use 
newer testing methods with improved testing quality 
and efficiency. These labs would also include large 
rearrangement testing after a negative test result is 
received from full sequencing. Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 17-­
18;; Chung Decl. ¶ 18;; Ostrer Decl. ¶ 9. In addition, 
labs would perform genetic testing on tumor 
specimens preserved in paraffin from deceased 
family members, which Myriad does not regularly 
perform even though, according to Plaintiffs, such 
testing can often provide valuable genetic 
information for living relatives and is often necessary 
for accurate test interpretation. Chung Decl. ¶ 24. 
According to Myriad, however, its full 
sequencing test has been recognized as the "gold 
standard" for BRCA1/2 mutation testing, and it 
continues to improve its testing process.                 
Critchfield Decl. ¶ 37. Myriad contends that it 
researched and developed a commercially viable high 
quality test for detecting large rearrangements as 
soon as it and the research community recognized 
the need for such testing, and continues work 
towards a test capable of detecting all large 
rearrangement mutations, including extremely rare 
ones. Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 49, 50. According to 
Myriad, BRCA1/2 studies conducted by outside 
researchers confirmed that the BART test exhibited 
superior performance over other methods for 
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mutation detection, including the MLPA kit often 
used by academic researchers.22 Critchfield Decl. ¶ 
51. 
According to Plaintiffs, the lack of independent 
BRCA1/2 analysis also undermines the ability of the 
scientific community to determine the meaning of 
VUS results, which are reported disproportionately 
for members of minority groups, and whose 
significance would be more extensively analyzed by 
other labs. Chung Decl. ¶ 20-­21;; Ostrer Decl. ¶ 12;; 
Matloff Decl. ¶ 9. Myriad, however, asserts that it 
has undertaken significant efforts to determine the 
clinical importance of VUSs by establishing an in-­
house review committee for variant classification and 
developing a systematic approach to providing 
clinical interpretations for detected sequence 
variants based on generally accepted scientific data 
and analysis of its own database. In addition, 
clarification of any VUS previously reported to a 
patient is immediately provided to the patient and 
her doctor. According to Myriad, the VUS reporting 
rate has decreased markedly, with a 50% decrease in 
major ethnic groups between 2002 and 2006, and a 
total of 850 VUSs for about 21,000 patients have 
been clarified, including 502 VUSs for 13,127 
patients since the beginning of 2008. Myriad also 
asserts that it has made critical data available to 
researchers to assist in the analysis of VUSs and 
                                                                                                                    
22  In addition, Myriad states that the MLPA kit is for research 
use only, is not approved for clinical testing by the FDA, and is 
incapable of detecting certain smaller rearrangements. 
Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 49, 50.  
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which have the potential of improving the diagnostic 
testing for other genes. Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 57-­59. 
Plaintiffs contend that as a result of the 
patents-­in-­suit, BRCA1/2 genetic testing is one of 
the very few tests performed as part of breast cancer 
care and prevention for which a doctor or patient 
cannot get a second confirmatory test done through 
another laboratory. Love Decl. ¶ 12. In particular, 
women who receive a positive result cannot                   
confirm the lab's findings or seek a second opinion  
on the interpretation of those results.23                  
Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 23;; Ostrer Decl. ¶ 11. According to 
Myriad, absent any doubts regarding the accuracy of 
the original test, re-­sequencing the patient's genes by 
another laboratory would be an unnecessary waste of 
resources, and Myriad has never prohibited a second 
interpretation of the results of its diagnostic tests. 
Critchfield Decl. ¶ 64;; Reilly Decl. ¶¶ 54, 55.                     
In addition, there are multiple laboratories available 
to conduct confirmatory BRCA1/2 testing pursuant 
to patent licenses granted by Myriad, including both 
the University of Chicago Genetic Services 
Laboratories and Yale DNA Diagnostic Laboratories. 
Critchfield Decl. ¶ 62. That confirmatory testing, 
however, is limited to the confirmation of certain, 
specific positive test results;; the remaining types of 
                                                                                                                    
23   For example, Ms. Girard sought but was unable to obtain 
confirmatory testing of her Myriad test results that indicated 
the presence of a deleterious mutation in her BRCA2 gene. A 
second opinion would also be important for her immediate 
IDPLO\·V VFUHHQLQJ RSWLRQV*LUDUGDecl. ¶¶ 4-­9. Similarly, Ms. 
Ceriani and Ms. Fortune would both want a second opinion 
concerning their BRCA1/2 status before taking major surgical 
steps. Ceriani Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11;; Fortune Decl. ¶ 7. 
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positive test results as well as all negative test 
results are excluded from such testing services. 
Matloff Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10. 
Whether the patents at issue impact the 
testing for BRCA1/2 mutations favorably or 
unfavorably is an issue of factual dispute not 
resolvable in the context of the instant motions. 
2. The impact of gene patents on the 
advancement of science and medical 
treatment 
There exists a deep disagreement between the 
parties concerning the effects of gene patents on the 
progression of scientific knowledge. 
According to Plaintiffs, data sharing is the key 
to the future of genetic discoveries and 
bioinformatics, and gene patents impede research 
aimed at identifying the role of genes in medical 
conditions. Sulston Decl. ¶¶ 36, 38. Plaintiffs assert 
that this understanding has wide acceptance, noting 
that from the beginning of the Human Genome 
project,24 most scientists and even some private 
companies recognized the importance of keeping the 
genome freely available to all. For example, in 1994, 
the pharmaceutical company Merck funded a 
massive drive to generate gene sequences and place 
them into public databases, thereby making them 
difficult to patent. Sulston Decl. ¶¶ 22, 29. In 1996, a 
group of 50 of the most prominent geneticists who 
                                                                                                                    
24   The Human Genome Project was an international project 
initiated in 1990 with the aim of sequencing an entire human 
genome and in which Sir John Sulston, a Nobel laureate, 
actively participated. Sulston Decl. ¶¶, 22.  
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were involved with the sequencing of the human 
genome adopted the Bermuda principles which 
included the mandate that all "human genome 
sequence information should be freely available and 
in the public domain in order to encourage research 
and development and to maximize its benefit to 
society." Sulston Decl. ¶ 33. The proliferation of 
intellectual property rights directed to genetic 
material has also been postulated to contribute to a 
phenomenon dubbed "the tragedy of the anti-­
commons," in which numerous competing patent 
rights held by independent parties prevents anyone 
party from engaging in productive innovation.               
See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998) (citing 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transaction from Marx to Markets, 
111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998)). 
According to Dr. Fiona Murray ("Dr. Murray"), 
who received a grant to research the impact of gene 
patenting on scientific research and 
commercialization, 4382 of the 23,688 genes listed in 
the database of the National Center for 
Biotechnology Information ("NCBI") nearly 20% of 
human genes -­ are explicitly claimed as United 
States intellectual property. Murray Decl. ¶ 6.                    
After devising a study to gauge the impact of gene 
patenting on public knowledge that utilized the               
time lag between publication of papers on a gene 
sequence and the issuance of a patent claiming that 
gene sequence, Dr. Murray concluded that                      
the Myriad patents have negatively impacted the 
public knowledge of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes by 
5-­10%. Murray Decl. ¶¶ 7-­15, 20. 
172a 
  
Plaintiffs have cited other studies to 
demonstrate the chilling effect of gene patents on the 
advancement of both genetic research and clinical 
testing. A survey of laboratory directors in the 
United States conducted by Dr. Mildred Cho                  
(the "Cho study") found that 53% decided not to 
develop a new clinical test because of a gene patent 
or license, and 67% believed that gene patents 
decreased their ability to conduct research. Cho Decl. 
¶ 10. This correlated with a study conducted by the 
American Society of Human Genetics that reported 
that 46% of respondents felt that patents had 
delayed or limited their research. Cho Decl. ¶ 11. The 
Cho study also revealed that of those who stopped 
performing a clinical test because of a gene patent or 
license, the largest number stopped doing BRCA1 
and BRCA2 testing (with the same number having 
stopped Apolipoprotein E testing). Cho Decl. ¶ 16. 
Specifically, the survey found that nine labs had 
ceased performing BRCA1/2 genetic testing                        
as a result of the patents-­in-­suit. In addition to                  
labs that have ceased performing BRCAl/2 genetic 
testing, labs have avoided or refrained                              
from developing tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2                    
as a result of the patents held by Myriad.                  
Ostrer Decl. ¶ 6;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 14-­16. Studies of 
other gene patents have also revealed that labs 
frequently stop developing or offering clinical tests 
for disease as a result of gene patents. For example, 
a purportedly valid scientific survey of labs in the 
United States found a 26% drop in the number of 
labs performing testing for hemochromatosis as a 
result of gene patents. Cho Decl. ¶¶ 18-­20. 
Researchers, clinicians, and pathologists are 
aware that Myriad has sent cease and desist letters 
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in connection with the patents-­in-­suit and that 
Myriad prohibits clinical testing of the BRCA1/2 
genes. Kazazian Decl. ¶¶ 5-­11;; Ganguly Decl. ¶¶ 4-­
14;; Chung Decl. ¶ 15;; Hegde Decl. ¶ 10;; Matloff Decl. 
¶¶ 5-­7;; Ostrer Decl. ¶¶ 4-­7;; Swisher Decl. ¶ 28;; 
Hubbard Decl. ¶¶ 7-­8;; Kant Decl. ¶ 4;; Ledbetter 
Decl. ¶ 13;; Reich Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5;; Parthasarathy Decl. 
¶¶ 28-­31. Myriad also does not permit researchers to 
tell patients involved in research the results of their 
BRCA1/2 testing, leading physicians involved in 
breast cancer care and research unable to meet their 
ethical obligations to provide genetic test results to 
research subjects, when requested. Ostrer Decl. ¶ 10;; 
Chung Decl. ¶ 13, 14. In addition to the direct 
benefits to the patient of knowing the results of their 
testing, such disclosure would also provide valuable 
insights into patient behavior that would enhance 
patient care. Ostrer Decl. ¶ 10. The AMA has also 
expressed its belief that the "[t]he use of patents . . . 
or other means to limit the availability of medical 
procedures places significant limitation on the 
dissemination of medical knowledge, and is therefore 
unethical." American Medical Association, Opinion 
9.095 -­ The Use of Patents and Other Means to Limit 
Availability of Medical Procedures, (adopted June 
1995), available at http://www.ama-­
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-­resources/medical-­
ethics/code-­medical-­ethics/opinion9095.html. In 
addition, others have argued that human genes are 
the common heritage of mankind whose use should 
not be restricted by patent grants. See, e.g., Pilar A. 
Ossorio, The Human Genome as Common Heritage: 
Common Sense or Legal Nonsense?, 35 J.L. Med. & 
Ethics 425, 426 (2007);; Melissa L. Sturges, Who 
Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? 
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An Application of the Common Heritage of 
Humankind, 13 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 219, 245 (1997);; 
Barbara Looney, Should Genes Be Patented? The 
Gene Patenting Controversy: Ethical and Policy 
Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 Law 
& Pol'y Int'l Bus. 231 (1994);; Hubert Curien,                 
The Human Genome Project and Patents, 254 
Science 1710, 1710-­12 (1991). 
According to Plaintiffs, Myriad has withheld 
critical data concerning genetic predisposition to 
breast cancer from the Breast Cancer Information 
Core ("BIC"), an international, open access online 
database that is a central repository for information 
about the BRCA1/2 genes and their genetic variants. 
The BIC facilitates the identification of deleterious 
mutations (i.e. those associated with a higher risk of 
cancer), provides a mechanism to collect and 
distribute data about genetic variants, and plays an 
important role in helping to elucidate the 
significance of those variants through its collection of 
data. Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17, 18;; Chung Decl. ¶ 22;; 
Ostrer Decl. ¶ 13. Although the value of the                     
BIC comes from the amount and quality of data 
provided by the scientific community, Myriad, 
according to Plaintiffs, has not contributed any                  
data to BIC in the past two years. Sulston Decl. ¶ 36;; 
Swisher Decl. ¶¶ 19-­21;; Ostrer Decl. ¶¶ 12-­13;; 
Chung Decl. ¶¶ 21-­22;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 20. 
Plaintiffs also assert that gene patents impede 
the development of improved genetic testing. For 
example, as new sequencing technologies offer the 
possibility of faster and less expensive sequencing             
of a patient's genes, patents on one or more genes 
may impede scientists' ability to develop a 
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comprehensive test for complex diseases or provide a 
person with an analysis of his or her entire genome. 
Sulston Decl. ¶ 38;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 24. In addition, 
Plaintiffs assert that gene patents interfere with the 
ability of physicians and researchers to investigate 
complex diseases. For example, BRCA1/2 may be 
associated with cancers other than breast and 
ovarian cancer, but so long as the patents on these 
genes remain, no one will be able to include these 
genes in tests for other disease predispositions. 
Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 24-­25. Gene patents similarly 
impede the development and improvement of tests 
for diseases by geneticists. Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 14-­15. 
Plaintiffs also assert that allowing only a single lab 
to offer testing means that the one lab dictates the 
standards for patient care in testing for that disease;; 
in contrast, patient care is promoted when more than 
one lab offers a particular genetic test, utilizing 
different methodologies, since this can ensure the 
quality of the testing and accuracy of the test results. 
Chung Decl. ¶ 23;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 23;;                         
Reich Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11;; Ostrer Decl. ¶¶ 11;; 
Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 31. 
Plaintiffs further assert that gene patents are 
not necessary to create incentives for initial 
discoveries or the development of commercial 
applications, including diagnostic tests.                           
Cho Decl. ¶ 25;; Leonard Decl. ¶¶ 20-­21. Patents have 
not been necessary for the rapid introduction of 
genetic testing, as evidenced by genetic testing that 
has been offered prior to the issuance of a patent. 
Cho Decl. ¶ 21. In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs 
cite a study of gene patents issued in the United 
States for genetic diagnostics that showed that 67% 
of these patents were issued for discoveries funded by 
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the U.S. government. Cho Decl. ¶ 22. Similarly, 
another study showed that 63% of patents on gene 
sequences resulted from federally supported 
research. Leonard Decl. ¶ 22. As previously noted, 
the NIH provided $2 million in research grants to the 
University of Utah, or approximately one-­third of the 
total funding, for the identification of the BRCA1 
sequence. Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 18. 
Myriad has contested these assertions and 
disputes the idea that patenting of isolated human 
DNA conflicts with the advancement of science. 
According to Myriad, the quid pro quo of the                   
patent system is that inventors, in exchange for a 
limited period of patent exclusivity, must provide a 
sufficient description of the patented invention so 
that others may improve upon it. Reilly Decl. ¶ 24;; 
Doll Decl. ¶ 44. Furthermore, according to Myriad, 
its policy and practice has been and still is to allow 
scientists to conduct research studies on BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 freely, the result of which has been                         
the publication of over 5,600 research papers                   
on BRCA1 and over 3,000 research papers on 
BRCA2, representing the work of over 18,000 
scientists. Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 3, 13;; Li Decl. ¶¶ 3-­6;; 
Baer Decl. ¶¶ 3-­6;; Parvin Decl. ¶¶ 3-­6;; Sandbach 
Decl. ¶¶ 3-­7. 
According to Myriad, patents on isolated DNA, 
including the patents-­in-­suit, actually promote 
research and advance clinical development to the 
benefit of patients. Reilly Decl. ¶¶38, 43: Critchfield 
Decl. ¶¶ 2-­18, 65, 68: Linck Decl. ¶¶ 27-­28, 71, 73: 
Tavtigian Decl. ¶¶ 14-­17;; Doll Decl. ¶¶ 45-­46;; 
Schlessinger Decl. ¶¶ 31-­32. Myriad has contended 
that gene patents are essential for obtaining capital 
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investment in the development and 
commercialization of technological breakthroughs. 
Linck Decl. ¶¶ 27, 28;; Reilly Decl. ¶¶ 16;;                       
Doll Decl. ¶ 46. In support, Myriad has cited a survey 
published in 2009 by the BIO of 150 biotechnology 
member companies in the therapeutic and diagnostic 
healthcare industry stating that the majority of 
companies (61%) generally in-­licensed projects that 
are in the pre-­clinical or Phase I stage of 
development, and thus still require substantial R&D 
investment and commercialization risk by the 
licensee. A substantial majority (77%) of the 
respondents without approved products indicated 
that they expect to spend 5-­15 years and over                  
$100 million developing a commercial product. 
Myriad asserts that these expenditures dwarf any 
initial research funding by the federal government. 
Reilly Decl. ¶ 22. In particular, Myriad notes that a 
significant amount of private investment led to                   
its identification of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
sequences, with the expectation of patent                  
protection providing an incentive to fund the 
research into the determination of the gene 
sequences. Skolnick Decl. ¶¶ 14-­16. Therefore, 
Myriad asserts that absent the promise of a period of 
market exclusivity provided by patents and the 
infusion of venture and risk capital derived 
therefrom, companies such as Myriad that              
capitalize on innovation simply would not be created 
and their products would not be brought to market or 
the clinic. Reilly Decl. ¶¶18, 34, 51, 52, 62;; 
Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ 67, 68;; Linck Decl. ¶ 73. 
Myriad also notes that it has made over 20,000 
submissions to the BIC database, making it the 
largest contributor to the database. It has also 
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published the largest clinical series of mutation risk 
in the BRCA1/2 genes based on its testing data and 
has tabulated and posted the data on Myriad's 
website, where it is freely available to researchers 
throughout the world. Critchfield Decl. ¶¶ II, 12. 
According to Myriad, the majority of academic 
researchers operating laboratories (as opposed to 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments 
("CLIA")-­certified laboratories) do not believe that 
they should share test results with subjects outside 
of the standard clinical setting. Reilly Decl. ¶ 57-­59. 
As the declarations submitted by the parties make 
clear, there exists a sharp dispute concerning the 
impact of patents directed to isolated DNA on genetic 
research and consequently the health of society. As 
with the dispute concerning the effect of the patents-­
in-­suit on BRCA1/2 genetic testing, the resolution of 
these disputes of fact and policy are not possible 
within the context of these motions. 
IV. THE PATENTS 
A. Summary of the Patents 
The subjects of this declaratory judgment 
action are fifteen claims contained in seven patents 
issued by the USPTO: 25 claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 20 of 
U.S. patent 5,747,282 (the "'282 patent");; claims 1, 6, 
DQG  RI86 SDWHQW  WKH ´· SDWHnt") ;; 
                                                                                                                    
25   The USPTO granted these patents pursuant to a formal 
written policy that permits the patenting of "isolated and 
purified" DNA encoding human genes and pursuant to a 
practice that permits such DNA patents and the patenting of 
correlations created by nature between natural elements of the 
body and a predisposition to disease. See Utility Examination 
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,093 (Jan. 5, 2001).  
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claim 1 of U.S. patent 5,693,473 (the '''473 patent");; 
claim 1 of U.S. patent 5,709,999 (the "'999 patent");; 
claim 1 of U.S. patent 5,710,001 (the "'001 patent");; 
claim 1 of U.S. patent 5,753,441 (the "'441 patent");; 
and claims 1 and 2 of U.S. patent 6,033,857 (the "'857 
patent").26 
The claims-­in-­suit may be divided into two 
types of claims: composition claims and method, or 
process, claims. Independent claim 1 of the '282 
patent representative of the group of composition 
claims and claims:  
An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide, said polypeptide having 
the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO: 2. 
This claim is therefore directed to an isolated DNA 
molecule possessing a nucleotide sequence that 
translates into the BRCA1 protein. Because most 
amino acids can result from the translation of more 
than one DNA codon, multiple DNA sequences 
correspond to the nucleotide sequence claimed by 
this claim. Claim 2 of the '282 patent is dependent on 
claim 1 but contains an additional limitation that 
identifies the specific BRCA1 nucleotide sequence of 
the claimed DNA.27 Claims 5 and 6 of the '282 patent 
are directed to fragments as short as 15 nucleotides 
                                                                                                                    
26  For purposes of understanding what the claim terms would 
have meant to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of 
the application for the patents, an application date of August 
1994 is presumed for the '282, '473, '999, '001, and '441 patents 
and December 1995 for the '492 and '857 patents.  
27  Claim 2 of the '282 patent reads: "The isolated DNA of claim 
1, wherein said DNA has the nucleotide sequence set forth in 
6(4,'12µ  
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of the DNA molecules claimed in claims land 2 of the 
'282 patent.28 Finally, claim 7 of the '282 patent and 
claim 1 of the '473 patent are directed to isolated 
DNA possessing one of the specified mutant BRCA1 
gene sequences.29  
Claims 1, 6, and 7 of the '492 patent are also 
composition claims covering isolated DNA molecules 
containing certain specified nucleotide sequences 
relating to the BRCA2 gene. Claim 1 is directed to an 
isolated DNA molecule encoding the BRCA2 
protein.30 Like claim 1 of the '282 patent, claim 1 of 
the '492 patent is directed to multiple possible DNA 
sequences as a result of the redundancy of the DNA 
codons. Claim 6 of the '492 patent, however, is 
considerably broader than claim 1 and is directed to 
                                                                                                                    
28  Claim 5 of the '282 patent claims: "An isolated DNA having at 
least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1." Claim 6 of the '282 
patent reads: "An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides 
RIWKH'1$RIFODLPµ  
29  Claim 7 of the '282 patent reads: "An isolated DNA selected 
from the group consisting of: (a) a DNA having the nucleotide 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: l having T at nucleotide 
position 4056;; (b) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID NO: l having an extra C at nucleotide position 
5385;; (c) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO: l having G at nucleotide position 5443;; and (d) a 
DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: l 
having 11 base pairs at nucleotide positions 189-­199 deleted." 
Claim 1 of the '473 patent reads: "An isolated DNA comprising 
an altered BRCA1 DNA having at least one of the alterations 
set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18 or 19 with the proviso that the 
alteration is not a deletion of four nucleotides corresponding to 
base numbers 4184-­4187 in SEQ. ID. NO: 1."  
30  Claim 1 of the '492 patent reads: "An isolated DNA molecule 
coding for a BRCA2 polypeptide, said DNA molecule comprising 
a nucleic acid sequence encoding the amino acid sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID NO: 2."  
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any DNA nucleotide encoding any mutant BRCA2 
protein that is associated with a predisposition to 
breast cancer.31 Claim 7 of the '492 patent depends 
on claim 6, but is restricted to the mutated forms of 
the BRCA2 nucleotide sequence set forth in the 
specification.32 As a result of the breadth of these 
composition claims, they reach isolated BRCA1/2 
DNA obtained from any human being. 
Claim 1 of the '999 patent is representative of 
the group of method claims. It claims: 
A method for detecting a germline 
alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said 
alteration selected from a group 
consisting of the alterations set forth 
in Tables 12A, 14, 18, or 19 in a 
human which comprises analyzing a 
sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 
RNA from a human sample or 
analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 
cDNA made from mRNA from said 
human sample with the proviso that 
said germline alteration is not a 
deletion of 4 nucleotides 
corresponding to base numbers 4184-­
4187 of SEQ ID NO: 1. 
 
                                                                                                                    
31  Claim 6 of the '492 patent reads: "An isolated DNA molecule 
coding for a mutated form of the BRCA2 polypeptide set forth in 
SEQ ID NO: 2, wherein said mutated form of the BRCA2 
polypeptide is associated with susceptibility to FDQFHUµ  
32  Claim 7 of the '492 patent reads: "The isolated DNA molecule 
of claim 6, wherein the DNA molecule comprises a mutated 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID cNO: 1. " 
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Thus, claim 1 of the '999 patent covers the process of 
identifying the existence of certain specific mutations 
in the BRCA1 gene by "analyzing" the sequence of 
the BRCA1 DNA, RNA, or cDNA made from BRCA1 
RNA obtained from a human sample. 
Most of the remaining method claims-­in-­suit 
are similarly structured and directed to the 
comparison of gene sequences. Claim 1 of the '001 
patent claims a method for determining whether a 
human tumor sample contains a mutation in the 
BRCA1 gene by "comparing" the sequence of                  
the BRCA1 gene from the tumor with the sequence       
of the BRCA1 gene from a non-­tumor sample from 
the same person.33 Claim 1 of the '441 patent and 
claim 1 of the '857 are both directed to the same 
process, differing only as to whether the claimed 
method is directed to BRCA1 ('441) or BRCA2 ('857). 
Both of these independent claims are directed to the 
process of determining whether an individual has 
inherited an altered BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene by 
"comparing" the individual's BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene 
                                                                                                                    
33  Claim 1 of the '001 patent reads "A method for screening a 
tumor sample from a human subject for a somatic alteration in 
a BRCA1 gene in said tumor which comprises gene comparing a 
first sequence selected form [sic] the group consisting of a 
BRCA1 gene from said tumor sample, BRCA1 RNA from said 
tumor sample and BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from said 
tumor sample with a second sequence selected from the group 
consisting of BRCA1 gene from a nontumor sample of said 
subject, BRCA1 RNA from said nontumor sample and BRCAI 
cDNA made from mRNA from said nontumor sample, wherein a 
difference in the sequence of the BRCAI gene, BRCAI RNA or 
BRCA1 cDNA from said tumor sample from the sequence of the 
BRCA1 gene, BRCA1 RNA or BRCA1 eDNA from said 
nontumor sample indicates a somatic alteration in the BRCA1 
gene in said tumor sample."  
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sequence with the wild-­type BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene 
sequence.34 34 Claim 2 of the '857 patent covers a 
method for determining whether an individual has a 
predisposition for breast cancer by "comparing" the 
individual's BRCA2 gene sequence with the known 
wild-­type BRCA2 gene sequence.35 
Finally, claim 20 of the '282 patent claims a 
method for determining the effectiveness of a 
potential cancer therapeutic comprising growing cells 
carrying an altered BRCA1 gene known to cause 
cancer in the presence and absence of a potential 
cancer therapeutic, comparing the growth rates of 
the cells, and concluding that a slower growth rate in 
                                                                                                                    
34   Claim 1 of the '441 patent reads: "A method for screening 
germline of a human subject for an alteration of a BRCA1 gene 
which comprises comparing germline sequence of a BRCA1 gene 
or BRCA1 RNA from a tissue sample from said subject or a 
sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from said sample 
with germline sequences of wild-­type BRCAI gene, wild-­type 
BRCAI RNA or wild-­type BRCA1 cDNA, wherein a difference in 
the sequence of the BRCA1 gene, BRCA1 RNA or BRCA1 cDNA 
of the subject from wild-­type indicates an alteration in the 
BRCA1 gene in said subject." Claim I of the '857 patent claims: 
"A method for identifying a mutant BRCA2 nucleotide sequence 
in a suspected mutant BRCA2 allele which comprises 
comparing the nucleotide sequence of the suspected mutant 
BRCA2 allele with the wild-­type BRCA2 nucleotide sequence, 
wherein a difference between the suspected mutant and the 
wild-­type sequences identifies a mutant BRCA2 nucleotide 
sequence."  
35  Claim 2 of the '857 patent reads: "A method for diagnosing a 
predisposition for breast cancer in a human subject which 
comprises comparing the germline sequence of the BRCA2 gene 
or the sequence of its mRNA in a tissue sample from said 
subject with the germline sequence of the wild-­type BRCA2 
gene or the sequence of its mRNA, wherein an alteration in the 
germline sequence of the BRCA2 gene or the sequence of its 
mRNA of the subject indicates a predisposition to said cancer."  
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the presence of the potential therapeutic indicates 
that it is indeed a cancer therapeutic.36 
B. Construction of the Claims37 
1. Legal standard 
Before considering the patent-­eligibility of a 
patent claim, the disputed terms in the claims must 
be construed in order ensure the scope of the claims 
is accurately assessed. See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. 
Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) ("[AJ utility patent protects 'any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof,' 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), the scope of which is defined 
by the patent's written claims."). Courts are charged 
with interpreting disputed claim terms as a matter of 
law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 384-­85 (1996). 
                                                                                                                    
36  Claim 20 of the '282 patent reads: "A method for screening 
potential cancer therapeutics which comprises: growing a 
transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an altered BRCAI 
gene causing cancer in the presence of a compound suspected of 
being a cancer therapeutic, growing said transformed 
eukaryotic host cell in the absence of said compound, 
determining the rate of growth of said host cell in the presence 
of said compound and the rate of growth of said host cell in the 
absence of said compound and comparing the growth rate of 
said host cells, wherein a slower rate of growth of said host cell 
in the presence of said compound is indicative of a cancer 
therapeutic."  
37   In addition to the claim terms discussed below, the parties 
also dispute the proper interpretation of the method claims -­ 
i.e., whether they may be construed to encompass certain 
transformative steps. Because this issue is broader in scope 
than simple claim term definition, it is addressed infra in 
Section VII.D. 
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In interpreting the meaning of claim terms, 
"words of a claim are generally given their ordinary 
and customary meaning" to a person of ordinary skill 
in the art at the time of invention (i.e., the effective 
filing date of the patent application). Philips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-­l3 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
"Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is 
deemed to read the claim term not only in the 
context of the particular claim in which the disputed 
term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, 
including the specification." Id. at 1313. Thus, the 
Federal Circuit has emphasized the importance of 
"intrinsic" evidence in claim construction: the words 
of the claim themselves, the written description in 
the patent's specification, and, when necessary, the 
history of the patent application's prosecution before 
the USPTO. Id. at 1314-­17. 
The process of claim construction begins with 
the language of the claims themselves. The language 
of the claim is what the patentee chose to use to 
"'particularly point [ ] out and distinctly claim [ ]              
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention. '" Id. at 1311-­12 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
¶ 2). Thus, "the claims themselves provide 
substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular 
claim terms." Id. at 1314. In addition to the 
particular claim being examined, the context 
provided by other claims may be helpful as well. "For 
example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds 
a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption 
that the limitation in question is not present in the 
independent claim." Id. at 1314-­15. 
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Claim language must also be read in the 
context of the specification. Id. at 1315. As the 
Federal Circuit has made clear, "claims, of course, do 
not stand alone. Rather, they are part of 'a fully 
integrated written instrument,' consisting principally 
of a specification that concludes with the claims."             
Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995). "For that reason, 
claims 'must be read in view of the specification, of 
which they are a part.'" Id. (quoting Markman,         
52 F.3d at 979). The specification "is always highly 
relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually 
it is dispositive;; it is the single best guide to the 
meaning of a disputed term." Id. (quoting Vitronics 
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996)). Moreover, when the patentee "act[s] as 
his or her own lexicographer" and includes an 
explicit definition of a claim term in the specification, 
that definition is dispositive over any ordinary 
meaning. Id. at 1319 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted);; see also Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. 
Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
 In relying on the specification to interpret 
claim terms, the Federal Circuit has also "repeatedly 
warned against confining the claims" to the 
embodiments described in the specification. Phillips, 
415 F.3d at 1323. The mistake of "reading a 
limitation from the written description into the 
claims" is ·one of the cardinal sins of patent law."    
Id. at 1320 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
Courts may also utilize the prosecution history 
which "consists of the complete record of the 
proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior 
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art cited during the examination of the patent . . . . 
[T]he prosecution history can often inform the 
meaning of the claim language by demonstrating 
how the inventor understood the invention and 
whether the inventor limited the invention in the 
course of prosecution, making the claim scope 
narrower than it would otherwise be." Id. at 1317 
(internal citations omitted). However, the 
prosecution history "often lacks the clarity of the 
specification and thus is less useful claim 
construction purposes." Id. 
Lastly, courts may rely on extrinsic evidence 
such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony, 
which may serve to provide a source of "accepted 
meaning of terms used in various fields of science 
and technology," or by providing "background on the 
technology at issue." Id. at 1317-­18. However, such 
"extrinsic" evidence is "less significant than the 
intrinsic record in determining the legally operative 
meaning of the claim language." Id. At 1317 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). The use of 
extrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict the 
meaning of the claim terms as evidenced by the 
intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1317-­19;; Biagro W. Sales, 
Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
2. Resolution of the disputed claim terms  
a. "DNA" and "isolated DNA" 
The parties approach the terms "DNA" and 
"isolated DNA" from opposing perspectives.38 
                                                                                                                    
38   The degree to which the parties actually disagree on the 
meaning of the discussed claim terms is unclear;; however, to 
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Plaintiffs contend that the term "DNA" means "a 
sequence of nucleic acids, also referred to as 
nucleotides" and therefore constitutes a "nucleotide 
sequence" or a "polynucleotide," Pl. Br. at 10.39 
Myriad disputes Plaintiffs' definition of "DNA" 
insofar as Plaintiffs' definition suggests that the 
term "DNA" refers merely to information, that is, "a 
description of the linear order of nucleotide units 
that make up the polynucleotide." Myriad Br. at 15. 
Myriad instead argues that "DNA" refers to "a real 
and tangible molecule, a chemical composition made 
up of deoxyribonucleotides linked by a 
phosphodiester backbone." Myriad Br. at 14. 
As its name implies, DNA, or deoxyribonucleic 
acid, is an acid -­ a tangible, chemical compound. As 
Myriad correctly notes, the specifications make clear 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
the extent some disagreement has been noted by the parties, 
this section seeks to resolve them.  
39   For purposes of this opinion, "Pl. Br." refers to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment;; "Myriad Br." refers to Myriad Defendants' 
Memorandum of Law (1) in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and (2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
IRU6XPPDU\-XGJPHQW´3O5HSO\UHIHUVWRWKH0HPRUDQGXP
of Law (1) in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against All Defendants and (2) in Opposition to the 
Myriad Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and (3) in 
Opposition to Defendant United States Patent and Trademark 
Office's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings;; "Myriad Reply" 
refers to Myriad Defendants' Memorandum in Reply to 
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Myriad Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment;; and "USPTO Reply" refers to the Reply 
Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant United 
States Patent and Trademark Office's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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that "DNA," as used in the patents, refers to the 
physical manifestation of the acid, one that may be 
"substantially separated from other cellular 
components which naturally accompany a gene." '473 
patent, col. 19: 8-­9;; '282 patent, col. 19: 10-­11;; '492 
patent, col. 17: 64-­65. Despite the  description of the 
term "DNA" set forth in the briefs, this 
understanding of the meaning of "DNA" is shared by 
both Plaintiffs' and Myriad's declarants. Kay ¶ 125;; 
Linck ¶ 45;; Schlessinger ¶ 12;; Grody ¶ 10;; Leonard ¶ 
30. 
The term "isolated DNA" is defined by 
Plaintiffs as "a fragment of DNA substantially 
separated from other cellular components and other 
DNA." PI. Br. at 10. Myriad disputes Plaintiffs' 
definition insofar as it implies that fragments of 
DNA exist free-­floating in the cell, separate from 
other cellular components, such as proteins and the 
other DNA in the chromosome. Myriad Br. at 16. The 
patent specifications expressly define "isolated DNA" 
as a DNA molecule "which is substantially separated 
from other cellular components which naturally 
accompany a native human sequence [such as] 
human genome sequences and proteins" and 
"includes recombinant or cloned DNA isolates and 
chemically synthesized analogs or analogs 
biologically synthesized by heterologous systems." 
'473 patent, col. 19: 6-­15;; '282 patent, col. 19: 8-­18;; 
'492 patent, col. 17: 62-­18:5. 
"Isolated DNA" is therefore construed to refer 
to a segment of DNA nucleotides existing separate 
from other cellular components normally associated 
with native DNA, including proteins and other DNA 
sequences comprising the remainder of the genome, 
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and includes both DNA originating from a cell as 
well as DNA synthesized through chemical or 
heterologous biological means. 
b. "BRCA1" and "BRCA2 " 
3ODLQWLIIV GHILQH WKH WHUP %5&$ DV ´D
particular fragment of DNA found on chromosome 17 
that relates to a person's predisposition to develop 
breast and ovarian cancer." Pl. Br. at 11. Similarly, 
Plaintiffs define the term "BRCA2" as "a particular 
fragment of DNA found on chromosome 13 that 
relates) to a person's predisposition to develop breast 
and ovarian cancer." Pl. Br. at 14. As with Plaintiffs' 
proposed definition of "isolated DNA," Myriad argues 
that these definitions are inconsistent with the 
patents' definition of "BRCA1" and "BRCA2" as 
"cancer-­predisposing gene[sl. some alleles of which 
cause susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancers" 
because they suggest that the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes are not integrated into a chromosome, but are 
broken, detached, or otherwise easily removed from 
their respective chromosomes. Myriad Br. at 16. 
The specifications of the patents-­in-­suit define 
the terms "BRCAI" and "BRCA2" as "a human breast 
cancer predisposing gene . . . some alleles of which 
cause susceptibility to cancer, in particular breast 
and ovarian cancer." '282 patent, col. 4:33-­36;; see 
also '282 patent, col. 1: 22-­23;; '492 patent, col. 1: 20-­
21, 4:28-­29. Further, neither party disputes that 
"genes" refer to segments of DNA incorporated into 
chromosomes.  
"BRCA1" is therefore construed to refer to a 
human gene, normally integrated into chromosome 
17, some alleles of which cause susceptibility to 
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breast and ovarian cancer. Similarly, "BRCA2" is 
construed to refer to a human gene, normally 
integrated into chromosome 13, some alleles of which 
cause susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer. 
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The Summary Judgment Standard  
Summary judgment is granted only where 
there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);; see Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 3 (1986);; SCS Commc'ns, 
Inc. v. Herrick Co., 360 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2004). 
The courts do not try issues of fact on a motion for 
summary judgment, but, rather, determine "whether 
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-­
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-­ 
52 (1986). 
"The party seeking summary judgment bears 
the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and that the undisputed facts 
establish [its] right to judgment as a matter of law." 
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1060-­61 
(2d Cir. 1995). In determining whether a genuine 
issue of material fact exists, a court must resolve all 
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences 
against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. CO. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-­
88 (1986);; Gibbs-­Alfano v. Burton, 281 F.3d 12, 18 
(2d Cir. 2002). However, "the non-­moving party may 
not rely simply on conclusory allegations or 
speculation to avoid summary judgment, but instead 
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must offer evidence to show that its version of the 
events is not wholly fanciful." Morris v. Lindau,      
196 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the 
moving party has shown that "little or no evidence 
may be found in support of the nonmoving party's 
case. When no rational jury could find in favor of the 
nonmoving party because the evidence to support its 
case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper." 
Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 
1219, 1223-­24 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations 
omitted). 
B. 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Its Scope 
Section 101 of Title 35, United States Code, 
provides:   
Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this 
title. 
In interpreting this language, the Supreme 
Court has observed that "Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
wide scope." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
308 (1980);; see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Hi:-­Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001)                  
("[W]e are mindful that this Court has already 
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spoken clearly concerning the broad scope and 
DSSOLFDELOLW\RIµ) 
However, this broad reading of § 101 and 
statutory patent eligibility is not without limits. "The 
Supreme Court has recognized that scientific 
principles and laws of nature, even when for the first 
time discovered, have existed throughout time, define 
the relationship of man to his environment, and, as a 
consequence, ought not to be the subject of exclusive 
rights to anyone person." In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 
795 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 
155, 175 (1852)). Specifically, the Supreme Court has 
recognized three categories of subject matter that fall 
outside the scope of § 101: "The laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been 
held not patentable." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309;; 
see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
"The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot 
be patented rests, not on the notion that natural 
phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more 
fundamental understanding that they are not the 
kind of 'discovery' that the statute was enacted to 
protect." Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
The exclusion of products of nature40 as 
patentable subject matter under § 101 also reflects 
                                                                                                                    
40   Myriad distinguisheV EHWZHHQ ´ODZV RI QDWXUHµ ´QDWXUDO
SKHQRPHQDµ DQG ´DEVWUDFW LGHDVµ ZKLFK LW FRQFHGHV DUH QRW
patentable, and "products of nature," for which it appears to 
argue no prohibition to patentability exists. Although the 
distinction between these two categories is unclear, it is well 
HVWDEOLVKHG WKDW ´SURGXFWV RI QDWXUHµ DUH QRW SDWHQWDEOH See, 
e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 13 (stating that relevant 
GLVWLQFWLRQ IRU   SDWHQWDELOLW\ LV ´EHWZHHQ SURGXFWV RI
nature, whether living or not, and human-­made inveQWLRQVµ
Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 
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the Supreme Court's recogQLWLRQ WKDW ´>S@KHQRPHQD
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, 
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, 
as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work." Gottschalk v. Benson,                    
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Thus, as Justice Breyer has 
observed, "the reason for this exclusion is that 
sometimes too much patent protection can impede 
rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts,' the constitutional objective of patent 
and copyright protection." Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-­
27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting U. S. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.) (emphasis in original). For 
these reasons, "manifestations of laws of nature [are] 
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127, 130 (1948). 
The inquiry into an invention's patent 
eligibility is a fundamental one, and as such, "[t]he 
obligation to determine what type of discovery is 
sought to be patented must precede the 
determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, 
new or obvious." Flook, 437 U.S. at 593;; see also                 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
1928) QRWLQJWKDW´DSDWHQWFDQQRWEHDZDUGHGIRUDGLVFRYHU\
RU IRU D SURGXFW RI QDWXUH RU IRU D FKHPLFDO HOHPHQWµ In re 
Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (concluding that 
´>X@UDQLXP LV D SURGXFW RI QDWXUH DQG WKH DSSHOODQW LV QRW
entitled to a patent on the same, or upon any of the inherent 
QDWXUDOTXDOLWLHVRIWKDWPHWDOµIn re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959 
&&3$VWDWLQJWKDW´SXUHYDQDGLXPLVQRWQHZLQWKH
inventive sense, and, it being a product of nature, no one is 
HQWLWOHGWRDPRQRSRO\RIWKHVDPHµ 
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banc), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) 
("Whether a claim is drawn to patent-­eligible subject 
matter under § 101 is a threshold inquiry, and any 
claim of an application failing the requirements of § 
101 must be rejected even if it meets all of the other 
legal requirements of patentability." (citing                       
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2007));; Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Servs.,     581 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(noting that in determining patent eligibility, "it is 
improper to consider whether a claimed element or 
step in a process is novel or nonobvious, since such 
considerations are separate requirements set forth in 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, and 103, respectively."                    
(citing Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958)). Consistent with this 
approach, the courts have rejected patent claims 
even when the purported invention was highly 
beneficial or novel, or the research and work that 
went into identifying it was costly or time-­
consuming. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130;; 
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brodgex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 
11-­13 (1931);; Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 
28 F.2d 641, 642-­43 (3d Cir. 1928). 
The distinction between the § 101 inquiry into 
patentable subject matter and the other 
requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35 is 
of particular importance in evaluating the 
authorities cited by the parties and the arguments 
presented. The discussion of § 101 in In re Bergy,  
596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) by the late Honorable 
Giles S. Rich, one of the authors of the 1952 Patent 
Act, is particularly informative in clarifying the 
proper scope of a § 101 analysis. There, Judge Rich 
stated what considerations were salient -­ and 
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importantly, what considerations were not -­ in a § 
101 analysis: 
Section 101 states three 
requirements: novelty, utility, and 
statutory subject matter. The 
understanding that these three 
requirements are separate and 
distinct is long-­standing and has 
EHHQXQLYHUVDOO\DFFHSWHG7KXV
the questions of whether a particular 
invention is novel or useful are 
questions wholly apart from whether 
the invention falls into a category of 
statutory subject matter. Of the three 
requirements stated in § 101, only 
two, utility and statutory subject 
matter, are applied under § 101. As 
we shall show, in 1952 Congress 
voiced its intent to consider the 
novelty of an invention under § 102 
where it is first made clear what the 
statute means by "new," 
notwithstanding the fact that this 
requirement is first named in § 101. 
Id. at 960-­61 (emphasis added). Judge Rich further 
cautioned that "statements in the older cases must 
be handled with care lest the terms used in their 
reasoning clash with the reformed terminology of the 
present statute;; lack of meticulous care may lead to 
distorted legal conclusions." Id. at 959. The Supreme 
Court subsequently affirmed this understanding of 
the § 101 analysis in Diehr, noting that while it had 
been argued that "novelty is an appropriate 
consideration under § 101," "[t]he question . . . of 
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whether a particular invention is novel is 'wholly a 
part from whether from whether the invention falls 
into a category of statutory subject matter.'"           
450 U.S. at 189-­90 (quoting Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961);; 
see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958 ("So here, it is 
irrelevant to the § 101 analysis whether Applicants' 
claimed process is novel or nonobvious.") 
Accordingly, in considering whether the 
patents-­in-­suit comply with § 101, the proper 
analysis requires determining (1) whether the 
claimed invention possesses utility;; and (2) whether 
the claimed invention constitutes statutory subject 
matter, that is, whether it is a "process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof," 35 U.S.C. § 101, or 
whether the claimed invention instead falls within 
the judicially created "products of nature" exception 
to patentable subject matter, i.e., "laws of nature, 
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas," 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. In contrast,                      
the question of whether an invention is "new"                   
or "novel" over the prior art is a question addressed 
by § 102 and falls outside of the scope of the present 
§ 101 analysis. Because it is undisputed that the 
claimed compositions and methods possess utility, 
the sole task of this Court is to resolve whether the 
claimed compositions and methods constitute 
statutory subject matter or fall within the judicially 
created products of nature exception to patentable 
subject matter. 
C. The Composition Claims Are Invalid 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
As noted, the issue presented by the instant 
motions with respect to the composition claims is 
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whether or not claims directed to isolated DNA 
containing naturally-­occurring sequences fall within 
the products of nature exception to § 101. Based upon 
the reasons set forth below, it is concluded that the 
composition claims-­in-­suit are excepted. 
1. Consideration of the Merits of 
Plaintiffs' Challenge is Appropriate 
Myriad offers several arguments for why this 
Court should not engage the substance of Plaintiffs' 
claims, but should instead dismiss them out of hand. 
Foremost among them is Myriad's assertion that 
Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed in light of the 
"carefully considered policy of the USPTO," which is 
"entitled to great respect from the courts."                 
Myriad Br. at 26. In so arguing, Myriad notes the 
presumption of validity afforded to patents, see               
35 U.S.C. § 282, and the USPTO's prior consideration 
of the eligibility of gene-­related patents, see Utility 
Examination Guidelines 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092-­99 
(Jan. 5, 2001), as well as the Supreme Court's 
statements in J.E,M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. 124. 
The Federal Circuit has previously held that it 
owes no deference to USPTO legal determinations. 
See, e.g., Arnold P'ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) '"This court reviews statutory 
interpretation, the central issue in this case, without 
deference."). While Congress has created a 
presumption of validity for issued patents, 
approximately 40% of patents challenged in the 
courts have been found invalid, demonstrating that 
this presumption is far from absolute. See Institute 
for Intellectual Property & Information Law, 
University of Houston Law Center, Patstats.org, Full 
Calendar Year 2008 Report, http://www.patstats.org/ 
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2008_Full_Year_Posting.rev3.htm (indicating that 
40% of all validity determinations in federal court in 
2008 found the challenged patent invalid);; Paul F. 
Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination v. Litigation 
-­ Making Intelligent Decisions in Challenging Patent 
Validity, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 441-­461 
(2004) (citing USPTO statistics showing that 74% of 
patents previously issued by the Patent Office and 
later challenged through the reexamination process 
were either canceled or changed by the USPTO). 
Moreover, the lack of Congressional action to 
specifically prohibit gene patents in response to the 
USPTO's prior grant of such patents does not 
preclude their review by the courts. For example, in 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, the Federal Circuit set out a 
test for the patentability of method claims that 
potentially will invalidate thousands of patents on 
business method patents, despite Congress' silence 
concerning the patentability of such methods. 
Finally, while the Supreme Court in J.E.M. Ag 
Supply noted the USPTO's practice of issuing 
patents on sexually reproducing plants in concluding 
that such plants represented patentable subject 
matter under § 101, that passing observation was 
neither dispositive nor central to the Court's holding 
and does not establish a rule of judicial deference to 
the USPTO's practices. See J.E.M. Ag Supply,        
534 U.S. at 144-­45. Indeed, the judicial deference        
urged by Myriad is difficult to reconcile with the 
courts' consideration of the substantive issues 
presented in cases such as Chakrabarty and indeed, 
J.E.M. Ag Supply itself. 
Moreover, in the absence of a § 101 challenge 
to patent validity, the fact that courts have 
previously upheld the validity of patents directed to 
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biological products in response to § 102 and/or § 103 
challenges has no bearing on the present inquiry. 
See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(considering obviousness of claims);; In re O'Farrell, 
853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (same). The Patent Act 
sets out patent invalidity as an issue to be raised by 
the parties, see 35 U.S.C. § 282, and it would be 
erroneous to treat a case involving DNA-­related 
patents as holding that isolated human genes 
constitute patentable subject matter under § 101. 
Were that the case, the Supreme Court could have 
proceeded with its consideration of Metabolite Labs., 
after it granted certiorari and the parties and amici 
had fully briefed the issue of patentable subject 
matter eligibility, rather than dismissing certiorari 
as improvidently granted based on the parties' 
failure to raise the § 101 issue below. 548 U.S. 124. 
Finally, Myriad's suggestion that invalidating 
the patents-­in-­suit would constitute an 
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution or a violation of the 
United States' obligations under the Agreement on 
Trade-­Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights ("TRIPS") is unpersuasive. Myriad's novel 
takings argument runs counter to a long history of 
invalidation of patent claims by the courts and is 
unsupported by legal precedent. Similarly, Articles 
8.1 and 27.3 of TRIPS permit governments to 
incorporate public health concerns into their 
intellectual property laws and to exclude from 
patentability diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical 
methods as well as particular inventions on the 
grounds of public interest. As a result, invalidation of 
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the patents-­in-­suit would constitute neither a 
constitutional violation nor a conflict with the United 
States' treaty obligations. 
2. Patentable subject matter must be 
"markedly different" from a product of 
nature 
Supreme Court precedent has established that 
products of nature do not constitute patentable 
subject matter absent a change that results in                   
the creation of a fundamentally new product.                             
In American Fruit Growers, the Supreme Court 
rejected patent claims covering fruit whose skin                 
had been treated with mold-­resistant borax. 
Acknowledging that the "complete article is not 
found in nature," and "treatment, labor and 
manipulation" went into producing the fruit, the 
Court nonetheless held that the fruit did not            
become an "article of manufacture" unless it 
"possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property" compared to the naturally-­occurring 
article.41 283 U.S. at 11. The Court went on to 
observe: 
                                                                                                                    
41  Myriad argues that American Fruit Growers was decided on 
novelty grounds, rather than subject matter patentability. See 
Myriad Br. at 26. However, the Court's novelty discussion was 
restricted to its analysis of the process claims. Am. Fruit 
Growers, 263 U.S. at 13-­´,I LWEHDVVXPHGWKDWWKHSURFHVV
claims under consideration cover an invention, we think this 
lacked novelty when application was made for the patent 
August 13, 1923"). In contrast, its rejection of the composition 
claims was based on an analysis of subject matter patentability. 
See id. at 11 ("Is an orange, the rind of which has become 
impregnated with borax, through immersion in a solution, and 
thereby resistant to blue mold decay, a 'manufacture,' or 
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Manufacture implies a change, but 
every change is not manufacture, 
and yet every change in an article is 
the result of treatment, labor, and 
manipulation. But something more 
is necessary . . . There must be 
transformation;; a new and different 
article must emerge having a 
distinctive name, character, or use.  
Id. at 12-­13 (quoting Anheuser-­Busch Brewing Ass'n 
v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (l908)) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, in Funk Brothers, the Supreme 
Court considered whether a mixture of several 
naturally-­occurring species of bacteria was 
patentable.42 333 U.S. at 128-­31. Each species of 
bacteria in the mixture could extract nitrogen from 
the air for plant usage. While the patent holder had 
created a mixture by selecting and testing for strains 
of bacteria that did not mutually inhibit one another, 
the Court concluded that the patent holder "did not 
create a state of inhibition or of non-­inhibition in the 
bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. 
Those qualities are of course not patentable."                   
Id. at 130.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
manufactured article, within the meaning of section 31, title 35, 
U.S. Code?").  
42  Myriad suggests that the Supreme Court's holding in Funk 
Brothers was premised on an obviousness determination, rather 
than patentable subject matter. Subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions, however, have treated the holding in Funk Brothers 
as a statement of patentable subject matter. See Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 309-­10;; Flook, 437 U.S. at 591-­92;; Benson, 409 U.S. 
at 67-­68. 
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Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed 
the application of § 101 to product claims in  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. In 
Chakrabarty, the Court considered whether a "live, 
human-­made micro-­organism is patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. I 101." Id. At 305. The 
microorganism in question was a bacterium that had 
been genetically engineered to break down multiple 
components of crude oil and possessed considerable 
utility in the treatment of oil spills. Id. In concluding 
that the man-­made bacterial strain was patentable, 
the &RXUW REVHUYHG WKDW WKH FODLP ´is not to a 
hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a 
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition 
of matter -­ a product of human ingenuity 'having a 
distincWLYHQDPHFKDUDFWHU>DQG@XVH·µ Id. at 309-­10 
(quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 
(1887)). The Court went on to contrast the 
Chakrabarty bacterium with the bacterial mixture at 
issue in Funk Brothers, stating that in 
Chakrabarty's case, "the patentee has produced a 
new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one 
having the potential for significant utility.                       
His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own 
. . . ." Id. at 310.43 This requirement that an invention 
                                                                                                                    
43  Although Chakrabarty is often cited for the proposition that 
"anything under the sun that is made by man" is patentable, id. 
at 309, that phrase is a misleading quotation from the 
legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952. The full quote 
clearly acknowledges the statutory limitations to patentable 
subject matter: "A person may have ¶invented' a machine or a 
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun made 
by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 
unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled." H.R. Rep. No. 
1923. 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). 
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possess "markedly different characteristics" for 
purposes of § 101 reflects the oft-­repeated 
requirement that an invention have "a new or 
distinctive form, quality, or property" from a product 
of nature. Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11;; In re 
Merz, 97 F.2d 599,601 (C.C.P.A. 1935) ("[M]ere 
purification of known materials does not result in a 
patentable product," unless "the product obtained in 
such a case had properties and characteristics which 
were different in kind from those of the known 
product rather than in degree."). 
Courts have also specifically held that 
"purification" of a natural compound, without more, 
is insufficient to render a product of nature 
patentable. In The American Wood-­Paper Co. v. The 
Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 
(1874), the Supreme Court held that refined 
cellulose, consisting of purified pulp derived from 
wood and vegetable, was unpatentable because it 
was "an extract obtained by the decomposition or 
disintegration of material substance." Id. at 593. As 
the Court observed: 
There are many things well known 
and valuable in medicine or in the 
arts which may be extracted from 
divers[e] substances. But the extract 
is the same, no matter from what it 
has been taken. A process to obtain 
it from a subject from which it has 
never been taken may be the 
creature of invention, but the thing 
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itself when obtained cannot be called 
a new manufacture. 
Id. at 593-­94.44 Similarly, in Cochrane v. Badische 
Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884), the Court 
rejected a patent on an artificial version of a natural 
red dye called alizarine that was produced by 
manipulating another compound through acid, heat, 
water or distillation. See generally, id. Although the 
artificial version of the dye was of a brighter hue 
than the naturally occurring dye, the Court 
concluded that "[c]alling it artificial alizarine did not 
make it a new composition of matter, and patentable 
as such . . . ." Id. at 311 (citing Am, Wood-­Paper, 90 
U.S. (23 Wall.) at 593). 
In General Electric, 28 F.2d at 642, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the patentability 
of purified tungsten, which possessed superior 
characteristics and utility over its brittle, naturally-­
occurring form. The court first noted that "[i]f it is a 
natural thing then clearly, even if [the patentee] was 
the first to uncover it and bring it into view, he 
cannot have a patent for it because a patent cannot 
be awarded for a discovery or for a product of nature, 
or for a chemical element." Id. The court went on to 
state: 
Naturally we inquire who created 
pure tungsten. Coolidge? No. It 
existed in nature and doubtless has 
existed there for centuries. The fact 
                                                                                                                    
44  Given the posture of the challenge to the patent's validity, the 
Court rested its holding on the fact that the patent in question 
was invalid as non-­novel. Id. 
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that no one before Coolidge found it 
there does not negative its origin or 
existence. 
The second part of the claim reads: 
"Having ductility and high tensile 
strength." Did Coolidge give those 
qualities to "substantially pure 
tungsten"? We think not for it is now 
conceded that tungsten pure is 
ductile cold. If it possess that quality 
now it is certain that it possessed it 
always. 
Id. at 643. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
("C.C.P.A."), the precursor to the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals,45 subsequently relied on General 
Electric in rejecting patents claiming purified 
uranium and vanadium. See In re Marden, 47 F.2d 
957, 957-­58 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ("Marden Iµ
In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 1059 (C.C.P.A. 1931) 
("Marden II") ("The quality of purity of vanadium               
or its ductility is a quality of a natural product               
and as such is not patentable."). Similarly, in           
Ex Parte Latimer, the Patent Commissioner refused 
to allow a patent on pine needle fibers that were 
better suited for textile production, even though it 
was necessary to remove the needle from its sheath 
                                                                                                                    
45   The decisions of the C.C.P.A. remain binding precedent in 
patent cases. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 
1370-­71 (Fed. &LUHQEDQFDGRSWLQJ´>W@KDWERG\RIODZ
represented by the holdings of . . . the Court of Customs and 
Patent AppealVµDV´SUHFHGHQWµIRUWKHWKHQ-­new Federal Circuit 
VR DV WR ´FRQWLQX>H@ WKH stability in those areas of the law 
SUHYLRXVO\ZLWKLQWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIRXUSUHGHFHVVRUFRXUWVµ 
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and other resinous material. 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 
123, 125 (1889) ("Nature made them so and not the 
process by which they are taken from the leaf or 
needle."). 
Myriad argues that purification of "'naturally 
occurring' compounds that 'do not exist in nature in 
pure form' renders such compounds patent-­eligible." 
Myriad Br. at 21 (quoting In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 
1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). However, Myriad cites 
no Supreme Court authority that would rebut the 
authorities presented by Plaintiffs, nor do the cited 
cases support Myriad's position.  
Myriad has relied heavily on the holding of the 
Honorable Learned Hand in Parke-­Davis & Co. v. 
H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F.2d 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).46 In 
                                                                                                                    
46  The invocation of Judge Hand is frequently practiced in this 
Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 121 n.3 
(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Learned Hand for the proposition that 
appellate courts may not find facts);; United States v. Parker, 
554 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Learned Hand for his 
formulation of the requirements of conspiracy);; In re City of 
New York, 522 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Learned 
Hand for his formulation of negligence);; In re Hyman, 501 F.3d 
61, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting at length Learned Hand's 
inconclusive discussion of the meaning of the word "defalcation" 
in 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (4));; United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 
190 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Learned Hand's definition of 
inducement by the government);; In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 
115, 123 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Learned Hand's critique of 
statutes of limitations);; Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 95 
(2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Learned Hand's instruction that 
>Z@RUGVDUHQRWSHEEOHVLQDOLHQMX[WDSRVLWLRQµDanahy v. 
Buscaglia, 134 F.3d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Learned 
Hand on the rationale for qualified immunity). See also, 
Remarks .of the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr, Upon Receiving 
the Learned Hand Medal for Excellence in Federal 
Jurisprudence, 76 St. John's L. Rev. 595, 596 (2002) ("Judge 
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Parke-­Davis, Judge Hand considered a challenge to 
the validity of a patent claiming an adrenaline 
compound that had been isolated and purified from 
animal suprarenal glands. Id. at 97. It had been 
known that suprarenal glands in powdered form had 
hemostatic, blood-­pressure-­raising and astringent 
properties, but could not be used for those purposes 
in gross form. The isolated adrenaline, however, 
possessed the desired therapeutic properties and 
could be administered to humans. 
Although Myriad argues that the holding in 
Parke-­Davis establishes that the purification of a 
natural product necessarily renders it patentable, 
the opinion, read closely, fails to support such                     
a conclusion. The question before the court in                 
Parke-­Davis was one of novelty (a modern-­day                      
§ 102 question), not of patentable subject matter                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Hand is widely considered to have been one of the four greatest 
judges of the first half of the twentieth FHQWXU\µ -DPHV /
Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second 
Circuit, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1995);; Gerald Gunther, Learned 
Hand: the Man and the Judge (1994): Kathryn Griffin, Judge 
Learned Hand and the Role of the Federal Judiciary (1973);; 
Marvin Schick, Learned Hand's Court (1970);; Marcia Nelson, 
ed., The Remarkable Hands: An Affectionate Portrait (1983): 
Hershel Shanks, ed., The Art and Craft of Judging: The 
Decisions of Judge Learned Hand (1968). Although Judge Hand 
once turned his back on the author of this opinion arguing 
before him on behalf of the Government, his opinion in              
Parke-­Davis deserves careful review but brings to mind that oft 
repeated adage "Quote Learned, but follow GusµSee Oakes, 47 
Stan. L. Rev. at 389 n.175. This author, confronted by genomics 
and molecular biology, also emphatically empathizes with 
Judge Hand's complaint in Parke-­Davis about his lack of 
knowledge of the rudiments of chemistry. See Parke-­Davis, 189 
F. at 114. 
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(the § 101 question before this Court). In framing the 
issue, Judge Hand observed that, "[the validity of the 
claims] is attacked, first, because they are 
anticipated in the art;; and second, for a number of 
technical grounds which I shall take up in turn." Id. 
at 101 (emphasis added). He went on to conclude that 
the patented purified extract was not, in fact, 
different from the prior art "only for a degree of 
purity," but rather was a different chemical 
substance from that found in the prior art. Id. at 103 
(observing that "no one had ever isolated a substance 
[adrenaline] which was not in salt form" and that 
"the [claimed] base [form of adrenaline] was an 
original production of [the patentee's]"). Thus, Judge 
Hand held that the purified adrenaline was not 
anticipated by the prior art, namely, the ground 
paradrenal gland that was known to possess certain 
beneficial properties. See Merck & Co. v. Olin 
Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 
1958) ("It was further held [in Parke-­Davis] that the 
invention was not anticipated, though the principle 
was known to exist in the suprarenal glands."). 
Only after concluding that the claimed 
purified adrenaline was novel over the prior art did 
Judge Hand offer, as dicta, the statement to which 
Myriad cites: "But, even if it were merely an 
extracted product without change, there is no rule 
that such products are not patentable." Id. at 103. 
While the accuracy of this statement at the time was 
written is dubious in light of American Wood-­Paper 
(to which Judge Hand did not cite) it is certainly no 
longer good law in light of subsequent Supreme 
Court cases, which, as noted above, require that a 
claimed invention possess "markedly different 
characteristics" over products existing in nature in 
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order for it to constitute patentable subject matter.47 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310;; see also Funk Bros., 
333 U.S. at 130-­32. By the same token, Judge Hand's 
suggestion that a claimed invention was patentable 
since it was a "new thing commercially and 
therapeutically," Parke-­Davis, 189 F.2d at 103, is 
firmly contradicted by subsequent case law 
establishing that "it is improper to consider whether 
a claimed element or step in a process is novel or 
nonobvious, since such considerations are separate 
requirements" when evaluating whether a claim is 
patent-­eligible subject matter. Prometheus, 581 F.3d 
at 1343;; see also Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960-­61. Such                 
an approach would also be inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's rejection of the patentability                  
the commercially useful mixture of bacteria in                    
Funk Brothers, the refined cellulose in                    
American Wood-­Paper, and the electromagnetic 
communication devices in 2·Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) 62 (1853). 
The distinction between considerations of 
novelty and patentable subject matter similarly 
undermines Myriad's reliance on Bergstrom and In 
re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169 (C.C.P.A. 1979), both of 
which presented issues of novelty and anticipation 
rather than the question of patentable subject 
matter. In Bergstrom, the C.C.P.A. considered an 
appeal from a rejection by the Board of Patent and 
,QWHUIHUHQFHV ´%3$,µ) of a patent claiming the 
purified prostaglandins PGE2 and PGE3 that had 
                                                                                                                    
47    Notwithstanding Judge Hand's reputation, see supra note 46, 
his opinion in Parke-­Davis was one of a district court judge and 
does not supersede contrary statements of the law by the 
C.C.P.A. or the Supreme Court.  
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been extracted from human or animal prostate 
glands. 427 F.2d at 1398. Although the BPAI cited       
§ 101 in its rejection, the C.C.P.A. recognized the 
issue as a § 102 question of novelty. Id. at 1400 
´Tested by the conventional evidentiary criteria or 
'conditions for patentability' relevant to the present 
factual situation which Congress has expressed in 
the various provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102, appellants 
are undoubtedly correct, for the Patent Office has not 
been able to . . . establish that the claimed subject 
PDWWHU ODFNV ¶QRYHOW\·µ);; see also id. at 1401 ("[T]he 
fundamental error in the board's position, as we see 
it, is the analysis and answer it gave to the sole issue 
it accurately posed -­ whether the claimed pure 
materials are novel as compared with the less pure 
materials of the reference." (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the C.C.P.A. itself 
has subsequently recognized that Bergstrom is 
properly viewed as a case concerning novelty. Bergy, 
596 F.2d at 961 ("Our research has disclosed only 
two instances in which rejections for lack of novelty 
were made by the PTO under § 101 . . . In                              
In re Bergstrom we in effect treated the rejection as 
if it had been made under § 102, observing in the 
process that 'The word "new" in § 101 is defined and 
to be construed in accordance with the provisions of   
·µ (internal citation omitted)). 
Kratz examined the rejection of a patent 
claiming a substantially purified chemical compound 
naturally occurring in strawberries, called                           
2-­methyl-­2-­pentenoic acid ("2M2PA"). 592 F.2d at 
1170. The patentee had appealed from the BPAI's 
determination that the purified compound was 
obvious over the prior art under § 103. See id. 
Although there was some discussion about whether 
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the composition claimed was a naturally-­occurring 
compound, the C.C.P.A. did not view the question 
before it as a § 101 inquiry. Instead, the court treated 
the appeal as a question of novelty and anticipation 
pursuant to § 102.48 See, e.g., id. DW´It should 
be clear that an anticipation rejection in such a case 
LVQHFHVVDULO\EDVHGRQDGXDOIRRWLQJµ49 
Finally, Merck & Co., Inc.v. Olin Mathieson 
Chern. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, cited by Myriad, is 
entirely consistent with the principle set forth in 
Funk Brothers and American Fruit Growers that 
something derived from a product of nature must 
"possess a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property" in order to become patentable subject 
matter. Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11. In  
Merck, the Fourth Circuit considered the validity of a 
patent claiming a Vitamin B12 composition useful for 
                                                                                                                    
48   The differences between the test applied in Kratz and the 
"markedly different" requirement set forth in Chakrabarty and 
other Supreme Court precedent further demonstrates that the 
Kratz court was engaged in a § 102 anticipation analysis and 
not a § 101 statutory subject matter analysis. See id. at 1174 
(requiring, for a finding of anticipation, that "the natural 
composition must inherently contain the naturally occurring 
compound" and that "the claim must be of sufficient breadth to 
encompass both the known natural composition and the 
naturally occurring compound.").  
49   Bergy also cited by Myriad, considered the question of 
whether microorganisms constituted patentable subject matter, 
an issue subsequently addressed by the Supreme Court in 
Chakrabarty. It did not address the patentability of purified 
natural products, and its citation to Merck and Parke-­Davis 
was only for the purpose of noting that courts had upheld 
patents on pharmaceutical compounds such as vitamin B12" 
and adrenaline. See Bergy, 596 F.2d at 974-­75 & n.13. 
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treating pernicious anemia. Id. at 157. Although 
naturally occurring Vitamin B12 produced in cows 
had known therapeutic properties and was 
commercially available, the court found the purified 
B12 composition, which was obtained from a 
microorganism, patentable. In upholding the validity 
of the patent, the court held: 
Every slight step in purification does 
not produce a new product. What is 
gained may be the old product, but 
with a greater degree of purity. 
Alpha alumina purified is still alpha 
alumina, In re Ridgway, 76 F.2d 602, 
[ ] and ultramarine from-­which 
floatable impurities have been 
removed is still ultramarine, In re 
Merz, 97 F.2d 599 . . . 
Id. at 163. Because the court concluded that the 
purified B12 was more than a "mere advance in the 
degree of purity of a known product," it determined 
that the claimed invention was entitled to patent 
protection. Id. at 164. 
In sum, the clear line of Supreme Court 
precedent and accompanying lower court authorities, 
stretching from American Wood-­Paper through to 
Chakrabarty, establishes that purification of a 
product of nature, without more, cannot transform it 
into patentable subject matter. Rather, the purified 
product must possess "markedly different 
characteristics" in order to satisfy the requirements 
of § 101. 
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3. The claimed isolated DNA is not 
"markedly different" from native DNA 
The question thus presented by Plaintiffs' 
challenge to the composition claims is whether the 
isolated DNA claimed by Myriad possesses 
"markedly different characteristics" from a product of 
nature.50 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. In support of 
its position, Myriad cites several differences between 
the isolated DNA claimed in the patents and the 
native DNA found within human cells. None, 
however, establish the subject matter patentability of 
isolated BRCA1/2 DNA. 
The central premise of Myriad's argument that 
the claimed DNA is "markedly different" from DNA 
IRXQGLQQDWXUHLVWKHDVVHUWLRQWKDW´>L@VRODWHG'1$
molecules should be treated no differently than other 
chemical compounds for patent eligibility,"                 
Myriad Br. at 26, and that the alleged "difference in 
the structural and functional properties of isolated 
DNA" render the claimed DNA patentable subject 
matter, Myriad Sr. at 31. 
Myriad's focus on the chemical nature of DNA, 
however, fails to acknowledge the unique 
characteristics of DNA that differentiate it from 
other chemical compounds. As Myriad's expert Dr. 
Joseph Straus observed: "Genes are of double nature: 
On the one hand, they are chemical substances or 
molecules. On the other hand, they are physical 
carriers of information, i.e., where the actual 
biological function of this information is coding for 
                                                                                                                    
50   The parties do not appear to dispute that isolated DNA 
claimed in the patents-­in-­VXLWDUH´XVHIXOµIRUSXUSRVHVRI 
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proteins. Thus, inherently genes are 
multifunctional." Straus Decl. ¶ 20;; see also The Cell 
at 98, 104 ("Today the idea that DNA carries genetic 
information in its long chain of nucleotides is 50 
fundamental to biological thought that it is 
sometimes difficult to realize the enormous 
intellectual gap that it filled . . . . DNA is relatively 
inert chemically.");; Kevin Davies & Michael White, 
Breakthrough: The Race to Find the Breast Cancer 
Gene 166 (1996) (noting that Myriad Genetics' April 
1994 press release described itself as a "genetic 
information business"). This informational quality is 
unique among the chemical compounds found in our 
bodies, and it would be erroneous to view DNA as "no 
different [ ]" than other chemicals previously the 
subject of patents.51 
Myriad's argument that all chemical 
compounds, such as the adrenaline at issue in    
Parke-­Davis, necessarily conveys some information 
ignores the biological realities of DNA in comparison 
to other chemical compounds in the body. The 
information encoded in DNA is not information about 
                                                                                                                    
51  Myriad and many of the amici suggest that the invalidation of 
the patents-­in-­suit will result in the decimation of the 
biotechnology industry. See, e.g., Myriad Br. at 28-­29 
(suggesting that a finding that DNA is unpatentable subject 
matter will invalidate patents to important chemical 
compounds such as the anticancer drug Taxol (paclitaxel) and 
leave "little to nothing" of the United States biotechnology 
industry). The conclusions reached in this opinion concerning 
the subject matter patentability of isolated DNA, however, are 
based on the unique properties of DNA that distinguish it from 
all other chemicals and biological molecules found in nature. As 
a result, Myriad's predictions for the future of the U.S. 
biotechnology industry are unfounded. 
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its own molecular structure incidental to its 
biological function, as is the case with adrenaline or 
other chemicals found in the body. Rather, the 
information encoded by DNA reflects its primary 
biological function: directing the synthesis of other 
molecules in the body -­ namely, proteins, "biological 
molecules of enormous importance" which "catalyze 
biochemical reactions" and constitute the "major 
structural materials of the animal body."                
O'Farrell, 854 F.2d at 895-­96. DNA, and in particular 
the ordering of its nucleotides, therefore serves as 
the physical embodiment of laws of nature ² those 
that define the construction of the human body.           
Any "information" that may be embodied by 
adrenaline and similar molecules serves no 
comparable function, and none of the declarations 
submitted by Myriad support such a conclusion. 
Consequently, the use of simple analogies comparing 
DNA with chemical compounds previously the 
subject of patents cannot replace consideration of the 
distinctive characteristics of DNA. 
In light of DNA's unique qualities as a 
physical embodiment of information, none of the 
structural and functional differences cited by Myriad 
between native BRCA1/2 DNA and the isolated 
BRCA1/2 DNA claimed in the patents-­in-­suit render 
the claimed DNA "markedly different." This 
conclusion is driven by the overriding importance of 
DNA's nucleotide sequence to both its natural 
biological function as well as the utility associated 
with DNA in its isolated form. The preservation of 
this defining characteristic of DNA in its native and 
isolated forms mandates the conclusion that the 
challenged composition claims are directed to 
unpatentable products of nature. 
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Myriad argues that the § 101 inquiry into the 
subject matter patentability of isolated DNA should 
focus exclusively on the differences alleged to exist 
between native and isolated DNA, rather than 
considering the similarities that exist between the 
two forms of DNA. See, e.g., Myriad Reply at 8-­9 
("[T]he observation that isolated DNA and native 
DNA share this single property [i.e. the same protein 
coding sequences] is irrelevant to the critical issue of 
whether there are differences in their properties. It is 
the differences that are legally relevant to the novelty 
inquiry under Section 101, not the properties held in 
FRPPRQµ (emphasis in original));; Myriad Br. at 8. 
Setting aside the fact that considerations such as 
novelty are irrelevant for § 101 purposes, see     
Bergy, 126 596 F.2d at 960-­61, Myriad offers no 
authorities supporting such an approach. To the 
contrary, the Supreme Court has held that "[i]n 
determining the eligibility of [a] claimed process for 
patent protection under § 101, [the] claims must be 
considered as a whole." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has expressly held that 
"[i]n the final analysis under § 101, the claimed 
invention, as a whole, must be evaluated for what it 
is." In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 
1982)). 
Were Myriad's approach the law, it is difficult 
to discern how any invention could fail the test.                   
For example, the bacterial mixture in Funk Brothers     
was unquestionably different from any preexisting 
bacterial mixture;; yet the Supreme Court recognized 
that a patent directed to the mixture, considered            
as a whole, did no more than patent "the handiwork 
of nature." 333 U. S. at 131. There will almost 
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inevitably be some identifiable differences between a 
claimed invention and a product of nature;; the 
appropriate § 101 inquiry is whether, considering the 
claimed invention as a whole, it is sufficiently 
distinct in its fundamental characteristics from 
natural phenomena to possess the required 
"distinctive name, character, [and] use." 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-­10. 
None of Myriad's arguments establish the 
distinctive nature of the claimed DNA. Myriad's 
argument that association of chromosomal proteins 
with native DNA establishes the existence of 
"structural differences" between native and isolated 
DNA relies on an incorrect comparison between 
isolated DNA and chromatin, which are indeed 
different insofar as chromatin includes chromosomal 
proteins normally associated with DNA. The proper 
comparison is between the claimed isolated DNA and 
the corresponding native DNA, and the presence or 
absence of chromosomal proteins merely constitutes 
a difference in purity that cannot serve to establish 
subject matter patentability. See Gen. Elec.,                    
28 F.2d at 642-­43;; Marden I, 47 F.2d at 957-­58;;                      
Marden II, 47 F.2d at 1059. 
Myriad also attempts to rely on its assertion 
that native DNA contains intron sequences that are 
absent in the claimed BRCA1/2 DNA. However, 
some of the claims, such as claim 1 of the '282 patent, 
are directed broadly to DNA "coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide." Native BRCA1 DNA, by definition, 
encodes the BRCA1 protein;; thus claim 1 of the '282 
patent would cover purified BRCA1 DNA possessing 
the exact same structure found in the human cell, 
219a 
  
introns and all.52 See also '492 patent, claim 1 
(similarly claiming isolated DNA "coding for a 
BRCA2 polypeptide"). In addition, several of the 
composition claims are directed to isolated DNA 
containing as few as 15 nucleotides of the BRCAI 
coding sequence, see, e.g., '282 patent, claims 5 & 6, 
and at least some of these short DNA sequences will 
be found within a single exon of the native BRCAI 
gene sequence. See Adam Pavlicek, et al., Evolution 
of the Tumor Suppressor BRCA1 Locus in Primates: 
Implications for Cancer Predisposition, 13 Human 
Molecular Genetics 2737, 2737 (2004) (noting BRCAI 
exons range from 37 to 3427 nucleotides in length). 
Therefore, for these small DNA fragments, the 
existence of introns in native BRCA1 DNA is 
completely irrelevant to the question of structural 
differences when comparing these short DNA 
molecules with native BRCA1 DNA. 
More generally, the fact that the BRCA1/2 
cDNA molecules covered by the composition claims-­
in-­suit contain only the protein coding exons and not 
the introns found in native DNA does not render 
these cDNAs and their native counterparts 
"markedly different." The splice variants represented 
by these cDNAs are the result of the naturally 
occurring splicing of pre-­mRNA into mature mRNA. 
Therefore, not only are the coding sequences 
contained in the claimed DNA identical to those 
found in native DNA, the particular arrangement of 
those coding sequences is the result of the natural 
                                                                                                                    
52  To the extent a claim reads on unpatentable subject matter, 
the entire claim must be deemed invalid. See Titanium Metals 
Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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phenomena of RNA splicing. Finally, at least in the 
case of BRCA1, the claimed cDNA sequences are 
actually found in the human genome in the form of a 
naturally occurring pseudogene. See Mason Supp. 
Decl. ¶ 18.53 
Myriad's argument that the functional 
differences between native and isolated DNA 
demonstrates that they are "markedly different" 
relies on the fact that isolated DNA may be used in 
applications for which native DNA is unsuitable, 
namely, in "molecular diagnostic tests (e.g., as 
probes, primers, templates for sequencing reactions), 
in biotechnological processes (e.g. production of pure 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 protein), and even in medical 
treatments (e.g. gene therapy)." Myriad Reply at 9;; 
see also Myriad Br. at 30-­32. 
Isolated DNA's utility as a primer or a 
molecular probe (for example, for Southern blots) 
arises from its ability to "target and interact               
with other DNA molecules," that is, the ability of               
a given DNA molecule to bind exclusively to a 
specific DNA target sequence. Myriad Br. at 33;;      
                                                                                                                    
53  Native DNA is sometimes methylated, but that methylation is 
preserved when the DNA is extracted and purified. Nussbaum 
Decl. ¶ 20. Since the claimed "isolated DNA" includes DNA 
extracted and purified from the body, methylation of DNA in 
the body does not distinguish native DNA from the claimed 
DNA. In addition, DNA in the body also exists in a non-­
methylated state, just as the synthesized DNA claimed in the 
patents would not be methylated. More importantly, while 
methylation affects the transcription of a gene in the body, it 
does not have any impact on the genetic information contained 
within the DNA. Indeed, DNA is demethylated and 
remethylated as it passes from the germline of one generation 
to the next. Nussbaum Decl. ¶ 28.  
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see Kay Decl. ¶ 138. Thus, for example, a 24 
nucleotide segment of isolated BRCAI DNA can be 
used as a primer because it will bind only to its 
corresponding location in the BRCAI gene. However, 
the basis for this utility is the fact that the isolated 
DNA possesses the identical nucleotide sequence as 
the target DNA sequence,54 thus allowing target 
specific hybridization between the DNA primer and 
the portion of the target DNA molecule possessing 
the corresponding sequence. Kay Decl. ¶¶ 135-­36, 
138. In contrast, another 24 nucleotide segment of 
DNA possessing the same nucleotide composition but 
a different nucleotide sequence would not have the 
same utility because it would be unable to hybridize 
to the proper location in the BRCA1 gene.55 Indeed, 
Myriad implicitly acknowledges this fact when it 
states that the usefulness of isolated DNA molecules 
"is based on their ability to target and interact with 
other DNA molecules, which is a function of their 
own individual structure and chemistry." Myriad Br. 
at 33 (emphasis added). Therefore, the cited utility of 
the isolated DNA as a primer or probe is primarily a 
function of the nucleotide sequence identity between 
native and isolated BRCA1/2 DNA. 
Similarly, the utility of isolated DNA as a 
sequencing target relies on the preservation of native 
DNA's nucleotide sequence. Indeed, one need look no 
further than Myriad's BRACAnalysis testing, which 
                                                                                                                    
54   To be precise, the isolated single-­stranded DNA molecule 
utilized as a primer or probe has the identical sequence as the 
complementary DNA strand to the DNA strand containing the 
target DNA sequence. The description in the text is meant to 
serve as a short-­hand description of this relationship.  
55  The same reasoning applies with respect to the use of isolated 
DNA as a probe. Kay Decl. ¶¶ 135-­36.  
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relies on the sequencing of isolated DNA (i.e. the 
PCR amplified exons of BRCA1/2), to determine the 
sequence of the corresponding DNA coding sequences 
found in the cell. The entire premise behind Myriad's 
genetic testing is that the claimed isolated DNA 
retains, in all relevant respects, the identical 
nucleotide sequence found in native DNA. The use of 
isolated BRCA1/2 DNA in the production of 
BRCA1/2 proteins or in gene therapy also relies on 
the identity between the native DNA sequences and 
the sequences contained in the isolated DNA 
molecule. Were the isolated BRCA1/2 sequences 
different in any significant way, the entire point of 
their use -­ the production of BRCA1/2 proteins -­ 
would be undermined. 
While the absence of proteins and other 
nucleotide sequences is currently required for DNA 
to be useful for the cited purposes, the purification of 
native DNA does not alter its essential characteristic 
² its nucleotide sequence that is defined by nature 
and central to both its biological function within the 
cell and its utility as a research tool in the lab. The 
requirement that the DNA used be "isolated" is 
ultimately a technological limitation to the use of 
DNA in this fashion, and a time may come when the 
use of DNA for molecular and diagnostic purposes 
may not require such purification. The nucleotide 
sequence, however, is the defining characteristic of 
the isolated DNA that will always be required to 
provide the sequence-­specific targeting and protein 
coding ability that allows isolated DNA to be used for 
the various applications cited by Myriad. For these 
reasons, the use of isolated DNA for the various 
purposes cited by Myriad does not establish the 
existence of differences "in kind" between native and 
223a 
  
isolated DNA that would establish the subject matter 
patentability of what is otherwise a product of 
nature. See Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11. 
Finally, the isolated BRCA1/2 DNA claimed 
in Myriad's patents bears comparison to the bacterial 
mixture in Funk Brothers. In explaining why the 
claimed mixture of bacteria did not constitute an 
invention, the Court observed that the first part of 
the claimed invention was the "[d]iscovery of the fact 
that certain strains of each species of these bacteria 
can be mixed without harmful effect to the properties 
of either" which was "a discovery of their qualities of 
non-­inhibition. It is no more than the discovery of 
some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not 
patentable." 33 U.S. at 131. The Court went on to 
observe that the second part of the claimed invention 
was [t]he aggregation of select strains of the several 
species into one product[, ] an application of that 
newly discovered natural principle. But however 
ingenious the discovery of that natural principle may 
have been, the application of it is hardly more than 
an advance in the packaging of the inoculants." Id. 
According to Myriad, the invention claimed in 
its patents required the identification of the specific 
segments of chromosomes 17 and 13 that correlated 
with breast and ovarian cancer (BRCA1 and BRCA2) 
followed by the isolation of these sequences away 
from other genomic DNA and cellular components. 
Myriad Reply at 6 ("By identifying these particular 
BRCA DNAs and isolating them away from other 
genomic DNA and other cellular components, the 
inventors created the claimed isolated BRCA DNA 
molecules."). Like the discovery of the mutual non-­
inhibition of the bacteria in Funk Brothers,  
224a 
  
discovery of this important correlation was a 
discovery of the handiwork of nature -­ the natural 
effect of certain mutations in a particular segment of 
the human genome. And like the aggregation of 
bacteria in Funk Brothers, the isolation of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA, while requiring technical 
skill and considerable labor, was simply the 
application of techniques well-­known to those skilled 
in the art. See Parthasarathy Decl. ¶ 19.                        
The identification of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene 
sequences is unquestionably a valuable scientific 
achievement for which Myriad deserves recognition, 
but that is not the same as concluding that it is 
something for which they are entitled to a patent. 
See Funk Bros., 33 U.S. at 132 ("[O]nce nature's 
secret of the non-­inhibitive quality of certain strains 
of the [nitrogen-­fixing bacteria] was discovered, the 
state of the art made the production of a mixed 
inoculant a simple step. Even though it may have 
been the product of skill, it certainly was not the 
product of invention."). 
Because the claimed isolated DNA is not 
markedly different from native DNA as it exists in 
nature, it constitutes unpatentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
D. The Method Claims are Invalid Under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 
"Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, 
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts 
are not patentable, as they are the basic tools                    
of scientific and technological work." Benson,                 
409 U.S. at 67. However, "'an application of a law of 
nature or mathematical formula to a known 
structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
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protection.'" Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953 (quoting                 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187). In Bilski, the Federal Circuit 
set forth "the definitive test to determine whether a 
process claim is tailored narrowly enough to 
encompass only a particular application of a 
fundamental principle rather than pre-­empt the 
principle itself." Id. at 954. Under this "machine or 
transformation" test, "[a] claimed process is surely 
patent-­eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms 
a particular article into a different state or thing." Id. 
In addition, "the use of a specific machine or 
transformation of an article must impose meaningful 
limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-­
eligibility," and "the involvement of the machine or 
transformation in the claimed process must not 
merely be insignificant extra-­solution activity." Id. at 
961-­62. In other words, the "transformation must be 
central to the purpose of the claimed process." Id. at 
962. In particular, the Bilski court held that "adding 
a data-­gathering step to an algorithm is insufficient 
to convert that algorithm into a patent-­eligible 
process." Id. at 963 (citing Grams, 888 F.2d at 840;; 
Meyer)GDW´$UHTXLUHPHQWVLPSO\WKDW
data inputs be gathered -­ without specifying how is a 
meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because 
every algorithm inherently require the gathering of 
data inputs." Id. (citing Grams, 888 F.2d at 839-­40). 
"Further, the inherent step of gathering data can 
also fairly be characterized as insignificant extra-­
solution activity." Id. (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 590). 
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1. The claims for "analyzing" and 
"comparing" DNA sequences are 
invalid under § 101 
Claim 1 of the '999 patent is directed to the 
process of "analyzing" a BRCA1 sequence and noting 
whether or not the specified naturally-­occurring 
mutations exist. The claimed process is not limited to 
any particular method of analysis and does not 
specify any further action beyond the act of 
"analyzing." Similarly. claim 1 of the '001, '441, and 
'857 patents as well as claim 2 of the '857 patents are 
directed to "comparing" two gene sequences to see if 
any differences exist and do not specify any 
limitations on the method of comparison. 
Myriad argues that these method claims 
should not be viewed as mental processes because 
they incorporate a transformation step and therefore 
satisfy the "transformation" prong of the Bilski 
"machine or transformation" test. In support of its 
position, Myriad relies primarily on the Federal 
Circuit's holding in Prometheus, 581 F.3d 1336. 
There, the Federal Circuit considered a patent 
containing claims directed to methods for calibrating 
the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs by measuring 
metabolites in subjects having gastrointestinal 
disorders. Id. at 1343-­50. The patentees had 
discovered a correlation between metabolite levels in 
a patient's blood and the therapeutic efficacy of a 
dose of the drug. Based on this correlation, the 
patentees claimed methods to optimize therapeutic 
efficiency while minimizing side effects by 
determining metabolite levels and identifying a need 
to adjust drug dosage upward or downward based on 
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the levels. Id. at 1339-­40. A representative claim 
asserted by the patentee in Prometheus claimed: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic 
efficacy for treatment of an immune-­
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6-­
thioguanine to a subject having said 
immune-­mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder;; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-­
thioguanine in said subject having 
said immune-­mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder,  
wherein the level of 6-­thioguanine 
less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 
red blood cells indicates a need to 
increase the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said 
subject  
and 
wherein the level of 6-­thioguanine 
greater than about 400 pmol per 
8xl08 red blood cells indicates a need 
to decrease the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said 
subject. 
Id. at 1340. 
In concluding that the claimed methods 
satisfied the requirements of § 101, the Federal 
Circuit held that the relevant transformation for 
purposes of the "machine or transformation" test was 
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the transformation of the human body as well as the 
chemical and physical changes of the drug's 
metabolites. Id. at 1346 (stating that "claims to 
methods of treatment," were "always transformative 
when a defined group of drugs is administered to the 
body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired 
condition'". Because the transformative steps were 
central to the claimed treatment methods, they 
satisfied the "machine or transformation" test. Id. at 
1346-­47. The court went on to hold that the 
"determining" step alone was transformative and 
central to the claimed methods since "determining 
the levels of [the metabolites] 6-­TG or 6-­MMP in a 
subject necessarily involves a transformation, for 
those levels cannot be determined by mere 
inspection." Id. at 1347. 
Myriad argues that just as the act of 
"determining" metabolite levels in Prometheus was 
found to involve the transformation of human blood, 
so too should "analyzing" or "comparing" BRCA1/2 
gene sequences be construed to incorporate 
physically transformative steps (i.e. the isolation and 
sequencing of DNA56 ) that would satisfy the Bilski 
"machine or transformation" test. Myriad further 
asserts that these transformations are "central to the 
purpose of the claims," id. at 1347, because "Myriad's 
method claims each require the transformation of a 
tissue or blood sample in order to isolate the patient's 
DNA." Myriad Br. at 35. 
                                                                                                                    
56  The challenged method claims are also directed to analyzing 
and comparing RNA and cDNA sequences, but for purposes of 
this opinion, the discussion will be framed in terms of analyzing 
and comparing DNA sequences.  
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The claims in Prometheus, however, are 
distinguishable from the method claims in dispute 
here. In Prometheus, "determining metabolite levels 
in the clinical samples taken from patients" was 
found to be transformative because the act of 
"determining metabolite levels" was itself construed 
to include the extraction and measurement of 
metabolite concentrations, such as high pressure 
liquid chromatography. See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 
1347. Indeed, neither party in Prometheus disputed 
that "determining" metabolite levels in samples 
taken from patients was, in and of itself, 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYHµ57 
In contrast, the language of the method 
claims-­in-­suit and the plain and ordinary meanings 
of the terms "analyzing" or "comparing" establish 
that the method claims-­in-­suit are directed only to 
the abstract mental processes of "comparing" or 
"analyzing" gene sequences. Although Myriad asserts 
that the challenged method claims are directed to 
comparing DNA molecules rather than DNA 
sequences, the language of the claims belies such an 
interpretation. While the purpose of the claimed 
method is, for example, to "detect a germline 
alteration in a BRCA1 gene," see '999 patent,                
col. 161: 17-­18, the method actually claimed is 
"analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene." '999 patent, 
col. 161: 20-­21 (emphasis added);; see also '001 
patent, col. 144:2-­17 ("A method . . . which comprises 
gene comparing a first sequence selected from the 
                                                                                                                    
57   The issue ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH ´GHWHUPLQLQJµ VWHS was not 
whether it was transformative, but whether that 
transformation was central to the claimed invention. Id. 
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group consisting of a BRCA1 gene from said tumor 
sample with a second sequence selected from the 
group consisting of BRCA1 gene from a nontumor 
sample . . . wherein a difference in the sequence of 
the BRCA1 gene . . . indicates a somatic alteration in 
the BRCA1 gene.");; '857 patent, col. 169:40-­45         
("A method . . . which comprises comparing the 
nucleotide sequence of the suspected mutant BRCA2 
allele with the wild-­type BRCA2 nucleotide sequence 
µ). 
Similarly, the inclusion of the phrases "from a 
human subject" or "from a nontumor sample" in the 
claims serve only to specify the identity of the DNA 
or RNA sequence to be "analyzed" or "compared," i.e., 
from a human sample as opposed to an animal 
sample or cell culture, and do not, as Myriad argues, 
establish that the claims should be read to include 
the physical transformations associated with 
obtaining DNA from those sources.58 In addition, the 
passages from the '999 specification cited by Myriad 
describing the process by which DNA sequences are 
obtained cannot serve to redefine the scope of the 
                                                                                                                    
58   :KHWKHU DFWV DUH ´WUDQVIRUPDWLYH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH
"machine or transformation" test for process claims is distinct 
from the question of whether those acts would render the 
resulting product patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Am. 
Wood-­Paper, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 593-­94 (noting that a party 
may be entitled to a patent on a process for purifying a natural 
product but not the final product itself if the final product is not 
different "in kind" from the natural product);; Merz, 97 F.2d at 
601 (same). Therefore the description of DNA purification and 
sequencing as "transformative acts" in the context of the 
challenged process claims is not inconsistent with the 
conclusion that the isolated DNAs claimed in the challenged 
patents constitute unpatentable subject matter. 
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challenged claims without violating the prohibition 
against importing claim limitations from the 
specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320. 
By the same token, the transformative steps 
associated with isolating and sequencing DNA 
described in the unchallenged dependent claims 
cannot be used to establish that the challenged 
claims include trans formative events. To do so would 
violate the doctrine of claim differentiation, which 
presumes that "different words or phrases used in 
separate claims . . . indicate that the claims have 
different meanings and scope." Karlin Tech., Inc. v. 
Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 972 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). Because claim differentiation "prevents the 
narrowing of broad claims by reading into them the 
limitations of narrower claims," Clearstream 
Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-­Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 
1440, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 2000), the dependent claims 
serve only to illustrate the breadth of the challenged 
claims and reinforce the conclusion that what is 
claimed are mental processes independent of any 
physical transformations. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 
1314-­ ´>7@KH SUHVHQFH RI D GHSHQGHQW FODLP WKDW
adds a particular limitation gives rise to a 
presumption that the limitation in question is not 
present in the independent claim.µ).59 
Myriad also argues that because isolating and 
sequencing DNA are required for "analyzing" or 
                                                                                                                    
59  7KHSDWHQWH[DPLQHU·VUHDVRQVfor allowance, cited by Myriad, 
are precisely the legal conclusions concerning the patentability 
of the claimed methods being challenged by Plaintiffs. 
Moreover, the H[DPLQHU·VUHDVRQVRIDOORZDQFHFDQQRWVHUYH to 
define the scope of claim terms. See ACCO Brands, Inc. v. Micro 
Sec. Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 1075, 1079-­(Fed. Cir. 2003).  
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"comparing" DNA sequences, Prometheus allows 
those transformative acts to be incorporated into the 
process claims for purposes of the § 101 analysis. See 
Myriad Reply at 12. Myriad thus seeks to rely on 
transformations not actually claimed by the method 
claims-­in-­suit to satisfy the Bilski "machine or 
transformation" test. Neither Prometheus nor any 
other authority supports such an expansive approach 
to the application of this test. Prometheus held only 
that the term "determining," as used in the claims at 
issue, referred to acts that included manipulations 
that satisfied the "machine or transformation" test. 
Id. Nowhere did Prometheus suggest that 
preparatory physical transformations required for 
the performance of, but not included in, claims 
directed to mental processes should be incorporated 
into the claim for purposes of the § 101 analysis. Not 
only would such an approach be inconsistent with the 
prohibition on the importation of claim limitations 
from the specification, it would effectively vitiate the 
limitations to claiming mental processes provided by 
the "machine or transformation" test since "to use 
virtually any natural phenomenon for virtually              
any useful purpose could well involve the use of 
empirical information obtained through                            
an unpatented means that might have involved 
transforming matter." Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 
136 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Therefore the 
preparatory transformations relating to obtaining 
DNA sequences cannot be relied on to satisfy the 
requirements of § 101. 
Even if the challenged method claims were 
read to include the transformations associated with 
isolating and sequencing human DNA, these 
transformations would constitute no more than 
233a 
  
"data-­JDWKHULQJ VWHS>V@ WKDW DUH QRW ´FHQWUDO WR WKH
purpose of the claimed process." Bilski, 545 F.3d at 
962-­63. In Grams, the Federal Circuit considered a 
patent directed to a method of diagnosing an 
abnormal condition in an individual. The claimed 
method consisted of two steps: (1) "performance of 
Clinical laboratory tests on an individual to obtain 
data for the parameters," and (2) "analyz[ing] that 
data to ascertain the existence and identity of an 
DEQRUPDOLW\    µ)GDW&RQFOXGLQJWKDW
the essence of what was claimed was the 
mathematical algorithm for analyzing the clinical 
data, and that the sole physical process -­ laboratory 
testing -­ was merely data-­gathering to obtain clinical 
data, the court held the patent invalid under § 101 
for claiming a mathematic algorithm. Id. at 840. 
The method claims-­in-­suit present a closely 
analogous situation. The essence of what is claimed 
is the identification of a predisposition to breast 
cancer based on "analyzing" or "comparing" 
BRCA1/2 gene sequences. See, e.g., '857 patent, 
FODLP  ´$ PHWKRG IRU GLDJQRVLQJ D SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ
for breast cancer in a human subject which comprises 
comparing the [BRCA2 gene sequence] from said 
subject with the [ ] sequence of the wild-­type BRCA2 
JHQHµ$VLQGrams, isolation and sequencing of 
DNA from a human sample, even if incorporated into 
the method claims-­in-­suit, would represent nothing 
more than data-­gathering steps to obtain the DNA 
sequence information on which to perform the 
claimed comparison or analysis. Moreover, in the 
absence of a specified method for isolating and 
sequencing DNA, "[a] requirement simply that data 
inputs be gathered -­ without specifying how -­ is a 
meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because 
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every algorithm inherently requires the gathering of 
data inputs." Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (citing Grams, 
888 F.2d at 839-­40). Consequently, even if the 
method claims-­in-­suit were construed to include the 
physical transformations associated with isolating 
and sequencing DNA, they would still fail the 
"machine or transformation" test under § 101 for 
subject matter patentability. 
2. The Claim for "Comparing" the growth 
rate of Cells is invalid under § 101 
Claim 20 of the '282 patent is directed to 
"comparing" the growth rates of cells in the presence 
or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic. 
Specifically, the claim recites a method for 
identifying potential cancer therapeutics by utilizing 
cells into which an altered BRCA1 gene known to 
cause cancer has been inserted. Thus modified to 
mimic cancerous cells in the body, these cells are 
then grown in either the presence or absence of a 
potential cancer therapeutic, and the growth rates of 
the cells are compared to determine the effect of the 
potential therapeutic. 
Unlike the method claims directed to 
"analyzing" or "comparing" DNA sequences, claim 20 
arguably recites certain transformative steps, such 
as the administration of the test compound.60 
                                                                                                                    
60   It is questionable whether the two transformations cited by 
Myriad are relevant transformations for purposes of the § 101 
inquiry. Under Prometheus, the administration of a test com-­
pound is transformative only if it effects a change in cell 
growth. See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346 (finding 
"administering" of a drug transformative since it resulted in 
changes to both the patient and the drug metabolites). If the 
test compound had no effect on the cells, it is unclear whether 
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However, the essence of the claim, when considered 
in its entirety, is the act of comparing cell growth 
rates and concluding that "a slower growth of said 
host cell in the presence of said compound is 
indicative of a cancer therapeutic." '282 patent, col. 
156: 25-­27. 
This claimed "process" is, in fact, the scientific 
method itself, and claim 20 seeks to patent a basic 
scientific principle: that a slower rate of cell growth 
in the presence of a compound indicates that the 
compound may be a cancer therapeutic. The recited 
transformative steps, as in Grams, represent nothing 
more than preparatory, data-­gathering steps to 
obtain growth rate information and do not render the 
claimed mental process patentable under § 101.     
See Grams, 888 F.2d at 840 ("The presence of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
there would be any basis to view its administration as working 
a "transformation" since there would be no transformation with 
respect to the cells (i.e. there was no change in their growth 
rate) and there would also presumably be no transformation 
with respect to the test drug (i.e, it was not metabolized). 
 
The other alleged "transformation" cited by Myriad is the 
insertion of DNA into cells to create the "transformed 
eukaryotic cell" for treatment with the test compound.            
Kay Decl. ¶ 57. Even more that its expansive interpretation of 
the method claims for analyzing DNA sequences for § 101 
purposes, Myriad's attempt to rely on transformations 
associated with the creation of a starting product for its claimed 
process is unsupported by the law and demonstrates the 
OLPLWOHVVQHVVRI0\ULDG·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIPrometheus and the 
"machine or transformation" test. 
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physical step in the claim to derive data for the 
algorithm will not render the claim statutory").61 
E. The Constitutional Claims Against the 
USPTO Are Dismissed 
As determined above, the patents issued by 
the USPTO are directed to a law of nature and were 
therefore improperly granted. The doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, which states that courts 
should not reach unnecessary constitutional 
questions, thereby becomes applicable. See, e.g., 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 149-­50 (2d 
Cir. 2001) ("It is axiomatic that the federal courts 
should, where possible, avoid reaching constitutional 
questions.") (citing Sector Motor Serv., Inc. v. 
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) ("If there is one 
doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the 
process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we 
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . 
unless such adjudication is unavoidable"));; see also 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,347 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided 
on either of two grounds, one involving a 
constitutional question, the other a question of 
statutory construction or general law, the Court will 
decide only the latter."). This doctrine bears on the 
consideration of Plaintiffs' claims that the USPTO's 
policy permitting the grant of the Myriad patents 
violates Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and the First 
Amendment of the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                    
61   Because Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with 
respect to its claims against Myriad is granted on the basis of 
35 U.S.C. § 101, its Constitutional claims need not be 
addressed. 
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The Plaintiffs have not addressed these 
authorities and have contended that "the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance is inapplicable" because the 
invalidation of Myriad's claims pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 will not necessarily invalidate the USPTO's 
policy [in granting the patents]." Pl. Reply at 43. 
However, a decision by the Federal Circuit or the 
Supreme Court affirming the holding set forth above 
would apply to both the issued patents as well as 
patent applications and would be binding on all 
patent holders and applicants, as well as the USPTO. 
See Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Cardiac 
Science  )G   )HG &LU  ´:H
remind the district court and the [USPTOl Board 
that they must follow judicial precedHQWµ). Thus, 
to the extent the USPTO examination policies are 
inconsistent with a final, binding ruling, the USPTO 
would conform its examination policies to avoid 
issuing patents directed to isolated DNA or the 
comparison or analysis of DNA sequences. See 
USPTO Reply Memo, at 4. 
With the holding that the patents are invalid, 
the Plaintiffs have received the relief sought in the 
Complaint and the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance precludes this Court from reaching the 
constitutional claims against the USPTO. See 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 149-­50 (2d 
Cir. 2001);; USPTO Br. at 4. Plaintiffs' claims for 
constitutional violations against the USPTO are 
therefore dismissed without prejudice. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment is granted in part, 
Myriad's motion for summary judgment is denied, 
the USPTO's motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
granted, and the claims-­in-­suit are declared invalid 
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Submit judgment on notice. 
It is so ordered. 
 
New York, N.Y. 
April 2, 2010 
 
 
    Robert W. Sweet 
  U.S.D.J. 
 
 
239a 
  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR     09 Civ. 4515             
PATHOLOGY, ET. AL.,       OPINION 
Plaintiffs,       
 
-­-­against-­-­ 
 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND  
TRADEMARK OFFICE, ET AL., 
  Defendants. 
 
APPEARANCES: 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION 
125 Broad Street ² 18th Floor 
New York, NY 100004 
By:  Christopher A. Hansen, Esq. 
Aden Fine, Esq. 
Lenora M. Lapidus, Esq. 
Sandra S. Park, Esq. 
 
PUBLIC PATENT FOUNDATION  
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
55 Fifth Avenue, Suite 928 
New York, NY 10003 
By:  Daniel;; B. Ravicher, Esq. 
 
 
 
 
240a 
  
Attorney for Defendant USPTO 
 
PREET BHARARA 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York 
86 Chambers Street, 3rd Floor 
New York. NY 10007 
By:  Beth E. Goldman, Esq.  
 
Attorneys for Defendants Myriad Genetics and 
Directors of the University of Utah Research 
Foundation 
 
JONES DAY 
22 East 41st Street 
New York, NY 100017-­6702 
By:     Brian M. Poissant, Esq. 
Barry R. Satine, Esq. 
Laura A. Coruzzi, Esq.  
 
241a 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS .............................   243a 
II. THE COMPLAINT AND                                        
THE AFFIDAVITS .....................................   244a 
A. The Plaintiffs ................................................. 244a 
B. The  Defendants ............................................ 257a 
C. BRCA1 and BRCA2 ...................................... 258a 
D. Enforcement of the Patents-­in-­Suit ............. 262a 
III.  THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS ................ 265a 
IV.   THERE IS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE USPTO................................ 269a 
V . THERE IS STANDING ................................ 273a 
A. The Plaintiffs Have Standing to Sue the USPTO 
for Constitutional Violations ........................ 273a 
B. The Plaintiffs Have Established Standing to Sue 
Myriad and the Directors ............................. 277a 
1. Affirmative Acts by the Defendants .......... 281a 
2. Meaningful Preparations for Infringing Action
 .................................................................... 288a 
VI. JURISDICTION EXISTS OVER THE 
DIRECTORS ................................................. 293a 
VII. THE ALLEGATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS ARE ADEQUATE ................. 303a 
VIII. CONCLUSION.............................................. 306a 
242a 
  
 Sweet, D.J.  
In this action the Plaintiffs challenge certain 
patent claims granted to defendants Myriad Genetics 
and the Director1 of the University of Utah Research 
Foundation ("UURF") (collectively, "Myriad") by 
defendant United States Patent and Trademark 
Office ("USPTO") (collectively, the "Defendants"). 
The identified patent claims (the "patents-­in-­suit" or 
the "claims-­in-­suit") cover two human genes known 
as BRCA1 and BRCA2 (collectively, "BRCA1/2" or 
the "BRCA genes"). Compl. ¶¶ 37, 55-­80. The claims-­
in-­suit also cover certain mutations in those genes, 
the mental act of comparing different forms of the 
BRCA genes, and the correlations between certain 
genetic mutations and an increased risk of breast 
and/or ovarian cancer. Id. 
The Plaintiffs allege that these patents are 
unlawful under each of (1) the Patent Act,                 
35 U.S.C. §    101 (1952), (2) Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, and (3) 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments because they 
cover products of nature, laws of nature and/or 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic 
human knowledge or thought. Compl. ¶ 102. 
The Defendants now move, pursuant to Rules 
12 (b) (1), (b) (2), and (b) (6), Fed. R. Civ. P., to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint (the "Complaint") for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal 
jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. 
                                                                                                                    
1 Defendants Lorris Betz, Roger Boyer, Jack Brittan, Arnold B. 
Combe, Raymond Gesteland, James U. Jenson, John Kendall 
Morris, Thomas Parks, David W. Pershing, and Michael K. 
Young. For purposes of this opinion, they will be referred to as 
WKH´'LUHFWRUVµRUWKH´885)'LUHFWRUVµ  
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This action is unique in the identity of the 
parties, the scope and significance of the issues 
presented, and the consequences of the remedy 
sought. The Plaintiffs in this action comprise a broad 
range of parties, including researchers, genetic 
counselors, medical and/or advocacy organizations, 
and women facing the threat of breast cancer or who 
are in the midst of their struggle with the illness. 
The challenges to the patents-­in-­suit raise questions 
of difficult legal dimensions concerning constitutional 
protections over the information that serves as our 
genetic identities and the need to adopt policies that 
promote scientific innovation in biomedical research. 
The widespread use of gene sequence information as 
the foundation for biomedical research means that 
resolution of these issues will have far-­reaching 
implications, not only for gene-­based health care and 
the health of millions of women facing the specter of 
breast cancer, but also for the future course of 
biomedical research. 
Based on the conclusions set forth below, the 
motions to dismiss are denied. 
I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The Complaint in this action was filed on May 
12, 2009. 
The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., on August 26, 
2009. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs' 
motion for jurisdictional discovery2 were heard and 
                                                                                                                    
2 Defendants' motion to dismiss incorporates, by reference, 
challenges to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
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marked fully submitted on September 30, 2009, and 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was stayed 
pending resolution of Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
II. THE COMPLAINT AND THE 
AFFIDAVITS 
The following allegations, taken from the 
Complaint and the affidavits submitted by the 
parties in connection with Defendants' motion to 
dismiss, are accepted as true for the purpose of 
resolving the motions to dismiss. 
A. The Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff the Association for Molecular 
Pathology ("AMP") is a not-­for-­profit scientific society 
dedicated to the advancement, practice, and science 
of clinical molecular laboratory medicine and 
translational research based on the applications of 
genomics and proteomics. AMP members participate 
in basic and translational research aimed at 
broadening the understanding of gene/protein 
structure and function, disease processes, and 
molecular diagnostics, and provide clinical medical 
services for patients, including diagnosis of breast 
cancer.  Compl. ¶ 7.  
Plaintiff the American College of Medical 
Genetics ("ACMG") is a non-­profit organization of 
clinical and laboratory geneticists seeking to improve 
health through the practice of medical genetics. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Directors raised in Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion 
for jurisdictional discovery. Consequently, the arguments 
concerning personal jurisdiction set forth by the parties in 
connection with Plaintiffs' motion for jurisdictional discovery 
will be considered here. 
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AMCG strives to 1) promote excellence in medical 
genetics practice and the integration of translational 
research into practice;; 2) promote and provide 
medical genetics education;; 3) increase access to 
medical genetics services and integrate genetics into 
patient care;; and 4) advocate for and represent 
providers of medical genetics services and their 
patients. Compl. ¶ 8. 
Plaintiff the American Society for Clinical 
Pathology ("ASCP") is the largest and oldest 
organization representing pathologists and 
laboratory professionals. ASCP members design and 
interpret the tests that detect disease, predict 
outcome, and determine the appropriate therapy for 
the patient. Compl. ¶ 9. 
Plaintiff the College of American Pathologists 
("CAP") is a national medical society representing 
board-­certified pathologists and pathologists in 
training who practice anatomic pathology and 
laboratory medicine worldwide. The CAP is an 
advocate of high-­quality and cost-­effective medical 
care. Compl. ¶ 10. 
The affidavits submitted by the Plaintiffs state 
that members of AMP, ACMG, ASCP, and CAP are 
ready, willing, and able to engage in research and 
clinical practice involving the BRCA1/2 genes if the 
patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated. For example, 
Madhuri Hegde, Ph.D. ("Dr. Hegde"), is a member of 
AMP and ACMG and serves as an Associate 
Professor in the Department of Human Genetics at 
Emory University School of Medicine, Adjunct 
Assistant Professor at the University of Texas M.D. 
Anderson Cancer Center, and Senior Laboratory 
Director at the Emory Genetics Laboratory. He 
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currently conducts research on human genes in 
addition to supervising one of the largest and most 
technologically advanced clinical laboratories in the 
country. The laboratory sequences and analyzes 
approximately sixty genes every day for sequence 
variants and their clinical significance. Dr. Hegde 
has personally sequenced the BRCA1/2 genes while 
at the Auckland Hospital in New Zealand, and his 
lab would begin sequencing and analyzing BRCA1/2 
genes for clinically significant variants within weeks 
if the patents-­in-­suit were invalidated.                
Hegde Decl. ¶¶ 3-­12.3 
Roger Hubbard, Ph.D. ("Dr. Hubbard"), a 
member of ASCP, is the President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Molecular Pathology Laboratory 
Network, Inc. ("MPLN"), and an Adjunct Associate 
Professor at the University of Tennessee Medical 
Center/Knoxville, Department of Pathology. MPLN 
offers molecular diagnostics and cytogenetic testing 
services that target hematological malignancies, 
oncology, and medical diseases. MPLN currently 
sequences genes and has the personnel, experience 
and equipment to analyze the BRCA genes. They 
currently receive inquiries every few weeks from a 
hospital or laboratory asking them to analyze the 
BRCA genes, but they do not do so as solely because 
of the patents-­in-­suit. If the patents-­in-­suit were to 
be invalidated, Dr. Hubbard and MPLN would 
immediately consider doing testing in their 
laboratory.  Hubbard ¶¶ 1-­4, 6, 8-­9.  
                                                                                                                    
3 )RU SXUSRVHV RI WKLV RSLQLRQ UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH SDUWLHV·
declarations will be in the format [Declarant Name] ¶ 
[paragraph number]. 
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Jeffrey Kant, M.D., Ph.D. ("Dr. Kant"), a 
member of AMP and CAP, is the Director of the 
Division of Molecular Diagnostics in the Department 
of Pathology at the University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center and a Professor Pathology and Human 
Genetics at the University of Pittsburgh. As part of 
his responsibilities, he supervises a clinical 
laboratory that analyzes human genes and is 
experienced in sequencing and analyzing genes for 
inherited diseases. His laboratory currently tests 
nine genes, including five related to hereditary 
predisposition for cancer. His laboratory was asked 
in the late 1990s to engage in the sequencing and 
analysis of BRCA 1/2, but declined to do so because 
of the patents-­in-­suit.  If the patents-­in-­suit were to 
be invalidated, Dr. Kant would immediately consider 
doing full gene testing for the BRCA genes.                   
Kant ¶¶ 1-­2, 4-­6. 
Plaintiff Haig Kazazian, Jr., M.D. ("Dr. 
Kazazian"), is the Seymour Gray Professor of 
Molecular Medicine in Genetics in the Department of 
Genetics at the University of Pennsylvania School of 
Medicine. He is the previous chair of the 
Department. Kazazian ¶ 1, 2. Plaintiff Arupa 
Ganguly, Ph.D. ("Dr. Ganguly"), is an Associate 
Professor in the Department of Genetics at the 
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania.    
Ganguly ¶ 1. Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly have 
served as co-­Directors of the University of 
Pennsylvania Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory ("GDL") 
since 1995. Kazazian ¶ 3;; Ganguly ¶ 2. The GDL 
provides state-­of-­the-­art DNA-­based diagnostic 
testing for a variety of genetic conditions and 
diseases, as well as prenatal and predictive testing 
and genetic counseling services. Kazazian ¶ 3. 
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Starting in 1996, the GDL was providing BRCA1 
genetic testing services to approximately 500 women 
per year. Id. ¶ 4.  By late 1996, the GDL had 
designed and provided a similar test for the BRCA2 
gene. Id. Following Dr. Kazazian's and the 
University of Pennsylvania's receipt of a series of 
cease-­and-­desist letters from Myriad in 1998 and 
1999, described infra, the GDL ceased its BRCA1/2 
genetic testing services. Id. ¶ 5-­7;; Ganguly ¶ 4-­10.  If 
the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, the GDL 
possesses the technological capability necessary to 
begin performing BRCA1/2 testing again within a 
matter of weeks, and Drs. Ganguly and Kazazian 
have the desire to consider doing so. Kazazian ¶ 11;; 
Ganguly ¶ 14. 
Plaintiff Wendy Chung, M.D., Ph.D. ("Dr. 
Chung"), is the Herbert Irving Professor of Pediatrics 
and Medicine in the Division of Molecular Genetics 
at Columbia University and is the Director of 
Clinical Genetics and Director of Clinical 
Oncogenetics.  She is also a member of ACMG. Dr. 
Chung is a human geneticist whose current research 
includes research on the BRCA genes, for which she 
has received grants of over $1 million. Dr. Chung is a 
co-­investigator of the Breast Cancer Family Registry, 
funded by the National Cancer Institute of the 
National Institute of Health. The goal of the Registry 
is to collect and study families with multiple cases of 
breast and/or ovarian cancer and to study genetic 
and environmental factors influencing cancer 
susceptibility and clinical outcomes. As part of her 
research, Dr. Chung's lab sequences human genes, 
including the BRCA1/2 genes of research subjects to 
determine whether there exist alterations in the 
gene sequences and investigate their clinical 
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significance. Because of the patents-­in-­suit, Dr. 
Chung does not tell the research subjects in her 
studies the results of the analysis of their BRCA 
genes. Dr. Chung's clinical diagnostic laboratory at 
Columbia University sends samples to Myriad for 
any analysis of BRCA1/2 in order to tell the subjects 
the results and use the results clinically. It does not 
do BRCA testing on its own because of the patents-­
in-­suit. If the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, 
Dr. Chung would begin clinical testing of BRCA1/2 
immediately. Her clinical laboratory has the 
personnel, expertise to do various forms of BRCA1/2 
sequencing and would be able to offer genetic testing 
that is more comprehensive than the testing 
currently offered by Myriad. Chung Decl. ¶ 1, 4, 8-­9, 
11-­14, 16-­18. 
Plaintiff Harry Ostrer, M.D. ("Dr. Ostrer"), is a 
Professor of Pediatrics, Pathology and Medicine, 
Director of the Human Genetics Program in the 
Department of Pediatrics at the New York 
University ("NYU") Langone Medical Center, and a 
member of ACMG. As Director of the Human 
Genetics Program, Dr. Ostrer helped establish the 
Molecular Genetics Laboratory ("MGL") at the NYU 
Langone Medical Center, one of the largest academic 
genetic testing laboratories in the United States. Dr. 
Ostrer's work through the MGL has focused on 
understanding the genetic basis of development and 
disease, including genetic susceptibility to breast 
cancer. Dr. Ostrer is actively engaged in identifying 
genes that convey the risk of breast cancer and may 
mitigate the effects of mutations in BRCA1/2.  His 
laboratory has the ability to evaluate BRCA1/2 gene 
sequences, including in custom-­designed tests that 
may be more cost-­effective than Myriad's current 
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offerings. However, because of Myriad's assertions of 
the patents-­in-­suit, Dr. Ostrer sends all of his patient 
samples to Myriad for BRCA1/2 analysis. If the 
patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, Dr. Ostrer 
would immediately begin clinical sequencing of the 
BRCA1/2 genes. His laboratory possesses all of the 
personnel, expertise, and facilities necessary to do 
various types of sequencing of the BRCA1/2 genes, 
including full sequencing, detection of deletions and 
rearrangements, and searches for large 
rearrangements that Myriad currently does not offer 
as a service. If the patents-­in-­suit were to be 
invalidated, Dr. Ostrer would also tell patients 
involved in his current research program the results 
of their BRCA1/2-­related genetic screening. Ostrer 
Decl. ¶¶ 1-­5;; 8-­10. 
Plaintiff David Ledbetter, Ph. D. ("Dr. 
Ledbetter"), is the Robert W. Woodruff Professor of 
Human Genetics and Director of the Division of 
Medical Genetics at the Emory University School of 
Medicine. He is also a diplomat of the American 
Board of Medical Genetics (Clinical Cytogenetics) 
and a Founding Fellow of the ACMG. He has 
previously served as the Director of the Kleberg 
Cytogenetics Laboratory at Baylor College of 
Medicine and in the Senior Executive Service of the 
federal government as Branch Chief of the 
Diagnostic Development Branch at the National 
Center for Human Genome Research (now the 
National Human Genome Research Institute). He 
was also the founding Chair of the Department of 
Human Genetics at the University of Chicago where 
he held the Marjorie I. and Bernard A. Mitchell 
Professor of Human Genetics. As Director of the 
Division of Medical Genetics, Dr. Ledbetter is 
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responsible for very large genetic testing laboratories 
at the Emory University School of Medicine which 
provide clinical testing services for patients and 
families with genetic diseases, including biochemical, 
cytogenetics, and molecular genetics testing. The 
genetic testing laboratory utilizes state-­of-­the-­art 
technology and has the personnel, experience, 
expertise, and facilities necessary to conduct 
comprehensive mutation analysis (including full gene 
sequencing and high-­resolution deletion/duplication 
analysis) of any human gene, including the BRCA 
genes. If the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, 
Dr. Ledbetter would begin offering comprehensive 
BRCA1/2 testing and would likely have an 
operational program within one month's time. 
Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶1, 3-­4, 8-­10, 18. 
Plaintiff Stephen T. Warren, Ph.D. ("Dr. 
Warren"), is the William Patterson Timmie Professor 
of Human Genetics and Professor of Biochemistry 
and Professor of Pediatrics at Emory University as 
well as a past President of the American Society of 
Human Genetics. He personally supervises genetic 
research at Emory University and is also responsible 
for the Emory Genetics Laboratory. Dr. Warren is 
ready, willing, and able to being BRCA1/2 genetic 
testing if the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated. 
Compl. ¶ 17. 
Plaintiff Ellen Matloff, M. S. ("Ms. Matloff"), is 
Director of the Yale Cancer Genetic Counseling 
Program and a Research Scientist in the Department 
of Genetics at the Yale University School of 
Medicine. Ms. Matloff advises women on the 
desirability of obtaining an analysis of their genes to 
determine if the women have the genetic mutations 
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that correlate with an increased risk of breast and/or 
ovarian cancer. Ms. Matloff also arranges for such 
genetic analysis and advises women on the 
significance of the results. As a result of the patents-­
in-­suit, Ms. Matloff is currently required to utilize 
Myriad's testing services for analysis of BRCA1/2. If 
the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, Ms. 
Matloff would immediately begin sending samples 
from women who are appropriate candidates for 
BRCA gene analysis to laboratories other than 
Myriad, such as the laboratories of Drs. Chung, 
Ledbetter, and Ostrer, for gene sequencing as well as 
large rearrangement testing. Matloff Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4, 
10-­15. 
Plaintiff Elsa W. Reich, M.S.  ("Ms. Reich"), is 
a Professor of Pediatrics in the Human Genetics 
Program at the NYU School of Medicine Department 
of Pediatrics, where she has served as a genetic 
counselor since 1974.  Ms. Reich provides risk 
assessment and information to women and men 
about their risk of having a heritable form of cancer 
and advises them on the potential utility of obtaining 
an analysis of their genes to determine if they have 
genetic mutations that correlate with an increased 
risk of developing breast cancer, ovarian cancer, or 
other malignancies. The genes of most interest to be 
analyzed are the BRCA1/2 genes. If a patient 
requests this testing, Ms. Reich sends samples to 
Myriad and explains the results to the patient. If the 
patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, Ms. Reich 
would immediately begin sending samples, including 
ones previously tested by Myriad, to other 
laboratories, such as those of Drs. Chung, Ostrer, 
and Ledbetter for BRCA1/2 testing.                     
Reich Decl. ¶¶ 1-­3, 7-­9, 14-­15. 
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Plaintiff Breast Cancer Action ("BCA") is a 
national organization of approximately 30,000 
members based in San Francisco, California that 
works with researchers to encourage innovative 
approaches to unresolved issues in breast cancer. 
Members of Breast Cancer Action have had their 
BRCA genes analyzed or sought analysis to 
determine if they have genetic mutations that 
correlate with an increased risk of breast and/or 
ovarian cancer. In some instances, members have 
been unable to obtain testing at a laboratory of their 
choice or choose to be tested at a laboratory that 
would share data with researchers. In other 
instances, members have been unable to obtain 
genetic testing because of the high cost of the test. 
Members have also received ambiguous genetic test 
results from Myriad that show they have a genetic 
variant of uncertain significance, but have been 
unable to obtaining testing from a second laboratory. 
BCA staff and volunteers also provide information to 
members of the public about genetic analysis but 
have been unable to refer patients to labs other than 
Myriad. If the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, 
BCA and its members would immediately begin 
utilizing other alternatives to Myriad's BRCA1/2 
testing services in addition to publicizing the 
existence of such alternatives, such as the 
laboratories of Drs. Chung and Ostrer.                   
Compl. ¶ 19;; Brenner Decl. ¶¶ 2-­3, 7, 9. 
Plaintiff Boston Women's Health Book 
Collective ("BWHBC"), doing business as Our Bodies 
Ourselves ("OBOS"), is a women's health education, 
advocacy, and consulting organization that seeks to 
educate women about health, sexuality, and 
reproduction. OBOS staff provides information to 
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members of the public about genetic analysis, but 
does not, as a result of the patents-­in-­suit, refer their 
readers to or publicize genetic testing services at, 
laboratories other than Myriad. BWHC also does not 
advocate for researchers and clinicians to perform 
BRCA testing as a result of the patents-­in-­suit. If the 
patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, BWHBC and 
OBOS are ready, willing, and able to provide 
information about testing options offered by labs 
other than Myriad and would directly benefit from 
any increased research on BRCA1/2. Compl. ¶ 20;; 
Norsigian Decl. ¶¶ 2-­3. 
Plaintiff Lisbeth Ceriani ("Ms. Ceriani") is a 
43-­year-­old single mother who was diagnosed with 
cancer in both breasts in May 2008. Ms. Ceriani's 
oncologist and genetic counselor recommended that 
she obtain BRCA1/2 genetic testing to determine 
whether she should consider further surgery in order 
to reduce her risk of ovarian cancer. Because Myriad 
refused to accept Ms. Ceriani's insurance, however, 
her blood samples would not be processed unless she 
paid for the service out-­of-­pocket. Ms. Ceriani is 
unable to pay the full cost out-­of-­pocket and, to date, 
has not been tested and cannot determine her best 
medical course of action.  Were Ms. Ceriani able to 
obtain genetic testing from Myriad, she would also 
want verification of the results of the BRCA1/2 test 
before deciding whether to undergo removal of her 
ovaries.  If the patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, 
Ms. Ceriani would pursue BRCA1/2 genetic testing 
through laboratories other than Myriad, such as 
those of Drs. Chung and Ostrer. She would also seek 
verification of her BRCA1/2 test results at a second 
lab. Ceriani Decl. ¶¶ 2-­5, 7-­11. 
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Plaintiff Runi Limary ("Ms. Limary") is a 32-­
year-­old Asian-­American woman who was diagnosed 
with aggressive breast cancer in November 2005. 
Following her diagnosis, she sought BRCA1/2 
genetic testing on the advice of her doctor. However, 
she was unable to be tested by Myriad until two 
years later, when she obtained insurance that 
provided coverage for the test. Her test results 
informed her that she possessed a "genetic variant of 
uncertain significance" in her BRCA1 gene 
frequently identified in women of Asian descent and 
other racial minorities but whose significance as an 
indicator of predisposition to cancer was unclear. 
However, her test did not examine all known types of 
mutations in her BRCA genes, including known large 
rearrangements. Ms. Limary seeks additional 
resources for testing and research that could reveal 
the significance of her genetic variant, including 
whether it is correlated with an increased risk of 
breast or ovarian cancer, and could allow her to 
make an informed decision about her future medical 
treatment. If the patents-­in-­suit were to be 
invalidated, Ms. Limary would immediately pursue 
additional BRCA1/2 genetic testing through other 
laboratories, such as those of Drs. Chung and Ostrer. 
Such testing would include additional analysis to 
determine the significance of her BRCA1 variant of 
unknown significance. Limary Decl. ¶¶ 2-­6, 8-­9. 
Plaintiff Genae Girard ("Ms. Girard") is a 39-­
year-­old woman who was diagnosed with breast 
cancer in 2006.  Shortly after her diagnosis, she 
obtained BRCA1/2 genetic testing from Myriad and 
tested positive for a deleterious mutation on the 
BRCA2 gene. She sought, but was unable to obtain a 
second opinion confirming the test result before 
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making any decisions concerning prophylactic 
bilateral breast surgery and ovarian surgery. IF the 
patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, Ms. Girard 
would immediately pursue BRCA1/2 genetic testing 
through other laboratories, such as those of Drs. 
Chung and Ostrer. Girard Decl. ¶¶ 2-­5, 10. 
Plaintiff Patrice Fortune ("Ms. Fortune") is a 
48-­year-­old woman who was diagnosed with breast 
cancer in February 2009. Because Ms. Fortune has a 
family history of breast cancer, her genetic counselor 
and oncologist advised her to seek BRCA1/2 genetic 
testing. However, as a result of incomplete coverage 
for Myriad's test by Ms. Fortune's health insurance, 
Ms. Fortune would be required by Myriad to pay the 
full out-­of-­pocket cost for her genetic testing. Because 
Ms. Fortune currently works in unpaid positions 
while receiving treatment for her cancer, she cannot 
afford the cost of Myriad's genetic testing. If the 
patents-­in-­suit were to be invalidated, Ms. Fortune 
would immediately seek testing through other 
laboratories, such as those of Drs. Chung and Ostrer, 
in addition to seeking a second opinion by another 
lab before making any major decisions about her 
treatment. Fortune Decl. ¶¶ 2-­5, 8. 
Plaintiff Vicky Thomason ("Ms. Thomason") is 
a 52-­year-­old woman who was diagnosed with 
ovarian cancer in 2006. She obtained BRCA1/2 
genetic testing from Myriad in 2007 at the advice of 
her doctor and genetic counselor and was found to be 
negative for mutations covered by that test. 
However, in light of her family history of cancer, her 
genetic counselor advised her that she was an 
appropriate candidate for the additional BRCA1/2 
genetic testing offered by Myriad that looks for large 
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genetic rearrangements that are not detected by 
Myriad's standard genetic test. However, Ms. 
Thomason's insurance will not cover the entire cost 
of Myriad's additional test, and Ms. Thomason is 
unable to afford the extra cost. If the patents-­in-­suit 
were to be invalidated, Ms. Thomason would 
immediately seek BRCA1/2 testing, including the 
large rearrangement testing that she currently 
cannot afford, through other laboratories, such as 
those of Drs. Chung and Ostrer.                              
Thomason Decl. ¶¶ 2-­6, 8, 10. 
Plaintiff Kathleen Raker ("Ms. Raker") is a 42-­
year-­old woman whose mother and maternal 
grandmother died from breast cancer. She obtained 
BRCA1/2 genetic testing from Myriad in 2007 and 
was found to be negative for mutations covered by 
that test.  However, her genetic counselor advised 
her that she could still face hereditary risks for 
breast cancer due to a mutation in her BRCA genes 
that could not be detected by Myriad's standard test, 
but might be detected by Myriad's test for large 
rearrangements. Ms. Raker is unable to afford the 
cost of Myriad's additional testing and, to date, has 
not received this testing. Without those results, she 
cannot determine the risk of cancer she or her 
children face. If the patents-­in-­suit were to be 
invalidated, Ms. Raker would immediately pursue 
BRCA1/2 testing through other laboratories, such as 
those of Drs. Chung and Ostrer. Raker Decl. ¶¶ 2-­3, 
5-­7, 8-­9, 11-­12. 
 B. The  Defendants 
The USPTO is an agency of the Commerce 
Department of the United States. Compl. ¶ 27. The 
Plaintiffs assert only their claims' for constitutional 
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violations against the USPTO. 
Myriad is a for-­profit corporation located in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, doing business throughout the 
United States.  Myriad Genetics is a co-­owner of one 
of the patents-­in-­suit and holds the exclusive licenses 
for the remaining ones. It is currently the sole 
clinical provider of full sequencing of the BRCA 
genes in the United States. Compl. ¶ 28. 
The Directors are directors of the UURF, a 
not-­for-­profit corporation located in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, that the Plaintiffs allege is operated, 
supervised, and/or controlled by the University of 
Utah. The UURF is an owner or part-­owner of all of 
the patents-­in-­suit.4 Compl. ¶ 29. 
C. BRCA1 and BRCA2 
The human body is composed of cells. 
Contained in the nucleus of each cell are the genes 
that serve as the blueprints used by the body to 
create the proteins and gene products required for its 
function. Human genes are composed of unique 
combinations of four DNA5 nucleotides (i.e., bases) 
referred to by the letters A, T, C, and G. The 
sequence of each gene reflects the string of hundreds 
or thousands of A, T, C, and G nucleotides that make 
up the gene. Each gene has a normal, or "wild-­type" 
                                                                                                                    
4 The United States of America, represented by the Secretary of 
+HDOWKDQG+XPDQ6HUYLFHVLVDQDGGLWLRQDORZQHURIWKH¶
¶ ¶ DQG ¶ SDWHQWV (QGR 5HFKHUFKH ,QF RI 4XHEHF
Canada, HSC Research and Development Limited Partnership 
of Toronto, Canada, and the Trustees of the University of 
3HQQV\OYDQLD DUH DGGLWLRQDO RZQHUV RI WKH ¶ DQG ¶
patents. Compl. ¶ 30.   
5 DNA, which stands for deoxyribonucleic acid, is a chemical 
compound made by the body. Compl. ¶ 34.  
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sequence of nucleotides. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35, 36. 
The sequence of any given human gene varies 
in nature from one person to another and frequently 
varies from the "wild-­type" sequence. Some of the 
variations, referred to as "mutations" or "variants," 
can impact the body's ability to create proteins 
necessary for sound health. These mutations can 
include individual nucleotide substitutions (e.g., a T 
where G would normally appear in a gene), 
individual nucleotide deletions (e.g. a G being deleted 
altogether from a particular location in a gene), or 
much larger variations (e.g. a section of a gene 
containing numerous nucleotides is deleted or 
displaced). Mutations can be inherited from an 
individual's parents as well as be acquired during an 
individual's lifetime. Id. 
To find out if the nucleotide sequence of a 
person's gene differs from the normal, or "wild-­type" 
nucleotide sequence for the gene, a genetic 
researcher or clinician can sequence the person's 
gene to determine its nucleotide sequence. Once the 
sequence of the gene has been obtained, the 
researcher or clinician can examine the entire 
sequence to see if the A, T, C, and Gs encode a 
healthy sequence, a sequence with mutations known 
to be associated with cancer, or a sequence with one 
or more variants of uncertain significance. 
Alternatively, the researcher or clinician can 
sequence and examine a small section of the gene 
where a particular mutation or variant is known to 
occur. The methods by which researchers or 
clinicians identify the sequence of either the whole 
gene or any part thereof are not patented in the 
claims at issue here and are well known in the field.  
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Compl. ¶ 36. 
In the 1990s, a number of genetic researchers 
around the world began looking for a human gene 
that correlated with an increased risk of breast 
and/or ovarian cancer. Many of those researchers, 
including the researchers who ultimately formed 
Myriad, were funded, at least in part, by the federal 
government. Researchers, using techniques widely 
available in the profession, determined in 1990 that 
one gene that correlated with an increased risk of 
breast and/or ovarian cancer was located in the body 
on chromosome 17. Another research team that was 
eventually associated with Myriad, using techniques 
widely available in the profession, sequenced the 
precise gene, which was named BRCA1 because of its 
correlation with breast cancer susceptibility. These 
researchers subsequently formed Myriad. Myriad 
sought, and ultimately obtained, several patents on 
this human BRCA1 gene. Researchers also began 
looking for other genes similar to BRCA1, and 
Myriad, using techniques widely available in the 
profession, subsequently identified BRCA2 and 
obtained a series of patents over the human BRCA2 
gene. As a result, Myriad holds, either through 
ownership or exclusive license, numerous patents 
relating to the human BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  
Compl. ¶¶ 41-­45. 
The patents for BRCA1/2 were granted by the 
USPTO pursuant to a formal written policy that 
provides that naturally occurring genes can be 
patented if they are "isolated from their natural state 
and purified." Compl. ¶ 50. According to USPTO 
policy, an "isolated and purified" gene includes one 
that is simply removed from the body and separated 
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from the other contents of the cell. Compl. ¶ 51. 
However, the information dictated by the gene is 
identical whether it is inside or outside of the body, 
and an "isolated and purified" human gene performs 
the same function as the human gene in a person's 
body. Id. USPTO policy also permits patenting of 
comparisons or correlations created by nature, but 
identified by a patent holder. Compl. ¶ 53. 
Everyone carries the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes, but the sequence of each person's BRCA  
genes can differ. Compl. ¶ 37.  Certain mutations in 
the genes are correlated with an increased risk of 
breast and/or ovarian cancer and may also be 
associated with other cancers, such as prostate and 
pancreatic cancers. Id. Women with these mutations 
have an approximately 40-­85% lifetime risk of 
developing breast cancer. Compl. ¶ 39. 
Approximately 5-­10% of women who develop breast 
cancer are likely to have a mutation in their BRCA1 
or BRCA2 genes predisposing them to breast cancer 
and which they inherited from their parents.     
Compl. ¶ 38. 
A BRCA1/2 genetic test result that is positive 
for one of these mutations can have a substantial 
impact on a woman's medical decisions and health. 
Many women will obtain earlier and more vigilant 
screening for breast and/or ovarian cancers, and 
some women may choose to have prophylactic 
surgery to remove their breasts and/or ovaries in 
order to reduce the risk of future cancers.          
Compl. ¶ 40. 
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D. Enforcement of the Patents-­in-­Suit 
In the late 1990s, the GDL at the University of 
Pennsylvania was engaged in providing BRCA1 
genetic testing services to women. Kazazian          
Decl. ¶ 4. Around this time, Dr. Kazazian, one of the 
co-­Directors of the GDL, met with Dr. Mark Skolnick 
("Dr. Skolnick"), the Chief Science Officer at Myriad. 
During the meeting, Dr. Skolnick informed Dr. 
Kazazian that Myriad planned to stop the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 testing being done by the GDL.  
Kazazian Decl. ¶ 6. Shortly thereafter, on or about 
May 29, 1998, Dr. Kazazian received a letter from 
William A. Hockett, Director of Corporate 
Communications for Myriad which asserted that 
Myriad is "the patent holder for the BRCA1 gene" 
covering, among other things "composition of matter 
covering the BRCA1 gene [and] any fragments of the 
BRCA1 gene." Ganguly Decl. ¶ 5. The letter further 
offered the University a collaboration license of very 
limited scope. Id. 
On or about August 26, 1998, Dr. Kazazian 
received a cease-­and-­desist letter from George A. 
Riley of O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, asserting that the 
Dr. Kazazian's commercial testing activities 
infringed the patents-­in-­suit and demanding that he 
cease "all infringing testing activity."                       
Ganguly Decl. ¶ 6. 
On or about June 10, 1999, the University of 
Pennsylvania general counsel, Robert Terrell, 
received a letter from Christopher Wright, Myriad's 
General Counsel, asserting that Dr. Kazazian's 
BRCA testing activities infringed the patents-­in-­suit 
and demanding that the university cease all such 
commercial genetic testing services. Ganguly Decl. ¶ 
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7. In a subsequent letter to the University dated 
September 22, 1999, Myriad reiterated its belief that 
the genetic testing activities being performed at the 
GDL infringed the patents-­in-­suit and repeated its 
demand that such activities cease. Ganguly Decl. ¶ 9. 
As a result of these letters, the University of 
Pennsylvania advised Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly to 
discontinue their BRCA1/2 testing, which they did. 
Kazazian Decl. ¶ 7;; Ganguly Decl. ¶ 10. 
During this same period, Dr. Harry Ostrer was 
sending patient samples to Dr. Kazazian for 
BRCA1/2 related genetic screening. Ostrer Decl. ¶ 5. 
On May 21, 1998, Dr. Ostrer also received a letter 
from William Hocket similar to that sent to Dr. 
Kazazian. The letter notified Dr. Ostrer of Myriad's 
patents and offered him a license for BRCA1/2-­
related genetic testing.  Ostrer Decl. ¶ 7. Because of 
the narrow scope of the proposed license, Dr. Ostrer 
did not enter into a licensing agreement with 
Myriad. Id. 
On or about September 15, 1998, Gregory 
Critchfield, the President of Myriad, sent a letter to 
Dr. Susan Nayfield of the National Cancer Institute 
("NCI"). Ganguly Decl. Ex. 7. The letter assured Dr. 
Nayfield that Myriad would not interfere with 
research activities supported by the NCI in any way, 
but noted that Myriad had, over the past several 
months, sent several laboratories engaged in the 
"commercial testing" of the BRCA1 gene draft license 
agreements defining the conditions under which 
those laboratories would be allowed to conduct 
commercial genetic testing.  Id. 
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On or about September 2, 1999, a Myriad 
representative sent a letter to a Georgetown 
laboratory demanding that it no longer sent genetic 
samples to the GDL for testing because such testing 
infringed the patents-­in-­suit. Ganguly Decl. ¶ 13. As 
a result of the letter, Georgetown stopped sending 
samples to the GDL for BRCA1/2 screening.  Id. 
In December 2000, the director of the Yale 
DNA Diagnostics Laboratory (the "YDL") received a 
letter from Myriad directing that the YDL cease the 
BRCA1/2 genetic testing that was being conducted 
in the laboratory because the testing allegedly 
infringed the patents-­in-­suit. Matloff Decl. ¶ 7. 
Following receipt of the letter, the laboratory ceased 
offering such genetic testing. Id. 
In 2005, Ms. Matloff telephoned Myriad to 
inquire whether it was permissible for the YDL to 
perform genetic screening of the BRCA genes that 
looked for large rearrangement mutations.        
Matloff Decl. ¶ 8. Several scientific studies had 
demonstrated that Myriad's full sequencing test 
missed large rearrangements that are also correlated 
with cancer risk. Myriad informed Ms. Matloff that 
this large rearrangement testing could not be done 
by the Yale laboratory because it would infringe the 
patents-­in-­suit.  Id. 
Myriad has also engaged in litigation to assert 
its rights under the patents-­in-­suit. In 1997 and 
1998, Myriad filed suit against Oncormed, a company 
offering competing BRCA1/2 genetic testing. See 
Myriad Genetics v. Oncormed, 2:97-­cv-­922 (D. Utah);; 
Myriad Genetics v. Oncormed, 2:98-­cv-­35 (D. Utah). 
In November 1998, Myriad sued the University of 
Pennsylvania for infringing its BRCA patents. See 
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Myriad Genetics v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 2:98-­cv-­
829 (D. Utah). Although the lawsuit was dismissed 
after the University agreed to cease its BRCA 
testing, the dismissal was "without prejudice." See 
2:98-­cv-­829 (D. Utah) (docket entry 3). 
As a result of these efforts, it is widely 
understood within the research community that 
Myriad has taken the position that any BRCA1/2 
related activity infringes its patents and that Myriad 
will assert its patent rights against parties engaged 
in such activity. See, Ostrer Decl. ¶¶ 5-­6;; Chung 
Decl. ¶ 15;; Hubbard Decl. ¶ 7;; Kant Decl. ¶  4;; 
Matloff Decl. ¶¶   7-­9;; Reich Decl. ¶   5;; see also 
Mildred K. Cho, et al., Effects of Patents and License 
on the Provision of Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. 
Molecular Diagnostics 3 (2003) (reporting that nine 
clinical genetic testing laboratories ceased BRCA1/2 
testing as a result of Myriad's patents). 
III.  THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS 
The Plaintiffs challenge the validity of claims 
1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 20 of patent 5,747,282 (the "'282 
patent") ;; claims 1, 6, and 7 of patent 5,837,492 (the 
"'492 patent");; claim 1 of patent 5,693,473 (the "'473 
patent");; claim 1 of patent 5,709,999 (the "'999 
patent");; claim 1 of patent 5,710,001 (the "'001 
patent");; claim 1 of patent 5,753,441 (the "'441 
patent");; and claims 1 and 2 of patent 6,033,857 (the 
"'857 patent"). 
The Plaintiffs divide the claims-­in-­suit into 
four categories. The first category of claims, which 
include claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the '282 patent and 
claim 1 of the '492 patent, cover isolated, non-­
mutated forms of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as well as 
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fragments of BRCA1 of 15 nucleotides or more. The 
second category of claims, which includes claim 1 of 
the '473 patent, claim 7 of the '282 patent and claims 
6 and 7 of the '492 patent, cover isolated forms of 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 that contain mutations that may 
or may not have any correlation with an increased 
risk of breast and ovarian cancer. The third category 
of claims, comprised of claim 1 of the '999 patent, 
covers any method of analyzing an individual's 
BRCA1 gene to determine whether the individual's 
gene contains an inherited mutation. The fourth 
category of claims, which includes claim 1 of the '001 
patent, claim 1 of the '441 patent, and claims 1 and 2 
of the '857 patent, covers comparison of a patients' 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences with the normal 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences to determine 
whether there are differences that would indicate a 
genetic predisposition to breast cancer. Claim 20 of 
the '282 patent, which the Plaintiffs include in this 
fourth category of claims, covers a method of 
examining the growth of cells containing a mutated 
form of BRCA1 following their treatment with a 
potential therapeutic compound. None of the claims 
in the fourth category of claims are limited to 
"isolated" DNA. 
The Plaintiffs allege that because human 
genes are products of nature, laws of nature, and/or 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic 
human knowledge or thought, the claims-­in-­suit are 
invalid for violating Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of 
the United States Constitution, the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and 35 
U.S.C. § 101 of the patent statute. Compl. ¶ 52, 54. 
According to the Plaintiffs, these genes exist 
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as naturally occurring products of nature, and 
Myriad did not invent, create, or in any way 
construct or engineer the genes. Rather, Myriad 
located them in nature and described their 
informational content as it exists and functions in 
nature. According to the Plaintiffs, Myriad did not 
invent, create, or in any way construct the 
differences that may be found when a patient's 
BRCA1/2 gene sequences are compared to the 
normal BRCA1/2 gene sequences or the correlations 
between certain mutations in BRCA1/2 and an 
increased risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer. 
Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48. 
Myriad currently offers two types of tests: the 
Comprehensive BRACAnalysis Test and the 
BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test ("BART"). The 
Comprehensive BRACAnalysis Test costs over $3000;; 
BART costs approximately $600, although Myriad 
will offer BART testing for free to some women who 
meet certain criteria.  Compl. ¶ 92, 94.  Although 
Myriad's tests examine many mutations known to 
correlate with a predisposition to breast and/or 
ovarian cancer, they do not look for all mutations 
known to correlate with breast and/or ovarian 
cancer. Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 16. The Plaintiffs allege 
that Myriad's patents on BRCA1/2 have allowed it to 
bar any other entity from conducting genetic testing 
on the BRCA genes despite the ability of other 
clinical laboratories, such as the laboratories of Drs. 
Chung, Ostrer, and Ledbetter, to do so and the desire 
of patients, such as Ms. Limary and Ms. Girard, to 
seek such alternative testing. Compl. ¶ 84. As a 
result, any person seeking testing of their BRCA1/2 
genes is required to utilize Myriad's tests.                 
Compl. ¶ 90. 
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According to the Plaintiffs, Myriad also has 
the ability to prevent researchers from conducing 
any research examining the BRCA genes.                 
Compl. ¶ 96. Myriad has permitted some scientists to 
conduct pure research on BRCA1/2, but the 
Plaintiffs allege that Myriad has no official policy 
permitting such research and has not publicized its 
willingness to allow such research.  Compl. ¶ 97. The 
Plaintiffs allege that the patents on the BRCA gene 
sequences deny researchers access to genomic 
information which, unlike other patented inventions, 
cannot be "invented around" or built upon to foster 
scientific progress.  Commpl. ¶ 88.  As a result, 
researchers are chilled from engaging in research on 
BRCA1/2 as well as research on other genes that 
may interact with BRCA1/2. Compl. ¶ 98. Included 
in such activities would be the development of new 
tests for breast and/or ovarian cancer that might be 
linked to BRCA1/2 . The Plaintiffs assert that this 
infringes on quality medical practice and 
compromises quality assurance and improvement of 
testing. Compl. ¶ 101;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 23. 
The Defendants have moved to dismiss the 
claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.    
12(b) (1) on the grounds that the Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against the 
USPTO and that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring 
this declaratory judgment action. The Defendants 
have also moved to dismiss the claims against the 
UURF Directors pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2) 
on the grounds that the Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the Directors. Finally, the 
Defendants move to dismiss the constitutional claims 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for failure to 
sufficiently plead a claim. 
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IV. THERE IS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE USPTO 
The USPTO has moved to dismiss the 
Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l), on the grounds 
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
the Plaintiffs' claims. A claim is "properly dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(l) when the district court lacks the statutory or 
constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. 
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). 
"When jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff 'bears 
the burden of showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" 
Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 
2003)). "[J]urisdiction must be shown affirmatively, 
and that showing is not made by drawing from the 
pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting 
it." Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 
129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). As such, 
the Court may rely on evidence outside the 
pleadings, including declarations submitted in 
support of the motion and the records attached to 
these declarations. See Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 
("In resolving a motion to dismiss . . . under Rule 
12(b)(l), a district court . . . may refer to evidence 
outside the pleadings. "). 
The Plaintiffs premise their assertion of 
subject matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 
1338(a).6 28 U.S.C. § 1331 vests the district courts 
                                                                                                                    
6 Although Plaintiffs also cite 28 U.S.C. § 2201 as a basis for 
jurisdiction, "[i]t is settled law that the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994), does not enlarge the jurisdiction of 
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with subject matter jurisdiction for "all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution." The USPTO, 
however, asserts that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against them in 
OLJKW RI WKH ´comprehensive scheme Congress 
HVWDEOLVKHG WR JRYHUQ SDWHQW JUDQWVµ7 Hitachi 
Metals, Ltd. v. Quigg, 776 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 
1991). According to the USPTO, the existence of this 
FRPSUHKHQVLYH VWDWXWRU\ VFKHPH UHIOHFWV &RQJUHVV·
intention to preclude judicial challenges of the type 
brought by the Plaintiffs. 
The cases cited by the USPTO, however, 
involved claims alleging statutory violations for 
which the Patent Act provided a remedy. The issue 
before the courts, then, was whether the existence of 
a comprehensive statutory scheme that addressed 
the alleged statutory violation precluded the right to 
also seek judicial review of the alleged violations. See 
Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 883 F.2d 1570, 1572-­74 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(concluding remedy provided by patent statute for 
alleged statutory violations precluded private judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
the federal courts . . . and that a declaratory judgment action 
must therefore have an independent basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction." Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. v. 
1<6WDWH'HS·WRI(QYWO&RQVHUYDWLRQ, 127 F.3d 201, 206 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 
U.S. 667, 671 (1950)).  
7 The USPTO also argues that sovereign immunity serves to bar 
this action. Courts, however, routinely entertain actions against 
federal agencies alleging violations of the Constitution. See, 
e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). As Plaintiffs note in 
their Complaint, the only claims raised against the USPTO are 
of a constitutional nature. Compl. ¶ 27.   
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remedy for those claims);;8 Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. 
Lehman, 959 F. Supp. 539, 543 (D.D.C. 1997) 
(concluding Congress' statutory framework providing 
means to challenge issuance of Certificates of 
&RUUHFWLRQLPSOLFLWO\SUHFOXGH>G@µDULJKWWR MXGLFLDO
relief);; Hitachi Metals, 776 F. Supp. at 7-­8 (finding 
statutory scheme for administrative and judicial 
review of patent reissue decisions precluded third-­
party judicial challenges to reissue process). 
In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), cited by 
the USPTO, the Supreme Court considered whether 
an employee subjected to adverse employment action 
as a result of his criticism of the federal agency 
employing him could maintain a suit against the 
agency for violation of his First Amendment rights. 
Id. at 369-­72. Noting that "the ultimate question on 
the merits . . . may appropriately be characterized as 
one of 'federal personnel policy,'" id. at 380-­81, the 
Court went on to describe Congress' "repeated 
consideration of the conflicting interests involved in 
providing job security, protecting the right to speak 
freely, and maintaining discipline and efficiency in 
the federal workforce." Id. at 385. The result, the 
Court concluded, was an "elaborate, comprehensive 
scheme" within which "Constitutional challenges to 
agency action, such as First Amendment claims 
raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable." Id. As a 
result, the Court was presented with a question 
"quite different from the typical remedial issue 
confronted by a common-­law court" since the issue 
                                                                                                                    
8 The Syntex opinion noted in passing that the plaintiff had 
pled a violation of the 5th Amendment, but included no 
discussion concerning the claim in its analysis of subject matter 
jurisdiction.   
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was not whether a judicial remedy should be created 
where none existed, but rather whether a judicial 
remedy should be created where a plaintiff was 
merely dissatisfied by the statutory remedy Congress 
provided for his alleged wrong. Id. at 388. 
While the USPTO notes the existence of a 
comprehensive scheme to redress violations of the 
Patent Act, it cites to no comparable statutory 
scheme providing a remedy for persons who complain 
about the constitutionality of patents issued by the 
USPTO and/or the policies and practices of the 
USPTO. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 
340, 349 (1984) ("[W]hen a statute provides a 
detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of 
particular issues at the behest of particular persons, 
judicial review of those issues at the behest of other 
persons may be found to be impliedly precluded." 
(emphasis added));; see generally Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In such circumstances, 
the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not 
intend to preclude enforcement of federal rights 
through private actions. See Wright v. Roanoke, 479 
U.S. 418, 427-­28 (1987) (citing absence of statutorily 
defined private judicial remedy for alleged violation 
of federal housing law as evidence that Congress did 
not intend to foreclose private right of action). 
Indeed, even when Congress has created a statutory 
remedy, if that remedy is not coextensive with the 
remedy provided by the Constitution, plaintiffs may 
still bring a separate action to enforce the 
Constitution. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 
Comm., __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 788, 796-­978 (2009).  
The novel circumstances presented by this 
action against the USPTO, the absence of any 
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remedy provided in the Patent Act, and the 
important constitutional rights the Plaintiffs seek to 
vindicate establish subject matter jurisdiction over 
the Plaintiffs' claim against the USPTO.9 See, e.g., 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997);; Mace v. Skinner, 
34 F.3d 854, 859-­60 (9th Cir. 1994). 
V . THERE IS STANDING 
A. The Plaintiffs Have Standing to Sue 
the USPTO for Constitutional 
Violations 
The "judicial power . . . defined by Art. III is 
not an unconditioned authority to determine the 
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts" but, 
rather, is limited to the resolution of "cases" and 
"controversies."  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 471 (1982);; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 559-­60 (1992). An "essential and 
unchanging part" of that limitation is the doctrine of 
standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Indeed, "[tlhe Art. 
III doctrine that requires a litigant to have 'standing' 
to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the 
most important of these doctrines." Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). "At an irreducible 
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes 
the court's authority to show (1) that he personally 
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a 
                                                                                                                    
9 Although the USPTO suggests that finding subject matter 
MXULVGLFWLRQRYHU3ODLQWLIIV·FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFODLPVZRXOGRSHQWKH
gates to a flood of challenges to patents based on alleged 
constitutional violations, it is difficult to see how a colorable 
claim for constitutional violations could arise out of patents for 
more commonly patented inventions, such as computer chips or 
carburetors.   
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result of the putatively illegal conduct of the 
defendant, that (2) the injury fairly can be traced to 
the challenged action, and (3) is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision." Valley Forge, 454 
U.S. at 472 (internal citations omitted).10 
Beyond these constitutional requirements, a 
plaintiff must also satisfy certain prudential 
standing requirements, based on the principle that 
the judiciary should "avoid deciding questions of 
broad social import where no individual rights would 
be vindicated."  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797, 804 (1985). Prudential standing requires, 
inter alia, that a party "assert his own legal interests 
rather than those of third parties," id. at 804, and 
that a claim must not be a "generalized grievance" 
shared in by all or a large class of citizens, Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Prudential standing 
also addresses whether "the constitutional or 
statutory provision on which [a plaintiff's] claim 
rests properly can be understood as granting persons 
in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." 
See id. at 499-­500. Thus, the litigant's complaint 
must fall within the "zone of interests to be protected 
or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 
475. 
 
                                                                                                                    
10 7KH86372·VFKDOOHQJHWR3ODLQWLIIV·VWDQGLQJLVLQWHUWZLQHG
with its challenge WR3ODLQWLIIV·VXEMHFWPDWWHU MXULVGLFWLRQSee 
Syntex  )G DW  ´7KH VWDQGLQJ DQG UHYLHZDELOLW\
inquiries tend to merge. A plaintiff cannot claim standing based 
on violation of an asserted personal statutorily-­created 
procedural right when Congress intended to grant that plaintiff 
QRVXFKULJKWµTXRWLQJBanzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167, 1170 
n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984))).  
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The Defendants allege that it is well 
established that third parties do not have standing to 
challenge the USPTO's issuance of a patent. The 
authorities cited by the USPTO, however, address a 
party's standing to bring claims for statutory 
violations and establish only that the existence of a 
comprehensive framework within the Patent Act 
designed to address certain statutory violations may 
demonstrate Congressional intent to foreclose a 
judicial remedy for those violations. See Syntex, 882 
F.2d at 1572-­74;; Hitachi Metals, 776 F. Supp. at 7-­8;; 
Godtfredsen v. Banner, 503 F. Supp. 642, 644-­45 
(D.D.C. 1980) (finding statutory remedies for claims 
of examiner error during interference proceedings 
precluded judicial review of the proceedings prior to 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies).11 As 
discussed supra in Section IV, these cases do not, as 
the USPTO suggests, establish that the remedial 
scheme provided by the Patent Act for statutory 
violations divests the Plaintiffs of standing to assert 
constitutional claims for which the Patent Act 
                                                                                                                    
11 Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F. 2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 
cited by the USPTO, did not involve allegations of constitutional 
violaWLRQV0RUHRYHUWKHFRXUW·VDQDO\VLVRIVWDQGLQJWXUQHGRQ
the specific APA provisions involved and was, in substance, a 
finding that no legally cognizable right was violated. See id. at 
929-­ 7KH FRXUW·V KROGLQJ DOVR WXUQHG RQ WKH IDFW WKDW QR
patents on animals had been granted and therefore any harm 
that might occur in the future from such patents was 
speculative. Id. at 933. The same cannot be said here, where 
patents over BRCA1/2 have already been granted and have 
been used to present Plaintiffs from engaging in clinical 
analysis of the BRCA1/2 genes, from informing women about 
testing options other than by Myriad, and from obtaining 
genetic testing or second opinions. Plaintiffs alleged harms are 
therefore not the type of speculative harms at issue in Animal 
Legal Defense Fund.   
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provides no remedy. 
The USPTO also argues that the Plaintiffs do 
not have standing because the injuries alleged are 
not "fairly traceable" to the USPTO's allegedly 
improper conduct.  The "fairly traceable" 
requirement "examines the causal connection 
between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the 
alleged injury." Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. While 
the USPTO is correct that Myriad's refusal to license 
its patent broadly contributes to Plaintiffs' alleged 
injuries, the patents were issued by the USPTO, in 
accordance with its policies and practices. It is those 
policies and practices that the Plaintiffs allege are 
unconstitutional. The injury alleged is therefore 
"fairly traceable" to the USPTO . 
Finally, the USPTO argues that Plaintiffs' 
claim against it fails to meet the redressibility 
requirement, which "examines the causal connection 
between the alleged injury and the judicial relief 
requested." Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.9. The Plaintiffs 
ask the Court to enjoin the Defendants from taking 
any actions to enforce the challenged claims in 
Myriad's patents. Fairly included in this prayer for 
relief is a request that the Court declare 
unconstitutional the USPTO's policies and practices 
with respect to the challenged claims and similar 
classes of claims. Granting Plaintiffs' request for 
relief would serve to render the claims-­at-­issue 
definitionally invalid. As a result, the Plaintiffs 
would be allowed to engage in conduct currently 
prohibited by Myriad's patents, and the alleged 
injuries would be redressed. 
 
277a 
  
B.  The Plaintiffs Have Established 
Standing to Sue Myriad and the 
Directors 
 Article III limits federal jurisdiction to 
disputes involving an actual "case or controversy," 
and not merely "a difference or dispute of a 
hypothetical or abstract character." Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). As the 
Supreme Court has recently observed, there exists no 
bright-­line rule for determining whether an action 
satisfies the case or controversy requirement. 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 
127 (2007). Rather, "[t]he difference between an 
abstract question and a 'controversy' contemplated 
by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one 
of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be 
possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in 
every case whether there is such a controversy." Md. 
Cas. Co.. v. Pac. Coal & Oil -­Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 
(1941). Consequently, "the analysis must be 
calibrated to the particular facts of each case." Cat 
Tech LLC v. TubMasters, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 879 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
"Whether an actual case or controversy exists 
so that a district court may entertain an action for a 
declaratory judgment of non-­infringement and/or 
invalidity is governed by Federal Circuit law."  
MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted), rev'd on 
other grounds, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  "The purpose of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act  . . . in patent cases is 
to provide the allegedly infringing party relief from 
uncertainty and delay regarding its legal rights."  
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 
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824 F.2d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  As the Federal 
Circuit has explained: 
[A] patent owner . . . attempts 
extrajudicial enforcement with scare-­
the-­customer-­and-­run tactics that 
infect the competitive environment 
of the business community with 
uncertainty and insecurity . . . . 
Before the Act, competitors . . . were 
rendered helpless and immobile so 
long as the patent owner refused to 
grasp the nettle and sue. After the 
Act, those competitors were no 
longer restricted to an in terrorem 
choice between the incurrence of a 
growing potential liability for patent 
infringement and abandonment of 
their enterprises;; they could clear 
the air by suing for a judgment that 
would settle the conflict of interests. 
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, 
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 
1988), overruled on other grounds by MedImmune, 
549 U.S. 118). 
The Federal Circuit's jurisprudence governing 
a party's standing to seek a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity was recently revised by the 
Supreme Court in MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118. There, 
the Supreme Court considered whether the licensee 
of a patent had standing to seek a judgment 
declaring the underlying patent invalid, 
unenforceable, or not infringed without first 
breaching or terminating the license agreement. Id. 
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at 137. In concluding that subject matter jurisdiction 
existed over the plaintiff's declaratory judgment 
claim, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test as 
conflicting with the Court's precedent. Id. at 132 
n.11;; see also Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex 
Eyewear, Inc., 556 F.3d 1294, 1297 (Fed Cir. 2009) 
(observing that "the Federal Circuit's requirements, 
specific to patent cases, that there be both a threat or 
other action by the patentee sufficient to create a 
reasonable apprehension of infringement suit, and 
present activity that could constitute infringement or 
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such 
activity, were more rigorous than warranted by the 
principle and purpose of declaratory actions.").12 
Instead, the Court held that the jurisdictional 
analysis was properly based on an examination of 
"all the circumstances." MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 
127. 
Under the "all the circumstances" test, "the 
question in each case is whether the facts alleged, 
under all the circumstances, show that there is a 
substantial controversy, between the parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and 
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
                                                                                                                    
12 8QGHU WKH ´UHDVRQDEOH DSSUHKHQVLRQ RI VXLWµ WHVW
determining whether a party seeking a declaratory judgment of 
invalidity possessed the necessary standing required examining 
 ´ZKHWKHU WKH GHFODUDWRU\ MXGJPHQW SODLQWLII actually 
SURGXFHG RU ZDV SUHSDUHG WR SURGXFH DQ LQIULQJLQJ SURGXFWµ
DQG  ´ZKHWKHU FRQGXFW E\ WKH SDWHQWHH KDG FUHDWHG RQ WKH
part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff a reasonable 
apprehension that the patentee would file suit of the allegedly 
infringLQJ DFWLYLW\ FRQWLQXHGµ Sony Elecs. Inc v. Guardian 
Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
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judgment." Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co., 312 U.S. 
at 273). This "more lenient legal standard facilitates 
or enhances the availability of declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction in patent cases," and, accordingly, there 
is now an "ease of achieving declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction." Micron Tech. v. Mosaid Techs. Inc., 518 
F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Courts in this district 
have likewise recognized that since MedImmune, 
"the trend is to find an actual controversy, at least 
where the declaratory judgment plaintiff's product 
arguably practices a patent and the patentee has 
given some indication it will enforce its rights." 
Diamonds.net LLC v. IDEX Online, Ltd., 590 F. 
Supp. 2d 593, 597-­98 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
Although MedImmune did not define the 
precise contours of the "all the circumstances" test, 
guidance is provided by other courts' standing 
analysis. First, there must be some affirmative act by 
the defendant relating to enforcement of its patent 
rights. See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. 
Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338-­39 (Fed. Cir. 2008);; 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F. 3d 
1372, 1380-­81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[J]urisdiction 
generally will not arise merely on the basis that a 
party learns of the existence of a patent owned by 
another or even perceives such a patent to pose a 
risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by 
the patentee."). Second, the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff must have undertaken "meaningful 
preparation to conduct potentially infringing 
activity." Cat Tech LLC, 528 F.3d at 880. This 
inquiry ensures that a party does not seek a 
declaratory judgment "merely because it would like 
an advisory opinion on whether it would be liable for 
patent infringement if it were to initiate some merely 
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contemplated activity." Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 
(citations omitted). Whether there exists "sufficient 
'preparation' is a question of degree to be resolved on 
a case-­by-­case basis." Id. (citing Md. Cas. Co., 312 
U.S. at 273). 
1. Affirmative Acts by the Defendants 
The Defendants assert that in order to satisfy 
the "affirmative act" requirement for declaratory 
judgment standing, there must be some act by the 
Defendants directed towards the Plaintiffs. As an 
initial matter. the Defendants have, in fact, taken 
specific affirmative acts toward Drs. Kazazian and 
Ganguly.13 Moreover, other courts have recognized 
that "an overt, specific act toward the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the 
existence of an actual controversy." Edmunds 
Holding Co. v. Autobytel, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 606, 
610 (D. Del. 2009). 
The cases cited by the Defendants 
unquestionably considered the absence of 
"affirmative acts" directed towards the plaintiff in 
finding a lack of standing to bring the declaratory 
judgment action. None of the cases, however, 
establish a requirement that only acts directed 
towards the plaintiff could be considered for purposes 
of the standing analysis or even that there must exist 
                                                                                                                    
13 The Defendants argue that the cease-­and-­desist letters 
addressed to the University of Pennsylvania cannot be viewed 
as affirmative acts directed towards Dr. Ganguly. However, the 
letters were designed to stop the BRCA1/2 testing being 
conducted by the lab jointly overseen by Drs. Kazazian and 
Ganguly, and Defendants seek to draw an overly formalistic 
distinction. 
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acts specifically directed towards the plaintiffs in 
order to establish standing. Instead, in most of the 
cases, the dismissal was based on a lack of any 
legally cognizable acts by the defendant upon which 
a declaratory judgment could be established. See, 
e.g., Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1334, 1340 (observing that 
the plaintiff's only basis for standing was the 
plaintiff's allegation that its product did not infringe 
the defendants' patents);; Indigodental GMBH & Co. 
KG v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc ., No. 08 Civ. 7657 (RJS), 
2008 WL 5262694, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2008) 
(concluding that "Plaintiff had done little more than 
become aware of Defendant's patent");; Document 
Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Adler Techs., Inc., No. 03-­CV-­6044, 
2008 WL 596879, at *10 -­*11 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 29. 
2008) (finding single page of deposition testimony 
and an unrelated patent litigation insufficient basis 
for standing);; Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcornm Inc., No. 
08cv1829 WQH (LSP), 2009 WL 684835, at *6 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (citing, as the basis for its 
holding, plaintiff's failure "to specify any affirmative 
act by the defendants" that would support 
jurisdiction);; Impax Labs., Inc v. Medicis Pharm. 
Corp., No. C-­08-­0253 MMC, 2008 WL 1767044, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2008) (finding plaintiff's filing of 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application coupled with 
defendant's public statements of intent to enforce 
patents insufficient to create an "actual 
controversy");; The Wooster Brush Co. v. Bercom Int'l, 
LLC, No. 5:06CV474, 2008 WL 1744782, at *4 -­*5 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2008) (finding defendant had 
never engaged in any activity that would suggest the 
plaintiffs infringed its patent);; Baker Hughes Oilfield 
Operations, Inc. v. Reedhycalog UK, Ltd., No. 2:05-­
CV-­931, 2008 WL 345849, at *2 -­*3 (D. Utah Feb. 6, 
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2008) (dismissing case where letters from defendant 
did not indicate that it thought plaintiffs were 
infringing its patents).14 
A requirement that there be a specific, 
affirmative act directed towards the plaintiff to 
establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity would be inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's mandate that the Court examine 
"the facts alleged, under all the circumstances," in 
assessing the existence of a case or controversy.  See 
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co., 
312 U.S. at 273).  As the Federal Circuit has 
previously stated: 
Article III jurisdiction may be met 
where the patentee takes a position 
that puts the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff in the position of either 
pursuing arguably illegal behavior or 
abandoning that which he claims a 
right to do. We need not define the 
outer boundaries of declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction, which will 
                                                                                                                    
14 In Geospan Corp. v. Pictometry Int'l Corp., 598 F. Supp. 2d 
968 (D. Minn. 2008), the court observed that the only instances 
post-­MedImmune in which declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
had been found to exist were those in which the defendants had 
engaged in some form of activity against the plaintiff. Id. at 970. 
It did not, however, state a general rule that actions directed 
towards the plaintiff were required to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, nor how such a 
requirement would be consistent with the "all the 
circumstances" test. To the extent that Geospan may be read to 
set forth such a requirement concerning a defendant's relevant 
"affirmative acts," the Court declines to adopt a similar holding. 
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depend on the application of the 
principle of declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction to the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.  In light of these 
principles, an examination of the totality of Myriad's 
conduct relating to the patents-­in-­suit is appropriate. 
The Defendants raise several challenges to the 
legal significance of the acts relied on by the 
Plaintiffs to establish standing.  First, the 
Defendants argue that Myriad's 1998 letter to Dr. 
Kazazian is too old to serve as the basis for a case or 
controversy. The Federal Circuit cases cited by the 
Defendants in support of their argument, however, 
predate MedImmune and examined the timeliness of 
letters in the context of the now-­defunct 
"apprehension of suit" test. See Sierra Applied Scis., 
Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 1361, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004);; Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. 
ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
Given the recent changes to the standing analysis for 
declaratory judgment claims, those cases no longer 
serve as controlling authorities. See Benitec Austl., 
Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (questioning holdings in prior cases 
applying the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test 
for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in light of 
MedImmune). Furthermore, the Defendants cite no 
authority that would preclude the Court from 
considering the letter as part of "all the 
circumstances." 
While the district court cases cited by the 
Defendants correctly applied the "all the 
circumstances" test in dismissing the declaratory 
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judgment actions, they are also distinguishable from 
the present situation. In Avante, the affirmative act 
cited by the plaintiff consisted of a single, brief 
infringement suit lasting a few weeks. See Avante 
Int'l Tech., Inc. v. Hart Intercivic, Inc., No 08-­832-­
GPM, 2009 WL 2431993, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 
2009). In Edmunds Holdinq, the court's dismissal 
turned on the a finding that "[n]one of the facts 
adduced by [the plaintiff] established that [the 
defendant] believe[d] [the plaintiff] to be infringing 
the '517 patent." Edmunds Holding, 598 F. Supp. 2d 
at 610. While the Court agrees that an 11-­year old 
letter may not, alone, be sufficient to establish 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, those are not the 
circumstances presented here. Myriad's assertions of 
its patent rights consist not only of the letter to Dr. 
Kazazian, but a continuing course of conduct over a 
period of several years. In addition, Defendants' prior 
efforts to prevent the Plaintiffs and other similarly 
situated parties from engaging in BRCA1/2 testing 
establish that Plaintiffs' planned activities would be 
considered infringing by the Defendants. The totality 
of the circumstances, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, 
cannot be said to be comparable to the circumstances 
presented by Avante and Edmunds. 
The Defendants also dispute the relevance of 
prior litigation to the standing analysis. The 
Defendants argue at the outset that only litigation 
brought against the Plaintiffs may be considered by 
the Court in its jurisdictional analysis;; none of the 
cited cases, however, supports such a rule,15 and, as 
                                                                                                                    
15 Prasco held only that the particular prior lawsuit in question 
did not establish the existence of a case or controversy between 
the parties in light of the absence of any other evidence that the 
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discussed supra, this approach is inconsistent with 
the premise of the "all the circumstances" test. 
Further, although the lawsuits brought by Myriad 
against Oncormed and the University of 
Pennsylvania were dismissed, both serve as evidence 
of Myriad's willingness to assert its rights granted by 
the patents-­in-­suit against others. See Prasco, 537 
F.3d at 1341 ("Prior litigious conduct is one 
circumstance to be considered in assessing whether 
the totality of the circumstances creates an actual 
controversy."). Finally, the suit against the 
University of Pennsylvania was dismissed without 
prejudice and therefore would not bar a new 
infringement action by Myriad against the 
University of Pennsylvania or Drs. Kazazian and 
Ganguly. Consequently, Myriad's prior litigations 
involving the patents-­in-­suit are fairly included in 
the Court's standing analysis. 
The Plaintiffs cite counsel's August 11, 2009 
letter to Defendants' counsel requesting a waiver of 
claims against intended BRCA-­related activities and 
Defendants' subsequent refusal to grant such a 
waiver as evidence in support of the existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction. See Ravicher Decl. Ex. 1. 
However, the presence or absence of jurisdiction 
must be determined on the facts existing at the time 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
defendants had taken a position adverse to the plaintiff's 
position. See Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1340, 1341 n.9. It did not set 
forth a general rule concerning the consideration of prior 
litigation. The court in Edmunds similarly did not prohibit 
consideration of prior litigation directed to third parties. See 
Edmunds, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (distinguishing cases cited by 
the plaintiff in support of its assertion of the existence of case or 
controversy). 
  
287a 
  
the complaint under consideration was filed. GAF 
Bldg Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp. of Dallas, 90 F.3d 
479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d 
at 734 n.2). Because the filing of the Complaint pre-­
dated the August 11, 2009 letter, the letter does not 
factor into the standing analysis. 
Taken together, Plaintiffs' allegations 
establish the existence of sufficient "affirmative acts" 
by the Defendants for purposes of declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction. The Defendants have asserted 
their right to preclude others from engaging in 
BRCA1/2 genetic testing through personal 
communications, cease-­and-­desist letters, licensing 
offers, and litigation. The result, as alleged by the 
Plaintiffs and supported by affidavits, is the 
widespread understanding that one may engage in 
testing at the risk of being sued for infringement 
liability by Myriad.  This places the Plaintiffs in 
precisely the situation that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act was designed to address: the Plaintiffs 
have the ability and desire to engage in BRCA1/2 
testing as well as the belief that such testing is 
within their rights, but cannot do so without risking 
infringement liability.16 
In light of "all the circumstances," there exists 
a sufficiently "real and immediate injury or threat of 
future injury that is caused by the defendants" to 
satisfy the "affirmative act" requirement for a 
declaratory judgment action. Prasco, 537 F.3d at 
                                                                                                                    
16 Indeed, in light of the widespread knowledge of Myriad's 
BRCA1/2 patents and the breadth of the relevant claims, a 
finding of patent infringement would likely be considered 
willful and result in treble damages. See 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
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1339;; see also Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 
F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007);; Micron Tech., 518 
F.3d at 899 (patentee "pursues a systematic licensing 
and litigation strategy"). 
2. Meaningful Preparations for 
Infringing Action  
The Defendants also assert that the Plaintiffs 
have failed to demonstrate the existence of 
"meaningful preparation" to engage in infringing 
activity.  
With respect to the researcher Plaintiffs, the 
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs allege only that 
they are "ready, willing, and able" to infringe 
expressions of desire and ability are insufficient to 
establish "meaningful preparations" without 
reference to specific preparatory activities. However, 
the "meaningful preparation" inquiry properly 
focuses on whether the Plaintiffs are meaningfully 
prepared to engage in the infringing act such that 
the court's decision would serve as more than an 
"advisory opinion." See Cat Tech LLC, 528 F.3d at 
879;; SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381 ("[A] party need not 
risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the 
identified activity before seeking a declaration of its 
legal rights."). Where plaintiffs' normal course of 
business renders them meaningfully prepared to 
engage in the infringing activity at issue, the lack of 
some identifiable preparatory effort separate and 
apart from their normal activities cannot, without 
more, serve as the basis for finding that there has 
been no "meaningful preparation" for purposes of 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. To hold otherwise 
would render those most prepared to engage in 
infringing activity, i.e., those for whom essentially no 
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additional preparation is required to perform the 
infringing activity, the parties least likely to satisfy 
the standing requirements for a declaratory 
judgment action. 
The Defendants also cite Benitec, 495 F.3d 
1340, and Mega Lift Sys., LLC v. MGM Well 
Services, Inc., No. 6:08 CV 420, 2009 WL 1851919 
(E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009), in support of their 
assertion that the researcher Plaintiffs' preparation 
is insufficient as a matter of law to establish 
standing. In Benitec, the Federal Circuit found the 
plaintiff's plans to adapt its human gene silencing 
technology for use in the animal husbandry and 
veterinary markets insufficiently immediate for 
standing purposes. Benitec, 495 F.3d at 1349.  The 
court based its holding on the fact that (1) the 
plaintiff had merely stated that it "expect[ed]" to 
begin work "shortly" on adapting its existing gene 
silencing technology to livestock;; (2) the plaintiff had 
provided insufficient information for the court to 
assess whether the plaintiff's planned activities 
would be infringing;; and (3) the parties agreed that 
the plaintiff's planned activities would fall within the 
safe harbor provision to infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1).  See Benitec, 495 F. 3d at 1349.  
In Mega Lift, the district court relied on the fact that 
the plaintiff had failed to include in its complaint any 
"allegation about its readiness to manufacture and 
sell" the future product that was the subject of the 
declaratory judgment action.  Mega Lift, 2009 WL 
1851919, at *4. 
The factual circumstances, as set forth in the 
Plaintiffs' affidavits, render Benitec and Mega Lift 
distinguishable on their facts and demonstrate 
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sufficient preparation by the researcher Plaintiffs to 
establish standing. The Plaintiffs have demonstrated 
that the researcher Plaintiffs are poised to begin 
BRCA1/2 testing and that the patents-­in-­suit 
present the only obstruction to doing so.17 See, e.g., 
Chung Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15-­18;; Ledbetter Decl. ¶¶ 8-­9. 
All are established human geneticists whose 
laboratories are routinely engaged in genetic testing 
and therefore possess the necessary equipment and 
expertise to immediately begin performing BRCA1/2 
genetic testing.  Compl. ¶¶ 11-­16;; Kazazian Decl. ¶¶ 
3-­5, 8-­11;; Ganguly Decl. ¶¶ 3, 14;; Chung Decl. 
¶¶17-­18, 21;; Ostrer Decl. ¶¶ 8-­10, 13;; Ledbetter 
Decl. ¶¶ 18-­19 (speaking for himself and Dr. 
Warren). Moreover, Drs Kazazian, Ganguly, and 
Ostrer had previously engaged in BRCA1/2 testing 
prior to Myriad's assertion of its patent rights 
against them.18 Is Kazazian Decl. ¶¶ 4-­10;; Ganguly 
Decl. ¶¶ 3-­10. Consequently, the researcher 
Plaintiffs are meaningfully prepared to begin "BRCA 
testing to advance research and/or to offer . . . an 
important service to the public" and "could do so 
                                                                                                                    
17 The affidavits also establish that the proposed BRCA testing 
would infringe the claims-­in-­suit and provide sufficient 
LQIRUPDWLRQ WR VDWLVI\ WKH )HGHUDO &LUFXLW·V UHTXLUHPHQW WKDW
´Whe existence of a case or controversy [ ] be evaluated on a 
claim-­by-­FODLPEDVLVµJervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 
742 F. 2d 1388, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
18 Defendants argue that Drs. Kazazian and Ganguly state only 
that they would "consider" engaging in infringing Myriad's 
patents, and that such speculative intent cannot satisfy the 
"meaningful preparation" prong. However, the proper focus of 
this inquiry is whether the plaintiffs are meaningfully 
prepared, not whether they have made a final, conclusive 
decision to engage in the infringing activity. See Cat Tech LLC, 
528 F.3d at 879 (describing inquiry as requiring "a showing of 
'meaningful preparation' for making or using that product").  
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within a matter of weeks." Ganguly Decl. ¶ 14;; see 
also Ledbetter Decl. ¶ 18.19 
Plaintiffs' affidavits similarly establish that 
members of the various medical organizations, 
represented by the organizations under the "doctrine 
of associational standing," are, like the researcher 
Plaintiffs, also meaningfully prepared and possess 
the desire to engage in BRCA1/2 testing were the 
patents-­in-­suit invalidated. See, e.g., Hegde Decl. I 6-­
12;; Hubbard Decl. ¶ 3-­9;; Kant Decl. ¶ 4-­6.  
The remaining non-­researcher Plaintiffs have 
also established the existence of sufficient 
"meaningful preparations" to satisfy this prong of the 
standing inquiry. As an initial matter, the non-­
researcher Plaintiffs cannot be found to have failed 
to satisfy the meaningful preparation requirement on 
the grounds that the researcher Plaintiffs have not 
yet chosen to engage in infringing BRCA testing. 
Potential contributory infringers, such as the non-­
researcher Plaintiffs, may very well understand the 
precise nature of, and be prepared to take advantage 
of, the services of a potential infringer were the latter 
not prevented from offering those services by a third 
party's assertion of its patent rights. Here, it is 
alleged that the researcher Plaintiffs would offer 
infringing BRCA1/2 genetic testing services of the 
                                                                                                                    
19 According to Plaintiffs' counsel, all that would be required to 
begin genetic testing would be to order the necessary 
oligonucleotides specific to the BRCA1/2 genes, a delay of less 
than a month. Although Defendants raise the possibility that 
state certification may, in some instances, be required in order 
for Plaintiffs to engage in clinical BRCA testing, they have 
offered no evidence suggesting that this would constitute a 
delay of sufficient length to render the dispute of insufficient 
immediacy to warrant judicial intervention.  
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type the non-­researcher Plaintiffs would solicit or 
encourage others to solicit. The Defendants cite no 
authorities establishing that only potential direct, 
and not potential contributory infringers can have 
standing in a declaratory judgment action.20 
The Plaintiffs have set forth sufficient factual 
allegations to establish that the non-­researcher 
Plaintiffs are meaningfully prepared to engage in 
contributory infringement so as to render the 
controversy between them and the Defendants of 
"sufficient immediacy and reality." MedImmune, 549 
U.S. at 126 (citation omitted) ;; see, e.g., Matloff Decl. 
¶¶ 4, 10-­15;; Reich Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7-­11, 14-­15;; Brenner 
Decl. ¶¶ 2-­3, 9;; Ceriani Decl. ¶ 11;; Limary Decl. ¶ 9;; 
Girard Decl. ¶ 10;; Fortune Decl. ¶ 8;; Thomason Decl. 
¶ 10. Indeed, for these Plaintiffs, whose infringing 
activity would constitute nothing more than taking 
advantage of alternatives to Myriad's BRCA1/2 
testing or encouraging others to do the same, it is 
difficult to conceive what more "meaningful 
preparation" would be required.21 
The contentions of the Defendants in urging 
the Plaintiffs' lack of standing to bring a declaratory 
                                                                                                                    
20 Animal Legal Defense Fund, cited by Defendants, addressed 
the standing of a third party to challenge the findings of a PTO 
Examiner during examination of a patent and has no bearing 
on standing in the context of a declaratory judgment action. See 
Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d, 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
("A third party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of a 
particular patent application to prevent issuance of an allegedly 
invalid patent."). 
  
21 Similarly, it is difficult to envision what preparatory activity 
would be required to infringe the claims-­in-­suit covering the 
comparison of the BRCA1/2 gene sequence.   
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judgment action present a stark alternative: the 
deliberate violation of the patents-­in-­suit in order to 
challenge their constitutionality and validity. The 
risks, expense, and uncertainty of that protracted 
litigation process to compel the Defendants to defend 
the patents-­in-­suit are well known and recognized. 
Under the unique circumstances of this action and 
the pendency of the Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, the declaratory judgment procedure is 
preferable. It offers a far speedier and potentially 
less risky and protracted route to a resolution of the 
direct and fundamental issues. See Elecs. for 
Imaging, 394 F.3d at 1346. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs 
possess the necessary standing to bring their claims 
against the Defendants. 
VI. JURISDICTION EXISTS OVER THE 
DIRECTORS 
The Defendants have moved to dismiss the 
Directors as defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b) (2), for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 
considering this challenge to personal jurisdiction, 
Federal Circuit law applies because the jurisdictional 
issue is "intimately involved with the substance of 
the patent laws." Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene 
Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 
552 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
"In the procedural posture of a motion to 
dismiss, a district court must accept the 
uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's 
complaint as true and resolve any factual conflicts in 
the affidavits in the plaintiff's favor." Elecs. for 
294a 
  
Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1349 (internal citations 
omitted). Furthermore, because discovery has not yet 
been conducted, the Plaintiffs need only make a 
prima facie showing that the Directors are subject to 
personal jurisdiction. Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1329;; 
Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1349. 
"Determining whether personal jurisdiction 
exists over an out-­of-­state defendant involves two 
inquiries: whether a forum state's long-­arm statute 
permits service of process, and whether the assertion 
of personal jurisdiction would violate due process." 
Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Inamed Corp. v. 
Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
"[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has distinguished between 
"general" and "specific" forms of personal 
jurisdiction. General jurisdiction requires that a 
defendant have "continuous and systematic" contacts 
with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-­16 (1984). 
Minimum contacts establishing specific jurisdiction 
exist where "the defendant has purposefully directed 
his activities at residents of the forum and the 
litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out 
of or relate to those activities." Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-­73 (1985) (internal 
quotes and citations omitted). "Once it has been 
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decided that a defendant purposefully established 
minimum contacts within the forum State, these 
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to 
determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and 
substantial justice.'" Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 
at 320). Relevant factors include "'the burden on the 
defendant,' 'the forum State's interest in adjudicating 
the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief,' 'the interstate 
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared 
interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.'" Id. at 477 
(quoting World-­Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
In an action seeking a declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity, the Federal Circuit has held that 
sSHFLILF MXULVGLFWLRQ H[LVWV LI ´(1) the defendant 
purposefully directed its activities at residents of the 
forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to those 
activities, and (3) the assertion of personal 
MXULVGLFWLRQ LV UHDVRQDEOH DQG IDLUµ Breckenridge 
Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 444 F. 3d 1356 
)HG &LU  ´7KH ILUVW WZR IDFWRUV FRUUHVSRQG
ZLWK WKH ¶PLQLPXP FRQWDFWV· SURQJ RI WKH
International Shoe analysis, and the third factor 
FRUUHVSRQGV ZLWK WKH ¶fair play and substantial 
MXVWLFH· SURQJ RI WKH DQDO\VLVµ Inamed, 249 F.3d at 
1360. With respect to the last prong, the burden of 
proof is on the defendant, which must "present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction 
unreasonable." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-­77. 
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The Plaintiffs assert claims against the 
Directors not in their individual capacities, but in 
their capacity as state officials, pursuant to Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The threshold question 
is whether, for purposes of the personal jurisdiction 
analysis, the contacts of the Directors as individuals 
or as state officials should be examined. 
Under Ex parte Young, state officials are 
treated as state actors for all but Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity issues, regardless 
of whether the conduct in question is authorized by 
state law. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure 
Salvos, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982) (suit for relief 
against a state officer is not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment);; Home Tel. & Tel. v. Los Angeles, 227 
U.S. 278, 282-­85 (1913) (officer sued in his official 
capacity treated as state actor for 14th Amendment 
purposes). As a result, an official capacity action is, 
in all but name, a suit against the governmental 
entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-­66 
(1985) ("Official capacity suits . . . 'generally 
represent only another way of pleading an action 
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" 
(quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Servs., 
436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55  (1978)));; see also Will v. 
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) 
("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official 
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is 
a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no 
different from a suit against the State itself." 
(internal citations omitted)). Consistent with these 
principles, official capacity defendants may assert 
only those defenses available to the governmental 
entity, rather than those available to the defendant 
as an individual. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-­66;; see 
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also Will, 491 U.S. at 71.22 
When confronted with the issue of specific 
personal jurisdiction23 over a non-­forum state official, 
courts routinely examine the contacts of the state 
officials in their capacity as representatives of the 
state, rather than their contacts with the forum in 
their individual capacity. See, e.g., Stroman Realty, 
Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) 
H[DPLQLQJH[WHQWRIGHIHQGDQW·VFRQWDFWZLWKIRUXP
as a representative of the state of Arizona);;24 Grand 
River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor,                        
425 F3d. 158, 166 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2005)                  
                                                                                                                    
22 The treatment of state officials sued in their official capacities 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflects this conception 
of official capacity suits. Those officials need not be identified by 
name;; they are automatically replaced as parties by their 
successors;; and any relief granted is automatically binding not 
just on the named individual but on his or her successor. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(d), 25(d);; Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 
(1991).  
23 Because specific personal jurisdiction exists over the 
Directors, Plaintiffs' general personal jurisdiction arguments 
are not addressed here  
24 Defendants cite language in Stroman which they assert 
refutes Plaintiffs' position. See Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp. to 
Pls.' Mot. to Conduct Jurisdictional Disc. at 4 (citing Stroman, 
513 F.3d at 485 ("Even if the State of Arizona itself -­ as a 
sovereign state, subject to Eleventh Amendment protections -­ 
derived a benefit from any 'effects' in Texas generated by the 
action of the Commissioner, the benefit does not run to those 
officials in their individual capacity, stripped of their sovereign 
immunity cloak.")). The cited language, however, in addition to 
being dicta, is taken from the discussion of whether a 
"commercial benefit" accrued to the state. It does not establish 
that the contacts of the official's department are not imputed to 
her as an official defendant for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction. 
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(analyzing contacts of state attorneys general with 
New York as representatives of their states). 
7KH'HIHQGDQW·VUHO\RQGreat Western United 
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Circuit. 1978), 
UHY·G RQ RWKHU JURXQGV E\ Leroy v. Great Western 
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), for their assertion 
that the jurisdictional analysis properly focuses on 
the contacts of the Directors as individuals with New 
York. In Great Western, the Court of Appeals 
considered whether a court in the Northern District 
of Texas could assert personal jurisdiction over Idaho 
RIILFLDOVHQIRUFLQJDQ,GDKRODZWKDWKDG´VXEVWDQWLDO
FRQVHTXHQFHVµLQWKHIRUXPGreat Western, 557 F.2d 
at 1265, 1267. The Defendants argue that the Fifth 
&LUFXLW·V RSLQLRQ HVWDEOLVKHG WKDW EHFause as state 
cannot authorize unconstitutional action, a suit for 
injunctive relief against a state official in his official 
capacity cannot be viewed as a suit against the state. 
Instead, it must be viewed as a suit against the 
official as a private individual, and the contacts to be 
examined for purposes of personal jurisdiction must 
be the contacts of the defendant as an individual, 
rather than as an extension of the state. 
The discussion in Great Western cited by the 
Defendants, however, did not address the question of 
personal jurisdiction. Instead, the Fifth Circuit 
considered only the narrow issue of whether the 
Idaho official was immune from suit outside of Idaho. 
See id. at 1265 ("Initially McEldowney contends that 
his status as a state official means that even though 
he may be sued under Ex Parte Young . . . he may 
not be sued outside Idaho without his consent." 
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(citation omitted)).25 In contrast, when the court 
turned to the issue of "whether due process permits a 
court in Texas to exercise jurisdiction over the Idaho 
official who has enforced the Idaho takeover law 
[against a Texas corporation]," id. at 1266, the Fifth 
Circuit examined the actions of the defendants as 
representatives of the state, not as individual 
defendants. See, e.g., id. at 1267 (evaluating 
defendants' contacts with the forum by examining 
activities relating to the enforcement of the Idaho 
takeover statute). On the basis of those contacts, the 
court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction 
over the Idaho officials pursuant to the Texas long 
arm statute did not violate considerations of due 
process. Id. at 1266. 
The Defendants also rely on Pennington Seed, 
Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334                  
(Fed. Cir. 2006). There, the Federal Circuit's opinion 
contained no discussion about the proper analysis for 
considering a state official's contacts with a forum for 
personal jurisdiction purposes, instead finding that 
there were no allegations that the university officials 
had the necessary contacts with the forum. Id. at 
1344. The court's observation concerning the location 
of the officials' residences was made only in passing 
to note that even that fact failed to establish 
purposeful activity directed to the forum. Id. 
                                                                                                                    
25 To the extent the Fifth Circuit's discussion may be viewed 
more broadly as establishing that a state official sued in his 
official capacity should be treated as an individual defendant, 
such a holding is at odds with subsequent Supreme Court 
caselaw. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26;; Will, 491 U.S. at 71;; 
Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-­66. 
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In light of the foregoing, the question of 
jurisdiction over the Directors should be resolved 
based upon the Directors' contacts, as 
representatives of the state, with New York. 
Under New York C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (1), specific 
jurisdiction exists where a defendant "transacts any 
business within the state or contracts anywhere to 
supply goods or services in the state." A party 
"transacts business" when it "purposefully avails 
[itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within 
[New York], thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws." McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-­
Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382 (1967)                       
(citation omitted). Here, the Directors have entered 
into an exclusive license agreement that permits 
Myriad to market the UURF's products and services 
in New York and creates continuing obligations for 
UURF.26 As a result, the Directors have purposefully 
availed themselves of the privilege of conducting 
business in New York. Because the claims in this 
case are directly related to that license agreement 
and to Defendants' patent enforcement activities that 
have occurred in New York, the requisite "articulable 
nexus" between the cause of action and the business 
activity is present. See, e.g., Credit Lyonais Sec. 
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 
1999). Consequently, specific personal jurisdiction 
over the Directors exists under New York's long arm 
statute. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (1) (2008). 
The exercise of specific personal jurisdiction 
over the Directors also comports with considerations 
of due process. The Federal Circuit has established 
                                                                                                                    
26 See infra.  
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that in the context of an action seeking a declaration 
of patent invalidity, due process considerations are 
satisfied when the defendants have (1) engaged in 
cease-­and-­desist efforts directed to parties in the 
forum state or attempted to license the patents at 
issue in the forum state;;27 and (2) entered into an 
exclusive license agreement with an entity that 
markets and sells its products and services in the 
forum state. See Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at 1366;; see 
also Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1333-­35;; Akro Corp. v. 
Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1546 (Fed Cir. 1995);; Genetic 
Implant Sys. v. Core-­Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 
1458-­59 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The critical requirement for 
purposes of establishing due process is that the 
license agreement impose continuing obligations on 
the patentee, such as the right to enforce or defend 
the patents, so that the patentee maintains an 
ongoing relationship with the licensee operating 
within the forum that goes beyond the mere receipt 
of royalty income. See Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at 
1366. The personal jurisdiction analysis of the 
Directors' contacts with the forum state thus turns 
on "the defendant's relationship with its exclusive 
licensee." Id. at 1365;; see also Akro, 45 F.3d                      
at 1546-­47. 
                                                                                                                    
27 Although Defendants appear to assert that only cease-­and-­
desist letters sent to a party in the forum may be relied upon to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has 
stated that offers to license may also serve as the requisite first 
point of contact with the forum. See Breckenridqe, 444 F.3d at 
1366 ("Thus, the crux of the due process inquiry should focus 
first on whether the defendant has had contacts with parties in 
the forum state beyond the sending of cease and desist letters or 
mere attempts to license the patent at issue there."). 
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Here, the Defendants have attempted to 
license the patents-­in-­suit to Dr. Ostrer, a resident of 
New York.28 See Ostrer Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. 2. They have 
also caused or participated in direct in-­person cease-­
and-­desist efforts that occurred in New York. 
Kazazian Decl. ¶ 6. In addition, the agreement 
between Myriad and UURF creates ongoing 
obligations on the part of the UURF beyond the mere 
receipt of royalty payments. As set forth in the 
standard licensing term sheet, UURF's policy is to 
retain the right to enforce licensed patents and to 
initiate proceedings regarding them. Ravicher Aff. 
Ex. 7. Myriad, of course, has a similar ability to take 
action enforcing the patents as demonstrated by its 
actions to enforce the patents-­in-­suit.29 See supra. 
Both UURF and Myriad appear to have obligations 
relating to the enforcement and maintenance of the 
patents at issue in this lawsuit which establishes 
that the Directors have purposefully directed their 
activities at New York as a matter of law.30 See, e.g., 
Avocent, 55 F.3d at 1336 ("[W]hen the patentee 
enters into an exclusive license or other obligation 
relating to the exploitation of the patent by such 
licensee or contracting party in the forum . . . the 
                                                                                                                    
28 While the offer to license made to Dr. Ostrer was sent on 
Myriad Genetics' letterhead, Plaintiffs assert that Myriad and 
UURF acted together in asserting the rights granted by the 
patents-­in-­suit. See, e.g., Compl. IT 29, 49.  
29 Neither party contests that Myriad purposefully engages in 
business in New York, where it both solicits and sells a 
significant volume of its testing services.  
30 In addition, both the Directors and Myriad are represented 
jointly by counsel, further suggesting the existence of an 
ongoing relationship between the two entities. See 
Breckenridge, 44 4 F.3d at 1367. 
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patentee may be said to purposefully avail itself of 
the forum and to engage in activity that relates to 
the validity and enforceability of the patent.");; 
Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at 1366;; Akro, 45 F.3d at 
1546. 
In addition, the claims in this suit directly 
relate to the license agreement between the 
Defendants and their efforts to enforce the patents. 
See, e.g., Akro, 45 F.3d at 1548-­49 ("[The patentee's] 
exclusive license agreement with [the plaintiff's] 
local competitor Pretty Products undoubtedly relates 
to [the plaintiff's] challenge to the validity and 
enforceability of the '602 patent."). Finally, the 
Defendants have not presented other considerations 
that would render it unfair or unjust for the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over them. 
Consequently, the Court's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the Directors satisfies the 
requirements of due process. 
VII. THE ALLEGATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ARE 
ADEQUATE 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss made 
pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), the Court must accept all 
well-­pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as 
true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007)). In addition, the Court must "construe[ ] the 
complaint liberally" and "draw[ ] all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Chambers v. Time 
Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 
Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
The question before the court "is not whether a 
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plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the 
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 
F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235-­36 (1974)). Consequently, 
the complaint should not be dismissed on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of its claims that would entitle it to 
the relief it seeks. Faconti v. Potter,                                  
242 Fed. App'x 775, 777 (2d Cir. 2007). 
The USPTO challenges the sufficiency of 
Plaintiffs' complaint in light of the Supreme Court's 
recent holding in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 
(2009). Iqbal set forth "[t]wo working principles" to 
guide a court's analysis of a complaint's sufficiency. 
Id. at 1949. "First, the tenet that a court must accept 
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 
is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. "Second, only 
a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief 
survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs have pled sufficient 
factual allegations to satisfy the standard set forth in 
Iqbal.  The Complaint alleges the existence of a 
specific, written policy for the patenting of genes and 
the parameters of the policy. Compl. ¶ 50. The policy, 
contained in the Federal Register, Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 
2001), is alleged by the Plaintiffs to be applied to a 
series of specific patents and patent claims. Compl. 
passim. The Plaintiffs describe each application of 
the policy in considerable detail. See, e.g.,                    
Compl. ¶¶ 55-­80. Similar allegations and specificity 
apply to the Plaintiffs' allegations of the USPTO's 
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practices. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 53-­54. 
 The Complaint further alleges that the 
information encoded in the BRCA1/2 genetic 
sequences, rather than being the result of an 
inventive process, exists in nature. See Compl. ¶¶ 34, 
46, 51, 55-­60. The Complaint also alleges that the 
existence of certain mutations in BRCA1/2 and their 
correlation with an increased risk of breast and/or 
ovarian cancer constitutes nothing more than a 
naturally occurring phenomenon. See Compl. ¶¶ 61-­
80. Based on these factual allegations, the Plaintiffs 
assert that the patents-­in-­suit grant Myriad 
ownership rights over products of nature, laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and basic 
human knowledge and thought in violation of the 
First Amendment's protections over freedom of 
thought. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 54. In addition, the Plaintiffs 
assert that Myriad's ownership of correlations 
between certain BRCA1/2 mutations and an 
increased risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer has 
inhibited further research on BRCA1/2 as well as 
genes that interact with BRCA1/2. See, e.g.,              
Compl. ¶¶ 96-­98, 101. As a result, the patents-­in-­suit 
are alleged to violate Article I, section 8, clause 8 of 
the Constitution which directs Congress to "promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ."                
Compl. ¶¶ 52, 54. 
The facts alleged in the Complaint are 
plausible, specific, and form a sufficient basis for 
Plaintiff's legal arguments. Consequently, the 
pleading requirements as set forth in Iqbal are 
satisfied. 
 
306a 
  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' 
motion to dismiss the Complaint is denied. 
Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment will be due December 2, 2009. 
Plaintiffs' reply will be due on December 9, 2009, and 
argument will be heard on December 11, 2009, at ten 
o'clock in the forenoon in Courtroom 18C, unless 
good cause is shown to alter the date of the 
submissions. 
It is so ordered. 
 
New York, N.Y. 
November 1, 2009 
 
        
     Robert W. Sweet 
             U.S.D.J. 
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CLAIMS 
 
&ODLPVDQGRISDWHQW¶ 
 1.  An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID No. 2. 
 2.  The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein said 
DNA has the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID 
No. 1. 
 5.  An isolated DNA having at least 15 
nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1. 
 6.  An isolated DNA having at least 15 
nucleotides of the DNA of claim 2. 
 7.  An isolated DNA selected from the group 
consisting of: 
 (a) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID No. 1 having T at nucleotide position 
4056;; 
 (b) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID No. 1 having an extra C at 
nucleotide position 5385;; 
 (c)  a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID No. 1 having G at nucleotide position 
5443;; and 
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 (d) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set 
forth in SEQ ID No. 1 having 11 base pairs at 
nucleotide position 189-­199 deleted. 
 
&ODLPVDQGRISDWHQW¶ 
 1.  An isolated DNA molecule coding for a 
BRCA2 polypeptide, said DNA molecule comprising a 
nucleic acid sequence encoding the amino acid 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID No. 2.  
 6.  An isolated DNA molecule coding for a 
mutated form of the BRCA2 polypeptide set forth in 
SEQ ID No. 2, wherein said mutated form of the 
BRCA2 polypeptide is associated with a 
susceptibility to cancer. 
 7.  The isolated DNA molecule of claim 6, 
wherein the DNA molecule comprises a mutated 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID No. 1. 
 
ClaLPRISDWHQW¶ 
 1.  An isolated DNA comprising an altered 
BRCA1 DNA having at least one of the alterations 
set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18, or 19 with the proviso 
that the alteration is not a deletion of four 
nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-­
4187 in SEQ. ID No. 1.  
